intermediate standard in Georgia

2007When, in cases concerning punitive damages, reviewing a motion for directed verdict, the trial and appellate courts have the same basic task: each must determine as a matter of law whether the evidence was sufficient under the clear and convincing standard. [Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 218 Ga. App. 248, 255, n. 2 ( 461 SE2d 877 ) (1995) (the appellate court will not defer to the trial judge’s determination if there is any evidence “whatsoever” to support it; rather, the issue on appeal remains whether there is any evidence sufficient “under the clear and convincing standard”), rev’d on

2007When, in cases concerning punitive damages, reviewing a motion for directed verdict, the trial and appellate courts have the same basic task: each must determine as a matter of law whether the evidence was sufficient under the clear and convincing standard. [Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 218 Ga. App. 248, 255, n. 2 ( 461 SE2d 877 ) (1995) (the appellate court will not defer to the trial judge’s determination if there is any evidence “whatsoever” to support it; rather, the issue on appeal remains whether there is any evidence sufficient “under the clear and convincing standard”), rev’d on

2018We agree that the current record contains no clear and convincing evidence that termination of the guardianship would cause K.M. physical or long-term emotional harm. 8 See Clarke v. Cotton , 207 Ga.App. 883 , 884, 429 S.E.2d 291 (1993) (under Georgia law, " 'clear and convincing evidence' is 'an intermediate standard of proof' ... which is greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily employed in civil proceedings, but less than the reasonable doubt standard applicable in criminal proceedings"), quoting Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745 , 756, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d

2018We agree that the current record contains no clear and convincing evidence that termination of the guardianship would cause K.M. physical or long-term emotional harm. 8 See Clarke v. Cotton , 207 Ga.App. 883 , 884, 429 S.E.2d 291 (1993) (under Georgia law, " 'clear and convincing evidence' is 'an intermediate standard of proof' ... which is greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily employed in civil proceedings, but less than the reasonable doubt standard applicable in criminal proceedings"), quoting Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745 , 756, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d

2026D., 346 Ga. App. at 259 (1) (punctuation omitted). “[C]lear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof which is greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily employed in civil proceedings, but less than the reasonable doubt standard applicable in criminal proceedings.” In the Interest of K.

2019D., 346 Ga. App. 257, 259 (1) ( 816 SE2d 132 ) (2018) (punctuation and footnote omitted). “[Under] Georgia law, clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof which is greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily employed in civil proceedings, but less than the reasonable doubt standard applicable in criminal proceedings.” In the Interest of K. 16 M., 344 Ga. App. 838, 847 (2) ( 811 SE2d 505 ) (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2023Notwithstanding the above, a DNA test showing paternity creates a rebuttable presumption of kinship.3 A party whose kinship is in question may petition the court for DNA testing upon “good cause shown[.]”4 The Appellants in this case did not request DNA testing, but instead relied on OCGA § 53-2-3 (2) (A) (v): “clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of the father.” “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence,’ but less than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applicable in criminal cases.”5 In Varner

2023Notwithstanding the above, a DNA test showing paternity creates a rebuttable presumption of kinship.3 A party whose kinship is in question may petition the court for DNA testing upon “good cause shown[.]”4 The Appellants in this case did not request DNA testing, but instead relied on OCGA § 53-2-3 (2) (A) (v): “clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of the father.” “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence,’ but less than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applicable in criminal cases.”5 In Varner

2021Co. v. Purdy, 283 Ga. App. 21, 32 (7) ( 640 SE2d 620 ) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021Co. v. Purdy, 283 Ga. App. 21, 32 (7) ( 640 SE2d 620 ) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024According to Karen, the only testimony at the declaratory judgment hearing was from the temporary administrator. 3 estate of the decedent, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created.” OCGA § 7-1-813 (a); see also Howard v. Leonard, 330 Ga. App. 331, 336 (1) ( 765 SE2d 466 ) (2014); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 281 Ga. App. 756, 760 (1) ( 637 SE2d 56 ) (2006); Godwin v. Johnson, 197 Ga. App. 829, 830 (1) ( 399 SE2d 581 ) (1990). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence

2024According to Karen, the only testimony at the declaratory judgment hearing was from the temporary administrator. 3 estate of the decedent, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created.” OCGA § 7-1-813 (a); see also Howard v. Leonard, 330 Ga. App. 331, 336 (1) ( 765 SE2d 466 ) (2014); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 281 Ga. App. 756, 760 (1) ( 637 SE2d 56 ) (2006); Godwin v. Johnson, 197 Ga. App. 829, 830 (1) ( 399 SE2d 581 ) (1990). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence

2024According to Karen, the only testimony at the declaratory judgment hearing was from the temporary administrator. 3 estate of the decedent, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created.” OCGA § 7-1-813 (a); see also Howard v. Leonard, 330 Ga. App. 331, 336 (1) ( 765 SE2d 466 ) (2014); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 281 Ga. App. 756, 760 (1) ( 637 SE2d 56 ) (2006); Godwin v. Johnson, 197 Ga. App. 829, 830 (1) ( 399 SE2d 581 ) (1990). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence

2024According to Karen, the only testimony at the declaratory judgment hearing was from the temporary administrator. 3 estate of the decedent, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created.” OCGA § 7-1-813 (a); see also Howard v. Leonard, 330 Ga. App. 331, 336 (1) ( 765 SE2d 466 ) (2014); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 281 Ga. App. 756, 760 (1) ( 637 SE2d 56 ) (2006); Godwin v. Johnson, 197 Ga. App. 829, 830 (1) ( 399 SE2d 581 ) (1990). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence

2024According to Karen, the only testimony at the declaratory judgment hearing was from the temporary administrator. 3 estate of the decedent, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created.” OCGA § 7-1-813 (a); see also Howard v. Leonard, 330 Ga. App. 331, 336 (1) ( 765 SE2d 466 ) (2014); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 281 Ga. App. 756, 760 (1) ( 637 SE2d 56 ) (2006); Godwin v. Johnson, 197 Ga. App. 829, 830 (1) ( 399 SE2d 581 ) (1990). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence

2024According to Karen, the only testimony at the declaratory judgment hearing was from the temporary administrator. 3 estate of the decedent, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created.” OCGA § 7-1-813 (a); see also Howard v. Leonard, 330 Ga. App. 331, 336 (1) ( 765 SE2d 466 ) (2014); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 281 Ga. App. 756, 760 (1) ( 637 SE2d 56 ) (2006); Godwin v. Johnson, 197 Ga. App. 829, 830 (1) ( 399 SE2d 581 ) (1990). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence

2023Notwithstanding the above, a DNA test showing paternity creates a rebuttable presumption of kinship.3 A party whose kinship is in question may petition the court for DNA testing upon “good cause shown[.]”4 The Appellants in this case did not request DNA testing, but instead relied on OCGA § 53-2-3 (2) (A) (v): “clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of the father.” “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence,’ but less than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applicable in criminal cases.”5 In Varner

2023Notwithstanding the above, a DNA test showing paternity creates a rebuttable presumption of kinship.3 A party whose kinship is in question may petition the court for DNA testing upon “good cause shown[.]”4 The Appellants in this case did not request DNA testing, but instead relied on OCGA § 53-2-3 (2) (A) (v): “clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of the father.” “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence,’ but less than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applicable in criminal cases.”5 In Varner

2023Notwithstanding the above, a DNA test showing paternity creates a rebuttable presumption of kinship.3 A party whose kinship is in question may petition the court for DNA testing upon “good cause shown[.]”4 The Appellants in this case did not request DNA testing, but instead relied on OCGA § 53-2-3 (2) (A) (v): “clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of the father.” “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence,’ but less than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applicable in criminal cases.”5 In Varner

2023Notwithstanding the above, a DNA test showing paternity creates a rebuttable presumption of kinship.3 A party whose kinship is in question may petition the court for DNA testing upon “good cause shown[.]”4 The Appellants in this case did not request DNA testing, but instead relied on OCGA § 53-2-3 (2) (A) (v): “clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of the father.” “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence,’ but less than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applicable in criminal cases.”5 In Varner

2023Notwithstanding the above, a DNA test showing paternity creates a rebuttable presumption of kinship.3 A party whose kinship is in question may petition the court for DNA testing upon “good cause shown[.]”4 The Appellants in this case did not request DNA testing, but instead relied on OCGA § 53-2-3 (2) (A) (v): “clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of the father.” “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence,’ but less than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applicable in criminal cases.”5 In Varner

2023Notwithstanding the above, a DNA test showing paternity creates a rebuttable presumption of kinship.3 A party whose kinship is in question may petition the court for DNA testing upon “good cause shown[.]”4 The Appellants in this case did not request DNA testing, but instead relied on OCGA § 53-2-3 (2) (A) (v): “clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of the father.” “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is an intermediate standard of proof, greater than ‘the preponderance of evidence,’ but less than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applicable in criminal cases.”5 In Varner

2020Still less, of course, can such damages be charged against one who acts under an innocent mistake in engaging in conduct that nevertheless constitutes a tort.”). 9 See Ga. Clinic, P.C. v. Stout, 323 Ga. App. 487, 491 (1) ( 747 SE2d 83 ) (2013) (punctuation & citation omitted); accord Clarke v. Cotton, 263 Ga. 861, 861 ( 440 SE2d 165 ) (1994). 10 Nicole Jones testified at trial that the family stopped using the invisible electric-fence system because it established rules to no longer allow the dog outside of the home off of a leash.

2020Still less, of course, can such damages be charged against one who acts under an innocent mistake in engaging in conduct that nevertheless constitutes a tort.”). 9 See Ga. Clinic, P.C. v. Stout, 323 Ga. App. 487, 491 (1) ( 747 SE2d 83 ) (2013) (punctuation & citation omitted); accord Clarke v. Cotton, 263 Ga. 861, 861 ( 440 SE2d 165 ) (1994). 10 Nicole Jones testified at trial that the family stopped using the invisible electric-fence system because it established rules to no longer allow the dog outside of the home off of a leash.

2019M., 344 Ga. App. at 847 (2) (“clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof which is greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily employed in civil proceedings, but less than the reasonable doubt standard applicable in criminal proceedings”) (citations and punctuation omitted); Cf. In the Interest of A. B., 274 Ga. App. 230, 232 ( 617 SE2d 189 ) (2005) (in the context of termination, holding that clear and convincing evidence existed that the cause of the children’s deprivation was likely to continue because the mother was highly likely to continue to

2019M., 344 Ga. App. at 847 (2) (“clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof which is greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily employed in civil proceedings, but less than the reasonable doubt standard applicable in criminal proceedings”) (citations and punctuation omitted); Cf. In the Interest of A. B., 274 Ga. App. 230, 232 ( 617 SE2d 189 ) (2005) (in the context of termination, holding that clear and convincing evidence existed that the cause of the children’s deprivation was likely to continue because the mother was highly likely to continue to

2018See also In the Interest of J.V.J. , 329 Ga. App. 421 , 428, 765 S.E.2d 389 (2014) ("the juvenile court's preference that [custody of a child] remain with [someone other than her natural parents] is wholly without consequence, [where] the court lack[s] clear and convincing evidence" to support that decision).

2018See also In the Interest of J.V.J. , 329 Ga. App. 421 , 428, 765 S.E.2d 389 (2014) ("the juvenile court's preference that [custody of a child] remain with [someone other than her natural parents] is wholly without consequence, [where] the court lack[s] clear and convincing evidence" to support that decision).

2013The clear and convincing standard “is an intermediate standard of proof, requiring a higher minimum level of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard, but less than that required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 839-840 (2).

2007When, in cases concerning punitive damages, reviewing a motion for directed verdict, the trial and appellate courts have the same basic task: each must determine as a matter of law whether the evidence was sufficient under the clear and convincing standard. [Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 218 Ga. App. 248, 255, n. 2 ( 461 SE2d 877 ) (1995) (the appellate court will not defer to the trial judge’s determination if there is any evidence “whatsoever” to support it; rather, the issue on appeal remains whether there is any evidence sufficient “under the clear and convincing standard”), rev’d on

2007When, in cases concerning punitive damages, reviewing a motion for directed verdict, the trial and appellate courts have the same basic task: each must determine as a matter of law whether the evidence was sufficient under the clear and convincing standard. [Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 218 Ga. App. 248, 255, n. 2 ( 461 SE2d 877 ) (1995) (the appellate court will not defer to the trial judge’s determination if there is any evidence “whatsoever” to support it; rather, the issue on appeal remains whether there is any evidence sufficient “under the clear and convincing standard”), rev’d on

2001In this regard, it remains the rule that something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Kodadek v. Lieberman, 247 Ga. App. 606, 610 (2) ( 545 SE2d 25 ) (2001).

2001In this regard, it remains the rule that something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Kodadek v. Lieberman, 247 Ga. App. 606, 610 (2) ( 545 SE2d 25 ) (2001).

2001See Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991).

2001See Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991).

1997The General Assembly has imposed such intermediate standard of proof under many statutes, because of the effect of such statutes on personal or property rights, such as civil commitment, child custody and *656 adoption, termination of parental rights, and property rights. 6 When statutes failed to safeguard individual rights, either personal or property,-by imposing too low a standard of proof the Supreme Court of Georgia has required that the intermediate standard, “clear and convincing evidence,” be applied rather than the less protective standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” 7 When a

1997Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 423 (99 SC 1804, 60 LE2d 323) (1979); see also In the Matter of Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (90 SC 1068, 25 LE2d 368) (1970).

1997Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 423 (99 SC 1804, 60 LE2d 323) (1979); see also In the Matter of Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (90 SC 1068, 25 LE2d 368) (1970).

1997The General Assembly has imposed such intermediate standard of proof under many statutes, because of the effect of such statutes on personal or property rights, such as civil commitment, child custody and *656 adoption, termination of parental rights, and property rights. 6 When statutes failed to safeguard individual rights, either personal or property,-by imposing too low a standard of proof the Supreme Court of Georgia has required that the intermediate standard, “clear and convincing evidence,” be applied rather than the less protective standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” 7 When a

1997The General Assembly has imposed such intermediate standard of proof under many statutes, because of the effect of such statutes on personal or property rights, such as civil commitment, child custody and *656 adoption, termination of parental rights, and property rights. 6 When statutes failed to safeguard individual rights, either personal or property,-by imposing too low a standard of proof the Supreme Court of Georgia has required that the intermediate standard, “clear and convincing evidence,” be applied rather than the less protective standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” 7 When a

1994Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 756 (II), 768 (IV) (102 SC 1388, 71 LE2d 599) (1982); Blackburn v. Blackburn, 249 Ga. 689, 692 (2) ( 292 SE2d 821 ) (1982); see also Annotation: Standard Of Proof As To Conduct Underlying Punitive Damage Awards — Modern Status, 58 ALR4th 878, 882-883, § 2[a] (1987); 30 AmJur2d 334-336, Evidence, § 1162; McCormick on Evidence (4th ed.), Vol. 2, pp. 441-445, § 340.

1994Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 756 (II), 768 (IV) (102 SC 1388, 71 LE2d 599) (1982); Blackburn v. Blackburn, 249 Ga. 689, 692 (2) ( 292 SE2d 821 ) (1982); see also Annotation: Standard Of Proof As To Conduct Underlying Punitive Damage Awards — Modern Status, 58 ALR4th 878, 882-883, § 2[a] (1987); 30 AmJur2d 334-336, Evidence, § 1162; McCormick on Evidence (4th ed.), Vol. 2, pp. 441-445, § 340.