limitation clause in Vermont

2024Thus, Borden stands for the principle that if the DOC contemplates imposing “punishment” for purposes of § 851, then it must first grant a hearing under § 852(b).1 Rose v. Touchette, 2021 VT 27 , 215 Vt. 555 , is to the same effect.

2002Id.

1988Thus, although a specific reference to negligence liability is not essential to effectively immunize a party from such liability, Douglass, 142 Vt. at 636 , 459 A.2d at 98 ; Lamoille Grain, 135 Vt. at 8 , 369 A.2d at 1390 , in order for the agreement to have such an effect, "words conveying a similar import must appear." Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d at 108 , 400 N.E. 2d at 310 , 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368 ; see also Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F.Supp. 262 , 273 & n. 10 (D.Me.1977) (A specific reference to negligence or a cognate, or the absence of such a reference, is a significant fact

1988Thus, although a specific reference to negligence liability is not essential to effectively immunize a party from such liability, Douglass, 142 Vt. at 636 , 459 A.2d at 98 ; Lamoille Grain, 135 Vt. at 8 , 369 A.2d at 1390 , in order for the agreement to have such an effect, "words conveying a similar import must appear." Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d at 108 , 400 N.E. 2d at 310 , 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368 ; see also Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F.Supp. 262 , 273 & n. 10 (D.Me.1977) (A specific reference to negligence or a cognate, or the absence of such a reference, is a significant fact

1988Thus, although a specific reference to negligence liability is not essential to effectively immunize a party from such liability, Douglass, 142 Vt. at 636 , 459 A.2d at 98 ; Lamoille Grain, 135 Vt. at 8 , 369 A.2d at 1390 , in order for the agreement to have such an effect, "words conveying a similar import must appear." Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d at 108 , 400 N.E. 2d at 310 , 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368 ; see also Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F.Supp. 262 , 273 & n. 10 (D.Me.1977) (A specific reference to negligence or a cognate, or the absence of such a reference, is a significant fact

1988Thus, although a specific reference to negligence liability is not essential to effectively immunize a party from such liability, Douglass, 142 Vt. at 636 , 459 A.2d at 98 ; Lamoille Grain, 135 Vt. at 8 , 369 A.2d at 1390 , in order for the agreement to have such an effect, "words conveying a similar import must appear." Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d at 108 , 400 N.E. 2d at 310 , 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368 ; see also Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F.Supp. 262 , 273 & n. 10 (D.Me.1977) (A specific reference to negligence or a cognate, or the absence of such a reference, is a significant fact

1988Thus, although a specific reference to negligence liability is not essential to effectively immunize a party from such liability, Douglass, 142 Vt. at 636 , 459 A.2d at 98 ; Lamoille Grain, 135 Vt. at 8 , 369 A.2d at 1390 , in order for the agreement to have such an effect, "words conveying a similar import must appear." Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d at 108 , 400 N.E. 2d at 310 , 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368 ; see also Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F.Supp. 262 , 273 & n. 10 (D.Me.1977) (A specific reference to negligence or a cognate, or the absence of such a reference, is a significant fact

1988Thus, although a specific reference to negligence liability is not essential to effectively immunize a party from such liability, Douglass, 142 Vt. at 636 , 459 A.2d at 98 ; Lamoille Grain, 135 Vt. at 8 , 369 A.2d at 1390 , in order for the agreement to have such an effect, "words conveying a similar import must appear." Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d at 108 , 400 N.E. 2d at 310 , 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368 ; see also Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F.Supp. 262 , 273 & n. 10 (D.Me.1977) (A specific reference to negligence or a cognate, or the absence of such a reference, is a significant fact

1987Id.

1982Capron v. Romeyn, supra, 137 Vt. at 555 , 409 A.2d at 567 .

1982Capron v. Romeyn, supra, 137 Vt. at 555 , 409 A.2d at 567 .

1966Kelley v. State, supra; Chase v. Jennifer, 219 Md. 564 , 150 A.2d 251, 254 .

1966Kelley v. State, supra; Chase v. Jennifer, 219 Md. 564 , 150 A.2d 251, 254 .

1918The presumption of law is that the writing contains the whole contract (Wason v. Rowe, 16 Vt. 525 ; Winn v. Chamberlin, supra), and the exception to this rule is where it is satisfactorily shown that, for some reason, the parties did not intend to reduce the whole contract to writing, and the portion omitted is consistent with the writing.

1918We apprehend that the limitation of this doctrine is pretty generally, and perhaps fully, stated in Winn v. Chamberlin, 32 Vt. 318 .

1918The presumption of law is that the writing contains the whole contract (Wason v. Rowe, 16 Vt. 525 ; Winn v. Chamberlin, supra), and the exception to this rule is where it is satisfactorily shown that, for some reason, the parties did not intend to reduce the whole contract to writing, and the portion omitted is consistent with the writing.

1912It was said by this Court in Simonds v. Estate of Powers, 28 Vt. 354 , that “the intention of the Legislature is the pole-star in construing a statute, and to effectuate such intention, the language of the Legislature may be enlarged or restrained, if necessary, and the construction should be on the whole statute.” And in United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556 , 11 L. ed. 724, Mr. Justice Wayne speaking for the court, it is stated as a rule, “that the meaning of the Legislature may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, from the reason or motive upon which the Legislature proceede

1912See Lampson v. New Haven, 2 Vt. 14 ; Williams v. Goddard, 8 Vt. 492 .

1912It was said by this Court in Simonds v. Estate of Powers, 28 Vt. 354 , that “the intention of the Legislature is the pole-star in construing a statute, and to effectuate such intention, the language of the Legislature may be enlarged or restrained, if necessary, and the construction should be on the whole statute.” And in United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556 , 11 L. ed. 724, Mr. Justice Wayne speaking for the court, it is stated as a rule, “that the meaning of the Legislature may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, from the reason or motive upon which the Legislature proceede

1903In Shedd v. Leslie, 22 Vt. 498 , and Clement v. Gould, 61 Vt. 573 , the contrary intention referred to was apparent and governed, and these cases show the limitation of the rule.

1903In Shedd v. Leslie, 22 Vt. 498 , and Clement v. Gould, 61 Vt. 573 , the contrary intention referred to was apparent and governed, and these cases show the limitation of the rule.

1881Moreover, this court decided in Lytle v. Bond's Estate, 40 Vt. 618 , that the limitation or exception in the proviso in case of the death or insanity of one of the parties, applies only to parties ; it does not exclude persons interested in the event of the suit, “ unless they are parties to the contract or cause of action in issue and on trial.” The witness being competent and the testimony admissible, the County Court was warranted in finding as it did that Dwinell called upon Waterman to advise him as his, Dwinell’s, attorney, and not to advise him as the attorney of Fletcher.