14 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kersten v. Continental Bankgreen2 sentences2005See Johnson Int’l, Inc., 192 Ariz. at 474, ¶ 49 , 967 P.2d at 615 ; see also Kersten v. Cont’l Bank, 129 Ariz. 44, 47 , 628 P.2d 592 , *512 595 (App.1981) (stating that promissory es-toppel may afford relief if “some element necessary to the creation of an enforceable contract, such as consideration, is not present”). ¶46 Some'authorities hold that a promise made enforceable by promissory estoppel constitutes an implied-in-law contract. 2005See Johnson Int’l, Inc., 192 Ariz. at 474, ¶ 49 , 967 P.2d at 615 ; see also Kersten v. Cont’l Bank, 129 Ariz. 44, 47 , 628 P.2d 592 , *512 595 (App.1981) (stating that promissory es-toppel may afford relief if “some element necessary to the creation of an enforceable contract, such as consideration, is not present”). ¶46 Some'authorities hold that a promise made enforceable by promissory estoppel constitutes an implied-in-law contract. | 2 | 2 |
Waugh v. Lennardgreen2 sentences1976According to the law it is not whose name the property is in that counts but from where the money came from that paid for the property, and as it was your money that paid for the investment, thay [sic] will continue to be your separate property.” The doctrine of promissory estoppel, approved in Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214 , 211 P.2d 806 (1949) is enunciated in Restatement of Contracts, § 90 (1932) as follows : “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such a 1976According to the law it is not whose name the property is in that counts but from where the money came from that paid for the property, and as it was your money that paid for the investment, thay [sic] will continue to be your separate property.” The doctrine of promissory estoppel, approved in Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214 , 211 P.2d 806 (1949) is enunciated in Restatement of Contracts, § 90 (1932) as follows : “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such a | 1 | 4 |
Higginbottom v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Higginbottom v. State, 203 Ariz. 139 , 144 ¶ 18 (App. 2002). 2005See Weiner v. Romley, 94 Ariz. 40, 43 , 381 P.2d 581, 584 (1963); Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 223-24 , 211 P.2d 806, 812 (1949); Higginbottom v. State, 203 Ariz. 139, 144, ¶ 18 , 51 P.3d 972, 977 (App.2002). | 1 | 2 |
Weiner v. Romleygreen2 sentences2005See Weiner v. Romley, 94 Ariz. 40, 43 , 381 P.2d 581, 584 (1963); Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 223-24 , 211 P.2d 806, 812 (1949); Higginbottom v. State, 203 Ariz. 139, 144, ¶ 18 , 51 P.3d 972, 977 (App.2002). 2005See Weiner v. Romley, 94 Ariz. 40, 43 , 381 P.2d 581, 584 (1963); Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 223-24 , 211 P.2d 806, 812 (1949); Higginbottom v. State, 203 Ariz. 139, 144, ¶ 18 , 51 P.3d 972, 977 (App.2002). | 1 | 2 |
Orme School v. Reevesgreen1 sentence2021See Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 309 . ¶25 Donald argues that the lack of damages does not preclude summary judgment because he need only prove a detriment to state a promissory estoppel claim. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Priscilla Finaugreen1 sentence2021But "[t]here can be no implied contract where there is an express contract between the parties in reference to the same subject matter." Chanay v. Chittenden, 115 Ariz. 32, 35 (1977); see also Bowman v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 438 F. App'x 613 , 615 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Arizona law prohibits an action based on the promissory estoppel theory 3 The court noted that the affidavit on which Patisserie relied conflicted with the affiant's prior deposition testimony and that the asserted promise was insufficiently definite to support a promissory estoppel claim. 11 TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al. | 1 | 1 |
Chanay v. Chittendengreen1 sentence2021But "[t]here can be no implied contract where there is an express contract between the parties in reference to the same subject matter." Chanay v. Chittenden, 115 Ariz. 32, 35 (1977); see also Bowman v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 438 F. App'x 613 , 615 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Arizona law prohibits an action based on the promissory estoppel theory 3 The court noted that the affidavit on which Patisserie relied conflicted with the affiant's prior deposition testimony and that the asserted promise was insufficiently definite to support a promissory estoppel claim. 11 TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al. | 1 | 1 |
Jangula v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fundgreen2 sentences2005See Jangula, 207 Ariz. at 470, ¶ 12, 88 P.3d at 184 . ¶ 44 Section 12-341.01(A) applies to actions that arise out of “express or implied” contracts. 2005See Jangula, 207 Ariz. at 470, ¶ 12, 88 P.3d at 184 . ¶ 44 Section 12-341.01(A) applies to actions that arise out of “express or implied” contracts. | 1 | 1 |
Chewning v. Palmergreen2 sentences2005A subcontractor’s refusal to honor its bid can be financially disastrous for the general contractor, because it will typically be bound by the bid price submitted to the owner. ¶ 13 Arizona has previously adopted Section 90(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), see Chewning v. Palmer, 133 Ariz. 136, 138 , 650 P.2d 438, 440 (1982), which describes those promises that will be binding under the promissory estoppel doctrine: A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such ac 2005A subcontractor’s refusal to honor its bid can be financially disastrous for the general contractor, because it will typically be bound by the bid price submitted to the owner. ¶ 13 Arizona has previously adopted Section 90(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), see Chewning v. Palmer, 133 Ariz. 136, 138 , 650 P.2d 438, 440 (1982), which describes those promises that will be binding under the promissory estoppel doctrine: A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such ac | 1 | 1 |
Johnson International, Inc. v. City of Phoenixgreen2 sentences2005See Johnson Int’l, Inc., 192 Ariz. at 474, ¶ 49 , 967 P.2d at 615 ; see also Kersten v. Cont’l Bank, 129 Ariz. 44, 47 , 628 P.2d 592 , *512 595 (App.1981) (stating that promissory es-toppel may afford relief if “some element necessary to the creation of an enforceable contract, such as consideration, is not present”). ¶46 Some'authorities hold that a promise made enforceable by promissory estoppel constitutes an implied-in-law contract. 2005See Johnson Int’l, Inc., 192 Ariz. at 474, ¶ 49 , 967 P.2d at 615 ; see also Kersten v. Cont’l Bank, 129 Ariz. 44, 47 , 628 P.2d 592 , *512 595 (App.1981) (stating that promissory es-toppel may afford relief if “some element necessary to the creation of an enforceable contract, such as consideration, is not present”). ¶46 Some'authorities hold that a promise made enforceable by promissory estoppel constitutes an implied-in-law contract. | 1 | 1 |
EA Coronis Assocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co.green2 sentences2005Co., 90 N.J.Super. 69 , 216 A.2d 246, 251 (Ct.App.Div.1966). ¶ 17 Arizona has long recognized and applied the promissory estoppel doctrine. 2005Co., 90 N.J.Super. 69 , 216 A.2d 246, 251 (Ct.App.Div.1966). ¶ 17 Arizona has long recognized and applied the promissory estoppel doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Barron G. Collier, Inc. v. Paddockgreen2 sentences1998See Barron Collier, 37 Ariz. at 194 , 291 P. at 1000 ; Pointe Resorts, 158 Ariz. at 137 , 761 P.2d at 1041 . 1998See Barron Collier, 37 Ariz. at 194 , 291 P. at 1000 ; Pointe Resorts, 158 Ariz. at 137 , 761 P.2d at 1041 . | 1 | 1 |
Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc.green2 sentences1981See Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 Wash.2d 126 , 443 P.2d 544 (1968). 1981See Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 Wash.2d 126 , 443 P.2d 544 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Home Elec. Co. of Lenoir, Inc. v. HALL & UNDERDOWN HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING CO.
green
1 sentence2020Co. of Lenoir, Inc., 358 S.E.2d at 541 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Best v. Edwards
green
1 sentence2020On appeal, Designee abandons its claim that Arizona law governs this issue, see Best v. Edwards, 217 Ariz. 497 , 504 n.7, ¶ 28 (App. 2008) (issues not raised in opening brief are waived), and argues for the first time that North Carolina law permits an affirmative cause of action predicated on the theory of promissory estoppel. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
green
1 sentence2015The purpose of the covenant is "to ensure the parties' reasonable expectations are fulfilled." Id. 4 Defendants argue only that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was precluded by the reorganization. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Tiffany Incorporated v. WMK Transit Mix, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Finally, Subcontractor’s reason for refusing to perform the obligation was that it could not adequately staff the job, which further confirms that its bid involved the sale of services. ¶37 Subcontractor further contends that the statute of frauds prevents appHcation of the promissory estoppel doctrine, citing Tiffany, 16 Ariz.App. 415 , 493 P.2d 1220 . 2005Finally, Subcontractor’s reason for refusing to perform the obligation was that it could not adequately staff the job, which further confirms that its bid involved the sale of services. ¶37 Subcontractor further contends that the statute of frauds prevents appHcation of the promissory estoppel doctrine, citing Tiffany, 16 Ariz.App. 415 , 493 P.2d 1220 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
King v. Riveland
green
2 sentences2003In support of this proposition, Defendants rely on principles expressed in King v. Riveland, 125 Wash.2d 500 , 886 P.2d 160 (1994). 7 However, in King , the program agreement at issue expressly prohibited the state from releasing the relevant information. 2003In support of this proposition, Defendants rely on principles expressed in King v. Riveland, 125 Wash.2d 500 , 886 P.2d 160 (1994). 7 However, in King , the program agreement at issue expressly prohibited the state from releasing the relevant information. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pointe Resorts, Inc. v. Culbertson
green
2 sentences1998See Barron Collier, 37 Ariz. at 194 , 291 P. at 1000 ; Pointe Resorts, 158 Ariz. at 137 , 761 P.2d at 1041 . 1998See Barron Collier, 37 Ariz. at 194 , 291 P. at 1000 ; Pointe Resorts, 158 Ariz. at 137 , 761 P.2d at 1041 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Kiely v. St. Germain
green
1 sentence1992Germain, 670 P.2d 764 (Colo.1983), cited correctly by appellant for the proposition that a balancing test should be applied to the question of a promissory estoppel claim and the Statute of Frauds defense, is inapposite. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.