limitation rule in Oklahoma

2016ANALYSIS ^ licable law ¶ 13 One of the purposes for the Disclosure Act is “placing a limitation on the doctrine of caveat emptdr in real estate sales and expanding the situations in which a seller will be liable for structural or other covered defects.” Rogers v. Meiser, 2003 OK 6, 13 , 68 P.3d 967, 971 .

2016ANALYSIS ^ licable law ¶ 13 One of the purposes for the Disclosure Act is “placing a limitation on the doctrine of caveat emptdr in real estate sales and expanding the situations in which a seller will be liable for structural or other covered defects.” Rogers v. Meiser, 2003 OK 6, 13 , 68 P.3d 967, 971 .

2008As explained in Rogers v. Meiser, 2008 OK 6 , 68 P.3d 967 : One of the main purposes of the Act appears to be placing a limitation on the doctrine of caveat emptor 3 in real estate sales and expanding the situations in which a seller will be liable for structural or other covered defects.

2006For a finding that the action was not time-barred the jury was required to find that “plaintiffs must [have] commence[d] their lawsuit within two years from the time it became apparent to them, or would be apparent to a reasonable person under the same circumstances, that the injury was permanent....” Harper-Turner Oil Co., 311 P.2d at 950 . ¶ 12 Neither Petition 1 nor 2 (nor anything else in this record) shows that more than two years before the filing of Petition 2 it was apparent to Plaintiff or would have been apparent to a reasonable person under the same circumstances that any damage to

2002In Thompson v. Haskell, 24 Okl. 70 , 102 Pac. 700 , this court made the limitation of the rule clear.

2002In Thompson v. Haskell, 24 Okl. 70 , 102 Pac. 700 , this court made the limitation of the rule clear.

2001Instead, the Erikssons acquiesced in the Muskogee County replevin judgment by allowing it to become final, although the judgment had required only that Jones surrender the property. 114 Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, "a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relit-igating not only the adjudicated claim but also any theories or issues that were actualty decided, or could have been decided, in that action." National Diversified Business Services, Inc. v. Corporate Financial Opportunities, Inc., 1997 OK 36 ¶ 12 , 946 P.2d 662, 667 . [Emphasis as in the origi

2001Instead, the Erikssons acquiesced in the Muskogee County replevin judgment by allowing it to become final, although the judgment had required only that Jones surrender the property. 114 Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, "a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relit-igating not only the adjudicated claim but also any theories or issues that were actualty decided, or could have been decided, in that action." National Diversified Business Services, Inc. v. Corporate Financial Opportunities, Inc., 1997 OK 36 ¶ 12 , 946 P.2d 662, 667 . [Emphasis as in the origi

1979Application of Central Airlines 199 Okl. 300 , 185 P.2d 919 (1947). .Such a limitation may be a violation of §§ 6 & 7 of Art.

1979Application of Central Airlines 199 Okl. 300 , 185 P.2d 919 (1947). .Such a limitation may be a violation of §§ 6 & 7 of Art.

1961The limitation to this rule is thoroughly discussed in the case of Davis v. State, 20 Okl.Cr. 203 , 201 P. 1001 .

1961The limitation to this rule is thoroughly discussed in the case of Davis v. State, 20 Okl.Cr. 203 , 201 P. 1001 .

1951In support of said contention, defendant cites Wever v. Pioneer Fire Insurance Co., 49 Okla. 546 , 153 P. 1146 ; Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Nichols, 96 Okla. 96 , 220 P. 920 , and Aetna Insurance Co. v. Wewoka Realty & Trust Co., 104 Okla. 183 , 230 P. 738 .

1951In support of said contention, defendant cites Wever v. Pioneer Fire Insurance Co., 49 Okla. 546 , 153 P. 1146 ; Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Nichols, 96 Okla. 96 , 220 P. 920 , and Aetna Insurance Co. v. Wewoka Realty & Trust Co., 104 Okla. 183 , 230 P. 738 .

1951In support of said contention, defendant cites Wever v. Pioneer Fire Insurance Co., 49 Okla. 546 , 153 P. 1146 ; Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Nichols, 96 Okla. 96 , 220 P. 920 , and Aetna Insurance Co. v. Wewoka Realty & Trust Co., 104 Okla. 183 , 230 P. 738 .

1951In support of said contention, defendant cites Wever v. Pioneer Fire Insurance Co., 49 Okla. 546 , 153 P. 1146 ; Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Nichols, 96 Okla. 96 , 220 P. 920 , and Aetna Insurance Co. v. Wewoka Realty & Trust Co., 104 Okla. 183 , 230 P. 738 .

1951In support of said contention, defendant cites Wever v. Pioneer Fire Insurance Co., 49 Okla. 546 , 153 P. 1146 ; Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Nichols, 96 Okla. 96 , 220 P. 920 , and Aetna Insurance Co. v. Wewoka Realty & Trust Co., 104 Okla. 183 , 230 P. 738 .

1951In support of said contention, defendant cites Wever v. Pioneer Fire Insurance Co., 49 Okla. 546 , 153 P. 1146 ; Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Nichols, 96 Okla. 96 , 220 P. 920 , and Aetna Insurance Co. v. Wewoka Realty & Trust Co., 104 Okla. 183 , 230 P. 738 .

1947Co. v. Lynn, 62 Okla. 17 , 161 P. 1058 , we quoted the limitation on the rule in these words: “The statute ( 12 O.S. 1941 §236) is only mandatory where ‘a determination of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of the other parties.’ ” In the instant case plaintiff does not seek relief against Mrs. Irwin.

1947Co. v. Lynn, 62 Okla. 17 , 161 P. 1058 , we quoted the limitation on the rule in these words: “The statute ( 12 O.S. 1941 §236) is only mandatory where ‘a determination of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of the other parties.’ ” In the instant case plaintiff does not seek relief against Mrs. Irwin.

1935In the case of Farmers Product & Supply Co. v. Bond, 61 Okla. 244 , 161 P. 181 , it was said in paragraph 5 of the syllabus: “Error in the exclusion of the testimony of a witness is harmless, where such witness has already testified to the facts upon which his testimony is again offered, or whore he is afterwards permitted to testify fully with reference to such facts.” Since the purpose of the examination in this case was proof of facts and not the impeachment of the witness, the rule above announced and the principle embodied therein is applicable to this case and determines the issue advers

1935In the case of Farmers Product & Supply Co. v. Bond, 61 Okla. 244 , 161 P. 181 , it was said in paragraph 5 of the syllabus: “Error in the exclusion of the testimony of a witness is harmless, where such witness has already testified to the facts upon which his testimony is again offered, or whore he is afterwards permitted to testify fully with reference to such facts.” Since the purpose of the examination in this case was proof of facts and not the impeachment of the witness, the rule above announced and the principle embodied therein is applicable to this case and determines the issue advers

1934The plaintiff contends that the instrument in question should be held invalid as a deed on the authority, Herren et al. v. Herren, 152 Okla. 281 , 4 P. (2d) 92 .

1934The plaintiff contends that the instrument in question should be held invalid as a deed on the authority, Herren et al. v. Herren, 152 Okla. 281 , 4 P. (2d) 92 .

1932Where such a claim or a substitute authorized by statute is filed for compensation within one year after the injury, the limitation is not a bar to continuing jurisdiction provided by law.” In Patrick & Tillman v. Matkin, 154 Okla. 232 , 7 P. (2d) 414 , this court held: “When a stipulation and receipt on form prescribed by the State Industrial Commission is filed with the State Industrial Commission, it becomes a! substitute for an original claim.

1932Where such a claim or a substitute authorized by statute is filed for compensation within one year after the injury, the limitation is not a bar to continuing jurisdiction provided by law.” In Patrick & Tillman v. Matkin, 154 Okla. 232 , 7 P. (2d) 414 , this court held: “When a stipulation and receipt on form prescribed by the State Industrial Commission is filed with the State Industrial Commission, it becomes a! substitute for an original claim.

1924In Bragdon v. McShea, 26 Okla. 35 , 107 Pac. 916 , Mr. Justice Hays, speaking for the court, asserts a limitation to the rule discussed above in section 3 of (he syllabus, where it is said: “In order for the silence of a party to constitute an estoppel against him, it must have occurred under such circumstances as to' have made it his imperative duty to speak, and the party in whose favor the estoppel is invoked must have been misled into doing that which he would not have done but for such silence.” The Court of Appeals,of Kentucky, in the case of Warren Deposit Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.

1924In Bragdon v. McShea, 26 Okla. 35 , 107 Pac. 916 , Mr. Justice Hays, speaking for the court, asserts a limitation to the rule discussed above in section 3 of (he syllabus, where it is said: “In order for the silence of a party to constitute an estoppel against him, it must have occurred under such circumstances as to' have made it his imperative duty to speak, and the party in whose favor the estoppel is invoked must have been misled into doing that which he would not have done but for such silence.” The Court of Appeals,of Kentucky, in the case of Warren Deposit Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.

1924In Bragdon v. McShea, 26 Okla. 35 , 107 Pac. 916 , Mr. Justice Hays, speaking for the court, asserts a limitation to the rule discussed above in section 3 of (he syllabus, where it is said: “In order for the silence of a party to constitute an estoppel against him, it must have occurred under such circumstances as to' have made it his imperative duty to speak, and the party in whose favor the estoppel is invoked must have been misled into doing that which he would not have done but for such silence.” The Court of Appeals,of Kentucky, in the case of Warren Deposit Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.

1924In Bragdon v. McShea, 26 Okla. 35 , 107 Pac. 916 , Mr. Justice Hays, speaking for the court, asserts a limitation to the rule discussed above in section 3 of (he syllabus, where it is said: “In order for the silence of a party to constitute an estoppel against him, it must have occurred under such circumstances as to' have made it his imperative duty to speak, and the party in whose favor the estoppel is invoked must have been misled into doing that which he would not have done but for such silence.” The Court of Appeals,of Kentucky, in the case of Warren Deposit Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.

1915Waiver depends upon what one himself intends to do; estoppel depends rather upon what he caused his adversary to do.” “Estoppel results from an act which may operate to the injury of the other party; waiver may affect the opposite party beneficially.” (Kennedy v. Manry, 6 Ga. App. 816 , 66 S. E. 29 .) 'Keeping in mind the distinctions between waiver and estoppel, we proceed to the consideration of those assignments of error discussed in plaintiff in error’s brief by which it questions the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence, whereby defendant in error, in the trial court, sought to e

1915Waiver depends upon what one himself intends to do; estoppel depends rather upon what he caused his adversary to do.” “Estoppel results from an act which may operate to the injury of the other party; waiver may affect the opposite party beneficially.” (Kennedy v. Manry, 6 Ga. App. 816 , 66 S. E. 29 .) 'Keeping in mind the distinctions between waiver and estoppel, we proceed to the consideration of those assignments of error discussed in plaintiff in error’s brief by which it questions the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence, whereby defendant in error, in the trial court, sought to e