limitation clause in Kansas

2002The court viewed the limiting language of loss of consortium and injury to the relationship as being surplusage at best, since the sentence immediately preceding the limitations specifically limited recovery to $100,000 when only one person sustained bodily injury. 826 P.2d at 435-36 .

1978A limitation clause was held inapplicable for an unauthorized sale of goods in Page v. Allison, 173 Okla. 205 , 47 P.2d 134 (1935), wherein the Oklahoma Supreme Court held: “The situation of the parties and the attendant circumstances should be considered in the solution of this matter.

1978A limitation clause was held inapplicable for an unauthorized sale of goods in Page v. Allison, 173 Okla. 205 , 47 P.2d 134 (1935), wherein the Oklahoma Supreme Court held: “The situation of the parties and the attendant circumstances should be considered in the solution of this matter.

1977They point out that as to these lands “each crop ... in effect, uses the rains from two years and farming operations for two years. . . .” The rule that the life tenant’s estate is entitled to the entire crop rent when the crop is planted before his death is said in Finley to be based on the rule that “under existing Kansas law his ownership in the landlord’s share of the crop attaches after the crop is *561 planted and his inchoate interest is one which he may sell before maturity of the crop and which ripens into full ownership with such maturity. . . .” ( 222 Kan. at 642 .) See also K.S.A.

1977They point out that as to these lands “each crop ... in effect, uses the rains from two years and farming operations for two years. . . .” The rule that the life tenant’s estate is entitled to the entire crop rent when the crop is planted before his death is said in Finley to be based on the rule that “under existing Kansas law his ownership in the landlord’s share of the crop attaches after the crop is *561 planted and his inchoate interest is one which he may sell before maturity of the crop and which ripens into full ownership with such maturity. . . .” ( 222 Kan. at 642 .) See also K.S.A.

1977They point out that as to these lands “each crop ... in effect, uses the rains from two years and farming operations for two years. . . .” The rule that the life tenant’s estate is entitled to the entire crop rent when the crop is planted before his death is said in Finley to be based on the rule that “under existing Kansas law his ownership in the landlord’s share of the crop attaches after the crop is *561 planted and his inchoate interest is one which he may sell before maturity of the crop and which ripens into full ownership with such maturity. . . .” ( 222 Kan. at 642 .) See also K.S.A.

1970According to the general rules for statutory construction, the words `provided, however', are deemed to denote the expression of a limitation or exception...." (p. 265.) An interpretation giving effect to both provisos, I believe, was foreshadowed in this court's opinion in Scammahorn v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Assn., 195 Kan. 220 , 404 P.2d 165 .

1970According to the general rules for statutory construction, the words `provided, however', are deemed to denote the expression of a limitation or exception...." (p. 265.) An interpretation giving effect to both provisos, I believe, was foreshadowed in this court's opinion in Scammahorn v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Assn., 195 Kan. 220 , 404 P.2d 165 .

1970In Matter of Livingston, 14 A.D.2d 264 , 220 N.Y.S.2d 434 , the court expresses the sense of the phrase in this fashion: "...

1970In Matter of Livingston, 14 A.D.2d 264 , 220 N.Y.S.2d 434 , the court expresses the sense of the phrase in this fashion: "...

1970Where such is the language introducing a proviso, the New York court in Millard v. McFadden, 185 Misc. 771 , 57 N.Y.S.2d 594 , said that the word "provided" expresses a limitation or exception *167 and the word "however" is added confirmation of the intention to qualify what precedes the proviso.

1970Where such is the language introducing a proviso, the New York court in Millard v. McFadden, 185 Misc. 771 , 57 N.Y.S.2d 594 , said that the word "provided" expresses a limitation or exception *167 and the word "however" is added confirmation of the intention to qualify what precedes the proviso.

1930(McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270 ; Ross v. Duval, 13 Pet. 45 ; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599 .) But it can hardly be contended, I think, that the statute in question creates a limitation to which the rule or principle invoked is applicable.

1930(McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270 ; Ross v. Duval, 13 Pet. 45 ; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599 .) But it can hardly be contended, I think, that the statute in question creates a limitation to which the rule or principle invoked is applicable.

1930(McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270 ; Ross v. Duval, 13 Pet. 45 ; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599 .) But it can hardly be contended, I think, that the statute in question creates a limitation to which the rule or principle invoked is applicable.

1920Stat. 1915, § 6907; Erickson v Commercial Travelers, 103 Kan. 831 , 176 Pac. 989 .) It was brought within the period prescribed by the code, and that is sufficient.

1920Stat. 1915, § 6907; Erickson v Commercial Travelers, 103 Kan. 831 , 176 Pac. 989 .) It was brought within the period prescribed by the code, and that is sufficient.

1915(See authorities cited in the opinion in Kirby v. Railroad Co., 94 Kan. 485 , 146 Pac. 1183 .) In Watt v. Railway Co., 90 Kan. 466 , 135 Pac. 600 , we held, in a case involving an interstate shipment,' that a limitation clause requiring that actions to recover for inj ury to property transported must be commenced within ninety days was not unreasonable.

1915(See authorities cited in the opinion in Kirby v. Railroad Co., 94 Kan. 485 , 146 Pac. 1183 .) In Watt v. Railway Co., 90 Kan. 466 , 135 Pac. 600 , we held, in a case involving an interstate shipment,' that a limitation clause requiring that actions to recover for inj ury to property transported must be commenced within ninety days was not unreasonable.

1915Since the innocent holder could collect from the maker, it can make no difference to the maker into whose hands the note may pass. (7 Cyc. 790.) In 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 6th ed., it is said: “But there is this limitation to this doctrine; that if the holder acquired paper after maturity, from one who became a bona fide holder for value and without notice before maturity, he is then protected by the strength of his transferrer’s title.” (§ 782.) In Lill v. Gleason, 92 Kan. 754 , 142 Pac. 287 , Mr. Justice Burch said : “Section 65 of the negotiable-instruments law merely affirms th

1915Since the innocent holder could collect from the maker, it can make no difference to the maker into whose hands the note may pass. (7 Cyc. 790.) In 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 6th ed., it is said: “But there is this limitation to this doctrine; that if the holder acquired paper after maturity, from one who became a bona fide holder for value and without notice before maturity, he is then protected by the strength of his transferrer’s title.” (§ 782.) In Lill v. Gleason, 92 Kan. 754 , 142 Pac. 287 , Mr. Justice Burch said : “Section 65 of the negotiable-instruments law merely affirms th

1915(See authorities cited in the opinion in Kirby v. Railroad Co., 94 Kan. 485 , 146 Pac. 1183 .) In Watt v. Railway Co., 90 Kan. 466 , 135 Pac. 600 , we held, in a case involving an interstate shipment,' that a limitation clause requiring that actions to recover for inj ury to property transported must be commenced within ninety days was not unreasonable.

1915(See authorities cited in the opinion in Kirby v. Railroad Co., 94 Kan. 485 , 146 Pac. 1183 .) In Watt v. Railway Co., 90 Kan. 466 , 135 Pac. 600 , we held, in a case involving an interstate shipment,' that a limitation clause requiring that actions to recover for inj ury to property transported must be commenced within ninety days was not unreasonable.

1907Co. v. Franklin, 23 Kan. 74, 80 , and in Holden v. Garrett, 23 Kan. 98 .

1907Co. v. Franklin, 23 Kan. 74, 80 , and in Holden v. Garrett, 23 Kan. 98 .

1905Encycl. of L. 817, second paragraph of note 1.) In Steinhart v. National Bank, 94 Cal. 362 , 29 Pac. 717 , 28 Am.

1905Encycl. of L. 817, second paragraph of note 1.) In Steinhart v. National Bank, 94 Cal. 362 , 29 Pac. 717 , 28 Am.

1891Rep. 973 ,) after quoting from the opinion in the case of City of Topeka v. Gage, 44 Kas. 87 , referring to the limitation clause in ¶590 of the General Statutes of 1889, it is stated: “With this broad and liberal interpretation of this statute, a conflict inevitably arises between it and §253 of the code.” And after referring to ¶ 590, containing the thirty-days’ limitation clause, it is added: “ The plain intent of these various provisions is to cause litigation, if any there is to be, to be commenced before the issue of the bonds, so as to avoid any uncertainty about their legality that mig

1873That ordinances and proceedings, similar in their main features to those we are now considering, are valid, we would refer to the following authorities: Helen v. Noe, 3 Iredell (N. C.) Law, 493; Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Iredell, 268; Gooselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296 ; Gilmore v. Holt, 4 Pick., 257 ; and Rockwell v. Nearing, and Campbell v. Evans, supra. Such proceedings as these do not determine a man’s rights without giving him his day in court.

1873That ordinances and proceedings, similar in their main features to those we are now considering, are valid, we would refer to the following authorities: Helen v. Noe, 3 Iredell (N. C.) Law, 493; Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Iredell, 268; Gooselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296 ; Gilmore v. Holt, 4 Pick., 257 ; and Rockwell v. Nearing, and Campbell v. Evans, supra. Such proceedings as these do not determine a man’s rights without giving him his day in court.