individualized hearing in Iowa

2024Next, we applied Miller’s individualized sentencing requirement to a fifty-two and one-half-year sentence in State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72 (Iowa 2013), “because an offender sentenced to a lengthy term-of-years sentence should not be worse off than an offender sentenced to life in prison without parole who has the benefit of an individualized hearing.” And in State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 403 (Iowa 2014), we held that article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution “prohibits the one-size-fits-all mandatory sentencing for juveniles.” 14 Nevertheless, we clarified that “this case does not pro

2014Finally, though neither Pearson nor Null was sentenced to life without parole, we found both sentences “effectively deprived” both teens of “the possibility of leading a more normal adult life.” Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96–97 (invalidating Pearson’s minimum sentence of thirty- five years without parole); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71 (concluding Null’s 52.5-year minimum sentence triggered an individualized hearing).

2024Next, we applied Miller’s individualized sentencing requirement to a fifty-two and one-half-year sentence in State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72 (Iowa 2013), “because an offender sentenced to a lengthy term-of-years sentence should not be worse off than an offender sentenced to life in prison without parole who has the benefit of an individualized hearing.” And in State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 403 (Iowa 2014), we held that article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution “prohibits the one-size-fits-all mandatory sentencing for juveniles.” 14 Nevertheless, we clarified that “this case does not pro

2024Next, we applied Miller’s individualized sentencing requirement to a fifty-two and one-half-year sentence in State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72 (Iowa 2013), “because an offender sentenced to a lengthy term-of-years sentence should not be worse off than an offender sentenced to life in prison without parole who has the benefit of an individualized hearing.” And in State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 403 (Iowa 2014), we held that article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution “prohibits the one-size-fits-all mandatory sentencing for juveniles.” 14 Nevertheless, we clarified that “this case does not pro

2015We also summarized five factors that a court must consider at the individualized hearing required by Miller : In Miller , the Court described the factors that the sentencing court must consider at the hearing, including: (1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the “family and home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may

2015We also summarized five factors that a court must consider at the individualized hearing required by Miller : In Miller , the Court described the factors that the sentencing court must consider at the hearing, including: (1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the “family and home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may

2018As a remedy, Anderson contends our supreme court’s holding in State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 884 (Iowa 2009), requires his case be remanded for an individualized hearing.

2016In Lyle , we noted that death is no longer irreconcilably "different for juveniles and extended the requirement of an individualized hearing when sentencing juveniles for lesser crimes for which the legislature has prescribed mandatory adult sentences. 854 N.W.2d at 396-98 ; see also Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 883-84 (applying Roper concepts outside the death-penalty context).

2015We also summarized five factors that a court must consider at the individualized hearing required by Miller: In Miller, the Court described the factors that the sentencing court must consider at the hearing, including: (1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the “family and home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may ha

2015We also summarized five factors that a court must consider at the individualized hearing required by Miller : In Miller , the Court described the factors that the sentencing court must consider at the hearing, including: (1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the “family and home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may

2014Finally, though neither Pearson nor Null was sentenced to life without parole, we found both sentences “effectively deprived” both teens of “the possibility of leading a more normal adult life.” Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96–97 (invalidating Pearson’s minimum sentence of thirty- five years without parole); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71 (concluding Null’s 52.5-year minimum sentence triggered an individualized hearing).

2014Finally, though neither Pearson nor Null was sentenced to life without parole, we found both sentences “effectively deprived” both teens of “the possibility of leading a more normal adult life.” Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96-97 (invalidating Pearson’s minimum sentence of thirty-five years without parole); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71 (concluding Null’s 52.5-year minimum sentence triggered an individualized hearing).

2014Such an inquiry is essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear . . . .”). 21 Furthermore, institutions cannot merely look to “accepted academic norms,” in exploring reasonable accommodations—because reasonable alternatives may often “involve new approaches or devices quite beyond ‘accepted academic norms.’ ” Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 , 106 S. Ct. 507, 513 , 88 L.

2014Such an inquiry is essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear . . . .”). 21 Furthermore, institutions cannot merely look to “accepted academic norms,” in exploring reasonable accommodations—because reasonable alternatives may often “involve new approaches or devices quite beyond ‘accepted academic norms.’ ” Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 , 106 S. Ct. 507, 513 , 88 L.

2009State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Iowa 2008); Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 749 ; State v. Rubino, 602 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Iowa 1999); State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1999).

2009State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Iowa 2008); Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 749 ; State v. Rubino, 602 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Iowa 1999); State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1999).

2009State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Iowa 2008); Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 749 ; State v. Rubino, 602 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Iowa 1999); State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1999).

2009State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Iowa 2008); Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 749 ; State v. Rubino, 602 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Iowa 1999); State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1999).

2009State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Iowa 2008); Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 749 ; State v. Rubino, 602 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Iowa 1999); State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1999).

2009State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Iowa 2008); Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 749 ; State v. Rubino, 602 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Iowa 1999); State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1999).

2024Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 148 . “[I]f the court follows our outlined sentencing procedure by 5 conducting an individualized hearing, applies the Miller/Lyle/Roby factors, and imposes a sentence authorized by statute and supported by the evidence, then we affirm the sentence.” State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372 , 387 (Iowa 2020); accord id. at 388–91 (describing in detail the analysis required for each factor).

2019Although Roby received an individualized hearing, we upheld Roby’s illegal sentence claim, noting that “the district court applied the [Miller/Lyle/Seats] factors, but not in the manner required to protect the juvenile offender from cruel and unusual punishment.” Id.

2016In re Det. of Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455 , 459–60 (Iowa 2004). 7 recommended “with a reasonable degree of professional certainty” that Taft should move to transitional release.

2016In re Det. of Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 459-60 (Iowa 2004).

2014Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 , 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1130-31 , 94 L.Ed.2d 307, 320 (“[T]he [fact finder] will need to conduct an individualized inquiry and make appropriate findings of fact.

1995Smith v. ADM Feed Corp., 456 N.W.2d 378, 385 (Iowa 1990); cf. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 , 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1130 , 94 L.Ed.2d 307 , 320 (1987) (interpreting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).

2022Id. at 304 ; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (“[A]n individualized decision is essential in capital cases.”).

2016See id. at 552-53 (noting “a district court did not abuse its discretion if the evidence supports the sentence”). 7 III.

2014Thomas Univ., Inc., 768 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1234 (S.D.Fla.2010) (explaining school could not invoke “across-the-board” GPA requirement as basis for dismissal and noting court could not “ignore the fact that [school dean] did provide accommodations, and with them Forbes earned a [satisfactory GPA].”).

2004See Iowa Code § 229A.2(5) (requiring a condition that “predispos[es] that person to commit sexually violent offenses to a degree which would constitute a menace to the health and safety of others”); id. § 229A.2(11) (requiring the offender to “suffer[ ] from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility”) (emphasis added); cf. In re Commitment of Adams, 223 Wis.2d 60 , 588 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Ct.App.1998) (stating that the Wisconsin civil commitment statute focuses “on the person who is t

2004See Iowa Code § 229A.2(5) (requiring a condition that “predispos[es] that person to commit sexually violent offenses to a degree which would constitute a menace to the health and safety of others”); id. § 229A.2(11) (requiring the offender to “suffer[ ] from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility”) (emphasis added); cf. In re Commitment of Adams, 223 Wis.2d 60 , 588 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Ct.App.1998) (stating that the Wisconsin civil commitment statute focuses “on the person who is t

1995Smith v. ADM Feed Corp., 456 N.W.2d 378, 385 (Iowa 1990); cf. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 , 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1130 , 94 L.Ed.2d 307 , 320 (1987) (interpreting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).