16 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1925–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexandergreen2 sentences2001A limitation on this rule occurs when "the conduct of the trial judge, on the entire record, was so reprehensible and prejudicial as to deny a fair trial or due process of law." Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 246 Miss. 268, 277 , 148 So.2d 674, 678 (1963). ¶ 30. 2001A limitation on this rule occurs when "the conduct of the trial judge, on the entire record, was so reprehensible and prejudicial as to deny a fair trial or due process of law." Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 246 Miss. 268, 277 , 148 So.2d 674, 678 (1963). ¶ 30. | 3 | 3 |
Continental Oil Company v. Walkergreen2 sentences2001This Court has also held that the only person who may claim the limitation defense of § 15-1-7 is one who "has been in adverse possession of the land against the true owner." Continental Oil Co. v. Walker, 238 Miss. 21, 33 , 117 So.2d 333, 337 (1960). ¶ 12. 2001This Court has also held that the only person who may claim the limitation defense of § 15-1-7 is one who "has been in adverse possession of the land against the true owner." Continental Oil Co. v. Walker, 238 Miss. 21, 33 , 117 So.2d 333, 337 (1960). ¶ 12. | 2 | 2 |
Turnbough v. Ladnergreen1 sentence2022In striking down the limitation clause, the Supreme Court held, “[t]he law does not look with favor on contracts intended to exculpate a party from the liability of his or her own negligence although, with some exceptions, they are enforceable.” Id. at 469 (¶7). ¶60. | 1 | 1 |
Foster v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Morris v. State, 843 So. 2d 676, 678 (¶3) (Miss. 2003). ¶45. “[V]oir dire is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.” Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1274 (Miss. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Morris v. State, 843 So. 2d 676, 678 (¶3) (Miss. 2003). ¶45. “[V]oir dire is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.” Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1274 (Miss. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Adams v. Lucedale Commercial Co.
green
2 sentences1954In the case of Adams, State Revenue Agent v. Lucedale Commercial Company, et al., 113 Miss. 608 , 74 So. 435 , this Court, in discussing the rule with respect to the right of a party to suffer a non-suit, said: “The only limitation of the rule is applied to cases wherein the defendant has secured some right by the filing of the bill which would be destroyed by the dismissal of the bill. 1954In the case of Adams, State Revenue Agent v. Lucedale Commercial Company, et al., 113 Miss. 608 , 74 So. 435 , this Court, in discussing the rule with respect to the right of a party to suffer a non-suit, said: “The only limitation of the rule is applied to cases wherein the defendant has secured some right by the filing of the bill which would be destroyed by the dismissal of the bill. | 3 | 1925–1954 |
United States v. Beckford
green
2 sentences2003Byrom cites as support for her argument United States v. Beckford, 962 F.Supp. 748 (E.D.Va.1997), where the federal district court interpreted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and allowed the sealing of psychiatric evaluations until the penalty phase of the trial, and United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2001), where a limiting order was issued by the trial court, requiring one prosecutor to prepare for the introduction of the psychiatric report at sentencing, and, simultaneously to keep the contents of the report secret from the rest of the prosecution team during the guilt p 2000Byrom cites as support for her argument United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. | 2 | 2000–2003 |
United States v. Billie Jerome Allen, United States of America v. Norris G. Holder
green
1 sentence2003Byrom cites as support for her argument United States v. Beckford, 962 F.Supp. 748 (E.D.Va.1997), where the federal district court interpreted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and allowed the sealing of psychiatric evaluations until the penalty phase of the trial, and United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2001), where a limiting order was issued by the trial court, requiring one prosecutor to prepare for the introduction of the psychiatric report at sentencing, and, simultaneously to keep the contents of the report secret from the rest of the prosecution team during the guilt p | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Tome v. United States
green
1 sentence1995Id. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Nichols v. Munn
green
1 sentence1991In Nichols v. Munn, 565 So.2d 1132 (Miss. 1990), we said that an attorney is not held to the same degree of diligence in making an objection to a judge's comments that he is in making other objections, since a judge interjects himself into a trial by his own volition. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Talbot v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1984Co., 373 So.2d 267 (Miss. 1979) (allowing aggregation of coverage from multiple premiums under one policy). [3] Contra: Talbot v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 291 So.2d 699 (Miss. 1974) (the limitation clause was clear and unambiguous and therefore stacking was denied). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Pearthree v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.
green
1 sentence1984Co., 373 So.2d 267 (Miss. 1979) (allowing aggregation of coverage from multiple premiums under one policy). [3] Contra: Talbot v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 291 So.2d 699 (Miss. 1974) (the limitation clause was clear and unambiguous and therefore stacking was denied). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Agurs v. Holt
green
2 sentences1978Authority for this statement is the case of Agurs v. Holt, 232 La. 1026 , 95 So.2d 644 (1957), in which the Court states: But, where it is shown, as here, that the purchaser did not intend to buy or possess the property, as described in the deed, there is no basis for a conclusion that he has possessed conformably to the title, and, even if it is found that he possessed a part, the presumption that he possessed according to the title is rebutted by the fact that no such possession was intended. 95 So.2d at 649 . 1978Authority for this statement is the case of Agurs v. Holt, 232 La. 1026 , 95 So.2d 644 (1957), in which the Court states: But, where it is shown, as here, that the purchaser did not intend to buy or possess the property, as described in the deed, there is no basis for a conclusion that he has possessed conformably to the title, and, even if it is found that he possessed a part, the presumption that he possessed according to the title is rebutted by the fact that no such possession was intended. 95 So.2d at 649 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Allison v. Camp Creek Drainage Dist.
green
2 sentences1952In the case of Allison v. Camp Creek Drainage District of DeSoto County, 211 Miss. 354 , 51 So. (2d) 743, 747 , the court held that “a party to a suit in chancery has the right to take without prejudice a voluntary dismissal ‘up to the time- when the cause has been submitted to the chancellor for final decision upon the merits of the case. ’ ’ ’ Again in Adams v. Lucedale Commercial Company, 113 Miss. 608 , 74 So. 435 , the Court held that the only limitation of the rule is in cases wherein the defendant has secured some right by the filing of the bill which would be destroyed by its dismissal 1952In the case of Allison v. Camp Creek Drainage District of DeSoto County, 211 Miss. 354 , 51 So. (2d) 743, 747 , the court held that “a party to a suit in chancery has the right to take without prejudice a voluntary dismissal ‘up to the time- when the cause has been submitted to the chancellor for final decision upon the merits of the case. ’ ’ ’ Again in Adams v. Lucedale Commercial Company, 113 Miss. 608 , 74 So. 435 , the Court held that the only limitation of the rule is in cases wherein the defendant has secured some right by the filing of the bill which would be destroyed by its dismissal | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Loughridge v. Bowland
green
1 sentence1933Loughbridge v. Bowland, 52 Miss. 546 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Schaffer v. Deemer Manufacturing Co.
neutral
2 sentences1925In Schaffer v. Deemer Manufacturing Co., 108 Miss. 257 , 66 So. 736 , the court held that a nonsuit at law could not be taken after the trial judge had granted the peremptory instruction, using the following language: “To permit a party to dismiss under such circumstances is, in substance, to grant him a new trial after he has been fairly defeated, and to deprive his adversary of the fruits of a fairly won victory. 1925In Schaffer v. Deemer Manufacturing Co., 108 Miss. 257 , 66 So. 736 , the court held that a nonsuit at law could not be taken after the trial judge had granted the peremptory instruction, using the following language: “To permit a party to dismiss under such circumstances is, in substance, to grant him a new trial after he has been fairly defeated, and to deprive his adversary of the fruits of a fairly won victory. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.