Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
14 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1856–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Giglio v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174, 205 , 283 A.3d 477 (2022); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , 153-54, 92 S. Ct. 763 , 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972); Napue 2 The record establishes that the prosecutor requested, and was granted, a limitation on defense counsel’s cross-examination of Martinez regarding his prior invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination. 2026See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174, 205 , 283 A.3d 477 (2022); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , 153-54, 92 S. Ct. 763 , 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972); Napue 2 The record establishes that the prosecutor requested, and was granted, a limitation on defense counsel’s cross-examination of Martinez regarding his prior invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174, 205 , 283 A.3d 477 (2022); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , 153-54, 92 S. Ct. 763 , 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972); Napue 2 The record establishes that the prosecutor requested, and was granted, a limitation on defense counsel’s cross-examination of Martinez regarding his prior invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination. 2026See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174, 205 , 283 A.3d 477 (2022); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , 153-54, 92 S. Ct. 763 , 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972); Napue 2 The record establishes that the prosecutor requested, and was granted, a limitation on defense counsel’s cross-examination of Martinez regarding his prior invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 1 |
Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grossogreen2 sentences2006It is important to emphasize, however, the limitation of this principle to the extent that it “embraces alike those [laws] which affect [the contract’s] validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement!’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, supra, 213 Conn. 199 ; see, e.g., Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58 , 76-77 n.18, 689 A.2d 1097 (1997) (“whenever there is an attorney’s fees clause in the commercial party’s contract, that clause is subject to [General Statutes] § 42-150aa, and the contract must be read as inco 2006It is important to emphasize, however, the limitation of this principle to the extent that it “embraces alike those [laws] which affect [the contract’s] validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement!’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, supra, 213 Conn. 199 ; see, e.g., Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58 , 76-77 n.18, 689 A.2d 1097 (1997) (“whenever there is an attorney’s fees clause in the commercial party’s contract, that clause is subject to [General Statutes] § 42-150aa, and the contract must be read as inco | 1 | 1 |
Kaminski v. Town of Fairfieldgreen2 sentences2004Thus, we stated: “Exposing the negligent taxpayer to liability for having summoned the police would impose upon him multiple burdens for that protection.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 39 . 2004Second, although, in rejecting the claim of a duty to warn, we used language and cited some out-of-state cases that appear to apply beyond the confines of landowner’s liability; see, e.g., id., 38-39 ; our principal rationale was consistent with the limitation of the rule to premises liability cases, namely, the risk of double taxation. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2011Thereafter, in State v. Brown, 22 Conn. App. 108, 109 , 575 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811 , 580 A.2d 61 (1990), the Appellate Court held that a violation of § 14-227a “constituted a violation of that condition of [the defendant’s] probation order forbidding [the defendant] from violating ‘any criminal law’ of this state.” Prior to reaching that conclusion, however, the Appellate Court, on the basis of the analysis in Kluttz , concluded that “for purposes of ... § 53a-24 (a), § 14-227a is a motor vehicle violation and not a ‘crime.’ ” Id., 111. 2011Thereafter, in State v. Brown, 22 Conn. App. 108, 109 , 575 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811 , 580 A.2d 61 (1990), the Appellate Court held that a violation of § 14-227a “constituted a violation of that condition of [the defendant’s] probation order forbidding [the defendant] from violating ‘any criminal law’ of this state.” Prior to reaching that conclusion, however, the Appellate Court, on the basis of the analysis in Kluttz , concluded that “for purposes of ... § 53a-24 (a), § 14-227a is a motor vehicle violation and not a ‘crime.’ ” Id., 111. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2011Thereafter, in State v. Brown, 22 Conn. App. 108, 109 , 575 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811 , 580 A.2d 61 (1990), the Appellate Court held that a violation of § 14-227a “constituted a violation of that condition of [the defendant’s] probation order forbidding [the defendant] from violating ‘any criminal law’ of this state.” Prior to reaching that conclusion, however, the Appellate Court, on the basis of the analysis in Kluttz , concluded that “for purposes of ... § 53a-24 (a), § 14-227a is a motor vehicle violation and not a ‘crime.’ ” Id., 111. 2011Thereafter, in State v. Brown, 22 Conn. App. 108, 109 , 575 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811 , 580 A.2d 61 (1990), the Appellate Court held that a violation of § 14-227a “constituted a violation of that condition of [the defendant’s] probation order forbidding [the defendant] from violating ‘any criminal law’ of this state.” Prior to reaching that conclusion, however, the Appellate Court, on the basis of the analysis in Kluttz , concluded that “for purposes of ... § 53a-24 (a), § 14-227a is a motor vehicle violation and not a ‘crime.’ ” Id., 111. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Sanghavi v. Paul Revere Life Insurance
green
2 sentences2006Co., 214 Conn. 303, 307 , 572 A.2d 307 (1990) (concluding that income option rider to disability insurance policy was invalid because it violated insurance law under then General Statutes § 38-167, now General Statutes § 38a-483). 2006Co., 214 Conn. 303, 307 , 572 A.2d 307 (1990) (concluding that income option rider to disability insurance policy was invalid because it violated insurance law under then General Statutes § 38-167, now General Statutes § 38a-483). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Leon's Bakery, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp.
green
1 sentence2002Leon's Bakery, Inc. v. Industrial Electric Service, Inc. , 990 F.2d 44 CT Page 12984 (2nd. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Atkins v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co.
green
2 sentences2002Atkins v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 5 Conn. App. 643, 648 , 501 A.2d 1223 (1985). 2002Atkins v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 5 Conn. App. 643, 648 , 501 A.2d 1223 (1985). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Retirement Management Group, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996In Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Retirement Management Group, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 80 , 84-85 , that court stated "As long as the [the] defendant is fully apprised of a claim arising from specified conduct and has prepared to defend the action, his ability to protect himself will not be prejudicially affected if a new plaintiff is added, and he should not be permitted to invoke a limitation defense. . . . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Smith v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America
green
1 sentence1996Co. of America, 225 Conn. 566 , 574 (1993), the court is not permitted to review the policy to determine its validity, and subsequently the validity of the defendant's special defense, on a motion to strike. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Joslin v. Joslin
green
1 sentence1995Joslin v. Joslin, 6 A.2d 456 , 459 , 62 R. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Pickering v. American Employers Insurance
green
1 sentence1991The limitation which such a clause places on the recovery of an insured injured by an uninsured motorist is contrary to the intent of the statute to protect the insured against his actual loss; the statute unequivocally states, as we have held before, that "each policy issued must supply the required minimum degree of protection." Id. at 152-53, 282 A.2d at 590 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Padilla v. Hooks International, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1986Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz. App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511 (1971); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 938-40 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Air-line Railway Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 422 , 17 S.E. 619 (1893); Tarnowski v. Fite, 335 Mich. 267, 269-70 , 55 N.W.2d 824 (1952); Padilla v. Hooks International, Inc., 99 N.M. 121, 123-24 , 654 P.2d 574 (N.M. 1986Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz. App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511 (1971); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 938-40 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Air-line Railway Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 422 , 17 S.E. 619 (1893); Tarnowski v. Fite, 335 Mich. 267, 269-70 , 55 N.W.2d 824 (1952); Padilla v. Hooks International, Inc., 99 N.M. 121, 123-24 , 654 P.2d 574 (N.M. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Klang v. Shell Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1986Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz. App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511 (1971); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 938-40 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Air-line Railway Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 422 , 17 S.E. 619 (1893); Tarnowski v. Fite, 335 Mich. 267, 269-70 , 55 N.W.2d 824 (1952); Padilla v. Hooks International, Inc., 99 N.M. 121, 123-24 , 654 P.2d 574 (N.M. 1986Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz. App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511 (1971); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 938-40 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Air-line Railway Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 422 , 17 S.E. 619 (1893); Tarnowski v. Fite, 335 Mich. 267, 269-70 , 55 N.W.2d 824 (1952); Padilla v. Hooks International, Inc., 99 N.M. 121, 123-24 , 654 P.2d 574 (N.M. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Atlanta & Charlotte Air-Line Railway Co. v. Leach
green
2 sentences1986Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz. App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511 (1971); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 938-40 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Air-line Railway Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 422 , 17 S.E. 619 (1893); Tarnowski v. Fite, 335 Mich. 267, 269-70 , 55 N.W.2d 824 (1952); Padilla v. Hooks International, Inc., 99 N.M. 121, 123-24 , 654 P.2d 574 (N.M. 1986Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz. App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511 (1971); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 938-40 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Air-line Railway Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 422 , 17 S.E. 619 (1893); Tarnowski v. Fite, 335 Mich. 267, 269-70 , 55 N.W.2d 824 (1952); Padilla v. Hooks International, Inc., 99 N.M. 121, 123-24 , 654 P.2d 574 (N.M. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Tarnowski v. Fite
green
2 sentences1986Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz. App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511 (1971); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 938-40 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Air-line Railway Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 422 , 17 S.E. 619 (1893); Tarnowski v. Fite, 335 Mich. 267, 269-70 , 55 N.W.2d 824 (1952); Padilla v. Hooks International, Inc., 99 N.M. 121, 123-24 , 654 P.2d 574 (N.M. 1986Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz. App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511 (1971); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 938-40 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Air-line Railway Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 422 , 17 S.E. 619 (1893); Tarnowski v. Fite, 335 Mich. 267, 269-70 , 55 N.W.2d 824 (1952); Padilla v. Hooks International, Inc., 99 N.M. 121, 123-24 , 654 P.2d 574 (N.M. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Sulpher Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo
green
2 sentences1986Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz. App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511 (1971); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 938-40 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Air-line Railway Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 422 , 17 S.E. 619 (1893); Tarnowski v. Fite, 335 Mich. 267, 269-70 , 55 N.W.2d 824 (1952); Padilla v. Hooks International, Inc., 99 N.M. 121, 123-24 , 654 P.2d 574 (N.M. 1986Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz. App. 141, 144 , 481 P.2d 511 (1971); Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 933, 938-40 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971); Air-line Railway Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 422 , 17 S.E. 619 (1893); Tarnowski v. Fite, 335 Mich. 267, 269-70 , 55 N.W.2d 824 (1952); Padilla v. Hooks International, Inc., 99 N.M. 121, 123-24 , 654 P.2d 574 (N.M. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Moore v. Miller
green
2 sentences1984Other courts have so held. 7 See, e.g., Moore v. Miller, 198 Colo. 24 , 596 P.2d 64 (1979); In re Consalvi, 5 Mass. App. 729, 370 N.E.2d 707 (1977); Olson v. Thurston, 393 A.2d 1320 (Me. 1978); Crabtree v. State, 186 Mont. 340 , 607 P.2d 566 (1980); Ex parte Cain, 592 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. 1984Other courts have so held. 7 See, e.g., Moore v. Miller, 198 Colo. 24 , 596 P.2d 64 (1979); In re Consalvi, 5 Mass. App. 729, 370 N.E.2d 707 (1977); Olson v. Thurston, 393 A.2d 1320 (Me. 1978); Crabtree v. State, 186 Mont. 340 , 607 P.2d 566 (1980); Ex parte Cain, 592 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Consalvi
neutral
1 sentence1984Other courts have so held. 7 See, e.g., Moore v. Miller, 198 Colo. 24 , 596 P.2d 64 (1979); In re Consalvi, 5 Mass. App. 729, 370 N.E.2d 707 (1977); Olson v. Thurston, 393 A.2d 1320 (Me. 1978); Crabtree v. State, 186 Mont. 340 , 607 P.2d 566 (1980); Ex parte Cain, 592 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Crabtree v. State
neutral
2 sentences1984Other courts have so held. 7 See, e.g., Moore v. Miller, 198 Colo. 24 , 596 P.2d 64 (1979); In re Consalvi, 5 Mass. App. 729, 370 N.E.2d 707 (1977); Olson v. Thurston, 393 A.2d 1320 (Me. 1978); Crabtree v. State, 186 Mont. 340 , 607 P.2d 566 (1980); Ex parte Cain, 592 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. 1984Other courts have so held. 7 See, e.g., Moore v. Miller, 198 Colo. 24 , 596 P.2d 64 (1979); In re Consalvi, 5 Mass. App. 729, 370 N.E.2d 707 (1977); Olson v. Thurston, 393 A.2d 1320 (Me. 1978); Crabtree v. State, 186 Mont. 340 , 607 P.2d 566 (1980); Ex parte Cain, 592 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Olson v. Thurston
green
1 sentence1984Other courts have so held. 7 See, e.g., Moore v. Miller, 198 Colo. 24 , 596 P.2d 64 (1979); In re Consalvi, 5 Mass. App. 729, 370 N.E.2d 707 (1977); Olson v. Thurston, 393 A.2d 1320 (Me. 1978); Crabtree v. State, 186 Mont. 340 , 607 P.2d 566 (1980); Ex parte Cain, 592 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Ex Parte Cain
green
1 sentence1984Other courts have so held. 7 See, e.g., Moore v. Miller, 198 Colo. 24 , 596 P.2d 64 (1979); In re Consalvi, 5 Mass. App. 729, 370 N.E.2d 707 (1977); Olson v. Thurston, 393 A.2d 1320 (Me. 1978); Crabtree v. State, 186 Mont. 340 , 607 P.2d 566 (1980); Ex parte Cain, 592 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Caldwell Co. v. Lea
green
2 sentences1931But a classification of loans according to the amounts involved is a not unusual feature of legislation for the protection of borrowers, upon the ground that those who seek loans of larger sums “do not require the same protection as do others less fortunately endowed.” Caldwell & Co. v. Lea, 152 Tenn. 48, 54 , 272 S. W. 715 ; State v. Wickenhoefer, 6 Pen. 1931But a classification of loans according to the amounts involved is a not unusual feature of legislation for the protection of borrowers, upon the ground that those who seek loans of larger sums “do not require the same protection as do others less fortunately endowed.” Caldwell & Co. v. Lea, 152 Tenn. 48, 54 , 272 S. W. 715 ; State v. Wickenhoefer, 6 Pen. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Carey v. Berkshire Railroad
red
1 sentence1856Co., 1 Cush., 475 .) But such actions, if countenanced, would furnish no sound apology for a limitation of the principle which they involved, and when tested by argument, have invariably been discouraged. | 1 | 1856–1856 |
Ford v. Monroe
yellow
1 sentence1856The case of Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend., 210 , is not only an anomaly on the score of principle, but anomalous by reason of the fact that a question so momentous as the right to treat death as an actionable injury, was overlooked both by counsel and the court, in every stage of the case. | 1 | 1856–1856 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.