individualized inquiry in Illinois

2021Therefore, in the present case, the only question is whether “the record contained sufficient information on these factors for the court to consider before sentencing [Johnathan T.].” Javaun I., 2014 IL App (4th) 130189, ¶ 32 .

2021Thus, the only question is whether “the record contained sufficient information on these factors for the court to consider before sentencing respondent to [IDJJ].” Javaun I., 2014 IL App (4th) 130189, ¶ 32 .

2023Raheem M., 2013 IL App (4th) 130585, ¶ 53 .

2014In re Raheem M., 2013 IL App (4th) 130585, ¶ 45 , 1 N.E.3d 86 . ¶ 23 Before sentencing a minor to DOJJ, section 5-750 of the Juvenile Act requires, inter alia, the court to find commitment to DOJJ is the “least restrictive alternative based on evidence that efforts were made to locate less restrictive alternatives to secure confinement and the reasons why efforts were unsuccessful in locating a less restrictive alternative to secure confinement.” 705 ILCS 405/5-750(1)(b) (West 2012). ¶ 24 In making a decision to commit a minor, the statute further requires the trial court to: “[M]ake a finding

2014We can discern no reason why juveniles classified as violent offenders against youth are not entitled to an individualized hearing prior to the expiration of the 10-year registration period and prior to being required to register as adults. ¶ 64 Significantly, the court in Konetski determined that the amendments allowing minor sex offenders to remain on the juvenile registry as well as to seek termination of their registration obligation altogether were "sufficient to satisfy the minor's constitutional right to procedural due process." Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 206 .

2014We can discern no reason why juveniles classified as violent offenders against youth are not entitled to an individualized hearing prior to the expiration of the 10-year registration period and prior to being required to register as adults. ¶ 64 Significantly, the court in Konetski determined that the amendments allowing minor sex offenders to remain on the juvenile registry as well as to seek termination of their registration obligation altogether were “sufficient to satisfy the minor’s constitutional right to procedural due process.” Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 206 .

1999Paschen, 225 Ill.

1999Paschen , 225 Ill.

2025Defendant contends that the existence, type, and extent of damages require individualized determinations. -8- 1-24-1961 Defendant explains that damages would vary by class member because the number of potential violations will differ by employee, because some class members may seek actual damages rather than just statutory damages, and because defendant’s mental state must be determined as to each individual class member. ¶ 25 Bayeg v. Admiral at the Lake, 2024 IL App (1st) 231141 , is a case similarly alleging violations of the BIPA, where the court determined that if plaintiff establishes li

2025Id. § 10(a).

2021Thus, Illinois law indeed - 13 - provides a status altering dispensation by restoring firearm rights.” Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶¶ 26-27 . ¶ 34 The supreme court disagreed with the notion “civil rights” encompassed only those rights discussed in Logan and found that “(1) the right to keep and bear arms is a ‘civil right,’ (2) Illinois has a regulatory mechanism to restore those rights through an individualized determination, and (3) relief granted under section 10 of the FOID Card Act constitutes a sufficient restoration of civil rights as intended by section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).” Id. ¶ 30.

2020Thus, Illinois law indeed provides a status altering dispensation by restoring firearm rights.” Id. ¶¶ 26- 27. ¶ 29 The supreme court found that the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury were not the only three civil rights that could be restored following a conviction, “given Illinois’s mechanism for restoring civil rights and given the state of the law after District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).” Id. ¶ 30.

2020Thus, Illinois law indeed provides a status altering dispensation by restoring firearm rights.” Id. ¶¶ 26- 27. ¶ 29 The supreme court found that the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury were not the only three civil rights that could be restored following a conviction, “given Illinois’s mechanism for restoring civil rights and given the state of the law after District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).” Id. ¶ 30.

2020Thus, Illinois law indeed provides a status altering dispensation by restoring firearm rights.” Id. ¶¶ 26- 27. ¶ 29 The supreme court found that the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury were not the only three civil rights that could be restored following a conviction, “given Illinois’s mechanism for restoring civil rights and given the state of the law after District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).” Id. ¶ 30.

2020After inquiry, no juror had expressed an inability to remain impartial. ¶ 73 We find instructive People v. Luellen, 2019 IL App (1st) 172019 .

2019“The question of whether the court complied with statutory requirements is a question of law we review de novo.” In re Ashley C., 2014 IL App (4th) 131014, ¶ 22 . ¶ 60 The defendant askes that we review the trial court’s alleged sentencing issues but did not object and preserve these issues for appeal.

2019However, section 5-750 of the Act only requires a trial court to make a finding that secure confinement is necessary, but “does not require that it state every reason that it made the finding.” (Emphasis added.) In re Henry P., 2014 IL App (1st) 130241 , ¶ 61. ¶ 69 Respondent specifically argues there is no evidence that the trial court considered the individualized factors outlined in the Act as they applied to respondent.

2009Defendants who are subjected to conspiracy-based long-arm jurisdiction in Illinois must necessarily be provided the same due process protections as any other out-of-state defendant.” Cleary, 312 Ill.

1988(See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), 428 U.S. 280 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 ; Roberts v. Louisiana (1976), 428 U.S. 325 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 .) Therefore, the Constitution is not violated by a prosecutor's discretionary decision to show an individual defendant mercy or leniency.

1988(See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), 428 U.S. 280 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 ; Roberts v. Louisiana (1976), 428 U.S. 325 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 .) Therefore, the Constitution is not violated by a prosecutor's discretionary decision to show an individual defendant mercy or leniency.

1988(See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), 428 U.S. 280 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 ; Roberts v. Louisiana (1976), 428 U.S. 325 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 .) Therefore, the Constitution is not violated by a prosecutor's discretionary decision to show an individual defendant mercy or leniency.

1988(See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), 428 U.S. 280 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 ; Roberts v. Louisiana (1976), 428 U.S. 325 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 .) Therefore, the Constitution is not violated by a prosecutor's discretionary decision to show an individual defendant mercy or leniency.

1988This requirement has been consistently reaffirmed in later cases “to ensure that capital sentencing decisions rest on the individualized inquiry contemplated in Gregg." (McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 303 , 95 L.

1988This requirement has been consistently reaffirmed in later cases “to ensure that capital sentencing decisions rest on the individualized inquiry contemplated in Gregg." (McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 303 , 95 L.