intermediate standard in Kansas

2022This is "'an intermediate standard of proof between a preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.'" In re Adoption of C.L., 308 Kan. 1268 , 1278, 427 P.3d 951 (2018).

2021In re Adoption of C.L., 308 Kan. 1268 , 1278, 427 P.3d 951 (2018); In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686 , Syl. ¶ 2, 187 P.3d 594 (2008) ("'Clear and convincing evidence' is an intermediate standard of proof between a preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.").

2008For example, in Ortega , we acknowledged that clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof. 255 Kan. at 528 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756-57 , 71 L.

2008Per direction from the United States Supreme Court, Kansas, like Maine, recognizes that the clear and convincing standard of proof should apply when “ ‘ “particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.” ’ ” Ortega, 255 Kan. at 528 ; see Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (“This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof — ‘clear and convincing evidence’ — when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’ ”).

2024App. 2d 436, 442 , 263 P.3d 809 (2011). "'Clear and convincing evidence' is an intermediate standard of proof between a preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.

2024A 'preponderance of the evidence' is evidence which shows that the truth of the facts asserted is more probable than not. 'Clear and convincing evidence' is evidence that shows the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable." Crone, 46 Kan.

2008See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); In re S.M.Q., 247 Kan. 231 , 796 P.2d 543 (1990).

2008See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); In re S.M.Q., 247 Kan. 231 , 796 P.2d 543 (1990).

1987The court there noted this intermediate test required a "close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals." 270 N.W.2d at 133 .

1987The court there noted this intermediate test required a “close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals.” 270 N.W.2d at 133 .

1987See also Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op.2d 316 , 320, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976), where the Ohio court held the crucial question is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment; and Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859 , 555 P.2d 399 (1976), in which the Supreme Court of Idaho determined the standard of review was whether the statute reflected any reasonably conceived public purpose and whether the establishment of the classification had a fair and substantial relation to the achievement of the governmental objective and purpose.

1987See also Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op.2d 316 , 320, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976), where the Ohio court held the crucial question is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment; and Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859 , 555 P.2d 399 (1976), in which the Supreme Court of Idaho determined the standard of review was whether the statute reflected any reasonably conceived public purpose and whether the establishment of the classification had a fair and substantial relation to the achievement of the governmental objective and purpose.