limitation exception in Pennsylvania

1955This general principle is subject to the limitation or exception that if a trade name or trade-mark or other word or words have acquired, in the trade and in the minds of the purchasing public, a special so-called secondary meaning, i.e., have come to mean that the article is the product of a certain manufacturer * or of a particular individual or corporation, such trade name or trade-mark or word or words will be protected against infringement: Quaker State Oil v. Steinberg, 325 Pa. 273 , 189 A. 473 ; Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111 ; Thomson-Porcelite Co. v. Harad, 356 Pa.

1954This general principle is subject to the limitation or exception that if a trade name or trade-mark or other word or words have acquired, in the trade and in the minds of the purchasing public, a special so-called secondary meaning, i.e., have come to mean that the article is the product of a certain manufacturer or of a particular individual or corporation, such trade name or trade-mark or word or words will be protected against infringement: Quaker State Oil v. Steinberg, 325 Pa. 273 , 189 A. 473 ; Kellogg *59 Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 ; Thomson-Porcelite Co. v. Harad, 356 Pa

1955This general principle is subject to the limitation or exception that if a trade name or trade-mark or other word or words have acquired, in the trade and in the minds of the purchasing public, a special so-called secondary meaning, i.e., have come to mean that the article is the product of a certain manufacturer * or of a particular individual or corporation, such trade name or trade-mark or word or words will be protected against infringement: Quaker State Oil v. Steinberg, 325 Pa. 273 , 189 A. 473 ; Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111 ; Thomson-Porcelite Co. v. Harad, 356 Pa.

1955This general principle is subject to the limitation or exception that if a trade name or trade-mark or other word or words have acquired, in the trade and in the minds of the purchasing public, a special so-called secondary meaning, i.e., have come to mean that the article is the product of a certain manufacturer * or of a particular individual or corporation, such trade name or trade-mark or word or words will be protected against infringement: Quaker State Oil v. Steinberg, 325 Pa. 273 , 189 A. 473 ; Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111 ; Thomson-Porcelite Co. v. Harad, 356 Pa.

1974The discussion mentioned the comparable clause contained in Art. 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and cast some doubt (without resolving it) on the limitation of that clause to ‘capital offenses’. 452 Pa. at 243 , 304 A. 2d 432 .

1974The discussion mentioned the comparable clause contained in Art. 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and cast some doubt (without resolving it) on the limitation of that clause to “capital offenses”. 452 Pa. at 243 .

1952“Clause 19 is not a ‘result’-clause as in Selenack, Admr., v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 242 , 50 A. 2d 736 , in which the policy provided for an exclusion of liability ‘ “if the death . . . resulted . . . from having been engaged in military or naval service in time of war.’” Such a limitation clause has generally been construed as being tied into the doctrine of causation, so that unless, the accident and death resulted, i. e., were caused by, or flowed from, the military service, the insurer was held liable..

1952“Clause 19 is not a ‘result’-clause as in Selenack, Admr., v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 242 , 50 A. 2d 736 , in which the policy provided for an exclusion of liability ‘ “if the death . . . resulted . . . from having been engaged in military or naval service in time of war.’” Such a limitation clause has generally been construed as being tied into the doctrine of causation, so that unless, the accident and death resulted, i. e., were caused by, or flowed from, the military service, the insurer was held liable..

1948The citations are but different illustrations of the rule, that the meaning of the legislature may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, from the reason or motive upon which the legislature proceeded, from the end in view, or the purpose which was designed — the limitation of the rule being, that to extend the meaning to any case not included in the words, the case must be shown to come within the same reason upon which the lawmaker proceeded, and not only within a like reason: United States v. Freeman, 3 Howard 556 .” We are satisfied that when an act of assembly, such as the

1905The citations are but different illustrations of the rule, that the meaning of the legislature may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, from the reason or motive upon which the legislature proceeded, from the end in view, or the purpose which was designed—the limitation of the rule being, that to extend the meaning to any case not included in the words, the case must be shown to come within the same reason upon which the lawmaker proceeded, and not only within a like reason: ” United States v. Freeman, 3 Howard, 556 .

1937Co. v. Brown, 128 Pa. 386 , 18 A. 389 , it was held that the facts (1) that in an affidavit of defense to an action brought after the period limited in the policy had expired, the company did not set up the limitation as a defense, and (2) that afterwards the president of the company proposed to settle with the plaintiff, did not create an estoppel or authorize the inference of a waiver of the clause limiting suit.

1937Co. v. Brown, 128 Pa. 386 , 18 A. 389 , it was held that the facts (1) that in an affidavit of defense to an action brought after the period limited in the policy had expired, the company did not set up the limitation as a defense, and (2) that afterwards the president of the company proposed to settle with the plaintiff, did not create an estoppel or authorize the inference of a waiver of the clause limiting suit.

2021Such “reasonable restrictions” place a limitation on the doctrine, that “[t]he contemplated expansion must not be detrimental to the public health, welfare and safety.” Id.

2019In that case, however, we were not faced with considering whether evidence recorded by someone outside the organization could ever be admissible under the business records exception, the issue currently before the Court. 13 This Court also considered the business records exception in In re Indyk's Estate , 488 Pa. 567 , 413 A.2d 371 (1979), and set forth the standard relied upon by the parties and the courts in the case at bar.

2019In that case, however, we were not faced with considering whether evidence recorded by someone outside the organization could ever be admissible under the business records exception, the issue currently before the Court. 13 This Court also considered the business records exception in In re Indyk's Estate , 488 Pa. 567 , 413 A.2d 371 (1979), and set forth the standard relied upon by the parties and the courts in the case at bar.

2018Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1996), the Court adopted the following limitation to the doctrine as set forth by Justice Cappy in his concurring opinion in Mason, supra: [A]pplication of the “independent source doctrine” is proper only in the very limited circumstances where the “independent source” is truly independent from both the tainted evidence and the police or investigative team which engaged in the misconduct by which the tainted evidence was discovered.

2018Melendez, supra, 676 A.2d at 231 , quoting Mason, supra, 637 A.2d at 258 - 259 (Cappy J., Concurring).

2018Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1996), the Court adopted the following limitation to the doctrine as set forth by Justice Cappy in his concurring opinion in Mason, supra: [A]pplication of the “independent source doctrine” is proper only in the very limited circumstances where the “independent source” is truly independent from both the tainted evidence and the police or investigative team which engaged in the misconduct by which the tainted evidence was discovered.

2018Melendez, supra, 676 A.2d at 231 , quoting Mason, supra, 637 A.2d at 258 - 259 (Cappy J., Concurring).

2011Limerick Auto Body, Inc., 769 A.2d at 1179 -80 (quoting Koolvent Metal Awning Corp. v. Price, 368 Pa. 528, 532 , 84 A.2d 296, 298 (1951); Pennsylvania State University, supra; Brody’s, Inc., 454 A.2d at 607 n. 3 (“...names primarily understood to be personal names are not inherently distinctive and can be protected as trade names only when they have acquired secondary meaning.”).

2011Limerick Auto Body, Inc., 769 A.2d at 1179 -80 (quoting Koolvent Metal Awning Corp. v. Price, 368 Pa. 528, 532 , 84 A.2d 296, 298 (1951); Pennsylvania State University, supra; Brody’s, Inc., 454 A.2d at 607 n. 3 (“...names primarily understood to be personal names are not inherently distinctive and can be protected as trade names only when they have acquired secondary meaning.”).

2008In Firetree, Ltd. v. Fairchild, 920 A.2d 913, 919 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007), appeal denied, — Pa. —, 946 A.2d 689 (2008), it was held that under Noerr-Penning-ton Doctrine a citizen or a legislator has an absolute right to petition the executive branch to stop the proposed sale of government property, and his or her motive is irrelevant.

2008In Firetree, Ltd. v. Fairchild, 920 A.2d 913, 919 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 946 A.2d 689 (2008), it was held that under Noerr-Pennington Doctrine a citizen or a legislator has an absolute right to petition the executive branch to stop the proposed sale of government property, and his or her motive is irrelevant.

2000Cf. Haefner v. Sprague, 343 Pa.Super. 342 , 494 A.2d 1115 (1985) (although first action dismissed on procedural grounds, second action permitted because still within limitation period). .

2000Cf. Haefner v. Sprague, 343 Pa.Super. 342 , 494 A.2d 1115 (1985) (although first action dismissed on procedural grounds, second action permitted because still within limitation period). .

1988First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Airlines, 731 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1984); Universal Computer Systems Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines Inc., 479 F. Supp. 639 (M.D., Pa. 1979), aff'd mem. 622 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1980); Bullock Construction Inc. v. Federal Express Corp.,_F. Supp. _(D.C.

1988First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Airlines, 731 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1984); Universal Computer Systems Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines Inc., 479 F. Supp. 639 (M.D., Pa. 1979), aff'd mem. 622 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1980); Bullock Construction Inc. v. Federal Express Corp.,_F. Supp. _(D.C.

1988First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Airlines, 731 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1984); Universal Computer Systems Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines Inc., 479 F. Supp. 639 (M.D., Pa. 1979), aff'd mem. 622 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1980); Bullock Construction Inc. v. Federal Express Corp.,_F. Supp. _(D.C.

1987However, the application of the prejudice requirement to limitation of suit provisions was specifically rejected in Schreiber v. Pa. Lumberman’s Mutual Insurance Co., 498 Pa. 21 , 444 A.2d 647 (1982).

1987However, the application of the prejudice requirement to limitation of suit provisions was specifically rejected in Schreiber v. Pa. Lumberman’s Mutual Insurance Co., 498 Pa. 21 , 444 A.2d 647 (1982).

1987In support of its assertion that prejudice is a requirement to invoke the limitation clause, appellant cites to Brakeman v. Potamac Insurance Co., 472 Pa. 66 , 371 A.2d 193 (1977) where the court adopted a requirement that prejudice be shown before a notice provision was enforced.

1987In support of its assertion that prejudice is a requirement to invoke the limitation clause, appellant cites to Brakeman v. Potamac Insurance Co., 472 Pa. 66 , 371 A.2d 193 (1977) where the court adopted a requirement that prejudice be shown before a notice provision was enforced.

1985As Justice Roberts stated in his concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Nash, supra, 457 Pa. at 308 , 324 A.2d at 349 , “The limitation of the exception to declarations against pecuniary and proprietary interests is grounded in the belief that they are less likely to be motivated by extraneous considerations and provide less inducement to perjury.

1985As Justice Roberts stated in his concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Nash, supra, 457 Pa. at 308 , 324 A.2d at 349 , “The limitation of the exception to declarations against pecuniary and proprietary interests is grounded in the belief that they are less likely to be motivated by extraneous considerations and provide less inducement to perjury.