individualized inquiry in California

2015(Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 249 , quoting Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1202 .) As a result, parole applicants have a “due process liberty interest in parole” and “ ‘an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.’ ” (Lawrence, at pp. 1191, 1204, quoting In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 654 (Rosenkrantz).) The Board must, consistent with due process, answer the “essential question” of “whether the inmate currently

2015(Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 249 , quoting Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1202 .) As a result, parole applicants have a “due process liberty interest in parole” and “ ‘an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.’ ” (Lawrence, at pp. 1191, 1204, quoting In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 654 (Rosenkrantz).) The Board must, consistent with due process, answer the “essential question” of “whether the inmate currently

2015(Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 249 , quoting Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1202 .) As a result, parole applicants have a “due process liberty interest in parole” and “ ‘an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.’ ” (Lawrence, at pp. 1191, 1204, quoting In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 654 (Rosenkrantz).) The Board must, consistent with due process, answer the “essential question” of “whether the inmate currently

2015(Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 249 , quoting Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1202 .) As a result, parole applicants have a “due process liberty interest in parole” and “ ‘an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.’ ” (Lawrence, at pp. 1191, 1204, quoting In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 654 (Rosenkrantz).) The Board must, consistent with due process, answer the “essential question” of “whether the inmate currently

2017(See Leatherbury v. C&H Sugar Co. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 911 F.Supp.2d 872, 883-884 [employee’s ‘“description of his typical day” showed that ‘“his primary duties were either the direct supervision of the union employees or other activities that were ‘directly and closely related to exempt work’ or were ‘a means for carrying out exempt functions or [were] closely related to the supervision of the union employees’ ”]; Maddock v. KB Homes, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2007) 248 F.R.D. 229, 242 [when classifying employees as exempt or nonexempt, California law ‘“calls first for an individualized inquiry into the work

2017Cal. 2007) 248 F.R.D. 229, 242 [when classifying employees as exempt or non-exempt, California law “calls first for an individualized inquiry into the work actually performed in a typical workweek by the employee to determine how much of that work is exempt”].) Here, neither Batze nor Hayes testified that his responsibilities varied markedly from store to store or week to week, and Cesar affirmatively testified that his responsibilities did not.

2015(See In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["In the absence of clear waiver, whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge," fn. omitted]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413 , 418, 168 Cal.Rptr. 8 ["The court in Arbuckle held that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who accepts the guilty plea pursuant to plea bargain"]; People v. Pedregon (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 723 , 725, 171 Cal.Rptr. 468 [referring to "the Arbuckle court's finding of an implicit term in every plea bargain t

2015(See In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["In the absence of clear waiver, whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge," fn. omitted]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413 , 418, 168 Cal.Rptr. 8 ["The court in Arbuckle held that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who accepts the guilty plea pursuant to plea bargain"]; People v. Pedregon (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 723 , 725, 171 Cal.Rptr. 468 [referring to "the Arbuckle court's finding of an implicit term in every plea bargain t

2015(See In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["In the absence of clear waiver, whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge," fn. omitted]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413 , 418, 168 Cal.Rptr. 8 ["The court in Arbuckle held that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who accepts the guilty plea pursuant to plea bargain"]; People v. Pedregon (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 723 , 725, 171 Cal.Rptr. 468 [referring to "the Arbuckle court's finding of an implicit term in every plea bargain t

2015(See In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["In the absence of clear waiver, whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge," fn. omitted]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413 , 418, 168 Cal.Rptr. 8 ["The court in Arbuckle held that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who accepts the guilty plea pursuant to plea bargain"]; People v. Pedregon (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 723 , 725, 171 Cal.Rptr. 468 [referring to "the Arbuckle court's finding of an implicit term in every plea bargain t

2015Bell Telephone Co. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1060 [“existence of a uniform policy does not limit a trial court’s inquiry into whether class action treatment is appropriate”]; Dailey, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 989 ; see also Arenas v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 723, 734 (Arenas) [“[t]he trial court concluded plaintiffs’ theory of recovery—that managers, based solely on their job descriptions, were as a rule misclassified—was not amenable to common proof” given evidence employees’ “duties and time spent on individual tasks varied widely”].) To the contrary, “courts

2011(E.g., Arenas v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 723, 734 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 15 ] [theory of recovery that managers were misclassified on the basis of their job descriptions not amenable to common proof where evidence showed that managers’ duties and time spent on individual tasks varied significantly from one restaurant to another]; Ali v. U.S.A.

2011(See Nguyen, supra, 2009 WL 7742532 at p. *6 & fn. 19 [evidence showed that level of supervision provided varied among putative class members based on a number of factors; even the plaintiff’s “expert conceded that the supervision determination under 5053 ‘really does come down to a fact-and-circumstances analysis’ ”]; Ho II, supra, 2009 WL 111729 at pp. *3-*4 [finding a triable issue of fact as to the level of “general supervision” provided to an entry level accountant]; see also Campbell, supra, 253 F.R.D. at p. 601 [“These rules [(Bus. & Prof.

2010But the assumption behind such an intuitively appealing argument is that an employer should somehow be bound by its prior position—which is foreclosed by Walsh . ‘[I]n resolving questions of California law, this court is bound by the pronouncement of the California Supreme Court . . . and the opinions of the California Courts of Appeal are merely data for determining how the highest California court would rule . . . [but] the opinion of the Courtfs] of Appeal[s] on questions of California law cannot simply be ignored.’ [Citation.]” (Campbell v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, supra, 253 F.R.D. at

2023(Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1052 ; Lampe, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 848 [question of whether a missed meal period “was due to the employer’s failure to allow it or from the employee’s voluntary choice” required an individualized inquiry, precluding class certification].) In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s predominance finding on the no-relief Rest Break Class, so the court did not abuse its discretion by denying certification of the class.

2021(Id. at p. 848.) The court concluded that “[t]he question of whether a missed meal break was due to the employer’s failure to allow it or from the employee’s voluntary choice not to take it requires an individualized inquiry.” (Ibid.) Citing Brinker, the court noted that individual evidence concerning the reasons why any particular employee did not take a meal period is more likely to predominate where “the employer need only offer meal periods, but need not ensure employees take their meals.” (Lampe, at p. 850, citing Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1040–1041.) The same analysis applies her

2015(Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 249 , quoting Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1202 .) As a result, parole applicants have a “due process liberty interest in parole” and “ ‘an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.’ ” (Lawrence, at pp. 1191, 1204, quoting In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 654 (Rosenkrantz).) The Board must, consistent with due process, answer the “essential question” of “whether the inmate currently

2013In Shaputis II, the Supreme Court stressed the differing roles of a parole authority and the courts: “It bears emphasis that while ‘subjective analysis’ is an inherent aspect of the parole suitability determination, it plays a proper role only in the parole authority’s determination. [Citation.] The courts’ function is one of objective review, limited to ensuring that the Board’s or Governor’s analysis of the public safety risk entailed in a grant of parole is based on- a modicum of evidence, not mere guesswork. [Citation.] It is the parole authority’s duty to conduct an individualized inquiry

2020Because this is an individualized inquiry and parenting style and relationships differ greatly between families, the juvenile court must take caution before denying a contested hearing on this issue when a parent has clearly maintained regular contact with the child.” (Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 614-615.) In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeal also rejected the Los Angeles County Department of Child and Family Service’s [DCFS] arguments that the father’s offer of proof was insufficient because (1) “the proposed testimony would not provide new information to the court since

2020Because this is an individualized inquiry and parenting styles and relationships differ greatly between families, the juvenile court must take caution before denying a contested hearing on this issue when a parent has clearly maintained regular contact with the child.” (Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 614-615.) In Grace P., relied on by parents, this division concluded a juvenile court abuses its discretion if it denies a contested hearing on the beneficial parent-child relationship exception when a parent— who has consistently visited his or her children—offers testimony about “the qual

2015(Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 249 , quoting Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1202 .) As a result, parole applicants have a “due process liberty interest in parole” and “ ‘an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.’ ” (Lawrence, at pp. 1191, 1204, quoting In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 654 (Rosenkrantz).) The Board must, consistent with due process, answer the “essential question” of “whether the inmate currently

2012Accordingly, as we have discussed, the Board must determine, consistent with due process, the “essential question” of “whether the inmate currently poses a threat to public safety.” (Shaputis II, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 209, 220.) The Board answers this question by conducting “an individualized inquiry” into the inmate’s suitability for parole (id. at p. 219), “drawing] . . . answers from the entire record, including the facts of the offense, the inmate’s progress during incarceration, and the insight he or she has achieved into past behavior.” (Id. at p. 221, italics added.) It is required t

2018(See Bluford v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 864 , 873, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 212 ["Because Safeway's liability can be determined by law and facts common to all members of the class, the class will be certified even if the class members must individually prove their damages."].) 9 2.

2018(See Bluford v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 864 , 873, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 212 ["Because Safeway's liability can be determined by law and facts common to all members of the class, the class will be certified even if the class members must individually prove their damages."].) 9 2.

2017(See Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 716 [“Ultimately, courts must consider each statement in context in order to [determine admissibility under section 1230]”]; U.S. v. Smalls (10th Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 765, 786 [trial court erred by excluding entire confession that included some statements that were admissible as against penal interest, and remanding with directions to “determine what parts of [defendant’s] extended confession are sufficiently against his penal interest and therefore admissible”].) C.

2017(See Grimes , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 716 , 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 378 P.3d 320 ["Ultimately, courts must consider each statement in context in order to [determine admissibility under section 1230 ]"]; U.S. v. Smalls (10th Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 765 , 786 [trial court erred by excluding entire confession that included some statements that were admissible as against penal interest, and remanding with directions to "determine what parts of [defendant's] extended confession are sufficiently against his penal interest and therefore admissible"].) C.

2017(See Grimes , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 716 , 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 378 P.3d 320 ["Ultimately, courts must consider each statement in context in order to [determine admissibility under section 1230 ]"]; U.S. v. Smalls (10th Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 765 , 786 [trial court erred by excluding entire confession that included some statements that were admissible as against penal interest, and remanding with directions to "determine what parts of [defendant's] extended confession are sufficiently against his penal interest and therefore admissible"].) C.

2017(See Grimes , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 716 , 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 378 P.3d 320 ["Ultimately, courts must consider each statement in context in order to [determine admissibility under section 1230 ]"]; U.S. v. Smalls (10th Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 765 , 786 [trial court erred by excluding entire confession that included some statements that were admissible as against penal interest, and remanding with directions to "determine what parts of [defendant's] extended confession are sufficiently against his penal interest and therefore admissible"].) C.

2015(See In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["In the absence of clear waiver, whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge," fn. omitted]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413 , 418, 168 Cal.Rptr. 8 ["The court in Arbuckle held that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who accepts the guilty plea pursuant to plea bargain"]; People v. Pedregon (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 723 , 725, 171 Cal.Rptr. 468 [referring to "the Arbuckle court's finding of an implicit term in every plea bargain t

2015(See In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["In the absence of clear waiver, whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge," fn. omitted]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413 , 418, 168 Cal.Rptr. 8 ["The court in Arbuckle held that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who accepts the guilty plea pursuant to plea bargain"]; People v. Pedregon (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 723 , 725, 171 Cal.Rptr. 468 [referring to "the Arbuckle court's finding of an implicit term in every plea bargain t

2015(See In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["In the absence of clear waiver, whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge," fn. omitted]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413 , 418, 168 Cal.Rptr. 8 ["The court in Arbuckle held that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who accepts the guilty plea pursuant to plea bargain"]; People v. Pedregon (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 723 , 725, 171 Cal.Rptr. 468 [referring to "the Arbuckle court's finding of an implicit term in every plea bargain t

2015(See In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["In the absence of clear waiver, whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge," fn. omitted]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413 , 418, 168 Cal.Rptr. 8 ["The court in Arbuckle held that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who accepts the guilty plea pursuant to plea bargain"]; People v. Pedregon (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 723 , 725, 171 Cal.Rptr. 468 [referring to "the Arbuckle court's finding of an implicit term in every plea bargain t

2015(See In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["In the absence of clear waiver, whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge," fn. omitted]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413 , 418, 168 Cal.Rptr. 8 ["The court in Arbuckle held that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who accepts the guilty plea pursuant to plea bargain"]; People v. Pedregon (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 723 , 725, 171 Cal.Rptr. 468 [referring to "the Arbuckle court's finding of an implicit term in every plea bargain t

2015(See In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["In the absence of clear waiver, whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge," fn. omitted]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413 , 418, 168 Cal.Rptr. 8 ["The court in Arbuckle held that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who accepts the guilty plea pursuant to plea bargain"]; People v. Pedregon (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 723 , 725, 171 Cal.Rptr. 468 [referring to "the Arbuckle court's finding of an implicit term in every plea bargain t

2014See id.

2013We need not rely on Miller however, to find Allen‟s sentence unauthorized, as the California statute does not permit LWOP sentences for defendants who were 14 or 15 years old at the time they committed murder. (§ 190.5; People v. Demirdjian (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 10, 17 (Demirdjian).) Although the California Supreme Court has not reached the issue of Miller‟s applicability to murder, the court did make clear that a life sentence with a parole settings. [Citation.] And . . . a child‟s character is not as „well formed‟ as an adult‟s; his traits are „less fixed‟ and his actions less likely to be