individualized inquiry in Ohio

2011As the district aptly notes, “the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits one or more of an individual’s major life activities is an individualized inquiry.” District’s summary judgment motion, p. 18, citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, (2002), 534 U.S. 184 , 122 S.Ct. 681 , 151 L.Ed.2d 615 . {¶ 58} In addition to Dr. Bray’s conclusions, evidence exists from two other doctors that Johnson is “disabled,” the “disability is permanent,” and the “disability poses a direct threat of harm” to her.

2011As the district aptly notes, “the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits one or more of an individual’s major life activities is an individualized inquiry.” District’s summary judgment motion, p. 18, citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, (2002), 534 U.S. 184 , 122 S.Ct. 681 , 151 L.Ed.2d 615 . {¶ 58} In addition to Dr. Bray’s conclusions, evidence exists from two other doctors that Johnson is “disabled,” the “disability is permanent,” and the “disability poses a direct threat of harm” to her.

2011I would find that the appellant has established an identifiable class. {¶ 30} The majority concludes that appellant’s class definition is overly broad because appellant includes “all account holders who were charged interest or finance charges for any reason, even if the charged interest or finance charges were unrelated to the alleged improper account practices relating to promotional purchases.” The majority found that this definition would require the trial court to conduct an individualized inquiry with respect to each account. {¶ 31} However, “Civ.R. 23 does not require a class certificat

2011I would find that the appellant has established an identifiable class. {¶ 30} The majority concludes that appellant’s class definition is overly broad because appellant includes “all account holders who were charged interest or finance charges for any reason, even if the charged interest or finance charges were unrelated to the alleged improper account practices relating to promotional purchases.” The majority found that this definition would require the trial court to conduct an individualized inquiry with respect to each account. {¶ 31} However, “Civ.R. 23 does not require a class certificat

2022Glenn, 165 Ohio St.3d 432 , 2021-Ohio-3369 , 179 N.E.3d 1205, at ¶ 28 ; Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411 , 2015-Ohio-1480 , 31 N.E.3d 633, at ¶ 8 .

2022Glenn, 165 Ohio St.3d 432 , 2021-Ohio-3369 , 179 N.E.3d 1205, at ¶ 28 ; Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411 , 2015-Ohio-1480 , 31 N.E.3d 633, at ¶ 8 .

2022Glenn, 165 Ohio St.3d 432 , 2021-Ohio-3369 , 179 N.E.3d 1205, at ¶ 28 ; Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411 , 2015-Ohio-1480 , 31 N.E.3d 633, at ¶ 8 .

2022Glenn, 165 Ohio St.3d 432 , 2021-Ohio-3369 , 179 N.E.3d 1205, at ¶ 28 ; Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411 , 2015-Ohio-1480 , 31 N.E.3d 633, at ¶ 8 .

2017Thus, “[a]scertaining whether a plaintiff is disabled requires an individualized inquiry into her particular condition and its affect on her ability to perform a major life activity.” Id. at 892 .

2017“The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.” (Citation omitted.) Id. {¶51} The Sixth Circuit recognized that drug addiction is a “physical or mental impairment,” but stated that “[a] plaintiff cannot prove that her drug use amounts to a disabling addiction merely by providing self-serving, conclusory statements that her drug use substantially limits her ability to perform a major life activity.” Id. at 893 , citing Cerve

2011I would find that the appellant has established an identifiable class. {¶ 30} The majority concludes that appellant’s class definition is overly broad because appellant includes “all account holders who were charged interest or finance charges for any reason, even if the charged interest or finance charges were unrelated to the alleged improper account practices relating to promotional purchases.” The majority found that this definition would require the trial court to conduct an individualized inquiry with respect to each account. {¶ 31} However, “Civ.R. 23 does not require a class certificat

2011I would find that the appellant has established an identifiable class. {¶ 30} The majority concludes that appellant’s class definition is overly broad because appellant includes “all account holders who were charged interest or finance charges for any reason, even if the charged interest or finance charges were unrelated to the alleged improper account practices relating to promotional purchases.” The majority found that this definition would require the trial court to conduct an individualized inquiry with respect to each account. {¶ 31} However, “Civ.R. 23 does not require a class certificat

2007Co. (C.A.4, 2006), 445 F.3d 311 , 319 . {¶ 40} In cases where an element of a claim may be sufficiently established by inference or presumption, the predominance requirement will be held to be met, even where the element in question might otherwise require an individualized inquiry into each class member's situation.

2007Nothing in the record before us suggests that the difference in appellant's sentence from that of his co-defendant is a result of anything other than the individualized factors the court applied to appellant. {¶ 34} Also, we do not agree with appellant's allegation that the trial court erred because his sentence is inconsistent with the sentence imposed upon the defendants in Lloyd , supra, and State v. Pillar , 11th Dist.

2007No. 82657, 2004-Ohio-2559 , 2004 WL 1119619 , and Hoang v. E*Trade Group, Inc., 151 Ohio App.3d 363 , 2003-Ohio-301 , 784 N.E.2d 151 , show that above all else, actual injury is “key” and that the only way to determine actual injury is through an individualized inquiry.

2007No. 82657, 2004-Ohio-2559 , 2004 WL 1119619 , and Hoang v. E*Trade Group, Inc., 151 Ohio App.3d 363 , 2003-Ohio-301 , 784 N.E.2d 151 , show that above all else, actual injury is “key” and that the only way to determine actual injury is through an individualized inquiry.

2007No. 2002-L-055, 2003-Ohio-6692 .

2007The crux of their arguments, as in the first appeal, focuses on their contention that determining who would be included within the class, i.e., who “authorized” a charge or agreed to a membership, would require an individualized inquiry. 10 However, we agree with plaintiffs that Ritt I is controlling here and is the law of this case. *221 {¶ 73} The law-of-the-case doctrine was established by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3-4 , 462 N.E.2d 410 : {¶ 74} “[T]he doctrine provides that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on

2007The crux of their arguments, as in the first appeal, focuses on their contention that determining who would be included within the class, i.e., who “authorized” a charge or agreed to a membership, would require an individualized inquiry. 10 However, we agree with plaintiffs that Ritt I is controlling here and is the law of this case. *221 {¶ 73} The law-of-the-case doctrine was established by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3-4 , 462 N.E.2d 410 : {¶ 74} “[T]he doctrine provides that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on

2007State v. Bayer (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 172 , 656 N.E.2d 1314 .

2007State v. Bayer (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 172 , 656 N.E.2d 1314 .

2003This would obviate the purpose of a class action. {¶ 35} Similarly, in Petty v. Walmart (2002), 148 Ohio App.3d 348 , the Second Appellate District affirmed the lower court's order, which denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

1999Id.