18 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fletcher v. Stategreen2 sentences1997“Defendant ‘had the right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of any witness called against him. [Cit.] However, the extent of cross-examination can be curtailed if the inquiry is not relevant or material, and such restriction lies within the discretion of the trial court which will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly abused. [Cits.]’ (Cit.) Under the circumstances of the case sub judice, we find no manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court’s limitation of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the State’s [witness].” Fletcher v. State, 197 Ga. App. 112 (1), 113 ( 397 SE 1997“Defendant ‘had the right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of any witness called against him. [Cit.] However, the extent of cross-examination can be curtailed if the inquiry is not relevant or material, and such restriction lies within the discretion of the trial court which will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly abused. [Cits.]’ (Cit.) Under the circumstances of the case sub judice, we find no manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court’s limitation of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the State’s [witness].” Fletcher v. State, 197 Ga. App. 112 (1), 113 ( 397 SE | 2 | 3 |
Auto-Owners Insurance v. Ogdengreen2 sentences2020Co. v. Ogden, 275 Ga. 565, 567 (2) ( 569 SE2d 833 ) (2002). 12 limitation] clause in the contract was waived by the insurer can become a disputed question of fact for the jury.20 Nevertheless, settlement negotiations do not always give rise to a jury question on “whether the policyholder was led to believe that he need not file suit, even if they continue throughout the policy’s limitation period.”21 So, mere negotiation for settlement, unsuccessfully accomplished, is “not that type of conduct designed to lull the claimant into a false sense of security so as to constitute a waiver of the limi 2020Co. v. Ogden, 275 Ga. 565, 567 (2) ( 569 SE2d 833 ) (2002). 12 limitation] clause in the contract was waived by the insurer can become a disputed question of fact for the jury.20 Nevertheless, settlement negotiations do not always give rise to a jury question on “whether the policyholder was led to believe that he need not file suit, even if they continue throughout the policy’s limitation period.”21 So, mere negotiation for settlement, unsuccessfully accomplished, is “not that type of conduct designed to lull the claimant into a false sense of security so as to constitute a waiver of the limi | 2 | 2 |
Milliken & Co. v. Ga. Power Co.green2 sentences2023See McCoury, supra. Plaintiff also argues that the inspection agreement’s limitation clause is void under OCGA § 13-8-2 (b), which provides: A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building structure, appurtenances, and appliances, including moving, demolition, and excavating connected therewith, purporting to require that one party to such contract or agreement shall indemnify, hold harmless, insure, or defend the other party to the contract or other 2023See McCoury, supra. Plaintiff also argues that the inspection agreement’s limitation clause is void under OCGA § 13-8-2 (b), which provides: A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building structure, appurtenances, and appliances, including moving, demolition, and excavating connected therewith, purporting to require that one party to such contract or agreement shall indemnify, hold harmless, insure, or defend the other party to the contract or other | 1 | 1 |
McCoury v. Allstate Insurancegreen1 sentence2023See McCoury, supra. Plaintiff also argues that the inspection agreement’s limitation clause is void under OCGA § 13-8-2 (b), which provides: A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building structure, appurtenances, and appliances, including moving, demolition, and excavating connected therewith, purporting to require that one party to such contract or agreement shall indemnify, hold harmless, insure, or defend the other party to the contract or other | 1 | 1 |
Willis v. Allstate Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2020Co. v. Ogden, 275 Ga. 565, 567 (2) ( 569 SE2d 833 ) (2002). 20 Willis, 334 Ga. App. at 543 (punctuation omitted); accord Ogden, 275 Ga. at 567 (2). 13 need not file suit, even if they continue throughout the policy’s limitation period.”21 So, mere negotiation for settlement, unsuccessfully accomplished, is “not that type of conduct designed to lull the claimant into a false sense of security so as to constitute a waiver of the limitation defense.”22 Here, while MAG made several payments on Premier’s insurance claim, Premier was well aware that MAG did not intend to fully pay the amounts it cla | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. Stonegreen1 sentence2016See Stone v. Stone, 254 Ga. at 520 (1) (“Remarriage by the receiving spouse does not terminate the obligation of the paying spouse to continue payments intended as . . . ‘equitable division.’ ”) 4 (Emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Music v. Steamco, Inc.green2 sentences2015This limitation of the rule imputing knowledge of a hazard is simply a restatement of the truism, still applied, that a plaintiff is held to have knowledge of “an open and obvious condition.” See Wright v. K-Mart Corp., 286 Ga. App. 765 ( 650 SE2d 300 ) (2007) (no error in granting a store summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim arising from a trip over store’s shelf corner) (emphasis supplied); Music v. Steamco, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 185, 186 ( 593 SE2d 370 ) (2004) (plaintiff was held to have had equal knowledge of water on steps leading from restaurant); Becton v. Tire King of North Columbus, 2015This limitation of the rule imputing knowledge of a hazard is simply a restatement of the truism, still applied, that a plaintiff is held to have knowledge of “an open and obvious condition.” See Wright v. K-Mart Corp., 286 Ga. App. 765 ( 650 SE2d 300 ) (2007) (no error in granting a store summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim arising from a trip over store’s shelf corner) (emphasis supplied); Music v. Steamco, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 185, 186 ( 593 SE2d 370 ) (2004) (plaintiff was held to have had equal knowledge of water on steps leading from restaurant); Becton v. Tire King of North Columbus, | 1 | 1 |
Becton v. Tire King of North Columbus, Inc.green2 sentences2015This limitation of the rule imputing knowledge of a hazard is simply a restatement of the truism, still applied, that a plaintiff is held to have knowledge of “an open and obvious condition.” See Wright v. K-Mart Corp., 286 Ga. App. 765 ( 650 SE2d 300 ) (2007) (no error in granting a store summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim arising from a trip over store’s shelf corner) (emphasis supplied); Music v. Steamco, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 185, 186 ( 593 SE2d 370 ) (2004) (plaintiff was held to have had equal knowledge of water on steps leading from restaurant); Becton v. Tire King of North Columbus, 2015This limitation of the rule imputing knowledge of a hazard is simply a restatement of the truism, still applied, that a plaintiff is held to have knowledge of “an open and obvious condition.” See Wright v. K-Mart Corp., 286 Ga. App. 765 ( 650 SE2d 300 ) (2007) (no error in granting a store summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim arising from a trip over store’s shelf corner) (emphasis supplied); Music v. Steamco, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 185, 186 ( 593 SE2d 370 ) (2004) (plaintiff was held to have had equal knowledge of water on steps leading from restaurant); Becton v. Tire King of North Columbus, | 1 | 1 |
ST. PAUL REINSURANCE CO., LTD. v. Rossgreen2 sentences2008Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Ross, 276 Ga. App. 135, 139 (1) ( 622 SE2d 374 ) (2005). 2008Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Ross, 276 Ga. App. 135, 139 (1) ( 622 SE2d 374 ) (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Cantrell v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See Wand v. State, 230 Ga. App. 460 ( 496 SE2d 771 ) (1998); Cantrell v. State, 225 Ga. App. 680, 681 ( 484 SE2d 751 ) (1997). 1999See Wand v. State, 230 Ga. App. 460 ( 496 SE2d 771 ) (1998); Cantrell v. State, 225 Ga. App. 680, 681 ( 484 SE2d 751 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Wand v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See Wand v. State, 230 Ga. App. 460 ( 496 SE2d 771 ) (1998); Cantrell v. State, 225 Ga. App. 680, 681 ( 484 SE2d 751 ) (1997). 1999See Wand v. State, 230 Ga. App. 460 ( 496 SE2d 771 ) (1998); Cantrell v. State, 225 Ga. App. 680, 681 ( 484 SE2d 751 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Stevens v. Stategreen2 sentences1997“Defendant ‘had the right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of any witness called against him. [Cit.] However, the extent of cross-examination can be curtailed if the inquiry is not relevant or material, and such restriction lies within the discretion of the trial court which will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly abused. [Cits.]’ (Cit.) Under the circumstances of the case sub judice, we find no manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court’s limitation of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the State’s [witness].” Fletcher v. State, 197 Ga. App. 112 (1), 113 ( 397 SE 1997“Defendant ‘had the right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of any witness called against him. [Cit.] However, the extent of cross-examination can be curtailed if the inquiry is not relevant or material, and such restriction lies within the discretion of the trial court which will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly abused. [Cits.]’ (Cit.) Under the circumstances of the case sub judice, we find no manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court’s limitation of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the State’s [witness].” Fletcher v. State, 197 Ga. App. 112 (1), 113 ( 397 SE | 1 | 1 |
Bartlett v. Dimension Designs, Ltd.green2 sentences1994This limitation on our inquiry follows from the general rule that “an arbitrator’s decision must be upheld unless it is completely irrational or it constitutes a manifest disregard of the law.” Bartlett v. Dimension Designs, 195 Ga. App. 845, 848 ( 395 SE2d 64 ) (1990), overruled on other grounds, Pace Constr. 1994This limitation on our inquiry follows from the general rule that “an arbitrator’s decision must be upheld unless it is completely irrational or it constitutes a manifest disregard of the law.” Bartlett v. Dimension Designs, 195 Ga. App. 845, 848 ( 395 SE2d 64 ) (1990), overruled on other grounds, Pace Constr. | 1 | 1 |
House v. Stategreen2 sentences1989Although Chapman correctly points out that there are cases holding that evidence of specific bad acts showing the deceased was more likely than not the aggressor is admissible, e.g., House v. State, 252 Ga. 409, 413 ( 314 SE2d 195 ) (1984), she fails to heed the limitation that this exception applies only to those acts involving the defendant. 1989Although Chapman correctly points out that there are cases holding that evidence of specific bad acts showing the deceased was more likely than not the aggressor is admissible, e.g., House v. State, 252 Ga. 409, 413 ( 314 SE2d 195 ) (1984), she fails to heed the limitation that this exception applies only to those acts involving the defendant. | 1 | 1 |
Knox v. Yowgreen2 sentences1974See also Knox v. Yow, 91 Ga. 367, 376 ( 17 SE 654 ), and L. & N. R. 1974See also Knox v. Yow, 91 Ga. 367, 376 ( 17 SE 654 ), and L. & N. R. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wright v. K-Mart Corp.
green
2 sentences2015This limitation of the rule imputing knowledge of a hazard is simply a restatement of the truism, still applied, that a plaintiff is held to have knowledge of “an open and obvious condition.” See Wright v. K-Mart Corp., 286 Ga. App. 765 ( 650 SE2d 300 ) (2007) (no error in granting a store summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim arising from a trip over store’s shelf corner) (emphasis supplied); Music v. Steamco, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 185, 186 ( 593 SE2d 370 ) (2004) (plaintiff was held to have had equal knowledge of water on steps leading from restaurant); Becton v. Tire King of North Columbus, 2015This limitation of the rule imputing knowledge of a hazard is simply a restatement of the truism, still applied, that a plaintiff is held to have knowledge of “an open and obvious condition.” See Wright v. K-Mart Corp., 286 Ga. App. 765 ( 650 SE2d 300 ) (2007) (no error in granting a store summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim arising from a trip over store’s shelf corner) (emphasis supplied); Music v. Steamco, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 185, 186 ( 593 SE2d 370 ) (2004) (plaintiff was held to have had equal knowledge of water on steps leading from restaurant); Becton v. Tire King of North Columbus, | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Mangum v. State
green
2 sentences2002Because of the limitation on defense counsel's cross-examination of Wilson, Vogleson was not permitted "`to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 ." Mangum v. State, supra, 274 Ga. at 577 , 555 S.E.2d 451 . 2002Because of the limitation on defense counsel's cross-examination of Wilson, Vogleson was not permitted "`to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 ." Mangum v. State, supra, 274 Ga. at 577 , 555 S.E.2d 451 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Davis v. Alaska
green
2 sentences2002Because of the limitation on defense counsel's cross-examination of Wilson, Vogleson was not permitted "`to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 ." Mangum v. State, supra, 274 Ga. at 577 , 555 S.E.2d 451 . 2002Because of the limitation on defense counsel's cross-examination of Wilson, Vogleson was not permitted "`to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 ." Mangum v. State, supra, 274 Ga. at 577 , 555 S.E.2d 451 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Glover v. Donaldson
green
1 sentence1997While it is axiomatic that a statute standing alone may not contravene a constitutional provision, Glover, supra, 243 Ga. at 482 , OCGA § 50-21-28 is the implementation of a constitutional amendment authorizing not only the adoption of the GTCA but also the limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity contained therein. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Pace Construction Corp. v. Northpark Associates, L.P.
green
1 sentence1994Corp. v. Northpark Assoc., 215 Ga. App. 439 ( 450 SE2d 828 ) (1994). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Clayton County v. Billups Eastern Petroleum Co.
green
2 sentences1990The decisions in Department of Transp. v. Whitehead, 253 Ga. 150 ( 317 SE2d 542 ) (1984), and Clayton County v. Billups Eastern Petroleum Co., 104 Ga. App. 778 ( 123 SE2d 187 ) (1961), control. 1990The decisions in Department of Transp. v. Whitehead, 253 Ga. 150 ( 317 SE2d 542 ) (1984), and Clayton County v. Billups Eastern Petroleum Co., 104 Ga. App. 778 ( 123 SE2d 187 ) (1961), control. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Department of Transportation v. Whitehead
green
2 sentences1990The decisions in Department of Transp. v. Whitehead, 253 Ga. 150 ( 317 SE2d 542 ) (1984), and Clayton County v. Billups Eastern Petroleum Co., 104 Ga. App. 778 ( 123 SE2d 187 ) (1961), control. 1990The decisions in Department of Transp. v. Whitehead, 253 Ga. 150 ( 317 SE2d 542 ) (1984), and Clayton County v. Billups Eastern Petroleum Co., 104 Ga. App. 778 ( 123 SE2d 187 ) (1961), control. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Stevens
green
2 sentences1978Count 1 of Wilcher’s complaint is controlled adversely by this court’s holding in Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Stevens, 130 Ga. App. 363 ( 203 SE2d 587 ), where the court examined a liability limitation clause in a contract virtually identical to the liability limitation clause contained in the contract between the parties to this appeal and concluded that the limitation clause precluded the recovery of damages under tort or contract theory. 1978Count 1 of Wilcher’s complaint is controlled adversely by this court’s holding in Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Stevens, 130 Ga. App. 363 ( 203 SE2d 587 ), where the court examined a liability limitation clause in a contract virtually identical to the liability limitation clause contained in the contract between the parties to this appeal and concluded that the limitation clause precluded the recovery of damages under tort or contract theory. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Everett v. Planters' Bank
green
2 sentences1895(Everett v. Planters Bank, 61 Ga. 38 .) We think there is equal reason for holding that the act of 1879 did not repeal the limitation clause of the act of 1875. 1895(Everett v. Planters Bank, 61 Ga. 38 .) We think there is equal reason for holding that the act of 1879 did not repeal the limitation clause of the act of 1875. | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.