limitation clause in Ohio

1994No damages awarded may exceed the prayer that is in effect on the sixth day prior to trial. * * * “ * * * A major purpose of the limitation in the rule is to put the defendant on notice prior to trial as to his potential liability. * * * “Plaintiffs in this state are thus forced to determine the approximate amount of their total damages prior to trial.” Id. at 28-29 , 20 OBR at 214-215, 485 N.E.2d at 705-706 .

1994No damages awarded may exceed the prayer that is in effect on the sixth day prior to trial. * * * “ * * * A major purpose of the limitation in the rule is to put the defendant on notice prior to trial as to his potential liability. * * * “Plaintiffs in this state are thus forced to determine the approximate amount of their total damages prior to trial.” Id. at 28-29 , 20 OBR at 214-215, 485 N.E.2d at 705-706 .

2019The only limitation on this rule is that “[i]f the action has been set for pretrial or trial, a motion for summary judgment may be made only with leave of court.” Id.

2014“However, where a statute is found to be subject to various interpretations, a court called upon to interpret its provisions may invoke rules of statutory construction.” Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 96 , 573 N.E.2d 77 (1991). {¶ 25} Here, appellee, through its position, advances the interpretation that the phrase “injury or occupational disease which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment” limits the type of claim and proceedings for which there is protection, and that the limitation is separate and in addition to the limitation that the claim or

2014“However, where a statute is found to be subject to various interpretations, a court called upon to interpret its provisions may invoke rules of statutory construction.” Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 96 , 573 N.E.2d 77 (1991). {¶ 25} Here, appellee, through its position, advances the interpretation that the phrase “injury or occupational disease which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment” limits the type of claim and proceedings for which there is protection, and that the limitation is separate and in addition to the limitation that the claim or

2014Cuyahoga No. 97934, 2012-Ohio-4937, ¶ 15 , citing State v. Theuring, 46 Ohio App.3d 152, 155 , 546 N.E.2d 436 (1st Dist.1988). {¶37} Assuming, without deciding, that defense counsel laid the proper foundation for the admission of extrinsic evidence under Evid.R. 613(B), we find that any alleged error in the trial court’s limitation of defense counsel’s cross-examination of Det.

2014Cuyahoga No. 97934, 2012-Ohio-4937, ¶ 15 , citing State v. Theuring, 46 Ohio App.3d 152, 155 , 546 N.E.2d 436 (1st Dist.1988). {¶37} Assuming, without deciding, that defense counsel laid the proper foundation for the admission of extrinsic evidence under Evid.R. 613(B), we find that any alleged error in the trial court’s limitation of defense counsel’s cross-examination of Det.

2014Cuyahoga No. 97934, 2012-Ohio-4937, ¶ 15 , citing State v. Theuring, 46 Ohio App.3d 152, 155 , 546 N.E.2d 436 (1st Dist.1988). {¶37} Assuming, without deciding, that defense counsel laid the proper foundation for the admission of extrinsic evidence under Evid.R. 613(B), we find that any alleged error in the trial court’s limitation of defense counsel’s cross-examination of Det.

1990The limitation clause could have easily statedjust as United now suggests by the simple inclusion of the words "against the company" following the word "action." Or as in the policy discussed in Colvin, supra, the phrase "unless same in filed," referringback to the phrase "suit or arbitration demand against the company," might have clarified the meaning of the word "action." However, the limitation clause here does neither.

1990As a result, we believe the phrase "* * * unless action is filed * * *" is "* * *" reasonably susceptibleof more than one interpretation, * * *" within the test set forth above from Lane, supra, so as to reasonably include an "action" against the tortfeasor.

1986Co. (1981), 67 Ohio St. 2d 427 [ 21 O.O.3d 267 ], we recognized that an insurance company may waive a limitation clause where its actions or declarations hold out a hope of adjustment which occasions delay by the insured in filing a claim.

1986Co. (1981), 67 Ohio St. 2d 427 [ 21 O.O.3d 267 ], we recognized that an insurance company may waive a limitation clause where its actions or declarations hold out a hope of adjustment which occasions delay by the insured in filing a claim.

1982App. 3d 259 , 290 N.E. 2d 371 , the court ruled against a similar limitation clause, reasoning that enforcement of the clause would violate the public policy embodied within the uninsured motorist statute, of providing compensation to policyholders who suffer losses at the hands of uninsured motorists.

1973(Fla. App. 1967), 201 So. 2d 904 , there were two cars insured under one policy with a limitation clause similar t© that in the case at bar.

1973We hold that ITO was not one of those intended to be protected by the limitation of liability clause in the bill of lading. 1 Contrary to the assertion of ITO and the view of the district court below, we hold that our decision in Bernard Screen Printing Corp. v. Meyer Line, 464 F.2d 934 (2 Cir. 1972), does not require a different result.

1970This point was discussed in the leading case of McTighe v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 216 F. 2d 26 , in which the court stated as follows at page 27: “The publication of the classified directory, however, is wholly a matter of private contract and contracts relating thereto are not required to be filed with the Public Service Commission which has no jurisdiction except over matters relating to the public utility services rendered by the company and the rates relative thereto.” From the foregoing the court concludes that the running of advertisements in the classified or yellow page

1968In tfie ordinary case, tfie rule is stated in tfie first paragraph of tfie syllabus in Director of Highways v. Olrich, 5 Ohio St. 2d 70 , which reads: “Where a public authority having tfie power of eminent domain takes possession of property prior to tfie trial of tfie action to assess compensation, such compensation shall be awarded on tfie basis of the value of tfie property as of tfie date upon which possession is taken.” A limitation to this rule has been recognized and is announced in tfie first paragraph of tfie syllabus in Nichols v. Cleveland, 104 Ohio St. 19 , which reads: “Where one

1947The case of Koenig v. State, 121 Ohio St., 147 , 167 N. E., 385 , is inapplicable here and is in no wise a limitation of the doctrine announced in the Lopa case.

1947The case of Koenig v. State, 121 Ohio St., 147 , 167 N. E., 385 , is inapplicable here and is in no wise a limitation of the doctrine announced in the Lopa case.

1845This court has repeatedly, in effect, acted upon the rule, -and there may be found, in the reports of its'decisions, cases under it, like the cases which have, been cited from the reports of the English courts^ In 4 Dall. 14 ,“ The intention of the legislature, when discovered, must prevail, .any. rule.of construction declaredly previous acts to the contrary notwithstanding.” In’ 2 Cranch, 33 , “ A law is the best expositor of itself — that every part of an act is to be taken into, view for the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature,” See'. &c.

1845This court has repeatedly, in effect, acted upon the rule, -and there may be found, in the reports of its'decisions, cases under it, like the cases which have, been cited from the reports of the English courts^ In 4 Dall. 14 ,“ The intention of the legislature, when discovered, must prevail, .any. rule.of construction declaredly previous acts to the contrary notwithstanding.” In’ 2 Cranch, 33 , “ A law is the best expositor of itself — that every part of an act is to be taken into, view for the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature,” See'. &c.