individualized inquiry in Oregon

2024“The ulti- mate question is whether the state has met its burden to show that [a] defendant’s confession was a product of [the] defendant’s free will.” State v. Chavez-Meza, 301 Or App 373, 387 , 456 P3d 322 (2019), rev den, 366 Or 493 (2020); see also Powell, 352 Or at 223 (explaining that a court must make “an individualized inquiry into whether the alleged induce- ment was sufficiently compelling to influence [the] defen- dant’s decision to confess”).

2024“The ulti- mate question is whether the state has met its burden to show that [a] defendant’s confession was a product of [the] defendant’s free will.” State v. Chavez-Meza, 301 Or App 373, 387 , 456 P3d 322 (2019), rev den, 366 Or 493 (2020); see also Powell, 352 Or at 223 (explaining that a court must make “an individualized inquiry into whether the alleged induce- ment was sufficiently compelling to influence [the] defen- dant’s decision to confess”).

2016However, determining whether a “particular alert by a particular dog provides probable cause is an issue that requires an individualized inquiry, based on the totality of the circumstances known to police, which typically will include such considerations as the dog’s and its handler’s training, certification, and performance.” Id.

2013“Whether a particular alert by a particular dog provides probable cause is an issue that requires an individualized inquiry, based on the totality of the circumstances known to police, which typically will include such considerations as the dog’s and its handler’s training, certification, and performance.” Foster, 350 Or at 163 .

2015And in Thomas, the court concluded on facts similar to those here that the error in failing to give a concurrence instruction was harmless: “The evidence at trial included nothing that would lead a juror to conclude that the acts of those types described by the victims occurred on some occasions testified to by the 662 State v. Ashkins victim but not on others. * * * The defense evidence was general and designed to show that none of the incidents occurred, rather than providing an individualized defense aimed at discrete alleged instances.” Thomas, 803 P2d at 154-55 .

2015And in Thomas , the court concluded on facts similar to those here that the error in failing to give a concurrence instruction was harmless: “The evidence at trial included nothing that would lead a juror to conclude that the acts of those types described by the victims occurred on some occasions testified to by the *662 victim but not on others. *** The defense evidence was general and designed to show that none of the incidents occurred, rather than providing an individualized defense aimed at discrete alleged instances.” Thomas, 803 P2d at 154-55 .

2024Furthermore, “the juvenile court [makes] an individualized inquiry for each youth, with no particular factors entitled to greater weight.” Id. at 98 .

2024Id. at 98-100 .

2021Rather, under Miller, a sentencing court’s obligation to consider youth related mitigating factors is limited to cases in which the court imposes a sentence of life, or its equivalent, without parole.” (Emphases in original; internal citations omitted.)); James v. US, 59 A3d 1233, 1236-39 (DC 2013) (explaining that a man- datory minimum of 30 years without parole did not “fit into the Miller category” because it was not a mandatory life-without-parole sentence, but also noting that the mandatory nature of the sentence did not violate Miller or Graham because the legislature had taken youth int

2021Rather, under Miller, a sentencing court’s obligation to consider youth related mitigating factors is limited to cases in which the court imposes a sentence of life, or its equivalent, without parole.” (Emphases in original; internal citations omitted.)); James v. US, 59 A3d 1233, 1236-39 (DC 2013) (explaining that a man- datory minimum of 30 years without parole did not “fit into the Miller category” because it was not a mandatory life-without-parole sentence, but also noting that the mandatory nature of the sentence did not violate Miller or Graham because the legislature had taken youth int

2021Rather, under Miller, a sentencing court’s obligation to consider youth related mitigating factors is limited to cases in which the court imposes a sentence of life, or its equivalent, without parole.” (Emphases in original; internal citations omitted.)); James v. US, 59 A3d 1233, 1236-39 (DC 2013) (explaining that a man- datory minimum of 30 years without parole did not “fit into the Miller category” because it was not a mandatory life-without-parole sentence, but also noting that the mandatory nature of the sentence did not violate Miller or Graham because the legislature had taken youth int

2021It requires an individualized hearing only when a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.”).22 22 See also State v. Vera, 235 Ariz 571, 578, 334 P3d 754, 761 (Ariz Ct App 2014), cert den, 577 US 854 (2015) (explaining that life with the possibility of parole after 25 years is “consistent with the ‘meaningful opportunity’ for release contemplated by Miller and Graham”); State v. Delgado, 323 Conn 801, 810-11 , 151 A3d 345, 351-52 (2016) (“The eighth amendment, as interpreted by Miller, does not prohibit a court from imposing a sentence of life imprisonment with the

2017Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).