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27 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1993–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2024The Court did, however, allow a discretionary imposition of this sentence based on an individualized hearing, requiring judges to consider "how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 480 . 2019He contends that the statutory scheme does not allow judges to exercise their *1218 discretion to impose anything less than a life sentence, with the possibility of parole, after an individualized hearing. 4 He argues that such a mandatory sentence for a conviction of murder in the second degree is disproportional in light of the decisions in Okoro , 471 Mass. 51 , 26 N.E.3d 1092 ; Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 471 Mass. 12 , 27 N.E.3d 349 (2015) ( Diatchenko II ); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) ( Diatchenko | 4 | 7 |
Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Boardgreen2 sentences2025Doe No. 205614, 466 Mass. at 608 . 2025See Doe No. 205614, 466 Mass. at 608 . | 1 | 2 |
Doe v. Attorney Generalgreen2 sentences2012See also Doe v. Attorney Gen., 430 Mass. 155, 168 (1999) (sex offender entitled to “an individualized hearing to determine whether he is a present threat to children because of the likelihood that he will reof-fend” [emphasis added]). 2000In Doe v. Attorney Gen., 430 Mass. 155 (1999), the court held that one must be given an individualized hearing prior to registering as a sex offender, absent a showing that the offender “poses a grave threat to children and other vulnerable populations and that the risk of reoffense in those circumstances is compelling.” Id. at 165 . | 1 | 2 |
Cox v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.green2 sentences2006Co., 414 Mass. 375, 383-384 (1993) (“In most cases” trial judge “will need to conduct an individualized inquiry” to determine whether an individual is a “qualified handicapped person” under G. 2004Co., 414 Mass. at 383 , quoting from School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 . | 1 | 2 |
Godfrey v. Massachusetts Medical Servicegreen1 sentence2025Serv., 359 Mass. 610, 620 (1971), quoting Spear v. H.V. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Perezgreen1 sentence2024Nor is our determination in Diatchenko I inconsistent with our decision in Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 679 (2017) (Perez I), S.C., 480 Mass. 562 (2018) (Perez II), which required an individualized hearing "where a juvenile is sentenced for a nonmurder offense or offenses and the aggregate time to be served prior to parole eligibility exceeds that applicable to a juvenile convicted of murder." That hearing is different from the individualized hearing that we concluded was not possible in Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 669-670 , because the hearing required by Perez I does not concern whet | 1 | 1 |
In re Pers. Restraint of Monschkegreen1 sentence2024See Matter of the Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wash. 2d at 325 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rossgreen1 sentence2019See State v. Ross , 423 S.C. 504 , 513, 815 S.E.2d 754 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
Roper v. Simmonsgreen2 sentences2018In regard to the individualized inquiry, we have further explained: "Given current scientific research on adolescent brain development, and the myriad significant ways that this development impacts a juvenile's personality and behavior, a conclusive showing of traits such as an 'irretrievably depraved character,' Roper , 543 U.S. at 570 [ 125 S.Ct. 1183 ], can never be made, with integrity, by the Commonwealth at an individualized hearing to determine *630 whether a sentence of life without parole should be imposed on a juvenile homicide offender. 2018In regard to the individualized inquiry, we have further explained: "Given current scientific research on adolescent brain development, and the myriad significant ways that this development impacts a juvenile's personality and behavior, a conclusive showing of traits such as an 'irretrievably depraved character,' Roper , 543 U.S. at 570 [ 125 S.Ct. 1183 ], can never be made, with integrity, by the Commonwealth at an individualized hearing to determine *630 whether a sentence of life without parole should be imposed on a juvenile homicide offender. | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Police Commissioner of Bostongreen1 sentence2015Although we concluded in Doe v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 460 Mass. 342, 343 (2011), that this restriction was unconstitutional without an individualized hearing to determine the risk posed by the petitioner to the vulnerable community sought to be protected, the restriction is instructive of legislative intent. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense With Consent to Adoptiongreen1 sentence2014Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 383 Mass. 573, 593 (1981), and includes such factors as the risk of harm to any of the siblings by the proposed visitation, taking into account, inter alia, the emotional and physical health of the children, and whether any of the siblings has a history of violence or abuse. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsongreen1 sentence2014In addition, he claimed that the judge sentenced him to CPSL under the mistaken belief that its imposition was mandatory when in fact it is discretionary for first-time offenders under Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 677 (2012); that he was not given an individualized hearing to determine if CPSL was warranted in his case; that CPSL constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence because the defendant was effectively sentenced to more than two and one-half ye | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Bell Atlanticgreen1 sentence2013Nor did the Plaintiff’s closing argument to the jury in any way make such a claim.” Although, generally, a “[d]etermination of a job’s essential functions requires an individualized inquiry” typically reserved for a fact finder, and an “employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential is a factor to be considered, but it is not controlling!,]” Smith v. Bell Atl., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 702, 712 (2005) (quotation omitted), both Carleton v. Commonwealth, supra, and Everett v. 357 Corp., supra, illustrate instances where a question with respect to a dispositive prong of the plaintiff’s prima fa | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Boardgreen1 sentence2012Cf. Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 24341 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 386 (2009) (classification hearing “entail[s] meaningful consideration of [Doe’s] claim that he presents no current risk of reoffense or threat to the public” [emphasis added]). | 1 | 1 |
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.red1 sentence2004Accord Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (“whether a person has a disability under the [Americans with Disabilities Act] is an individualized inquiry”) 6 ; Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Guidelines: Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap Chapter 151B, § B.A.6 (1998) (MCAD Guidelines) (“determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity depends on the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and the permanent or long-term impact of the impairment”). | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Attorney Generalgreen2 sentences1999After this court’s decision in Doe v. Attorney Gen., supra, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction precluding the board from requiring him to register under the Act, 1 and precluding any further dissemination of sex offender registration information about him until after he had been granted an individualized hearing establishing the appropriateness of that requirement as applied to him. 1999See id. at 146 . | 1 | 1 |
Aime v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1999L. c. 265, § 23, must be afforded an individualized hearing as a condition of registration. 17 We do so by balancing “the individual interest at stake and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty or property under the procedures that the State seeks to use against the governmental interest in achieving its goals.” Doe (No. 3), supra at 140, citing Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 675 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Samuelgreen1 sentence1996See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Samuel, 398 Mass. 93, 96 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District
green
2 sentences2024Nor is our determination in Diatchenko I inconsistent with our decision in Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 679 (2017) (Perez I), S.C., 480 Mass. 562 (2018) (Perez II), which required an individualized hearing "where a juvenile is sentenced for a nonmurder offense or offenses and the aggregate time to be served prior to parole eligibility exceeds that applicable to a juvenile convicted of murder." That hearing is different from the individualized hearing that we concluded was not possible in Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 669-670 , because the hearing required by Perez I does not concern whet 2019He contends that the statutory scheme does not allow judges to exercise their *1218 discretion to impose anything less than a life sentence, with the possibility of parole, after an individualized hearing. 4 He argues that such a mandatory sentence for a conviction of murder in the second degree is disproportional in light of the decisions in Okoro , 471 Mass. 51 , 26 N.E.3d 1092 ; Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 471 Mass. 12 , 27 N.E.3d 349 (2015) ( Diatchenko II ); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) ( Diatchenko | 2 | 2019–2024 |
Waller v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2017In Jones , a case decided after the trial in this case, the Supreme Judicial Court held that, "before the courtroom properly may be closed during a rape shield procedure, the trial judge must conduct an individualized analysis consistent with the constitutional requirements set forth in [ Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39 (1984) ]." Id . at 729. 2015Our conclusion simply means that, in view of the importance of the public trial right, before the court room properly may be closed during a rape shield procedure, the trial judge must conduct an individualized analysis consistent with the constitutional requirements set forth in Waller, supra. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 598 , is instructive. | 2 | 2015–2017 |
School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline
green
2 sentences2004Co., 414 Mass. at 383 , quoting from School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 . 1993Such an inquiry is essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of protecting handi capped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns of [employers] as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks.” School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, supra at 287 . | 2 | 1993–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Perez
green
1 sentence2024Nor is our determination in Diatchenko I inconsistent with our decision in Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 679 (2017) (Perez I), S.C., 480 Mass. 562 (2018) (Perez II), which required an individualized hearing "where a juvenile is sentenced for a nonmurder offense or offenses and the aggregate time to be served prior to parole eligibility exceeds that applicable to a juvenile convicted of murder." That hearing is different from the individualized hearing that we concluded was not possible in Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 669-670 , because the hearing required by Perez I does not concern whet | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Okoro
green
2 sentences2019He contends that the statutory scheme does not allow judges to exercise their *1218 discretion to impose anything less than a life sentence, with the possibility of parole, after an individualized hearing. 4 He argues that such a mandatory sentence for a conviction of murder in the second degree is disproportional in light of the decisions in Okoro , 471 Mass. 51 , 26 N.E.3d 1092 ; Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 471 Mass. 12 , 27 N.E.3d 349 (2015) ( Diatchenko II ); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) ( Diatchenko 2019He contends that the statutory scheme does not allow judges to exercise their *1218 discretion to impose anything less than a life sentence, with the possibility of parole, after an individualized hearing. 4 He argues that such a mandatory sentence for a conviction of murder in the second degree is disproportional in light of the decisions in Okoro , 471 Mass. 51 , 26 N.E.3d 1092 ; Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 471 Mass. 12 , 27 N.E.3d 349 (2015) ( Diatchenko II ); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) ( Diatchenko | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District Commonwealth v. Roberio
green
2 sentences2019He contends that the statutory scheme does not allow judges to exercise their *1218 discretion to impose anything less than a life sentence, with the possibility of parole, after an individualized hearing. 4 He argues that such a mandatory sentence for a conviction of murder in the second degree is disproportional in light of the decisions in Okoro , 471 Mass. 51 , 26 N.E.3d 1092 ; Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 471 Mass. 12 , 27 N.E.3d 349 (2015) ( Diatchenko II ); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) ( Diatchenko 2019He contends that the statutory scheme does not allow judges to exercise their *1218 discretion to impose anything less than a life sentence, with the possibility of parole, after an individualized hearing. 4 He argues that such a mandatory sentence for a conviction of murder in the second degree is disproportional in light of the decisions in Okoro , 471 Mass. 51 , 26 N.E.3d 1092 ; Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 471 Mass. 12 , 27 N.E.3d 349 (2015) ( Diatchenko II ); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. , 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) ( Diatchenko | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Grady v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2019North Carolina's GPS monitoring program applies not only to individuals under State penal supervision, but also to people with a prior conviction who are "not otherwise subject to any direct supervision by State officers." See id . 13 The South Carolina Supreme Court similarly interpreted the decision in Grady v. North Carolina , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1368 , 1370, 191 L.Ed.2d 459 (2015), to require "an individualized inquiry into the reasonableness of the [GPS monitoring] search in every case," because "of the widely varying circumstances that may lead to automatic, mandatory electronic mon 2019North Carolina's GPS monitoring program applies not only to individuals under State penal supervision, but also to people with a prior conviction who are "not otherwise subject to any direct supervision by State officers." See id . 13 The South Carolina Supreme Court similarly interpreted the decision in Grady v. North Carolina , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1368 , 1370, 191 L.Ed.2d 459 (2015), to require "an individualized inquiry into the reasonableness of the [GPS monitoring] search in every case," because "of the widely varying circumstances that may lead to automatic, mandatory electronic mon | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, County of Norfolk
green
2 sentences2015Our conclusion simply means that, in view of the importance of the public trial right, before the court room properly may be closed during a rape shield procedure, the trial judge must conduct an individualized analysis consistent with the constitutional requirements set forth in Waller, supra. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 598 , is instructive. 2015Our conclusion simply means that, in view of the importance of the public trial right, before the court room properly may be closed during a rape shield procedure, the trial judge must conduct an individualized analysis consistent with the constitutional requirements set forth in Waller, supra. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 598 , is instructive. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 689 . 2005Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.