10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Comeau v. Arizona State Board of Dental Examinersgreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Comeau, 196 Ariz. at 107, ¶ 23 (“We hold that the investigative interview in this case satisfied the requirements of procedural due process.”). ¶13 At the March 4 hearing, the treatment provider’s clinical director testified that e-mail is Appellant’s preferred mode of communication and that Appellant advised e-mail is “how he wanted to communicate.” The record includes numerous e-mail messages from clinical staff to Appellant with details about the court proceedings and hearings. | 1 | 1 |
State v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC.green2 sentences2014See e.g., Williams, 125 Ariz. 575 , 611 P.2d 928 . 7 We, therefore, disapprove of the County Attorney’s blanket policy of putting the marijuana provision in all plea agreements. ¶ 26 In this DUI matter with marijuana implications and a prior DUI conviction, the trial judge erred by automatically rejecting the marijuana provision rather than engaging in an individualized analysis as to whether the condition was reasonable as to this defendant. 2014See e.g., Williams, 125 Ariz. 575 , 611 P.2d 928 . 7 We, therefore, disapprove of the County Attorney’s blanket policy of putting the marijuana provision in all plea agreements. ¶ 26 In this DUI matter with marijuana implications and a prior DUI conviction, the trial judge erred by automatically rejecting the marijuana provision rather than engaging in an individualized analysis as to whether the condition was reasonable as to this defendant. | 1 | 1 |
State v. DePianogreen2 sentences2004The State argues that State v. DePiano, 187 Ariz. 27 , 926 P.2d 494 (1996), a case subsequent to the Bartlett jurisprudence that disapproved of the Bartlett II court’s conclusion requiring an individualized analysis, provides the proper test. 2004The State argues that State v. DePiano, 187 Ariz. 27 , 926 P.2d 494 (1996), a case subsequent to the Bartlett jurisprudence that disapproved of the Bartlett II court’s conclusion requiring an individualized analysis, provides the proper test. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-96430green2 sentences1986The decision to transfer a juvenile to adult jurisdiction may be made only after an individualized inquiry which focuses on the juvenile himself and the nature of the offense. “[TJransfer decisions should be keyed ... to the individual.” In the Matter of the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-96430, 142 Ariz. 515, 520 , 690 P.2d 816, 821 (1984). 1986The decision to transfer a juvenile to adult jurisdiction may be made only after an individualized inquiry which focuses on the juvenile himself and the nature of the offense. “[TJransfer decisions should be keyed ... to the individual.” In the Matter of the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-96430, 142 Ariz. 515, 520 , 690 P.2d 816, 821 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ariana Miles v. Kirkland's Stores, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026Id. at 1226 . ¶19 Nor does the evidence support the superior court’s conclusion that the calculation of overtime owed to each class member is straightforward. • Correctional officers work eight-, ten-, or twelve-hour shifts. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Long
green
1 sentence2026Long, 207 Ariz. at 145–46, ¶ 27 ("[W]e conduct an individualized analysis, examining the specific circumstances of this case."). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Furgal
green
1 sentence2018In support of this conclusion we also cited the following holding from Furgal , 13 A.3d at 278-79 : "[w]e do not read Salerno to hold that all statutory bail schemes must include an individualized inquiry into a defendant's dangerousness in order to pass constitutional muster." Simpson II , Id . ¶ 53 Unfortunately, Simpson II also adopted several holdings from Lopez-Valenzuela that find no basis in Salerno . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Simpson v. Miller ex rel. County of Maricopa
green
2 sentences2018The Court held that absent such an individualized hearing, any offense-based approach must be premised on crimes that "inherently predict future dangerousness," id. at 349 ¶ 30, 387 P.3d at 1278 , and therefore serve as a "convincing proxy for unmanageable flight risk or dangerousness," id . at 348-49 ¶¶ 26-27, 387 P.3d at 1277 -78 (quoting Lopez-Valenzuela , 770 F.3d at 786 ). ¶ 48 Ultimately, Simpson II concluded that the bond provision, on its face, violated due process because sexual conduct with a minor is not a "convincing proxy for ... dangerousness." Id . at 348-49 ¶¶ 26-27, 387 P.3d a 2018The Court held that absent such an individualized hearing, any offense-based approach must be premised on crimes that "inherently predict future dangerousness," id. at 349 ¶ 30, 387 P.3d at 1278 , and therefore serve as a "convincing proxy for unmanageable flight risk or dangerousness," id . at 348-49 ¶¶ 26-27, 387 P.3d at 1277 -78 (quoting Lopez-Valenzuela , 770 F.3d at 786 ). ¶ 48 Ultimately, Simpson II concluded that the bond provision, on its face, violated due process because sexual conduct with a minor is not a "convincing proxy for ... dangerousness." Id . at 348-49 ¶¶ 26-27, 387 P.3d a | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Rendel v. Mummert
green
2 sentences2018In such cases, an individualized determination serves no narrowing function and is therefore unnecessary. ¶ 35 In enacting the On-Release provision, Arizona voters left "the keys to continued freedom" in the hands of felony defendants who enjoy pretrial release. 2 Rendel , 106 Ariz. at 238 , 474 P.2d at 829 . 2018In such cases, an individualized determination serves no narrowing function and is therefore unnecessary. ¶ 35 In enacting the On-Release provision, Arizona voters left "the keys to continued freedom" in the hands of felony defendants who enjoy pretrial release. 2 Rendel , 106 Ariz. at 238 , 474 P.2d at 829 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Angel Lopez-Valenzuela v. County of Maricopa
green
1 sentence2018The Court held that absent such an individualized hearing, any offense-based approach must be premised on crimes that "inherently predict future dangerousness," id. at 349 ¶ 30, 387 P.3d at 1278 , and therefore serve as a "convincing proxy for unmanageable flight risk or dangerousness," id . at 348-49 ¶¶ 26-27, 387 P.3d at 1277 -78 (quoting Lopez-Valenzuela , 770 F.3d at 786 ). ¶ 48 Ultimately, Simpson II concluded that the bond provision, on its face, violated due process because sexual conduct with a minor is not a "convincing proxy for ... dangerousness." Id . at 348-49 ¶¶ 26-27, 387 P.3d a | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Vaknin
green
2 sentences2004A sentencing court should undertake an individualized inquiry; what constitutes sufficient causation can only be determined case by case, in a fact-specific probe. 112 F.3d at 589-90 . 2004We find the First Circuit’s “modified but for standard,” id., to be a practical articulation of the Arizona standard and consistent with this state’s caselaw. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Bible
green
2 sentences2004As noted in Bible , and set forth at length above, supra ¶¶ 15-18, fundamental error analysis is "fact intensive" and "the same error may be fundamental in one case but not in another." 175 Ariz. at 572 , 858 P.2d at 1175 . 2004As noted in Bible , and set forth at length above, supra ¶¶ 15-18, fundamental error analysis is "fact intensive" and "the same error may be fundamental in one case but not in another." 175 Ariz. at 572 , 858 P.2d at 1175 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Neder v. United States
green
2 sentences2004As the Court explained in Neder , "[a] reviewing court making this harmless-error inquiry does not ... `become in effect a second jury to determine whether the defendant is guilty.'" 527 U.S. at 19 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting R. 2004As the Court explained in Neder , "[a] reviewing court making this harmless-error inquiry does not ... `become in effect a second jury to determine whether the defendant is guilty.'" 527 U.S. at 19 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting R. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Solem v. Helm
red
1 sentence1985In Solem , the court prefaced its analysis by stating that the question of cruel and unusual punishment cannot be considered in the abstract. 103 S.Ct. at 3008 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.