intermediate standard in North Dakota

39 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (17)

Case	Followed	Cited
Hanson v. Williams Countygreen nd · 1986 · cited in 19 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1987–2018 2 sentences 2018On several occasions, this Court has recognized the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right subject to the intermediate standard of equal protection analysis. 457 Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist. , 2002 ND 61 , ¶ 11, 642 N.W.2d 864 ; Bouchard , 555 N.W.2d at 87 ; Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc. , 420 N.W.2d 733 , 736 (N.D. 1988) ; Hanson v. Williams Cty. , 389 N.W.2d 319 , 325 (N.D. 1986) ; Patch v. Sebelius , 320 N.W.2d 511 , 513 (N.D. 1982) ; Herman v. Magnuson , 277 N.W.2d 445 , 450-52 (N.D. 1979) ; Arneson , 270 N.W.2d at 132 -33 . 2000*Statute of limitation and repose. 1.Except as provided in subsections 4 and 5, there may be no recovery of damages in a products liability action unless the injury, death, or property damage occurs within ten years of the date of initial purchase for use or consumption, or within eleven years of the date of manufacture of a product. [¶ 5] This Court, in Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 328 (N.D.1986), declared unconstitutional a substantively identical statute of repose, enacted by the 1979 legislature and codified at N.D.C.C. § 28-01.1-02. 1 In Hanson we applied an equal protection	8	19
Arneson v. Olsongreen nd · 1978 · cited in 9 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1983–2018 2 sentences 2018On several occasions, this Court has recognized the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right subject to the intermediate standard of equal protection analysis. 457 Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist. , 2002 ND 61 , ¶ 11, 642 N.W.2d 864 ; Bouchard , 555 N.W.2d at 87 ; Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc. , 420 N.W.2d 733 , 736 (N.D. 1988) ; Hanson v. Williams Cty. , 389 N.W.2d 319 , 325 (N.D. 1986) ; Patch v. Sebelius , 320 N.W.2d 511 , 513 (N.D. 1982) ; Herman v. Magnuson , 277 N.W.2d 445 , 450-52 (N.D. 1979) ; Arneson , 270 N.W.2d at 132 -33 . 1994*When an ‘important substantive right’ is involved, we apply an intermediate standard of review which requires a ‘“close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals.” ’ Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 323, 325 (N.D.1986) [quoting Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D.1978)].	6	9
Mund v. Ramboughgreen nd · 1988 · cited in 3 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1989–1994 2 sentences 1994E.g., Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 436 (N.D.1991); Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 221 (N.D.1989); Mund v. Rambough, 432 N.W.2d 50, 55 (N.D.1988). 1989Hanson v. Williams County, supra. The success of Lee’s argument depends on whether unemployment benefits are an important substantive right on a par with the right to recover for personal injuries (Hanson v. Williams County, supra) or “the right not to be easily deprived of a home” [Mund v. Rambough, 432 N.W.2d 50, 57 (N.D. 1988) ] and thus subject to the intermediate standard of review.	2	3
Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc.green nd · 1988 · cited in 5 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1989–2018 2 sentences 2018On several occasions, this Court has recognized the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right subject to the intermediate standard of equal protection analysis. 457 Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist. , 2002 ND 61 , ¶ 11, 642 N.W.2d 864 ; Bouchard , 555 N.W.2d at 87 ; Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc. , 420 N.W.2d 733 , 736 (N.D. 1988) ; Hanson v. Williams Cty. , 389 N.W.2d 319 , 325 (N.D. 1986) ; Patch v. Sebelius , 320 N.W.2d 511 , 513 (N.D. 1982) ; Herman v. Magnuson , 277 N.W.2d 445 , 450-52 (N.D. 1979) ; Arneson , 270 N.W.2d at 132 -33 . 2003*For the proposition that any conceivable purpose can be used in an equal protection analysis under the intermediate standard of review, the majority opinion cites to two cases, Olson, 2002 ND 61, ¶ 11 , 642 N.W.2d 864 , and Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 738 , Although Olson is a case in which we apply an intermediate standard of review, the cases cited for the proposition that we may consider unarticulated legislative purposes are both cases in which we apply the rational-basis standard of review.	1	5
Herman v. Magnusongreen nd · 1979 · cited in 5 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1979–2018 2 sentences 2018On several occasions, this Court has recognized the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right subject to the intermediate standard of equal protection analysis. 457 Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist. , 2002 ND 61 , ¶ 11, 642 N.W.2d 864 ; Bouchard , 555 N.W.2d at 87 ; Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc. , 420 N.W.2d 733 , 736 (N.D. 1988) ; Hanson v. Williams Cty. , 389 N.W.2d 319 , 325 (N.D. 1986) ; Patch v. Sebelius , 320 N.W.2d 511 , 513 (N.D. 1982) ; Herman v. Magnuson , 277 N.W.2d 445 , 450-52 (N.D. 1979) ; Arneson , 270 N.W.2d at 132 -33 . 2003*Again, although we purport in Herman to apply an intermediate standard of review, we find unstated legislative goals to uphold the constitutionality of the statute by citing to goals set forth in a Colorado decision and an Alabama decision, both of which applied the rational-basis test in their analysis. 277 N.W.2d at 453-54 . [¶41] I cannot find any case law or treatise that supports using the rational-basis analysis of determining a “legitimate state interest” as a quid pro quo for determining a “legislative goal” under the intermediate standard of review.	1	5
Patch v. Sebeliusgreen nd · 1982 · cited in 4 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1983–2018 2 sentences 2018On several occasions, this Court has recognized the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right subject to the intermediate standard of equal protection analysis. 457 Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist. , 2002 ND 61 , ¶ 11, 642 N.W.2d 864 ; Bouchard , 555 N.W.2d at 87 ; Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc. , 420 N.W.2d 733 , 736 (N.D. 1988) ; Hanson v. Williams Cty. , 389 N.W.2d 319 , 325 (N.D. 1986) ; Patch v. Sebelius , 320 N.W.2d 511 , 513 (N.D. 1982) ; Herman v. Magnuson , 277 N.W.2d 445 , 450-52 (N.D. 1979) ; Arneson , 270 N.W.2d at 132 -33 . 1986*The intermediate standard of review was also applied in Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1979), and Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511 (N.D.1982).	1	4
State v. Carpentergreen nd · 1980 · cited in 3 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1984–1996 2 sentences 1996We said “while indigency is not a ‘suspect classification’ at the present time, we believe that the combination of the classification based upon wealth and the vital interests of [the defendant] at stake in a criminal prosecution require an intermediate standard of review.” Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d at 110 . 1996In State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D.1980), this court used an intermediate standard of review to resolve an equal protection challenge against a wealth-based classification under a criminal statute which discriminated against indigents by affording a defense to a criminal charge of issuing checks without sufficient funds on the ability of the defendant to pay the amount of the nonsufficient fund checks.	1	3
State v. Knoeflergreen nd · 1979 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1979–1994 2 sentences 1994See State v. Knoefler, 279 N.W.2d 658, 662 (N.D.1979)." Because no inherently suspect or fundamental interest classifications warranting strict scrutiny are involved in this case, we 198 must choose between the rational basis standard and the intermediate standard. 1994*See State v. Knoefler, 279 N.W.2d 658, 662 (N.D.1979).” Because no inherently suspect or fundamental interest classifications warranting strict scrutiny are involved in this case, we must choose between the rational basis standard and the intermediate standard.	1	2
State v. Knoeflergreen nd · 1982 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003See Olson, at ¶ 11 (citing Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 202 and Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d at 195 ). [¶ 40] In Bellemare , we cite to Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 453-54 (N.D.1979), for the proposition that we can conceive legislative goals that are not stated in the statute or legislative history. 2003See Olson, at ¶ 11 (citing Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 202 and Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d at 195 ). [¶ 40] In Bellemare , we cite to Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 453-54 (N.D.1979), for the proposition that we can conceive legislative goals that are not stated in the statute or legislative history.	1	1
Valentine v. Thomasgreen lactapp · 1983 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003See Golden, at 247; Craven , at 310; Valentine , at 292. [¶ 22] In upholding statutes of repose, courts have stressed the need to create a reasonable limit on the legal consequences of a wrong and the difficulty in proof of old claims: The statute of limitations and repose sections are a way of implementing the public policy of limiting the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree. 2003See Golden, at 247; Craven , at 310; Valentine , at 292. [¶ 22] In upholding statutes of repose, courts have stressed the need to create a reasonable limit on the legal consequences of a wrong and the difficulty in proof of old claims: The statute of limitations and repose sections are a way of implementing the public policy of limiting the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.	1	1
Haney v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureaugreen nd · 1994 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003See Olson, at ¶ 11 (citing Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 202 and Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d at 195 ). [¶ 40] In Bellemare , we cite to Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 453-54 (N.D.1979), for the proposition that we can conceive legislative goals that are not stated in the statute or legislative history. 2003See Olson, at ¶ 11 (citing Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 202 and Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d at 195 ). [¶ 40] In Bellemare , we cite to Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 453-54 (N.D.1979), for the proposition that we can conceive legislative goals that are not stated in the statute or legislative history.	1	1
Baldock v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureaugreen nd · 1996 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 1 sentence 1998When no suspect class, fundamental right, or important substantive right is involved, we apply a rational basis standard and sustain the legislative classification unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.” [¶ 10] In Baldock , at 446, we considered an equal protection challenge to the seventy-five percent income classification in N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-01(3).	1	1
Harper v. Virginia Board of Electionsgreen scotus · 1966 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 2 sentences 1994See also Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 , 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1082 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (“Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race ..., are traditionally disfavored.”). 1994See also Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 , 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1082 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (“Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race ..., are traditionally disfavored.”).	1	1
Leadbetter v. Rosegreen nd · 1991 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 2 sentences 1994E.g., Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 436 (N.D.1991); Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 221 (N.D.1989); Mund v. Rambough, 432 N.W.2d 50, 55 (N.D.1988). 1994E.g., Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 436 (N.D.1991); Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 221 (N.D.1989); Mund v. Rambough, 432 N.W.2d 50, 55 (N.D.1988).	1	1
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schoolsgreen nd · 1987 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 2 sentences 1994Id. at 904-905 (Levine, Justice, concurring and dissenting). 1994Id. at 904-905 (Levine, Justice, concurring and dissenting).	1	1
Kavadas v. Lorenzengreen nd · 1989 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 2 sentences 1994E.g., Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 436 (N.D.1991); Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 221 (N.D.1989); Mund v. Rambough, 432 N.W.2d 50, 55 (N.D.1988). 1994E.g., Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 436 (N.D.1991); Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 221 (N.D.1989); Mund v. Rambough, 432 N.W.2d 50, 55 (N.D.1988).	1	1
City of Mandan v. Ferngreen nd · 1993 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 1 sentence 1994City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 744 (N.D.1993).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (18)

Case	Cited	Years
Johnson v. Hassett green nd · 1974 2 sentences 1991Finally, in Johnson [ v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 ,] we noted that there is an intermediate standard of review which, although less clearly defined, required a `close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals'". [Citations and footnotes omitted.] We analyzed Section 28-01.1-02, N.D. 1991Finally, in Johnson [v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 ,] we noted that there is an intermediate standard of review which, although less clearly defined, required a ‘close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals’.” [Citations and footnotes omitted.] We analyzed Section 28-01.1-02, N.D.	5	1979–1991
Gange v. CLERK OF BURLEIGH CTY. DIST. COURT green nd · 1988 2 sentences 2007Court, 429 N.W.2d 429 , 433 (N.D. 1988) (citations omitted) we outlined three levels of judicial scrutiny for reviewing equal protection claims: We apply strict scrutiny to an inherently suspect classification or infringement of a fundamental right and strike down the challenged statutory classification "unless it is shown that the statute promotes a compelling governmental interest and that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose." When an "important substantive right" is involved, we apply an intermediate standard of review which requires a "`close corresponden 2007Court, 429 N.W.2d 429 , 433 (N.D.1988) (citations omitted) we outlined three levels of judicial scrutiny for reviewing equal protection claims: We apply strict scrutiny to an inherently suspect classification or infringement of a fundamental right and strike down the challenged statutory classification “unless it is shown that the statute promotes a compelling governmental interest and that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.” When an “important substantive right” is involved, we apply an intermediate standard of review, which requires a “ ‘close corresponde	4	2003–2007
Bouchard v. Johnson green nd · 1996 2 sentences 2018On several occasions, this Court has recognized the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right subject to the intermediate standard of equal protection analysis. 457 Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist. , 2002 ND 61 , ¶ 11, 642 N.W.2d 864 ; Bouchard , 555 N.W.2d at 87 ; Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc. , 420 N.W.2d 733 , 736 (N.D. 1988) ; Hanson v. Williams Cty. , 389 N.W.2d 319 , 325 (N.D. 1986) ; Patch v. Sebelius , 320 N.W.2d 511 , 513 (N.D. 1982) ; Herman v. Magnuson , 277 N.W.2d 445 , 450-52 (N.D. 1979) ; Arneson , 270 N.W.2d at 132 -33 . 2008*Id.	3	2008–2018
Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation District green nd · 2002 2 sentences 2018On several occasions, this Court has recognized the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right subject to the intermediate standard of equal protection analysis. 457 Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist. , 2002 ND 61 , ¶ 11, 642 N.W.2d 864 ; Bouchard , 555 N.W.2d at 87 ; Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc. , 420 N.W.2d 733 , 736 (N.D. 1988) ; Hanson v. Williams Cty. , 389 N.W.2d 319 , 325 (N.D. 1986) ; Patch v. Sebelius , 320 N.W.2d 511 , 513 (N.D. 1982) ; Herman v. Magnuson , 277 N.W.2d 445 , 450-52 (N.D. 1979) ; Arneson , 270 N.W.2d at 132 -33 . 2018On several occasions, this Court has recognized the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right subject to the intermediate standard of equal protection analysis. 457 Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist. , 2002 ND 61 , ¶ 11, 642 N.W.2d 864 ; Bouchard , 555 N.W.2d at 87 ; Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc. , 420 N.W.2d 733 , 736 (N.D. 1988) ; Hanson v. Williams Cty. , 389 N.W.2d 319 , 325 (N.D. 1986) ; Patch v. Sebelius , 320 N.W.2d 511 , 513 (N.D. 1982) ; Herman v. Magnuson , 277 N.W.2d 445 , 450-52 (N.D. 1979) ; Arneson , 270 N.W.2d at 132 -33 .	2	2003–2018
Eagle v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau neutral nd · 1998 2 sentences 1999Eagle v. Workers Compensation Bureau , 1998 ND 154, ¶ 9 , 583 N.W.2d 97 . [¶15] The pursuit of happiness guaranteed by N.D. 1999Eagle v. Workers Compensation Bureau , 1998 ND 154, ¶ 9 , 583 N.W.2d 97 . [¶15] The pursuit of happiness guaranteed by N.D.	2	1999–1999
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 1993E.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). 1993E.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).	2	1993–1993
Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. green nh · 1983 2 sentences 1988“The intermediate standard of review is usually applied when ‘an important substantive right’ is involved.” Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 325 (N.D.1986) citing Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512 , 464 A.2d 288 (1983). 1988“The intermediate standard of review is usually applied when ‘an important substantive right’ is involved.” Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 325 (N.D.1986) citing Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512 , 464 A.2d 288 (1983).	2	1986–1988
United States v. Virginia green scotus · 1996 2 sentences 2003The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 , 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996), in applying this intermediate standard of review states that: “The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.” In the present case, the legislative history makes it crystal clear that the statute of repose was designed to remedy the rising cost of malpractice insurance. 2003The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 , 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996), in applying this intermediate standard of review states that: “The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.” In the present case, the legislative history makes it crystal clear that the statute of repose was designed to remedy the rising cost of malpractice insurance.	1	2003–2003
Craig v. Boren green scotus · 1976 2 sentences 1993Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 , 97 S.Ct. 451, 457 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). 1993Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 , 97 S.Ct. 451, 457 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976).	1	1993–1993
Jones v. United States green scotus · 1983 2 sentences 1992The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983), is useful for analyzing whether there is a close correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals in this case. 1992The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983), is useful for analyzing whether there is a close correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals in this case.	1	1992–1992
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools green scotus · 1988 2 sentences 1991We apply a rational basis test to legislative classifications that are not inherently suspect, or do not infringe upon fundamental or important substantive rights, and we uphold the classification unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose_” [Citations omitted.] See also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 , 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988). 1991We apply a rational basis test to legislative classifications that are not inherently suspect, or do not infringe upon fundamental or important substantive rights, and we uphold the classification unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose_” [Citations omitted.] See also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 , 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988).	1	1991–1991
Plyler v. Doe green scotus · 1982 2 sentences 1987Griffin, supra; Douglas, supra; Plyler v. Dole, 457 U.S. 202 , 102 S.Ct. 2382 , 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). 1987Griffin, supra; Douglas, supra; Plyler v. Dole, 457 U.S. 202 , 102 S.Ct. 2382 , 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982).	1	1987–1987
Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc. green ri · 1984	1	1986–1986
Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty green ala · 1982	1	1986–1986
North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. green scotus · 1973	1	1986–1986
Berry by and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft green utah · 1985	1	1986–1986
Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy green nd · 1974 2 sentences 1986Shortly after our decision in Johnson, supra, we were again faced with an equal protection question in Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140 (N.D.1974). 11 When analyzing the equal protection claim, we refrained from applying the intermediate standard of review adopted in Johnson, supra, and, instead, applied the lower rational basis test. 1986Shortly after our decision in Johnson v. Hassett, we were again faced with an equal protection question in Snyder’s Drug Store, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140 (N.D.1974). 7 When analyzing the equal protection claim, we refrained from applying the intermediate standard of scrutiny adopted in Johnson v. Hassett, and instead applied the lower rational relationship standard.	1	1986–1986
Reed v. Reed green scotus · 1971	1	1974–1974

Statutes the citing opinions construe

ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-01 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-49 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-50 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-03 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-06 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-07.2 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-30.1 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-31 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 43-17-32.1 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 532 (1981–2026) PA 54 (1978–2025) CA 45 (1978–2026) UT 45 (1930–2025) IL 45 (1986–2024) LA 43 (1920–2020) ND 39 (1974–2018) IN 39 (1888–2026) WA 28 (1917–2026) OH 28 (1992–2021) GA 24 (1993–2026) DE 23 (1980–2026) CT 22 (1985–2025) KS 22 (1987–2024) CO 21 (1982–2003) MD 18 (1981–2022) NC 17 (1984–2025) NJ 16 (1972–2017) FL 14 (1963–2018) ID 14 (1982–1999) NY 13 (1949–2025) OK 11 (1980–2024) HI 10 (1996–2025) TN 9 (1959–2010) WI 8 (1996–2020) OR 8 (1983–2020) NM 7 (1988–2023) AZ 7 (1988–2011) ME 6 (1984–2015) DC 6 (1978–1997) IA 6 (2009–2023) SC 5 (1996–2022) MI 5 (1978–2015) MO 4 (1980–2016) KY 3 (1954–2010) WV 3 (1995–2024) VA 3 (1995–2004) MA 3 (1975–1990) VI 2 (2013–2026) MN 2 (1987–2011) SD 2 (1991–1993) MS 2 (1984–2013) MT 2 (1995–2005) NV 2 (2020–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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