individualized inquiry in Washington

2019We review the adequacy of the trial court’s individualized inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay legal financial obligations (LFOs) de novo.19 In general, a court must impose mandatory LFOs regardless of the defendant’s ability to pay.2° However, RCW 9.94A.777 requires that if a defendant is unable to participate in gainful employment because of a mental disorder, the sentencing judge must determine if he has the ability to pay before imposing LFOs other than restitution or the victim penalty assessment (VPA):21 (1) Before imposing any legal financial obligations upon a defendant who suffe

2018Although a sentencing court must make an individualized inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs, “the legislature has divested courts of the discretion to consider a defendant’s ability to pay when imposing [mandatory LFOs].” Lundy, 176 Wn.

2018This is important because our court has held that any Miller "fix" must include an individualized hearing and " 'take into account how children are different [from *604 adults].' " 2 See State v. Ramos, 187 Wash.2d 420 , 428, 387 P.3d 650 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 467 , 199 L.Ed.2d 355 (2017).

2018This is important because our court has held that any Miller "fix" must include an individualized hearing and " 'take into account how children are different [from *604 adults].' " 2 See State v. Ramos, 187 Wash.2d 420 , 428, 387 P.3d 650 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 467 , 199 L.Ed.2d 355 (2017).

2017In light of Blazina, as well as our Supreme Court’s decision to review unpreserved challenges to LFOs, in State v. Lyle, 184 Wn.2d 1040 , 365 P.3d 1263 (2016), and State v. Marks, 185 Wn.2d 143 , 368 P.3d 485 (2016), we exercise its discretion under RAP 2.5(a) and review Valdez’s challenge to the LFOs imposed. 36 No. 48740-3-II Before imposing discretionary LFOs, the trial court must make an individualized inquiry into the defendant’s present and future ability to pay.

2017In light of Blazina, as well as our Supreme Court’s decision to review unpreserved challenges to LFOs, in State v. Lyle, 184 Wn.2d 1040 , 365 P.3d 1263 (2016), and State v. Marks, 185 Wn.2d 143 , 368 P.3d 485 (2016), we exercise its discretion under RAP 2.5(a) and review Valdez’s challenge to the LFOs imposed. 36 No. 48740-3-II Before imposing discretionary LFOs, the trial court must make an individualized inquiry into the defendant’s present and future ability to pay.

2017Sinclair, 192 Wn.

2016State v. Sinclair, 192 Wn.

2016To the extent trial counsel believed otherwise, a “ ‘significant change in the law’ requires that the law, not counsels’ understanding of the law on an unsettled question, has changed.” State v. Miller, 185 Wn.2d 111, 116 , 371 P.3d 528 (2016). ¶15 Blazina did not constitute a significant change in the law for purposes of RCW 10.73.100(6).

2016To the extent trial counsel believed otherwise, a “ ‘significant change in the law’ requires that the law, not counsels’ understanding of the law on an unsettled question, has changed.” State v. Miller, 185 Wn.2d 111, 116 , 371 P.3d 528 (2016). ¶15 Blazina did not constitute a significant change in the law for purposes of RCW 10.73.100(6).

2018This is important because our court has held that any Miller "fix" must include an individualized hearing and " 'take into account how children are different [from *604 adults].' " 2 See State v. Ramos, 187 Wash.2d 420 , 428, 387 P.3d 650 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 467 , 199 L.Ed.2d 355 (2017).

2018This is important because our court has held that any Miller "fix" must include an individualized hearing and " 'take into account how children are different [from *604 adults].' " 2 See State v. Ramos, 187 Wash.2d 420 , 428, 387 P.3d 650 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 467 , 199 L.Ed.2d 355 (2017).

2017In light of Blazina, as well as our Supreme Court’s decision to review unpreserved challenges to LFOs, in State v. Lyle, 184 Wn.2d 1040 , 365 P.3d 1263 (2016), and State v. Marks, 185 Wn.2d 143 , 368 P.3d 485 (2016), we exercise its discretion under RAP 2.5(a) and review Valdez’s challenge to the LFOs imposed. 36 No. 48740-3-II Before imposing discretionary LFOs, the trial court must make an individualized inquiry into the defendant’s present and future ability to pay.

2016App. 848 , 355 P.3d 327 (2015), petition for review granted in part, ___ Wn.2d ___, 365 P.3d 1263 (2016). 12 Schechert also testified at trial that he was under contract to rent-to-own the property at 2315 Sidney Avenue, that he was subletting the property to other individuals, and there is no indication that he was no longer under contract to acquire the property. 16 No. 46459-4-II discretionary LFOs13 as required under RCW 10.01.160(3).

2017It must consider factors like incarceration and the defendant's other debts.6 IState v. Hardesty, 129 Wn.2d 303, 317 , 915 P.2d 1080 (1996). 2 State v. Clark, 191 Wn.

2017But the transcript of the resentencing hearing shows that the trial court considered Blackmon's financial circumstances. 9 Clark, 191 Wn.

2017This individualized Miller hearing “gives effect to Miller’s substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect tran sient immaturity.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. _ , 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 , 193 L.

2017This individualized Miller hearing “gives effect to Miller’s substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect tran sient immaturity.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. _ , 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 , 193 L.

2016Restraint of Flippo. 191 Wn.

2016But 6 Division Three of this court seemed to reach the opposite conclusion in In re Personal Restraint of Flippo, 191 Wn.

2015They specifically argue that juveniles are treated like adults without an individualized inquiry into the nature of the offenses and the maturity of the juveniles. ¶9 Houston-Sconiers and Roberts acknowledge that our Supreme Court has previously upheld the automatic decline statute’s constitutionality in In re Boot, 130 Wn.2d 553 , 925 P.2d 964 (1996), but they argue that the reasoning on which the court relied has been rejected.

2015Houston-Sconiers and Roberts acknowledge that our Supreme Court has previously upheld the automatic decline statute’s constitutionality in In re Boot, 130 Wn.2d 553 , 925 P.2d 964 (1996), but they argue that the reasoning on which the court relied has been rejected.

2015They specifically argue that juveniles are treated like adults without an individualized inquiry into the nature of the offenses and the maturity of the juveniles. ¶9 Houston-Sconiers and Roberts acknowledge that our Supreme Court has previously upheld the automatic decline statute’s constitutionality in In re Boot, 130 Wn.2d 553 , 925 P.2d 964 (1996), but they argue that the reasoning on which the court relied has been rejected.

2015Houston-Sconiers and Roberts acknowledge that our Supreme Court has previously upheld the automatic decline statute’s constitutionality in In re Boot, 130 Wn.2d 553 , 925 P.2d 964 (1996), but they argue that the reasoning on which the court relied has been rejected.

2026Once a defendant establishes a constitutional error, it is “presumed to be prejudicial and the State bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless.” State v. Watt, 160 Wn.2d 626, 635 , 160 P.3d 640 (2007).

2026Once a defendant establishes a constitutional error, it is “presumed to be prejudicial and the State bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless.” State v. Watt, 160 Wn.2d 626, 635 , 160 P.3d 640 (2007).

2025Jackson, 195 Wn.2d at 853 (quoting State v. Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d 863, 887-88 , 959 P.2d 1061 (1998)). 15 No. 58990-7-II “Therefore, ‘[a] trial court must engage in an individualized inquiry into the use of restraints prior to every court appearance’ to determine whether the restraints are necessary for courtroom security.” Luthi, 3 Wn.3d at 256 (quoting Jackson, 195 Wn.2d at 854 ) (alteration in original).

2025Jackson, 195 Wn.2d at 854 ; Clark, 143 Wn.2d at 774 .

2025Jackson, 195 Wn.2d at 853 (quoting State v. Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d 863, 887-88 , 959 P.2d 1061 (1998)). 15 No. 58990-7-II “Therefore, ‘[a] trial court must engage in an individualized inquiry into the use of restraints prior to every court appearance’ to determine whether the restraints are necessary for courtroom security.” Luthi, 3 Wn.3d at 256 (quoting Jackson, 195 Wn.2d at 854 ) (alteration in original).

2025See id. at 263 ; Gordon, 172 Wn.2d at 676 .