limitation clause in Louisiana

2016Instead of limiting the time for cross-examination, Defendant argues, the trial court “should have allowed cross-examination to continue and, when appropriate, limit counsel from asking questions which would fit under one of the grounds noted in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 at 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).” Some of these grounds for limiting cross-examination, Van Arsdall stated, were “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id., 475 U.S. at 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 . 1 Defendant

2016Instead of limiting the time for cross-examination, Defendant argues, the trial court “should have allowed cross-examination to continue and, when appropriate, limit counsel from asking questions which would fit under one of the grounds noted in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 at 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).” Some of these grounds for limiting cross-examination, Van Arsdall stated, were “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id., 475 U.S. at 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 . 1 Defendant

2010See Smith v. Cannon, 43,964 (La.App.2d Cir.12/28/09), 2 So.3d 1227 ; and Morris v. Thomason, 28,238 (La.App.2d Cir.4/8/96), 672 So.2d 433 .

2010See Smith v. Cannon, 43,964 (La.App.2d Cir.12/28/09), 2 So.3d 1227 ; and Morris v. Thomason, 28,-238 (La.App.2d Cir.4/8/96), 672 So.2d 433 .

2006The limitation of the exception was eloquently explained in Shepard, 290 U.S. at 105-106 , 54 S.Ct. at 26 : Declarations of intention, casting light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to the past.

2006The limitation of the exception was eloquently explained in Shepard, 290 U.S. at 105-106 , 54 S.Ct. at 26 : Declarations of intention, casting light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to the past.

1995We find precedent for this holding in the case law: despite an identical limitation clause in the source provision for La.Ch.Code art. 618(D), La.R.S. 46:2136(D), the Fifth Circuit in Keneker v. Keneker, 579 So.2d 1083 (La.App. 5 Cir.1991) partially granted an application for supervisory writs regarding a protective order.

1990Drilling Co., 654 F.2d at 333 , that rule does not require us to adopt a stilted reading of the contract to avoid finding indemnity.

1989LSA-R.S. 22:691 In Grice v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 359 So.2d 1288 (La.1978), the Louisiana Supreme Court found that a homeowner’s policy was part of the same contract as the standard fire insurance policy form and thus burglary and theft coverage provisions were governed by the same limitation as the standard fire policy under LSA-R.S. 22:691.

1986However, Coastal contends that this limitation does not rule out the possi-bilty of the application of state law in certain instances citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Company, Inc., 421 U.S. 397 , 95 S.Ct. 1708 , 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975) and Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 , 94 S.Ct. 2174 , 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974) as examples where federal jurisprudence concluded maritime law recognizes the doctrine of contribution and apportionment of damages.

1986However, Coastal contends that this limitation does not rule out the possi-bilty of the application of state law in certain instances citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Company, Inc., 421 U.S. 397 , 95 S.Ct. 1708 , 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975) and Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 , 94 S.Ct. 2174 , 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974) as examples where federal jurisprudence concluded maritime law recognizes the doctrine of contribution and apportionment of damages.

1986However, Coastal contends that this limitation does not rule out the possi-bilty of the application of state law in certain instances citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Company, Inc., 421 U.S. 397 , 95 S.Ct. 1708 , 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975) and Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 , 94 S.Ct. 2174 , 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974) as examples where federal jurisprudence concluded maritime law recognizes the doctrine of contribution and apportionment of damages.

1986However, Coastal contends that this limitation does not rule out the possi-bilty of the application of state law in certain instances citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Company, Inc., 421 U.S. 397 , 95 S.Ct. 1708 , 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975) and Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 , 94 S.Ct. 2174 , 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974) as examples where federal jurisprudence concluded maritime law recognizes the doctrine of contribution and apportionment of damages.

1986In addition Coastal cites Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir.1979).

1978Health & Acc. Ass'n, Mo.App., 184 S.W.2d 188 ; Kentucky, Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686 , 117 S.W.2d 928 , 118 A.L.R. 331 ; Minnesota, Orenstein v. Preferred Acc. Ins.

1978Health & Acc. Ass'n, Mo.App., 184 S.W.2d 188 ; Kentucky, Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686 , 117 S.W.2d 928 , 118 A.L.R. 331 ; Minnesota, Orenstein v. Preferred Acc. Ins.

1978Such a limitation is not in violation of law, and, though a just law may work injury in individual cases, it must be regarded in the same manner as the fundamental principles of government, seeking the greatest good to the greatest number." To the same effect are decisions emanating from the courts of Georgia, Randall v. State Mutual Insurance Company, 112 Ga.App. 268 , 145 S.E.2d 41 ; Texas, Douglas v. Southwestern Life Insurance Company, Tex.Civ.App., 374 S.W.2d 788 ; Missouri, Hudson v. Mutual Ben.

1978Such a limitation is not in violation of law, and, though a just law may work injury in individual cases, it must be regarded in the same manner as the fundamental principles of government, seeking the greatest good to the greatest number." To the same effect are decisions emanating from the courts of Georgia, Randall v. State Mutual Insurance Company, 112 Ga.App. 268 , 145 S.E.2d 41 ; Texas, Douglas v. Southwestern Life Insurance Company, Tex.Civ.App., 374 S.W.2d 788 ; Missouri, Hudson v. Mutual Ben.

1978Such a limitation is not in violation of law, and, though a just law may work injury in individual cases, it must be regarded in the same manner as the fundamental principles of government, seeking the greatest good to the greatest number." To the same effect are decisions emanating from the courts of Georgia, Randall v. State Mutual Insurance Company, 112 Ga.App. 268 , 145 S.E.2d 41 ; Texas, Douglas v. Southwestern Life Insurance Company, Tex.Civ.App., 374 S.W.2d 788 ; Missouri, Hudson v. Mutual Ben.

1973In the case of Brocato v. Sun Underwriters Insurance Company of New York, 219 La. 495 , 53 So.2d 246 (1951) the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the actions of the insurer in that case constituted a waiver of a similar limitation clause and quoted the general rule of law from 29 Am.Jur.

1973In the case of Brocato v. Sun Underwriters Insurance Company of New York, 219 La. 495 , 53 So.2d 246 (1951) the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the actions of the insurer in that case constituted a waiver of a similar limitation clause and quoted the general rule of law from 29 Am.Jur.

1954Millard v. McFadden, 185 Misc. 771 , 57 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596 .

1954Millard v. McFadden, 185 Misc. 771 , 57 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596 .

1945In the case of The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375 , 17 S.Ct. 597 , 41 L.Ed. 1039 , the syllabus *Page 182 which clearly states the holding of the case reads: "A notice containing conditions, on the back of a steamship passenger's contract ticket, but not referred to therein, except by the words `See back' printed on the face of the ticket does not form a part of the contract binding on the passenger as to the liability of the steamship company for baggage or otherwise, where the passenger's attention is not called to the conditions, and there is no proof that he ever read or assented to them." The rel

1945In the case of The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375 , 17 S.Ct. 597 , 41 L.Ed. 1039 , the syllabus *Page 182 which clearly states the holding of the case reads: "A notice containing conditions, on the back of a steamship passenger's contract ticket, but not referred to therein, except by the words `See back' printed on the face of the ticket does not form a part of the contract binding on the passenger as to the liability of the steamship company for baggage or otherwise, where the passenger's attention is not called to the conditions, and there is no proof that he ever read or assented to them." The rel