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90 New York opinions name it 9 courts 1849–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ashwalgreen2 sentences2012“It is, of course, the right of counsel during summation 'to comment upon every pertinent matter of fact bearing upon the questions the jury have to decide’ ” (People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109 [1976] [citation omitted]). 2012“It is, of course, the right of counsel during summation 'to comment upon every pertinent matter of fact bearing upon the questions the jury have to decide’ ” (People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109 [1976] [citation omitted]). | 3 | 3 |
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertsonred2 sentences2004Securities Law Violations; Statute of Limitations “Litigation instituted pursuant to § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 . . . must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation[.]” (Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v Gilbertson, 501 US 350, 364 [1991].) However, since the Lampf decision, the appropriate statute of limitations period for section 10 (b) of the Securities Exhange Act of 1934 (15 USC § 78j [b]) and rule 10 (b-5) of the Securities and Exhange Commission (17 CFR 240.10b-5) claims has been changed by 2004Securities Law Violations; Statute of Limitations "Litigation instituted pursuant to § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 . . . must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation[.]" ( Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v Gilbertson , 501 US 350, 364 [1991].) However, since the Lampf decision, the appropriate statute of limitations period for section 10 (b) of the Securities Exhange Act of 1934 (15 USC § 78j [b]) and rule 10 (b-5) of the Securities and Exhange Commission (17 CFR 240.10b-5) claims has been changed b | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2023Nor is it relevant that a statement was made “one day prior” to filing of the action (id. at 18) or that it contained the “contents” of a future complaint (id. at n 9): communications made in anticipation of litigation are, by definition, subject to the qualified “pre-litigation” privilege. 4 As we noted in Williams, this limitation on the privilege is not “intended to restrict in any manner the reporting of news stories and other reports which are made in the public - 10 - - 11 - Nos. 32 & 33 the dissent’s view that Williams is limited to “the filing of a false complaint by a principal of a c | 1 | 1 |
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckiegreen1 sentence2019That section provides, in relevant part, that "[i]f, at the time that a demand for arbitration was made or a notice of intention to arbitrate was served, the claim sought to be arbitrated would have been barred by limitation of time had it been asserted in a court of the state, a party may assert the limitation as a bar to the arbitration" (CPLR 7502 [b]; see Matter of Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v Luckie , 85 NY2d 193, 201-202 [1995], rearg denied 85 NY2d 1033 [1995], cert denied 516 US 811 [1995]). | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. International Uniongreen1 sentence2019That section provides, in relevant part, that "[i]f, at the time that a demand for arbitration was made or a notice of intention to arbitrate was served, the claim sought to be arbitrated would have been barred by limitation of time had it been asserted in a court of the state, a party may assert the limitation as a bar to the arbitration" (CPLR 7502 [b]; see Matter of Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v Luckie , 85 NY2d 193, 201-202 [1995], rearg denied 85 NY2d 1033 [1995], cert denied 516 US 811 [1995]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Careygreen1 sentence2017Here, the court’s limitation of the defense cross-examination was a provident exercise of its discretion (see People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 202 [1950]; People v Carey, 67 AD3d 925, 926 [2009]; People v Griffin, 194 AD2d 738, 739 [1993]; People v Rivers, 109 AD2d 758, 761 [1985]). *1103 The defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed at sentencing should be waived is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Ruz, 70 NY2d 942, 943 [1988]; People v Norelius, 140 AD3d 799, 799 [2016]; People v Francis, 82 AD3d 1263, 1263 [2011]), and | 1 | 1 |
People v. Huntergreen1 sentence2017Here, the court’s limitation of the defense cross-examination was a provident exercise of its discretion (see People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 202 [1950]; People v Carey, 67 AD3d 925, 926 [2009]; People v Griffin, 194 AD2d 738, 739 [1993]; People v Rivers, 109 AD2d 758, 761 [1985]). *1103 The defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed at sentencing should be waived is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Ruz, 70 NY2d 942, 943 [1988]; People v Norelius, 140 AD3d 799, 799 [2016]; People v Francis, 82 AD3d 1263, 1263 [2011]), and | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Riversgreen | 1 | 1 |
Caci v. Stategreen1 sentence2017For this reason “ ‘the *1360 failure to strictly comply with the filing or service provisions of the Court of Claims Act divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction and compels dismissal of [a] claim’ ” (Baysah v State of New York, 134 AD3d 1304, 1305 [2015], quoting Caci v State of New York, 107 AD3d 1121, 1122 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Griffingreen1 sentence2017Here, the court’s limitation of the defense cross-examination was a provident exercise of its discretion (see People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 202 [1950]; People v Carey, 67 AD3d 925, 926 [2009]; People v Griffin, 194 AD2d 738, 739 [1993]; People v Rivers, 109 AD2d 758, 761 [1985]). *1103 The defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed at sentencing should be waived is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Ruz, 70 NY2d 942, 943 [1988]; People v Norelius, 140 AD3d 799, 799 [2016]; People v Francis, 82 AD3d 1263, 1263 [2011]), and | 1 | 1 |
Baysah v. State of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2017For this reason “ ‘the *1360 failure to strictly comply with the filing or service provisions of the Court of Claims Act divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction and compels dismissal of [a] claim’ ” (Baysah v State of New York, 134 AD3d 1304, 1305 [2015], quoting Caci v State of New York, 107 AD3d 1121, 1122 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Anthony Jonesgreen1 sentence2017Here, the court’s limitation of the defense cross-examination was a provident exercise of its discretion (see People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 202 [1950]; People v Carey, 67 AD3d 925, 926 [2009]; People v Griffin, 194 AD2d 738, 739 [1993]; People v Rivers, 109 AD2d 758, 761 [1985]). *1103 The defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed at sentencing should be waived is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Ruz, 70 NY2d 942, 943 [1988]; People v Norelius, 140 AD3d 799, 799 [2016]; People v Francis, 82 AD3d 1263, 1263 [2011]), and | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dockerygreen1 sentence2017Here, the court’s limitation of the defense cross-examination was a provident exercise of its discretion (see People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 202 [1950]; People v Carey, 67 AD3d 925, 926 [2009]; People v Griffin, 194 AD2d 738, 739 [1993]; People v Rivers, 109 AD2d 758, 761 [1985]). *1103 The defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed at sentencing should be waived is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Ruz, 70 NY2d 942, 943 [1988]; People v Norelius, 140 AD3d 799, 799 [2016]; People v Francis, 82 AD3d 1263, 1263 [2011]), and | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bonesgreen1 sentence2017Here, the court’s limitation of the defense cross-examination was a provident exercise of its discretion (see People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 202 [1950]; People v Carey, 67 AD3d 925, 926 [2009]; People v Griffin, 194 AD2d 738, 739 [1993]; People v Rivers, 109 AD2d 758, 761 [1985]). *1103 The defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed at sentencing should be waived is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Ruz, 70 NY2d 942, 943 [1988]; People v Norelius, 140 AD3d 799, 799 [2016]; People v Francis, 82 AD3d 1263, 1263 [2011]), and | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sorgegreen1 sentence2017Here, the court’s limitation of the defense cross-examination was a provident exercise of its discretion (see People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 202 [1950]; People v Carey, 67 AD3d 925, 926 [2009]; People v Griffin, 194 AD2d 738, 739 [1993]; People v Rivers, 109 AD2d 758, 761 [1985]). *1103 The defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed at sentencing should be waived is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Ruz, 70 NY2d 942, 943 [1988]; People v Norelius, 140 AD3d 799, 799 [2016]; People v Francis, 82 AD3d 1263, 1263 [2011]), and | 1 | 1 |
People v. Noreliusgreen1 sentence2017Here, the court’s limitation of the defense cross-examination was a provident exercise of its discretion (see People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 202 [1950]; People v Carey, 67 AD3d 925, 926 [2009]; People v Griffin, 194 AD2d 738, 739 [1993]; People v Rivers, 109 AD2d 758, 761 [1985]). *1103 The defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed at sentencing should be waived is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Ruz, 70 NY2d 942, 943 [1988]; People v Norelius, 140 AD3d 799, 799 [2016]; People v Francis, 82 AD3d 1263, 1263 [2011]), and | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pavaogreen1 sentence2017Here, the court’s limitation of the defense cross-examination was a provident exercise of its discretion (see People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 202 [1950]; People v Carey, 67 AD3d 925, 926 [2009]; People v Griffin, 194 AD2d 738, 739 [1993]; People v Rivers, 109 AD2d 758, 761 [1985]). *1103 The defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed at sentencing should be waived is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Ruz, 70 NY2d 942, 943 [1988]; People v Norelius, 140 AD3d 799, 799 [2016]; People v Francis, 82 AD3d 1263, 1263 [2011]), and | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ruzgreen1 sentence2017Here, the court’s limitation of the defense cross-examination was a provident exercise of its discretion (see People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 202 [1950]; People v Carey, 67 AD3d 925, 926 [2009]; People v Griffin, 194 AD2d 738, 739 [1993]; People v Rivers, 109 AD2d 758, 761 [1985]). *1103 The defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed at sentencing should be waived is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Ruz, 70 NY2d 942, 943 [1988]; People v Norelius, 140 AD3d 799, 799 [2016]; People v Francis, 82 AD3d 1263, 1263 [2011]), and | 1 | 1 |
| GOD'S CHURCH v. Miele Assoc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ferrer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Herring v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re the Accounting of Pattisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| County of Erie v. City of Buffalogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Palmer v. Moultongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gehrer v. Eisnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| De La Fuente v. DCI Telecommunications, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Von Bulow Ex Rel. Auersperg v. Von Bulowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Toys\ R\" US v. Silva"green | 1 | 1 |
| Lutheran Church in America v. City of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Dopyeragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Guillory v. Port of Houston Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown
green
2 sentences1969The United States Supreme Court has held that ‘ ‘ Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity ” (Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 ), and that while “ the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited ” (Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 716 ), “ the limitation is the exception; it is to be closely confined so as to preclude what may fairly be deemed licensing or censorship ” (Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, 441 ). 1958(See Kingsley Books v. Brown , 354 U. S. 436, 445-447 .) Indeed, the majority of the court as well, after noting that "`the protection * * * as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited'", went on, significantly, to say, "the limitation is the exception; it is to be closely confined so as to preclude what may fairly be deemed licensing or censorship" (354 U. S., at p. 441). *374 The latter is precisely what is here involved and the fact that a social problem is presented, which calls for solution, does not justify resort to unconstitutional means. | 3 | 1958–1969 |
Holy Properties Ltd. v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004The court held (at 559): “While a commercial tenancy was the subject of the litigation in Holy Props. (supra), neither the language nor reasoning employed in the decision signals an intent on the part of the Court of Appeals to abrogate the no-mitigation rule in the context of residential landlord and tenant relationships (Duda v Thompson, 169 Misc 2d 649 [Sup Ct, Westchester County]) . . . 2004The court held (at 559): " While a commercial tenancy was the subject of the litigation in Holy Props. (supra), neither the language nor reasoning employed in the decision signals an intent on the part of the Court of Appeals to abrogate the no-mitigation rule in the context of residential landlord and tenant {** 3 Misc 3d at 816 }relationships ( Duda v Thompson , 169 Misc 2d 649 [Sup Ct, Westchester County]) . . . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Whitehouse Estates, Inc. v. Post
neutral
2 sentences2004Hence, the court concludes that this plaintiff landlord is under no duty to mitigate prospective damages which will therefore be measured by both the past due and the accelerated payments . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The Appellate Term, First Department, subsequently followed the same reasoning and analysis as Justice Donovan and declined to recognize a limitation on this doctrine to the commercial context, extending the holding to the residential arena in Whitehouse Estates v Post ( 173 Misc 2d 558 [App Term, 1st Dept 1997]). 2004Hence, the court concludes that this plaintiff landlord is under no duty to mitigate prospective damages which will therefore be measured by both the past due and the accelerated payments . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The Appellate Term , First Department, subsequently followed the same reasoning and analysis as Justice Donovan and declined to recognize a limitation on this doctrine to the commercial context, extending the holding to the residential arena in Whitehouse Estates v Post ( 173 Misc 2d 558 [App Term, 1st Dept 1997]). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Duda v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2004The court held (at 559): “While a commercial tenancy was the subject of the litigation in Holy Props. (supra), neither the language nor reasoning employed in the decision signals an intent on the part of the Court of Appeals to abrogate the no-mitigation rule in the context of residential landlord and tenant relationships (Duda v Thompson, 169 Misc 2d 649 [Sup Ct, Westchester County]) . . . 2004The court held (at 559): " While a commercial tenancy was the subject of the litigation in Holy Props. (supra), neither the language nor reasoning employed in the decision signals an intent on the part of the Court of Appeals to abrogate the no-mitigation rule in the context of residential landlord and tenant {** 3 Misc 3d at 816 }relationships ( Duda v Thompson , 169 Misc 2d 649 [Sup Ct, Westchester County]) . . . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Wynne v. . Atlantic Avenue Railroad Company of Brooklyn
neutral
2 sentences1926The later cases of Fire Insurance Co. v. Village of Keeseville ( 148 N. Y. 46 ), and Buffalo Cement Co. v. McNaughton ( 90 Hun, 74 ; affd., 156 N. Y. 702 ) have given additional weight to the Wainwright case as an authority; and in McEntee v. Kingston Water Co. ( 165 N. Y. 27 ) it is said by Judge Bartlett, referring to that case: 1 It needs no argument to show that the plaintiff was a stranger to that contract.’ “ An examination of these cases and a proper limitation of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox (supra) compel the conclusion that the contract between the defendant and the town of Islip 1903Supp. 453 , affirmed 156 N. Y. 702 , 51 N. E. 1089 , have given additional weight to the Wainwright Case as an authority; and in McEntee v. Kingston Water Co., 165 N. Y. 27 , 58 N. E. 785 , it is said by Judge Bartlett, referring to that case, “It needs no argument to show that the plaintiff was a stranger to that contract.” An examination of these cases, and a proper limitation of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, supra, compel the conclusion that the contract between the defendant and the town of I slip was not made for the benefit of the plaintiff’s assignor, within the meaning of the rule i | 2 | 1903–1926 |
Lawrence v. . Fox
green
2 sentences1926The later cases of Fire Insurance Co. v. Village of Keeseville ( 148 N. Y. 46 ), and Buffalo Cement Co. v. McNaughton ( 90 Hun, 74 ; affd., 156 N. Y. 702 ) have given additional weight to the Wainwright case as an authority; and in McEntee v. Kingston Water Co. ( 165 N. Y. 27 ) it is said by Judge Bartlett, referring to that case: 1 It needs no argument to show that the plaintiff was a stranger to that contract.’ “ An examination of these cases and a proper limitation of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox (supra) compel the conclusion that the contract between the defendant and the town of Islip 1903Supp. 453 , affirmed 156 N. Y. 702 , 51 N. E. 1089 , have given additional weight to the Wainwright Case as an authority; and in McEntee v. Kingston Water Co., 165 N. Y. 27 , 58 N. E. 785 , it is said by Judge Bartlett, referring to that case, “It needs no argument to show that the plaintiff was a stranger to that contract.” An examination of these cases, and a proper limitation of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, supra, compel the conclusion that the contract between the defendant and the town of I slip was not made for the benefit of the plaintiff’s assignor, within the meaning of the rule i | 2 | 1903–1926 |
McEntee v. . Kingston Water Co.
green
2 sentences1926The later cases of Fire Insurance Co. v. Village of Keeseville ( 148 N. Y. 46 ), and Buffalo Cement Co. v. McNaughton ( 90 Hun, 74 ; affd., 156 N. Y. 702 ) have given additional weight to the Wainwright case as an authority; and in McEntee v. Kingston Water Co. ( 165 N. Y. 27 ) it is said by Judge Bartlett, referring to that case: 1 It needs no argument to show that the plaintiff was a stranger to that contract.’ “ An examination of these cases and a proper limitation of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox (supra) compel the conclusion that the contract between the defendant and the town of Islip 1903Supp. 453 , affirmed 156 N. Y. 702 , 51 N. E. 1089 , have given additional weight to the Wainwright Case as an authority; and in McEntee v. Kingston Water Co., 165 N. Y. 27 , 58 N. E. 785 , it is said by Judge Bartlett, referring to that case, “It needs no argument to show that the plaintiff was a stranger to that contract.” An examination of these cases, and a proper limitation of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, supra, compel the conclusion that the contract between the defendant and the town of I slip was not made for the benefit of the plaintiff’s assignor, within the meaning of the rule i | 2 | 1903–1926 |
People v. Corby
green
1 sentence2019Furthermore, the court's limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination with regard to DNA transfer was an improvident exercise of discretion, since the testimony defense counsel sought to elicit would have been relevant and would not have confused or misled the jury ( see People v Hayes , 17 NY3d at 53 ; People v Corby , 6 NY3d at 233-234 ; People v Davis , 43 NY2d at 27 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Crimmins
green
1 sentence2019Moreover, under the circumstances presented, the error was not harmless, as there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the defendant's convictions ( see People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 240-241 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Hayes
green
1 sentence2019Furthermore, the court's limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination with regard to DNA transfer was an improvident exercise of discretion, since the testimony defense counsel sought to elicit would have been relevant and would not have confused or misled the jury ( see People v Hayes , 17 NY3d at 53 ; People v Corby , 6 NY3d at 233-234 ; People v Davis , 43 NY2d at 27 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Davis
green
1 sentence2019Furthermore, the court's limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination with regard to DNA transfer was an improvident exercise of discretion, since the testimony defense counsel sought to elicit would have been relevant and would not have confused or misled the jury ( see People v Hayes , 17 NY3d at 53 ; People v Corby , 6 NY3d at 233-234 ; People v Davis , 43 NY2d at 27 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Suitte
green
1 sentence2017The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Owens
green
1 sentence2017Here, the court’s limitation of the defense cross-examination was a provident exercise of its discretion (see People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 202 [1950]; People v Carey, 67 AD3d 925, 926 [2009]; People v Griffin, 194 AD2d 738, 739 [1993]; People v Rivers, 109 AD2d 758, 761 [1985]). *1103 The defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed at sentencing should be waived is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Ruz, 70 NY2d 942, 943 [1988]; People v Norelius, 140 AD3d 799, 799 [2016]; People v Francis, 82 AD3d 1263, 1263 [2011]), and | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Rosario green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Bigelow green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Middleton green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| John v. Engel green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Von Steen v. Musch green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| 29 Holding Corp. v. Diaz green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Meyer v. Shearson Lehman Bros. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Martinez green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Haimes v. New York Telephone Co. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Pelham Esplanade, Inc. v. Board of Trustees green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| MATTER OF HARBISON v. City of Buffalo green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Bornholdt green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Suarez v. Underwood green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Ruttenberg v. Davidge Data Systems Corp. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Digitrex, Inc. v. Johnson green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Boulware v. New York green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Boulware green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Reisert v. . City of New York green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Morris neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Sheldon neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Gerace neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Rosado v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Lypka green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| United States v. Hensley green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Lanzi v. Brooks green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Lanzi v. Brooks green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.