25 Alabama opinions name it 4 courts 1876–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barran v. Rodengreen2 sentences1979"In Barran v. Roden, 263 Ala. 305, 307 , 82 So.2d 398, 399 (1955), this Court set out a limitation on the rule that, after an appeal is taken, the trial court cannot rule on any matter involving the appeal: `. . . 1979"In Barran v. Roden, 263 Ala. 305, 307 , 82 So.2d 398, 399 (1955), this Court set out a limitation on the rule that, after an appeal is taken, the trial court cannot rule on any matter involving the appeal: `. . . | 2 | 4 |
Osborn v. Rileygreen2 sentences1993The rule is stated to be that after an appeal is taken, the lower court “may proceed in matters which are entirely collateral to that part of the case which is taken up (by the appeal) but it can do nothing in respect to any matter or question which is involved in the appeal, and which may be adjudged by the appellate court.’ This is a limitation on the rule that after an appeal is taken the trial court cannot, pending that appeal, pass upon any matter involved on the appeal.... “ ‘As to those matters which are entirely collateral to the questions involved on appeal, the court and parties are 1993The rule is stated to be that after an appeal is taken, the lower court “may proceed in matters which are entirely collateral to that part of the case which is taken up (by the appeal) but it can do nothing in respect to any matter or question which is involved in the appeal, and which may be adjudged by the appellate court.’ This is a limitation on the rule that after an appeal is taken the trial court cannot, pending that appeal, pass upon any matter involved on the appeal.... “ ‘As to those matters which are entirely collateral to the questions involved on appeal, the court and parties are | 2 | 2 |
Marone v. Nassau Countygreen1 sentence2015“In fact, as far back as the Nineteenth Century, the Court of Appeals held, the writ of mandamus may, in a proper case, and in the absence of an adequate remedy by action, issue ... on the relation of one, who, in common with all other citizens, is interested in having some act done, of a general public nature, devolving as a duty upon a public officer or body, who refuse to perform it.” Marone v. Nassau Cnty., 967 N.Y.S.2d 583 , 589, 39 Misc.3d 1034, 1040-41 (Sup.Ct.2013) (expressing a limitation of the doctrine to “matters of great public interest ”) (internal quotation marks and citations o | 1 | 1 |
Westrate v. Schippergreen2 sentences2003See , e.g. , Westrate v. Schipper , 284 Mich. 383 , 386 , 279 N.W. 870 , 871 (1938) ("[T]he general rule of the common law . . . holds that an infant is not liable for necessaries, if he is living with his father who is ready and willing to pay for necessaries."). 2003See , e.g. , Westrate v. Schipper , 284 Mich. 383 , 386 , 279 N.W. 870 , 871 (1938) ("[T]he general rule of the common law . . . holds that an infant is not liable for necessaries, if he is living with his father who is ready and willing to pay for necessaries."). | 1 | 1 |
Tillman v. De Lacygreen1 sentence1917Rep. 56 , and in Tillman v. De Lacy, 80 Ala. 103, 105, 106 ; and it is the primary ground of the decision in Ross v. Perry, supra. In definition of this limitation it is said in Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344, 350 , 351: “It is conceded that there must necessarily be a limitation to this doctrine, which will exclude from its influence cases where the subject or mode of annexation is such that the attributes of personal property cannot be predicated of the thing in controversy. - Thtis a house or other building, which from its size or the materials of which it was constructed, or the manner in whic | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Francis v. Scott
green
2 sentences1979Appeal and Error § 212e, p. 401.' "Accord: Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 590 , 72 So.2d 93 (1954); Ex Parte Taylor, 251 Ala. 387 , 37 So.2d 656 (1948); Ex Parte City Council of Montgomery, 114 Ala. 115 , 14 So. 365 (1896)." Osborn v. Riley, 331 So.2d 268, 271 (Ala.1976). 1979Appeal and Error § 212e, p. 401.' "Accord: Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 590 , 72 So.2d 93 (1954); Ex Parte Taylor, 251 Ala. 387 , 37 So.2d 656 (1948); Ex Parte City Council of Montgomery, 114 Ala. 115 , 14 So. 365 (1896)." Osborn v. Riley, 331 So.2d 268, 271 (Ala.1976). | 4 | 1955–1979 |
Ex parte City Council
green
2 sentences1979Appeal and Error § 212e, p. 401.' "Accord: Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 590 , 72 So.2d 93 (1954); Ex Parte Taylor, 251 Ala. 387 , 37 So.2d 656 (1948); Ex Parte City Council of Montgomery, 114 Ala. 115 , 14 So. 365 (1896)." Osborn v. Riley, 331 So.2d 268, 271 (Ala.1976). 1976"As to those matters which are entirely collateral to the questions involved on appeal, the court and parties are free to proceed notwithstanding the appeal if taken, or without affecting the right to appeal if not then taken. 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 212e, p. 401." Accord: Francis v. Scott , 260 Ala. 590 , 72 So.2d 93 (1954); Ex parte Taylor , 251 Ala. 387 , 37 So.2d 656 (1948); Ex parte City Council of Montgomery , 114 Ala. 115 , 14 So. 365 (1896). | 2 | 1976–1979 |
Taylor v. Bailes
green
2 sentences1979Appeal and Error § 212e, p. 401.' "Accord: Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 590 , 72 So.2d 93 (1954); Ex Parte Taylor, 251 Ala. 387 , 37 So.2d 656 (1948); Ex Parte City Council of Montgomery, 114 Ala. 115 , 14 So. 365 (1896)." Osborn v. Riley, 331 So.2d 268, 271 (Ala.1976). 1979Appeal and Error § 212e, p. 401.' "Accord: Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 590 , 72 So.2d 93 (1954); Ex Parte Taylor, 251 Ala. 387 , 37 So.2d 656 (1948); Ex Parte City Council of Montgomery, 114 Ala. 115 , 14 So. 365 (1896)." Osborn v. Riley, 331 So.2d 268, 271 (Ala.1976). | 2 | 1976–1979 |
Gibson v. Edwards
neutral
2 sentences1964Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 590 , 72 So.2d 93 ; Gibson v. Edwards, 245 Ala. 334 , 16 So.2d 865 , and cases cited in them. 1964Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 590 , 72 So.2d 93 ; Gibson v. Edwards, 245 Ala. 334 , 16 So.2d 865 , and cases cited in them. | 2 | 1955–1964 |
Odom v. State
green
2 sentences1957Eldridge v. State, supra; Brothers v. State, supra; Odom v. State, 174 Ala. 4, 10 , 56 So. 913 . 1954Eldridge v. State, supra; Brothers v. State, supra; Odom v. State, 174 Ala. 4, 10 , 56 So. 913 . | 2 | 1954–1957 |
National Insurance Association v. Sockwell
green
1 sentence2006Worker's Compensation Law. . . ." 829 So.2d at 116 . 4 The trial court did recognize in its order (outside of the question certified) that the workers' compensation limitation "excludes coverage for any injuries suffered by [Pinkston] which are also covered by worker's compensation" but apparently did not appreciate the gravity of the fact that the limitation may be narrower than Continental contends. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Roland Pugh Min. Co. v. Smith
green
1 sentence1983Whenever an action has been commenced in a proper county, additional claims and parties may be joined, pursuant to Rules 13, 14, 22 and 24, as ancillary thereto, without regard to whether that county would be a proper venue for an independent action on such claims or against such parties." The limitation on this rule, that a foreign corporation may never be sued in a county where it does not do business, regardless of other defendants, Roland Pugh Mining Co. v. Smith , 388 So.2d 977 (Ala. 1980), is not applicable here, because Jim Skinner Ford is not shown to be a foreign corporation. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Young v. State
green
1 sentence1981Young , supra. Additionally, we find that appellant waived any objection to the lack of a proper predicate indicating the victim's consciousness of impending death not only by failing to object to the admission of the first statement, but also stating in the limitation hearing that he had no objection to the introduction of such testimony. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Mobile Light & R. R. v. Baker
neutral
2 sentences1951Co. v. Baker, 158 Ala. 491 , 48 So. 119 ; Tennessee River Transp. 1951Co. v. Baker, 158 Ala. 491 , 48 So. 119 ; Tennessee River Transp. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Shanan v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences1950This Court observed that there is “an exception or a limitation to the rule above announced, and that is, it does not apply to city or village lots, property for which artificial drainage has been obtained, or which, from necessity, must be so drained.” In Shanan v. Brown, 179 Ala. 425 , 60 So. 891 , 43 L.R.A., N.S., 792, the distinction between town and rural property was asserted without the limitation expressed in the Lewis case, supra. In the case of Ex parte Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. 1950This Court observed that there is “an exception or a limitation to the rule above announced, and that is, it does not apply to city or village lots, property for which artificial drainage has been obtained, or which, from necessity, must be so drained.” In Shanan v. Brown, 179 Ala. 425 , 60 So. 891 , 43 L.R.A., N.S., 792, the distinction between town and rural property was asserted without the limitation expressed in the Lewis case, supra. In the case of Ex parte Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Cotton v. Cotton
neutral
1 sentence1948But, as found stated in Cotton v. Cotton, supra [ 236 Ala. 459 , 183 So. 443 ], there is a limitation even to this principle to the effect there must be “no adverse holding of the possession for a period that is beyond the statute of limitations.” The argument of counsel is to the effect there should be here shown an adverse possession of ten years. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Jones v. Dimmick
green
1 sentence1947Blake v. State, 178 Ala. 407 , 59 So. 623 ; Luke v. Calhoun County, 56 Ala. 415 . | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Blake v. State ex rel. Going
green
1 sentence1947Blake v. State, 178 Ala. 407 , 59 So. 623 ; Luke v. Calhoun County, 56 Ala. 415 . | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Luke v. Calhoun County
green
1 sentence1947Blake v. State, 178 Ala. 407 , 59 So. 623 ; Luke v. Calhoun County, 56 Ala. 415 . | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Graustein & Co. v. Employees' Liability Assurance Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1937While not altogether in point, but as furnishing some analogy, see Graustein & Co. v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, of London, 214 Mass. 421 , 101 N.E. 1073 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Holliday v. Boston Elevated Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1937While not altogether in point, but as furnishing some analogy, see Graustein & Co. v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, of London, 214 Mass. 421 , 101 N.E. 1073 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Farmers & Merchants Bank of Monroe v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
green
2 sentences1932Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649 , 43 S. Ct. 651 , 67 L. 1932Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649 , 43 S. Ct. 651 , 67 L. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Moore & Handley Hardware Co. v. Curry
neutral
1 sentence1926Rep. 50 ), after stating the limitation on the principle of estoppel by judgment, this court said: "But this principle does not, in any wise, conflict with that other, that where a judgment is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in the regular course of judicial proceeding, without fraud or collusion, it is conclusive evidence of the amount and existence of a debt at the time of its rendition, and that, in a proceeding by the plaintiff against the defendant and his grantee, to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance, such judgment, whether rendered prior or subsequent to the conve | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Ford v. . Cobb
green
2 sentences1917Rep. 56 , and in Tillman v. De Lacy, 80 Ala. 103, 105, 106 ; and it is the primary ground of the decision in Ross v. Perry, supra. In definition of this limitation it is said in Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344, 350 , 351: “It is conceded that there must necessarily be a limitation to this doctrine, which will exclude from its influence cases where the subject or mode of annexation is such that the attributes of personal property cannot be predicated of the thing in controversy. - Thtis a house or other building, which from its size or the materials of which it was constructed, or the manner in whic 1917So of the separate materials of a building, and things fixed into the wall, so as to be essential to its support; it is impossible that they should by any agreement between the -owners become chattels.” Upon the reason and authority of Ford v. Cobb, supra, it was said in Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377, 380 , 13 Am. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Tifft v. . Horton
green
1 sentence1917So of the separate materials of a building, and things fixed into the wall, so as to be essential to its support; it is impossible that they should by any agreement between the -owners become chattels.” Upon the reason and authority of Ford v. Cobb, supra, it was said in Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377, 380 , 13 Am. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Kennedy's Heirs v. Kennedy's Heirs
green
1 sentence1915A limitation on the rule by Mr. Daniels is declared in Kennedy’s Heirs v. Kennedy’s Heirs, 2 Ala. 571 , where it is stated that “defendants who have different interests in the subject-matter, if the relief granted Avill affect them all,” may be joined. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crocker
neutral
1 sentence1914Other rulings made since the one above mentioned plainly show that the limitation of the rule allowing the recovery of damages for mental suffering which was stated in the opinion in the case relied upon is hot applicable to such a case as the one at bar. — Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crocker, 135 Ala. 492 , 33 South. 45 , 59 L. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Wayman v. Southard
green
1 sentence1883Marshall, “is generally, intended to restrain the enacting clause, and to except something which would otherwise have been within it, or, in some manner, to modify the enacting clause.” It is here a limitation or exception to a grant made, — to authority conferred. — Rawls v. Kennedy, 23 Ala. 240 ; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 . | 1 | 1883–1883 |
Rawls v. Doe ex dem. Kennedy
neutral
1 sentence1883Marshall, “is generally, intended to restrain the enacting clause, and to except something which would otherwise have been within it, or, in some manner, to modify the enacting clause.” It is here a limitation or exception to a grant made, — to authority conferred. — Rawls v. Kennedy, 23 Ala. 240 ; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 . | 1 | 1883–1883 |
Micou v. Ashurst
green
1 sentence1881The limitation of the rule, as was stated in Micou v. Ashurst, 55 Ala. 607 , is, that the alternative prayer must not be founded on inconsistent titles, and the relief must be of the same kind and nature. | 1 | 1881–1881 |
| Tarleton v. Goldthwaite's Heirs neutral | 1 | 1876–1876 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.