19 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 2004–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nolley, Erron Keithgreen2 sentences2020It requires an individualized hearing only when a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 428 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. Crim. 2018It requires an individualized hearing only when a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole." Id. | 1 | 3 |
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.red2 sentences2006Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 527 U.S. 471, 483 , 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999). 2006Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 527 U.S. 471, 483 , 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Romerogreen2 sentences2004We accordingly hold that trial courts must make an individualized inquiry in each case to determine whether the trial testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized will be sufficiently reliable to qualify for admission. 745 P.2d at 1016 . [8] Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243-44 . [9] Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243 . [10] Romero, 745 P.2d at 1016-17 (citations omitted; footnote omitted). [11] "Clear and convincing" was, however, the standard of proof required by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525 , 432 A.2d 86 (1981), when that court addressed the admissibility of hypnotically-induced 2004We accordingly hold that trial courts must make an individualized inquiry in each case to determine whether the trial testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized will be sufficiently reliable to qualify for admission. 745 P.2d at 1016 . . | 1 | 2 |
McCardle v. Stategreen1 sentence2020App. 2014); see also McCardle v. State, 550 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
Kansas v. Marshgreen1 sentence2019PUNISHMENT-PHASE EVIDENCE: OPINION TESTIMONY AND 258 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976). 259 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983). 260 See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 171 (2006) (“[A]s a requirement of individualized sentencing, a jury must have the opportunity to consider all evidence relevant to mitigation . . . .”); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381 (1999) (“[I]n order to satisfy the requirement that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry, a scheme must allow a ‘broad inquiry’ into all ‘constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Blystone v. Pennsylvaniagreen1 sentence2019PUNISHMENT-PHASE EVIDENCE: OPINION TESTIMONY AND 258 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976). 259 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983). 260 See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 171 (2006) (“[A]s a requirement of individualized sentencing, a jury must have the opportunity to consider all evidence relevant to mitigation . . . .”); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381 (1999) (“[I]n order to satisfy the requirement that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry, a scheme must allow a ‘broad inquiry’ into all ‘constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Turner, Litrey Demondgreen1 sentence2019Similarly, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that the analysis from Miller does not require that “all juvenile offenders” be given “individualized sentencing” and only “requires an individualized hearing . . . when a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.” Id.; see also Turner v. State, 443 S.W.3d 128, 129 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019PUNISHMENT-PHASE EVIDENCE: OPINION TESTIMONY AND 258 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976). 259 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983). 260 See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 171 (2006) (“[A]s a requirement of individualized sentencing, a jury must have the opportunity to consider all evidence relevant to mitigation . . . .”); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381 (1999) (“[I]n order to satisfy the requirement that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry, a scheme must allow a ‘broad inquiry’ into all ‘constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Jurek v. Texasgreen1 sentence2019PUNISHMENT-PHASE EVIDENCE: OPINION TESTIMONY AND 258 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976). 259 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983). 260 See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 171 (2006) (“[A]s a requirement of individualized sentencing, a jury must have the opportunity to consider all evidence relevant to mitigation . . . .”); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381 (1999) (“[I]n order to satisfy the requirement that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry, a scheme must allow a ‘broad inquiry’ into all ‘constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Barefoot v. Estellered1 sentence2019PUNISHMENT-PHASE EVIDENCE: OPINION TESTIMONY AND 258 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976). 259 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983). 260 See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 171 (2006) (“[A]s a requirement of individualized sentencing, a jury must have the opportunity to consider all evidence relevant to mitigation . . . .”); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381 (1999) (“[I]n order to satisfy the requirement that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry, a scheme must allow a ‘broad inquiry’ into all ‘constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 12669green1 sentence2014Additionally, Smith presented no evidence supporting how her alleged limitations of any major life activities actually manifested, either in the instances of the three missed IRS payments or in any other scenario.3 Although, as Smith points out, the term “substantially limits” should be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage of employees, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(1)(i) (Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Definitions), courts must nonetheless make an individualized inquiry into whether the employee has identified any specific limitations due to the disability, see Burch, 3 City employe | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Millergreen1 sentence2007See, e.g., Doe, 405 F.3d at 709 (concluding that the absence of an individualized hearing to determine a sex offender's dangerousness "does not offend principles of procedural due process"); State v. Seering, 70 1N. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2019Id. at 863–64. 2014He cites the Supreme Court’s language that “Graham, 10 Roper, 11 and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles,” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2475 , for the proposition that courts should read Miller to apply to their jurisdiction’s strictest penalty. 12 Appellant’s reliance is misplaced. | 2 | 2014–2019 |
State v. Druktenis
green
2 sentences2009SORNA’s [Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s] message is that no chance should be taken, even were a sex offender able to present evidence in an individualized hearing that he or she is integrateable into society and neither a recidivist nor a current danger, since the risk of harm to society, no matter what the evidence, is still too great if exceptions were permitted, a risk the Legislature simply refuses to take. 135 N.M. at 241 , 86 P.3d at 1068 . 2009SORNA’s [Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s] message is that no chance should be taken, even were a sex offender able to present evidence in an individualized hearing that he or she is integrateable into society and neither a recidivist nor a current danger, since the risk of harm to society, no matter what the evidence, is still too great if exceptions were permitted, a risk the Legislature simply refuses to take. 135 N.M. at 241 , 86 P.3d at 1068 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Hood
green
2 sentences2009Likewise, the New York Supreme Court in the Hood case rejected a defendant’s assertion that the sex offender registration statute violated substantive due process by failing to include a “no risk” category exempting purportedly non-dangerous offenders from registration. 790 N.Y.S.2d at 758–59. 2009Likewise, the New York Supreme Court in the Hood case rejected a defendant’s assertion that the sex offender registration statute violated substantive due process by failing to include a “no risk” category exempting purportedly non-dangerous offenders from registration. 790 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Zani v. State
red
2 sentences2004We accordingly hold that trial courts must make an individualized inquiry in each case to determine whether the trial testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized will be sufficiently reliable to qualify for admission. 745 P.2d at 1016 . [8] Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243-44 . [9] Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243 . [10] Romero, 745 P.2d at 1016-17 (citations omitted; footnote omitted). [11] "Clear and convincing" was, however, the standard of proof required by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525 , 432 A.2d 86 (1981), when that court addressed the admissibility of hypnotically-induced 2004We accordingly hold that trial courts must make an individualized inquiry in each case to determine whether the trial testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized will be sufficiently reliable to qualify for admission. 745 P.2d at 1016 . [8] Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243-44 . [9] Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243 . [10] Romero, 745 P.2d at 1016-17 (citations omitted; footnote omitted). [11] "Clear and convincing" was, however, the standard of proof required by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525 , 432 A.2d 86 (1981), when that court addressed the admissibility of hypnotically-induced | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Jones v. Flowers
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 233–36. 4 notice Mitchell’s facts, emphasizing that whether due process was satisfied is an individualized inquiry. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Stonebridge Life Insurance Co. v. Pitts
green
1 sentence2022Given the complexities of a trial involving equitable claims like Dickson’s and assuming her claims are typical of the members of the class, we conclude the individual differences “between each class member’s experience . . . could determine in whose favor the equities weigh in resolving their claims.” 47 Because Dickson failed to prove at the outset that individual issues governing her equitable claims alleging argument, American General suggests it would be entitled to argue in the trial of equitable defenses and claims to prove that an individual submitted a materially misleading affidavit | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Timothy Garrett Lane and Choat Enterprises, Inc. v. Silverio Martinez, II and Diana Martinez, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Silverio Martinez, III
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 351 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Seering
green
1 sentence2007See, e.g., Doe , 405 F.3d at 709 (concluding that the absence of an individualized hearing to determine a sex offender's dangerousness "does not offend principles of procedural due process"); State v. Seering , 701 N. W.2d 655 , 666 (Iowa 2005) (finding that the plaintiff "has not even explained how the [Iowa] residency restriction statute" violates "a private interest in freedom of choice in residence"). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Hurd
green
2 sentences2004We accordingly hold that trial courts must make an individualized inquiry in each case to determine whether the trial testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized will be sufficiently reliable to qualify for admission. 745 P.2d at 1016 . [8] Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243-44 . [9] Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243 . [10] Romero, 745 P.2d at 1016-17 (citations omitted; footnote omitted). [11] "Clear and convincing" was, however, the standard of proof required by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525 , 432 A.2d 86 (1981), when that court addressed the admissibility of hypnotically-induced 2004We accordingly hold that trial courts must make an individualized inquiry in each case to determine whether the trial testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized will be sufficiently reliable to qualify for admission. 745 P.2d at 1016 . [8] Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243-44 . [9] Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243 . [10] Romero, 745 P.2d at 1016-17 (citations omitted; footnote omitted). [11] "Clear and convincing" was, however, the standard of proof required by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525 , 432 A.2d 86 (1981), when that court addressed the admissibility of hypnotically-induced | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.