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39 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1888–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of T.D. v. Eskenazi Health Midtown Community Mental Health Centergreen2 sentences2026T.D. v. Eskenazi Health Midtown Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 40 N.E.3d 507, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 2024Clear and convincing evidence is “an intermediate standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” T.D. v. Eskenazi Health Midtown Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 40 N.E.3d 507, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). | 17 | 18 |
JCC v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Constructive fraud can occur when there is a “breach of a duty arising from a confidential or fiduciary relation.” Id. at 280 (quoting Hall, 351 N.E.2d at 38 ). 3The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is an intermediate standard of proof used in cases “where the wisdom of experience has demonstrated the need for greater certainty, and where this high standard is required to sustain claims [that] have serious social consequences or harsh or far reaching effects on individuals.” J.C.C. v. State, 897 N.E.2d 931, 935 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Est. of Reasor v. Putnam Cnty., 635 N.E.2d 153 , 159–60 2024As our Supreme Court explained, the “clear and convincing” standard is an intermediate standard of proof employed in cases “where the wisdom of experience has demonstrated the need for greater certainty, and where this high standard is required to sustain claims [that] have serious social consequences or harsh or far reaching effects on individuals[.]” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257 , 1260 n.1 (Ind. 2009) (quoting J.C.C. v. State, 897 N.E.2d 931, 934 (Ind. 2008)). [26] Here, the trial court entered sua sponte findings on the constructive trust issue. | 4 | 4 |
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of B.J. v. Eskenazi Hospital/Midtown CMHC (mem. dec.)green2 sentences2024“In order to be clear and convincing, the existence of a fact Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024 Page 9 of 14 must be highly probable.” Commitment of B.J. v. Eskenazi Hosp./Midtown CMHC, 67 N.E.3d 1034, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 2023The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is “an intermediate standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” B.J. v. Eskenazi Hosp./Midtown CMHC, 67 N.E.3d 1034, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). | 2 | 2 |
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences2012We further observe that utilization of this clear and convincing standard of proof comports with the United States Supreme Court’s mandate that an intermediate standard of proof be applied when an individual’s interests at stake in a particular state proceeding are both “particularly important” and “more substantial than the mere loss of money.” See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982). 1983Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 756 , 102 S.Ct. at 1395 . | 1 | 2 |
Lazarus Department Store v. Sutherlingreen1 sentence2015Lazarus Dep’t Store v. Sutherlin, 544 N.E.2d 513, 527 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), reh’g denied, trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of I.A. J.H. v. IDCSgreen1 sentence2012Regarding our appellate standard of review, the Indiana Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that appellate courts must give ‘“due regard” to the trial court’s unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” See In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Romine v. Gaglegreen1 sentence2009Clear and convincing evidence "indicatles] that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain." Black's Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed.2004); see Romine v. Gagle, 782 N.E.2d 369, 384 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) ("Clear and convincing evidence" is "an intermediate standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt and requires the existence of a fact to be highly probable"). | 1 | 1 |
Erie Insurance Co. v. Hickman Ex Rel. Smithgreen1 sentence2003Co. v. Hickman by Smith, 605 N.E.2d 161, 162 (Ind.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Methodist Hospitalgreen2 sentences1999New York Court of Appeals in Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196 , 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 , 341 N.E.2d 569, 570-71 (N.Y.1975), adopted an intermediate standard of "gross irresponsibility." SMOLLA, supra, ž 3.12. [14] See also Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 695 (Ind.1997) (Dickson, J., concurring in result with separate opinion, in which Sullivan, J., concurred) ("The Indiana Constitution provides express recognition of an individual's interest in reputation and accords it specific protection."). [15] This statement is well-supported in Anglo-American and Indiana law. 1999See also Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 695 (Ind. 1997) (Dickson, J., concurring in result with separate opinion, in which Sullivan, J., concurred) ("The Indiana Constitution provides express recognition of an individual’s interest in reputation and accords it specific protection."). . | 1 | 1 |
Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc.green2 sentences1999New York Court of Appeals in Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196 , 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 , 341 N.E.2d 569, 570-71 (N.Y.1975), adopted an intermediate standard of "gross irresponsibility.” Smolla, supra, § 3.12. . 1999New York Court of Appeals in Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196 , 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 , 341 N.E.2d 569, 570-71 (N.Y.1975), adopted an intermediate standard of "gross irresponsibility.” Smolla, supra, § 3.12. . | 1 | 1 |
Mercer - Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident Commissiongreen2 sentences1987See Serna v. Statewide Contractors (1967), 6 Ariz. 12, 15 , 429 P.2d 504, 508 (the most stringent standard); Beazley v. Torto-rich (La.1981), 397 So.2d 475 (the intermediate standard adopting the definition of intent contained in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 8A (1965)); and finally, Mercer Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n. (1953), 40 Cal.2d 102, 120 , 251 P.2d 955, 964 (the most liberal standard). 1987See Serna v. Statewide Contractors (1967), 6 Ariz. 12, 15 , 429 P.2d 504, 508 (the most stringent standard); Beazley v. Torto-rich (La.1981), 397 So.2d 475 (the intermediate standard adopting the definition of intent contained in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 8A (1965)); and finally, Mercer Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n. (1953), 40 Cal.2d 102, 120 , 251 P.2d 955, 964 (the most liberal standard). | 1 | 1 |
Serna v. Statewide Contractors, Inc.green2 sentences1987See Serna v. Statewide Contractors (1967), 6 Ariz. 12, 15 , 429 P.2d 504, 508 (the most stringent standard); Bazley v. Tortorich (La. 1981), 397 So.2d 475 (the intermediate standard adopting the definition of intent contained in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 8A (1965)); and finally, Mercer Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n. (1953), 40 Cal.2d 102, 120 , 251 P.2d 955, 964 (the most liberal standard). 1987See Serna v. Statewide Contractors (1967), 6 Ariz. 12, 15 , 429 P.2d 504, 508 (the most stringent standard); Beazley v. Torto-rich (La.1981), 397 So.2d 475 (the intermediate standard adopting the definition of intent contained in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 8A (1965)); and finally, Mercer Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n. (1953), 40 Cal.2d 102, 120 , 251 P.2d 955, 964 (the most liberal standard). | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Suspension of the Right to Practice Law of Palmergreen1 sentence1983See, Matter of Palmer, (1979) 296 N.C. 688 , 252 S.E.2d 784 and cases cited therein. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mills v. Habluetzel
green
2 sentences1987James argues under the intermediate standard of review as set out in Pickett v. Brown (1983), 462 U.S. 1 , 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 ; and Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 . 1987James argues under the intermediate standard of review as set out in Pickett v. Brown (1983), 462 U.S. 1 , 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 ; and Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 . | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Pickett v. Brown
green
2 sentences1987James argues under the intermediate standard of review as set out in Pickett v. Brown (1983), 462 U.S. 1 , 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 ; and Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 . 1987James argues under the intermediate standard of review as set out in Pickett v. Brown (1983), 462 U.S. 1 , 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 ; and Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 . | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Kalwitz v. Estate of Kalwitz
green
1 sentence2026Constructive fraud can occur when there is a “breach of a duty arising from a confidential or fiduciary relation.” Id. at 280 (quoting Hall, 351 N.E.2d at 38 ). 3The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is an intermediate standard of proof used in cases “where the wisdom of experience has demonstrated the need for greater certainty, and where this high standard is required to sustain claims [that] have serious social consequences or harsh or far reaching effects on individuals.” J.C.C. v. State, 897 N.E.2d 931, 935 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Est. of Reasor v. Putnam Cnty., 635 N.E.2d 153 , 159–60 | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Hall v. Indiana Department of State Revenue
green
1 sentence2026Constructive fraud can occur when there is a “breach of a duty arising from a confidential or fiduciary relation.” Id. at 280 (quoting Hall, 351 N.E.2d at 38 ). 3The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is an intermediate standard of proof used in cases “where the wisdom of experience has demonstrated the need for greater certainty, and where this high standard is required to sustain claims [that] have serious social consequences or harsh or far reaching effects on individuals.” J.C.C. v. State, 897 N.E.2d 931, 935 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Est. of Reasor v. Putnam Cnty., 635 N.E.2d 153 , 159–60 | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Estate of Reasor v. Putnam County
green
1 sentence2026Constructive fraud can occur when there is a “breach of a duty arising from a confidential or fiduciary relation.” Id. at 280 (quoting Hall, 351 N.E.2d at 38 ). 3The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is an intermediate standard of proof used in cases “where the wisdom of experience has demonstrated the need for greater certainty, and where this high standard is required to sustain claims [that] have serious social consequences or harsh or far reaching effects on individuals.” J.C.C. v. State, 897 N.E.2d 931, 935 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Est. of Reasor v. Putnam Cnty., 635 N.E.2d 153 , 159–60 | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In Re GY
green
1 sentence2024As our Supreme Court explained, the “clear and convincing” standard is an intermediate standard of proof employed in cases “where the wisdom of experience has demonstrated the need for greater certainty, and where this high standard is required to sustain claims [that] have serious social consequences or harsh or far reaching effects on individuals[.]” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257 , 1260 n.1 (Ind. 2009) (quoting J.C.C. v. State, 897 N.E.2d 931, 934 (Ind. 2008)). [26] Here, the trial court entered sua sponte findings on the constructive trust issue. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
An-Hung Yao and Yu-Ting Lin v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2015An-Hung Yao v. State, 975 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind.2012). [12] The clear and convincing standard is an intermediate standard of proof that[] lies between a preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt which is required to find [a defendant] guilty in criminal prosecutions. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
green
2 sentences1993The intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the words "clear," "cogent," "unequivocal," and "convincing," is less commonly used, but nonetheless "is no stranger to the civil law." Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 , 87 S.Ct. 483, 488 , 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966)... . 1993In re Winship, supra. The intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the words "clear," "cogent," "unequivocal," and "convincing," is less commonly used, but nonetheless "is no stranger to the civil law." - Woodby v. INS, 885 U.S. 276 , 285, 87 S.Ct. 483, 488 , 17 LEd.2d 862 (1966).... | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Traina
green
1 sentence1988Notwithstanding observations contained in Traina dicta, 486 N.E.2d at 1024 , we find that the above instructions were complete and sufficient to advise the jury with respect to punitive damages, and required no further elaboration. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bazley v. Tortorich
green
2 sentences1987See Serna v. Statewide Contractors (1967), 6 Ariz. 12, 15 , 429 P.2d 504, 508 (the most stringent standard); Bazley v. Tortorich (La. 1981), 397 So.2d 475 (the intermediate standard adopting the definition of intent contained in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 8A (1965)); and finally, Mercer Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n. (1953), 40 Cal.2d 102, 120 , 251 P.2d 955, 964 (the most liberal standard). 1987See Serna v. Statewide Contractors (1967), 6 Ariz. 12, 15 , 429 P.2d 504, 508 (the most stringent standard); Beazley v. Torto-rich (La.1981), 397 So.2d 475 (the intermediate standard adopting the definition of intent contained in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 8A (1965)); and finally, Mercer Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n. (1953), 40 Cal.2d 102, 120 , 251 P.2d 955, 964 (the most liberal standard). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences1983Santosky v. Kramer, supra, involved the termination of parental rights; applying the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 , a majority of the United States Supreme Court concluded that a "fair preponderance of the evidence standard" in such proceeding was inconsistent with due process. 1 In the course of this analysis, the Court noted that an intermediate standard of proof (clear and convincing) 2 has been mandated where the individual interests at stake in a particular state proceeding are both "particularly important" and "more substant 1983Santosky v. Kramer, supra, involved the termination of parental rights; applying the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 , a majority of the United States Supreme Court concluded that a "fair preponderance of the evidence standard" in such proceeding was inconsistent with due process. 1 In the course of this analysis, the Court noted that an intermediate standard of proof (clear and convincing) 2 has been mandated where the individual interests at stake in a particular state proceeding are both "particularly important" and "more substant | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Putt v. Putt
neutral
1 sentence1908Putt v. Putt (1897), 149 Ind. 30 . | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Douthit v. Douthit
green
1 sentence1902If, therefore, it' appears from the findings in so far as they were based upon issues that the appellant had the burden of maintaining, that appellant is not entitled to recover, then it is our duty to disregard an intermediate error in the ruling upon a demurrer to an affirmative pleading of appellee, .because it would then be apparent that the ruling was not influential in the attainment of a proper result. §670 Burns 1901; Douthit v. Douthit, 133 Ind. 26 ; Elliott App. Proc., §635. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Krug v. Davis
neutral
1 sentence1888Krug v. Davis, 101 Ind. 75 ; Bothwell v. Millikan, 104 Ind. 162 . | 1 | 1888–1888 |
Bothwell v. Millikan
green
1 sentence1888Krug v. Davis, 101 Ind. 75 ; Bothwell v. Millikan, 104 Ind. 162 . | 1 | 1888–1888 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.