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21 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1838–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Parentgreen2 sentences2015See Commonwealth v. Parent, supra at 401-402 (exclusion of prior inconsistent statement required reversal of one of three charges because that charge was based solely on victim's testimony).6 The Commonwealth also contends that in both instances, the judge's limitation on defense counsel's ability to confront Cruz with her inconsistent statement was not reversible error because the statement was cumulative of other impeachment evidence presented at trial, and defense counsel adequately undermined Cruz's credibility on cross-examination. 2015See Commonwealth v. Parent, supra at 401-402 (exclusion of prior inconsistent statement required reversal of one of three charges because that charge was based solely on victim’s testimony). 6 The Commonwealth also contends that in both instances, the judge’s limitation on defense counsel’s ability to confront Cruz with her inconsistent statement was not reversible error because the statement was cumulative of other impeachment evidence presented at trial, and defense counsel adequately undermined Cruz’s credibility on cross-examination. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2015See Commonwealth v. Jones, 471 Mass. 138, 143 (2015). | 1 | 1 |
Roviaro v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013Where the disclosure of an informant’s identity... is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to the fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.” Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957). “[N]o fixed rule” determines when disclosure is required. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ricegreen1 sentence2011Because the defendant did not object to the limiting instruction, we determine whether this limitation was error that resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 24 Where evidence is offered for its truth to prove that a third party is the true culprit, “we have permitted hearsay evidence that does not fall within a hearsay exception only if, in the judge’s discretion, ‘the evidence is otherwise relevant, will not tend to prejudice or confuse the jury, and there are other “substantial connecting links” to the crime.’ ” Silva-Santiago, supra at 801 , quoting Commonwealth v | 1 | 1 |
Protective Life Insurance v. Sullivangreen1 sentence2004Finally, Nancy asserts that “the Sullivan case [Protective Life Insurance Company v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 615, 635 (1997)] recognizes the potential that defendants will be precluded from asserting the limitation bar due to principles of equitable tolling (or, alternatively stated, equitable estoppel).” She identifies no facts from which any estoppel might arise, and the record provides none. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kozecgreen1 sentence1996Assuming for argument the above-cited statements were erroneous, the consequences of any such error depend on a number of factors, such as; seasonable objection by counsel; 9 the limitation of the error to collateral issues; mitigation by the judge of the prosecutor’s mistake; and, a determination, under the circumstances, of whether the error “possibly [made] a difference in the jury’s conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 518 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Whitney v. City of Worcestergreen1 sentence1992This court’s principal analysis of the reason for a discretionary function exception to governmental liability appears in Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 216-220 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Biniendagreen1 sentence1989Before a witness’s prior consistent statement can be admitted in evidence, it must *35 also appear that the statement was made before the witness possessed a possible motive to fabricate or before the inducements or bias which might have influenced the witness developed. 5 Commonwealth v. Binienda, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 756, 759 (1985), and cases cited. | 1 | 1 |
Wheeler v. Hagergreen1 sentence1975See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 *293 Mass. 534, 543-547 (1974); Commonwealth v. Dominico, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 693, 712-716 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dominicogreen1 sentence1975See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 *293 Mass. 534, 543-547 (1974); Commonwealth v. Dominico, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 693, 712-716 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Dexter v. Inchesgreen1 sentence1962The limitation in clause 5 of article Third of the testator’s will provides for a distribution of the corpus “to and among all the issue of my said five children share and share alike, in fee simple.” Limitations similarly phrased have been construed, in accordance with the general rule of construction, to mean a distribution per stirpes to the class of ‘ ‘issue.’ ’ Dexter v. Inches, 147 Mass. 324, 326 (“equally to and among the issue of said . . . [named ancestor]”). | 1 | 1 |
Cammann v. Abbegreen1 sentence1962Cammann v. Abbe, 258 Mass. 427, 430 (“to issue then living in equal shares”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hanagreen1 sentence1938Commonwealth v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 265, 266 . | 1 | 1 |
Indian Head National Bank v. Clarkgreen1 sentence1933See Indian Head National Bank v. Clark, 166 Mass. 27 , for a discussion of the limitation of this rule, where the agent was defrauding his own principal and had an adverse interest to it, or where the officer of the corporation was not the sole representative in the transaction or where he did not act in his capacity as agent of the corporation. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago
green
1 sentence2011Because the defendant did not object to the limiting instruction, we determine whether this limitation was error that resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 24 Where evidence is offered for its truth to prove that a third party is the true culprit, “we have permitted hearsay evidence that does not fall within a hearsay exception only if, in the judge’s discretion, ‘the evidence is otherwise relevant, will not tend to prejudice or confuse the jury, and there are other “substantial connecting links” to the crime.’ ” Silva-Santiago, supra at 801 , quoting Commonwealth v | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Canal Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 370 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
cluster 19566
green
1 sentence2001A significant limitation on the doctrine is that it applies only to “ministers” and not to persons who perform tasks not traditionally ecclesiastical or religious. 16 See Starkman, 198 F.3d at 175 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bilafsky v. Abraham
green
1 sentence1938An entirely different fact starts the running of the statute, cf. Bilafsky v. Abrahams, 183 Mass. 401 ; Kinder v. Scharff, 231 U. S. 517 , and there is no limit to its sweep- in point of subject matter. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Kinder v. Scharff
neutral
1 sentence1938An entirely different fact starts the running of the statute, cf. Bilafsky v. Abrahams, 183 Mass. 401 ; Kinder v. Scharff, 231 U. S. 517 , and there is no limit to its sweep- in point of subject matter. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Johnson v. Wilkinson
neutral
1 sentence1931It was said in Johnson v. Wilkinson, 139 Mass. 3 : “A license is a permission or authority to enter the land and do certain acts, or series of acts, the parties not intending to convey any interest in the land.” The instructions on this point were in substance the same as those requested. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Brown v. Town of Winthrop
green
1 sentence1931In so far as that might imply any limitation I remove the limitation and rule that the relationship here was not that of landlord and tenant between Mr. Rose and the Boston Publishing Company, but the exact character of the relationship is to be determined upon the nature of the contract entered into between them.” It was pointed out in Marston v. Boston Publishing Co. 271 Mass. 307 , at page 310, that “The plaintiff was not a party to the contract between the defendant [The company] and Rose and this was material to the case only in so far as it bore on the question whether the defendant [The | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Marston v. Boston Publishing Co.
neutral
1 sentence1931In so far as that might imply any limitation I remove the limitation and rule that the relationship here was not that of landlord and tenant between Mr. Rose and the Boston Publishing Company, but the exact character of the relationship is to be determined upon the nature of the contract entered into between them.” It was pointed out in Marston v. Boston Publishing Co. 271 Mass. 307 , at page 310, that “The plaintiff was not a party to the contract between the defendant [The company] and Rose and this was material to the case only in so far as it bore on the question whether the defendant [The | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Brooks v. Fitchburg & Leominster Street Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1928The principle of statutory interpretation applied in Brooks v. Fitchburg & Leominster Street Railway, 200 Mass. 8 , is not governing in the facts here disclosed, and is not violated by the conclusion here reached. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Stuart v. City of Cambridge
green
1 sentence1926The case at bar also is distinguishable from Cavanagh v. Tyson, Weare & Marshall Co. 227 Mass. 437 , where the mistake was not recognized as existent by both parties and touched a matter collateral to the main undertaking, and from cases like Stuart v. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102 , Winston v. Pittsfield, 221 Mass. 356 , and Young v. Holyoke, 225 Mass. 140 , where one has made a hard contract or a contract founded on his own mistake, not shared by the other party, and must be held to the performance of his obligation. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Rollins v. Marsh
green
1 sentence1926The case at bar does not come within the limitation of that principle exemplified by cases like Monroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298 , and Rollins v. Marsh, 128 Mass. 116 , to the effect that when a plaintiff, having entered into a contract to do certain work, refuses to proceed with it, and the defendant, in order to secure the actual performance of the work instead of a right to collect damages from the plaintiff, promises to pay him an additional sum, action lies to recover such additional sum upon the doctrine that there is a new consideration for such promise. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Winston v. City of Pittsfield
green
1 sentence1926The case at bar also is distinguishable from Cavanagh v. Tyson, Weare & Marshall Co. 227 Mass. 437 , where the mistake was not recognized as existent by both parties and touched a matter collateral to the main undertaking, and from cases like Stuart v. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102 , Winston v. Pittsfield, 221 Mass. 356 , and Young v. Holyoke, 225 Mass. 140 , where one has made a hard contract or a contract founded on his own mistake, not shared by the other party, and must be held to the performance of his obligation. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Young v. City of Holyoke
neutral
1 sentence1926The case at bar also is distinguishable from Cavanagh v. Tyson, Weare & Marshall Co. 227 Mass. 437 , where the mistake was not recognized as existent by both parties and touched a matter collateral to the main undertaking, and from cases like Stuart v. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102 , Winston v. Pittsfield, 221 Mass. 356 , and Young v. Holyoke, 225 Mass. 140 , where one has made a hard contract or a contract founded on his own mistake, not shared by the other party, and must be held to the performance of his obligation. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Cavanagh v. Tyson, Weare & Marshall Co.
green
1 sentence1926The case at bar also is distinguishable from Cavanagh v. Tyson, Weare & Marshall Co. 227 Mass. 437 , where the mistake was not recognized as existent by both parties and touched a matter collateral to the main undertaking, and from cases like Stuart v. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102 , Winston v. Pittsfield, 221 Mass. 356 , and Young v. Holyoke, 225 Mass. 140 , where one has made a hard contract or a contract founded on his own mistake, not shared by the other party, and must be held to the performance of his obligation. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Flynn v. Bourneuf
green
1 sentence1907Flynn v. Bourneuf, 143 Mass. 277 . | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Simanovich v. Wood
neutral
1 sentence1907The defendant relies upon the limitation of this rule expressed by Chief Justice Morton in Simanovich v. Wood, 145 Mass. 180 , in these words: “ While for some purposes it is competent to show what the real consideration of a deed is, a party cannot, under the guise of showing what the consideration is, prove an oral agreement, either antecedent to or contemporaneous with the deed, which will cut down or vary the stipulations of his written covenant.” It was expressly decided in that case, and it had been decided before, that a grantor in a deed cannot defend an action for a breach of his cove | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Foye v. Patch green | 1 | 1895–1895 |
| Marshall v. Fisk green | 1 | 1838–1838 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.