85 California opinions name it 4 courts 1902–2025 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 751 .) The high court explained its holding did not establish a separate cause of action for gross negligence but “simply impose[d] a limitation on the defense that is provided by a release. 2018(Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 766, fn. 9 ; Ordway v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 98, 108, fn. 5 , disapproved on other grounds in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 306-309 (Knight).) In Santa Barbara, the Supreme Court did not definitively resolve this issue, commenting only that it did not view its holding invalidating releases for future gross 19 negligence “as recognizing a cause of action for gross negligence.” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 779-780.) Instead, as is more relevant here, the high court went on to declare: “Our holding simply imposes a limitation | 2 | 4 |
Klopstock v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2013(Klopstock v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 19–21; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 1126, p. 581; id., § 1155, p. 614.)” 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 10 (Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn., supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 243 .) “The important limitation on the rule just mentioned is that the plaintiff proposed to be substituted may not ‘state facts which give rise to a wholly distinct and different legal obligation against the defendant.’ (Klopstock v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.2d at 13, 20 .) For this purpose, ‘[i]n determining wh 2006(Klopstock v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 19-21; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 1126, p. 581; id., § 1155, p. 614.) The important limitation on the rule just mentioned is that the plaintiff proposed to be substituted may not “state facts which give rise to a wholly distinct and different legal obligation against the defendant.” (Klopstock v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.2d 13, 20 .) For this purpose, “[i]n determining whether a wholly different cause of action is introduced by the amendment technical considerations or ancient formulae are not controlling; nothing more * | 2 | 3 |
Albertson v. Raboffgreen2 sentences1999Co., supra, 122 Cal.App. 205 ] that relevancy is not a limitation on the privilege generally has been followed (Donnell v. Linforth [(1936)] 11 Cal.App.2d 25 [ 52 P.2d 937 ]), and both these cases have been cited by the Supreme Court without limitation, although in a different context (Albertson v. Raboff [, supra,] 46 Cal.2d 375, 379 [ 295 P.2d 405 ]).” (Id. at pp. 398-399.) The court stated that even if the limitation applies, it should not be rigidly applied and that the privilege should be denied “only when the matter is ‘so palpably irrelevant to the subject matter of the controversy that 1999Co., supra, 122 Cal.App. 205 ] that relevancy is not a limitation on the privilege generally has been followed (Donnell v. Linforth [(1936)] 11 Cal.App.2d 25 [ 52 P.2d 937 ]), and both these cases have been cited by the Supreme Court without limitation, although in a different context (Albertson v. Raboff [, supra,] 46 Cal.2d 375, 379 [ 295 P.2d 405 ]).” (Id. at pp. 398-399.) The court stated that even if the limitation applies, it should not be rigidly applied and that the privilege should be denied “only when the matter is ‘so palpably irrelevant to the subject matter of the controversy that | 2 | 2 |
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospitalgreen2 sentences1994I pointed out then that the section “benefit[ed] the wrongdoer at the expense of his victim . . . .” (American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984) 36 Cal.3d 359, 387 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 182 , 578 P.2d 899 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) In addition, I observed that the Legislature assumed in passing MICRA that an inevitable reduction of malpractice premiums paid by hospitals would result in a meaningful containment of hospital costs. 1994I pointed out then that the section "benefit[ed] the wrongdoer at the expense of his victim...." ( American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984) 36 Cal.3d 359, 387 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 , 578 P.2d 899 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) In addition, I observed that the Legislature assumed in passing MICRA that an inevitable reduction of malpractice premiums paid by hospitals would result in a meaningful containment of hospital costs. | 2 | 2 |
Knight v. Jewettgreen2 sentences2018(Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 766, fn. 9 ; Ordway v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 98, 108, fn. 5 , disapproved on other grounds in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 306-309 (Knight).) In Santa Barbara, the Supreme Court did not definitively resolve this issue, commenting only that it did not view its holding invalidating releases for future gross 19 negligence “as recognizing a cause of action for gross negligence.” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 779-780.) Instead, as is more relevant here, the high court went on to declare: “Our holding simply imposes a limitation 2007As observed post, at footnote 61, the Court of Appeal concluded that there is sufficient evidence, but we do not address that determination. [57] Our decision in Knight explains that an express agreement releasing future liability for negligence, such as we consider in the present case, similarly can "be viewed as analogous to primary assumption of risk." ( Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 308-309, fn. 4, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 .) [58] Our holding simply imposes a limitation on the defense that is provided by a release. | 1 | 2 |
Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen2 sentences2013(Klopstock v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 19–21; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 1126, p. 581; id., § 1155, p. 614.)” 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 10 (Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn., supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 243 .) “The important limitation on the rule just mentioned is that the plaintiff proposed to be substituted may not ‘state facts which give rise to a wholly distinct and different legal obligation against the defendant.’ (Klopstock v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.2d at 13, 20 .) For this purpose, ‘[i]n determining wh 2006(Branick v. Downey Savings and...Loan Association, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 243; Klopstock v. Superior Court (1941) 17 Cal.2d 13, 19-21 [ 108 P.2d 906 ].) “The important limitation on the rule just mentioned is that the plaintiff proposed to be substituted may not ‘state facts which give rise to a wholly distinct and different legal obligation against the defendant.’ (Klopstock v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.2d 13, 20 .)” (Branick v. Downey Savings and Loan Association, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 243.) But “nothing more is meant [by that limitation] than that the defendant not be required to ans | 1 | 2 |
Walnut Irrigation Dist. v. Burkegreen2 sentences1932Dist. v. Burke, 158 Cal. 165, 167 [ 110 Pac. 517 ]; County of San Bernardino v. County of Riverside, supra.) The present case falls squarely within the limitation to the rule. 1932Dist. v. Burke, 158 Cal. 165, 167 [ 110 Pac. 517 ]; County of San Bernardino v. County of Riverside, supra.) The present case falls squarely within the limitation to the rule. | 1 | 2 |
Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fundgreen2 sentences2024Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431 (Tudor Ranches) [motion in limine]; Villano v. Waterman Convalescent Hospital, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1189 [in limine rulings tantamount to nonsuit]; Tos v. State of California (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 184 , 194 [judgment on the pleadings].) The only limitation the courts have imposed on the exception is a requirement that the stipulated judgment adjudicate all claims.7 Amicus CAC proposes a limitation on the exception requiring that a stipulated judgment must follow an adverse determination that is “outcome determinative” or “dispositive.” In its view, 2024Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431 (Tudor Ranches) [motion in limine]; Villano v. Waterman Convalescent Hospital, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1189 [in limine rulings tantamount to nonsuit]; Tos v. State of California (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 184 , 194 [judgment on the pleadings].) The only limitation the courts have imposed on the exception is a requirement that the stipulated judgment adjudicate all claims.7 Amicus CAC proposes a limitation on the exception requiring that a stipulated judgment must follow an adverse determination that is “outcome determinative” or “dispositive.” In its view, | 1 | 1 |
McMahon v. Craiggreen1 sentence2024Although some Court of all emotional distress damages, which constituted most of the plaintiff’s claimed damages); Martinez v. Robledo (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 384, 387 (trial court limited measure of damages for wrongful injury of a pet to the market value of the pet, which was minimal); McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1508 (the plaintiff “determined the trial court’s rulings had severely impaired the value and viability of her case”); Tudor Ranches, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427 (in limine rulings prevented plaintiff from presenting its case); City of South San Francisco v. Ma | 1 | 1 |
FOUR PT. ENTERTAINMENT, INC. v. New World Entertainment, Ltd.green1 sentence2024Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431 (Tudor Ranches) [motion in limine]; Villano v. Waterman Convalescent Hospital, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1189 [in limine rulings tantamount to nonsuit]; Tos v. State of California (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 184 , 194 [judgment on the pleadings].) The only limitation the courts have imposed on the exception is a requirement that the stipulated judgment adjudicate all claims.7 Amicus CAC proposes a limitation on the exception requiring that a stipulated judgment must follow an adverse determination that is “outcome determinative” or “dispositive.” In its view, | 1 | 1 |
Kenworthy v. Haddengreen1 sentence2024Although some Court of all emotional distress damages, which constituted most of the plaintiff’s claimed damages); Martinez v. Robledo (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 384, 387 (trial court limited measure of damages for wrongful injury of a pet to the market value of the pet, which was minimal); McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1508 (the plaintiff “determined the trial court’s rulings had severely impaired the value and viability of her case”); Tudor Ranches, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427 (in limine rulings prevented plaintiff from presenting its case); City of South San Francisco v. Ma | 1 | 1 |
HARRINGTON-WISELY v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431 (Tudor Ranches) [motion in limine]; Villano v. Waterman Convalescent Hospital, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1189 [in limine rulings tantamount to nonsuit]; Tos v. State of California (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 184 , 194 [judgment on the pleadings].) The only limitation the courts have imposed on the exception is a requirement that the stipulated judgment adjudicate all claims.7 Amicus CAC proposes a limitation on the exception requiring that a stipulated judgment must follow an adverse determination that is “outcome determinative” or “dispositive.” In its view, | 1 | 1 |
City of South San Francisco v. Mayergreen1 sentence2024Although some Court of all emotional distress damages, which constituted most of the plaintiff’s claimed damages); Martinez v. Robledo (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 384, 387 (trial court limited measure of damages for wrongful injury of a pet to the market value of the pet, which was minimal); McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1508 (the plaintiff “determined the trial court’s rulings had severely impaired the value and viability of her case”); Tudor Ranches, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427 (in limine rulings prevented plaintiff from presenting its case); City of South San Francisco v. Ma | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Robledogreen1 sentence2024Although some Court of all emotional distress damages, which constituted most of the plaintiff’s claimed damages); Martinez v. Robledo (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 384, 387 (trial court limited measure of damages for wrongful injury of a pet to the market value of the pet, which was minimal); McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1508 (the plaintiff “determined the trial court’s rulings had severely impaired the value and viability of her case”); Tudor Ranches, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427 (in limine rulings prevented plaintiff from presenting its case); City of South San Francisco v. Ma | 1 | 1 |
Hensley v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.green1 sentence2024Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431 (Tudor Ranches) [motion in limine]; Villano v. Waterman Convalescent Hospital, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1189 [in limine rulings tantamount to nonsuit]; Tos v. State of California (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 184 , 194 [judgment on the pleadings].) The only limitation the courts have imposed on the exception is a requirement that the stipulated judgment adjudicate all claims.7 Amicus CAC proposes a limitation on the exception requiring that a stipulated judgment must follow an adverse determination that is “outcome determinative” or “dispositive.” In its view, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hutchinsgreen1 sentence2022Jan. 1, 2022.) The People correctly respond, “The sentence on a lesser enhancement that was alleged and found true is stayed not by section 654 but by section 12022.53 itself.” “[T]he sentence enhancement provisions of Penal Code section 12022.53 are not limited by the multiple punishment prohibition of Penal Code section 654,” and “in enacting section 12022.53, the Legislature made clear that it intended to create a sentencing scheme unfettered by section 654.” (People v. Palacios (2007) 41 Cal.4th 720, 723 , 727–728.) Section 12022.53, subdivisions (b)–(d) mandate that their enhancements be | 1 | 1 |
| Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monicagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Orozcogreen | 1 | 1 |
| San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Tyrone V.green | 1 | 1 |
| Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. L.C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Sacramento County Department of Health & Human Services v. Carrie F.green | 1 | 1 |
| Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Josue E.green | 1 | 1 |
| San Bernardino County Children & Family Services v. A.S.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ordway v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Boyettegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rogersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Glebe v. Frostgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Acosta v. Glenfed Development Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gosvener v. Coastal Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Diffey v. Riverside County Sheriff's Departmentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Muller v. Automobile Club of So. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pensinger v. Bowsmith, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hobson v. Raychem Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Jordan v. Lemairegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Irwin v. Newbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Donnell v. Linforth
green
2 sentences1999Co., supra, 122 Cal.App. 205 ] that relevancy is not a limitation on the privilege generally has been followed (Donnell v. Linforth [(1936)] 11 Cal.App.2d 25 [ 52 P.2d 937 ]), and both these cases have been cited by the Supreme Court without limitation, although in a different context (Albertson v. Raboff [, supra,] 46 Cal.2d 375, 379 [ 295 P.2d 405 ]).” (Id. at pp. 398-399.) The court stated that even if the limitation applies, it should not be rigidly applied and that the privilege should be denied “only when the matter is ‘so palpably irrelevant to the subject matter of the controversy that 1999Co., supra, 122 Cal.App. 205 ] that relevancy is not a limitation on the privilege generally has been followed (Donnell v. Linforth [(1936)] 11 Cal.App.2d 25 [ 52 P.2d 937 ]), and both these cases have been cited by the Supreme Court without limitation, although in a different context (Albertson v. Raboff [, supra,] 46 Cal.2d 375, 379 [ 295 P.2d 405 ]).” (Id. at pp. 398-399.) The court stated that even if the limitation applies, it should not be rigidly applied and that the privilege should be denied “only when the matter is ‘so palpably irrelevant to the subject matter of the controversy that | 3 | 1962–1999 |
Wyatt v. Buell
green
2 sentences1999(Wyatt v. Buell [(1874)] 47 Cal. 624 .) The language of subdivision 2 of the amended section is, however, broad and unrestricted in its terms, and this court, in Hollis v. Meux [(1886)] 69 Cal. 625 , [ 58 Am. 1935(Wyatt v. Buell, 47 Cal. 624 .) The language of subdivision 2 of the amended section, is, however, broad and unrestricted in its terms, and this court, in Hollis v. Meux, 69 Cal. 625 [ 11 Pac. 248 , 58 Am. | 3 | 1911–1999 |
Hollis v. Meux
green
2 sentences1999(Wyatt v. Buell [(1874)] 47 Cal. 624 .) The language of subdivision 2 of the amended section is, however, broad and unrestricted in its terms, and this court, in Hollis v. Meux [(1886)] 69 Cal. 625 , [ 58 Am. 1935(Wyatt v. Buell, 47 Cal. 624 .) The language of subdivision 2 of the amended section, is, however, broad and unrestricted in its terms, and this court, in Hollis v. Meux, 69 Cal. 625 [ 11 Pac. 248 , 58 Am. | 3 | 1911–1999 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2024(See People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1050 , citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 .) Because the propriety of the “[i]nitial [a]ggressor” instruction turns on whether defendant “start[ed] a fight” (CALCRIM No. 3471 [so defining the term]), we must ask: Is there substantial evidence, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, that defendant started a fight with Rios? 2022(See People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1050 , citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 .) Because the propriety of the “initial aggressor” instruction turns on whether defendant “start[ed] a fight” (CALCRIM No. 3471 [so defining the term]), we must ask: Is there substantial evidence, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, that defendant started a fight with Rios? | 2 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Breverman
green
2 sentences2024(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 159 ; People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 290 .) In evaluating whether substantial evidence supports a limitation on a defense (such as being the initial aggressor), we view the record in the light most favorable to the People, as we would any other issue on which the People would be seeking an instruction. 2022(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 159 ; People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 290 .) In evaluating whether substantial evidence supports a limitation on a defense (such as being the initial aggressor), we view the record in the light most favorable to the People, as we would any other issue on which the People would be seeking an instruction. | 2 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Ross
green
2 sentences2024(See People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1050 , citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 .) Because the propriety of the “[i]nitial [a]ggressor” instruction turns on whether defendant “start[ed] a fight” (CALCRIM No. 3471 [so defining the term]), we must ask: Is there substantial evidence, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, that defendant started a fight with Rios? 2022(See People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1050 , citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 .) Because the propriety of the “initial aggressor” instruction turns on whether defendant “start[ed] a fight” (CALCRIM No. 3471 [so defining the term]), we must ask: Is there substantial evidence, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, that defendant started a fight with Rios? | 2 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Mentch
green
2 sentences2024(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 159 ; People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 290 .) In evaluating whether substantial evidence supports a limitation on a defense (such as being the initial aggressor), we view the record in the light most favorable to the People, as we would any other issue on which the People would be seeking an instruction. 2022(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 159 ; People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 290 .) In evaluating whether substantial evidence supports a limitation on a defense (such as being the initial aggressor), we view the record in the light most favorable to the People, as we would any other issue on which the People would be seeking an instruction. | 2 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Palacios
green
2 sentences2023Jan. 1, 2022.) The People correctly respond, “The sentence on a lesser enhancement that was alleged and found true is stayed not by section 654 but by section 12022.53 itself.” Indeed, “the sentence enhancement provisions of . . . section 12022.53 are not limited by the multiple punishment prohibition of . . . section 654,” and “in enacting section 12022.53, the Legislature made clear that it intended to create a sentencing scheme unfettered by section 654.” (People v. Palacios (2007) 41 Cal.4th 720, 723 , 727–728.) Section 12022.53, subdivisions (b)–(d) mandate that their enhancements be appl 2022Jan. 1, 2022.) The People correctly respond, “The sentence on a lesser enhancement that was alleged and found true is stayed not by section 654 but by section 12022.53 itself.” “[T]he sentence enhancement provisions of Penal Code section 12022.53 are not limited by the multiple punishment prohibition of Penal Code section 654,” and “in enacting section 12022.53, the Legislature made clear that it intended to create a sentencing scheme unfettered by section 654.” (People v. Palacios (2007) 41 Cal.4th 720, 723 , 727–728.) Section 12022.53, subdivisions (b)–(d) mandate that their enhancements be | 2 | 2022–2023 |
American Soda, LLP v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019For example, respondent relies on Doe 1 v. AOL LLC (9th Cir. 2009) 552 F.3d 1077 ( Doe 1 ) and American Soda v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group (10th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 921 ( American Soda ) to argue that the designation of a federal forum is valid, but those cases do not address a clause such as that found here. 2019For example, respondent relies on Doe 1 v. AOL LLC (9th Cir. 2009) 552 F.3d 1077 (Doe 1) and American Soda v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group (10th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 921 (American Soda) to argue that the designation of a federal forum is valid, but those cases do not address a clause such as that found here. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
SILO POINT II LLC v. Suffolk Const. Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2019"In analyzing forum selection clauses, courts begin by determining whether the limitation provided in the clause is one of sovereignty or geography. [Citations.] Clauses that are expressed in terms of sovereignty mandate that suit be brought in the courts of the state sovereign. [Citation.] On the other hand, clauses that are expressed in terms of geography permit suit to be brought in a state or federal court located within a specified geographic boundary. [Citation.]" ( Silo Point II LLC v. Suffolk Const. Co., Inc. (D.Md. 2008) 578 F.Supp.2d 807 , 810.) *219 The cases addressing whether a fo 2019As the superior court acknowledged, “[t]he case law generally does not appear to address forum selection clauses that select a federal forum, as opposed to such clauses that make geographic selections.” Nonetheless, we agree that the selection of a federal forum does not make enforcement of the clause unreasonable. 16 “In analyzing forum selection clauses, courts begin by determining whether the limitation provided in the clause is one of sovereignty or geography. [Citations.] Clauses that are expressed in terms of sovereignty mandate that suit be brought in the courts of the state sovereign. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Doe 1 v. AOL LLC
green
2 sentences2019For example, respondent relies on Doe 1 v. AOL LLC (9th Cir. 2009) 552 F.3d 1077 ( Doe 1 ) and American Soda v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group (10th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 921 ( American Soda ) to argue that the designation of a federal forum is valid, but those cases do not address a clause such as that found here. 2019For example, respondent relies on Doe 1 v. AOL LLC (9th Cir. 2009) 552 F.3d 1077 (Doe 1) and American Soda v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group (10th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 921 (American Soda) to argue that the designation of a federal forum is valid, but those cases do not address a clause such as that found here. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1994I pointed out then that the section "benefit[ed] the wrongdoer at the expense of his victim...." ( American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984) 36 Cal.3d 359, 387 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 , 578 P.2d 899 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) In addition, I observed that the Legislature assumed in passing MICRA that an inevitable reduction of malpractice premiums paid by hospitals would result in a meaningful containment of hospital costs. 1994I pointed out then that the section "benefit[ed] the wrongdoer at the expense of his victim...." ( American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984) 36 Cal.3d 359, 387 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 , 578 P.2d 899 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) In addition, I observed that the Legislature assumed in passing MICRA that an inevitable reduction of malpractice premiums paid by hospitals would result in a meaningful containment of hospital costs. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Cluness v. Bowen
green
2 sentences1944As to these the court, in San Bernardino Co. v. Riverside Co., 135 Cal. 620 [ 67 P. 1048 ], says: ‘A limitation to this rule exists where a reversal of the judgment or order cannot affect the right of the party to the benefit which he has secured thereby; as, for example, where there is no controversy as to his right for the amount for which the judgment was given, but he claims that he was entitled to a greater amount. 1910As to these the court, in San Bernardino Co. v. Riverside Co., 135 Cal. 620 , [ 67 Pac. 1048 ], says: “A limitation to this rule exists where a reversal of the judgment or order cannot affect the right of the party to the benefit which he has secured *167 thereby; as, for example, where there is no controversy as to his right for the amount for which the judgment was given, but he claims that he was entitled to a greater amount. | 2 | 1910–1944 |
Villano v. Waterman Convalescent Hospital, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431 (Tudor Ranches) [motion in limine]; Villano v. Waterman Convalescent Hospital, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1189 [in limine rulings tantamount to nonsuit]; Tos v. State of California (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 184 , 194 [judgment on the pleadings].) The only limitation the courts have imposed on the exception is a requirement that the stipulated judgment adjudicate all claims.7 Amicus CAC proposes a limitation on the exception requiring that a stipulated judgment must follow an adverse determination that is “outcome determinative” or “dispositive.” In its view, | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Le Francois v. Goel green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Marshall green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Watson green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Melton v. Boustred green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Rubin v. Green green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Leiva green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| McHugh v. Protective Life Ins. Co. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Christopher T. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Farnam green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Suff green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. McCurdy green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Delaware v. Van Arsdall green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Lewis v. Harper Hospital green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Davis v. United States green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Martinez v. Master Protection Corp. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Garcia v. Roberts green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Pasadena Hospital Ass'n v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Davis green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Eden v. Van Tine green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Lantzy v. Centex Homes green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Smithey green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Norgart v. Upjohn Co. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Whitman v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Carpenter v. Ashley green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.