intermediate standard in Oklahoma

1991American Cyanamid Co. v. Electrical Indus., 630 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir.1980); Alexander v. Warren, Arkansas, School Dist.

1990American Cyanamid Co. v. Electrical Indus., 630 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir.1980); Alexander v. Warren, Arkansas, School Dist.

2015The Court further noted it has: "mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing evidence'when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of money.'" Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282 , 110 S.Ct. 2841 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). ¶ 18 In Cruzan, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether the United States Constitution forbid Missouri from requiring clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof in proceedings where a guard

2015The Court further noted it has: "mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing evidence'when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of money.'" Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282 , 110 S.Ct. 2841 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). ¶ 18 In Cruzan, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether the United States Constitution forbid Missouri from requiring clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof in proceedings where a guard

2015The Court further noted it has: "mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing evidence'when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of money.'" Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282 , 110 S.Ct. 2841 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). ¶ 18 In Cruzan, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether the United States Constitution forbid Missouri from requiring clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof in proceedings where a guard

2015The Court further noted it has: "mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing evidence'when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of money.'" Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282 , 110 S.Ct. 2841 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). ¶ 18 In Cruzan, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether the United States Constitution forbid Missouri from requiring clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof in proceedings where a guard

2007"When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial serutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 89 (Del.2001). 129 When applying the business judgment rule, courts presume that "in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company and its shareholders." Id. (ci

2007"When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial serutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 89 (Del.2001). 129 When applying the business judgment rule, courts presume that "in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company and its shareholders." Id. (ci

2007"When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial serutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 89 (Del.2001). 129 When applying the business judgment rule, courts presume that "in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company and its shareholders." Id. (ci

2007"When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial serutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 89 (Del.2001). 129 When applying the business judgment rule, courts presume that "in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company and its shareholders." Id. (ci

1996Id., 441 U.S. at 424 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 ; see also Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Association, 170 Conn. 520 , 368 A.2d 125, 133-34 (1976).

1996Id., 441 U.S. at 424 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 ; see also Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Association, 170 Conn. 520 , 368 A.2d 125, 133-34 (1976).

1995At issue here is the intermediate standard, which our Legislature has termed “clear and convincing.” In using this standard our Legislature has determined the interests at stake in this area are more substantial than other civil proceedings (which a competency hearing has been determined to be, see Miller v. State, 751 P.2d 733, 737-38 (Okl.Cr.1988)).

1995The standard of proof used “is more than an empty semantic exercise.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 , 99 S.Ct. at 1809 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir.1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. dismissed sub nom.