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14 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1963–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Inquiry Concerning a Judgegreen2 sentences2018"This quantum of proof is an intermediate standard, more than 'a preponderance of the evidence,' but less than 'beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.' " In re Hawkins , 151 So.3d 1200 , 1212 (Fla. 2014) (quoting In re Holloway , 832 So.2d 716 , 726 (Fla. 2002) ). 2017“This quantum of proof is an intermediate standard, more than ⅛ preponderance of the evidence,’ but less than ‘beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.’” In re Hawkins, 151 So.3d 1200, 1212 (Fla. 2014) (quoting In re Holloway, 832 So.2d 716, 726 (Fla. 2002)). | 2 | 3 |
Reid v. Estate of Sondergreen2 sentences2013The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence “be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. (quoting Reid v. Estate of Sonder, 63 So.3d 7, 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (citations omitted)). 2012"This standard is an intermediate standard of proof between the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard used in most civil cases, and the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt standard’ of criminal cases, requiring the evidence ‘[to] be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’ ” Reid v. Estate of Sonder, 63 So.3d 7, 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (citations omitted). .The time the governing documents were executed is the pertinent point in time. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Grahamgreen2 sentences2007See State v. Graham, 240 So.2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). 1988See State v. Graham, 240 So.2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). | 2 | 2 |
Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 09-01 re Turnergreen2 sentences2018"If the findings meet this intermediate standard, then they are of persuasive force and are given great weight." In re Turner , 76 So.3d 898 , 901 (Fla. 2011) (quoting In re Graziano , 696 So.2d 744 , 753 (Fla. 1997) ). 2017“If the findings meet this' intermediate standard, then they are of persuasive force and are given great weight.” In re Turner, 76 So.3d 898, 901 (Fla. 2011) (quoting In re Graziano, 696 So.2d at 753 ). | 1 | 2 |
Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 11-550 Re Judith W. HAWKINSgreen2 sentences2018"This quantum of proof is an intermediate standard, more than 'a preponderance of the evidence,' but less than 'beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.' " In re Hawkins , 151 So.3d 1200 , 1212 (Fla. 2014) (quoting In re Holloway , 832 So.2d 716 , 726 (Fla. 2002) ). 2017“This quantum of proof is an intermediate standard, more than ⅛ preponderance of the evidence,’ but less than ‘beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.’” In re Hawkins, 151 So.3d 1200, 1212 (Fla. 2014) (quoting In re Holloway, 832 So.2d 716, 726 (Fla. 2002)). | 1 | 2 |
Allstate Insurance Company v. Vanatergreen1 sentence2015Co. v. Vanater, 297 So.2d 293, 295 (Fla.1974) (defining the “three basic standards by which the sufficiency of *1183 evidence is weighed by fact-finders” as: preponderance of evidence, used in most civil actions; proof beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, used in criminal cases; and clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence, an intermediate standard used in certain civil actions); Interest of K.H., 444 So.2d 547, 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (Wentworth, J., concurring specially) (noting that on remand the trial court must articulate the standard for determining whether continued su | 1 | 1 |
Interest of Khgreen1 sentence2015Co. v. Vanater, 297 So.2d 293, 295 (Fla.1974) (defining the “three basic standards by which the sufficiency of *1183 evidence is weighed by fact-finders” as: preponderance of evidence, used in most civil actions; proof beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, used in criminal cases; and clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence, an intermediate standard used in certain civil actions); Interest of K.H., 444 So.2d 547, 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (Wentworth, J., concurring specially) (noting that on remand the trial court must articulate the standard for determining whether continued su | 1 | 1 |
Dieguez v. Dept. of Law Enforcementgreen1 sentence2011Justice Standards & Training Comm’n, 947 So.2d 591, 595 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Inquiry Concerning Daveygreen1 sentence2005See In re Davey, 645 So.2d 398, 404 (Fla.1994). | 1 | 1 |
John L. Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Company, Inc., Anita W. Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Company, Inc.green1 sentence1982Moreover, in three (3) cases, federal courts have interpreted state law as having adopted Gertz : MISSISSIPPI: Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 , 101 S.Ct. 3112 , 69 L.Ed.2d 973 (1981) (applying Mississippi law); PENNSYLVANIA: Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law); VIRGINIA: Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D.Va. 1979) (applying Virginia law); only one federal court has interpreted state law as having adopted Rosenbloom : ALASKA: Gay v. Williams, 486 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Graziano
green
2 sentences2018"If the findings meet this intermediate standard, then they are of persuasive force and are given great weight." In re Turner , 76 So.3d 898 , 901 (Fla. 2011) (quoting In re Graziano , 696 So.2d 744 , 753 (Fla. 1997) ). 2017“If the findings meet this' intermediate standard, then they are of persuasive force and are given great weight.” In re Turner, 76 So.3d 898, 901 (Fla. 2011) (quoting In re Graziano, 696 So.2d at 753 ). | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Morey v. Everbank
green
2 sentences2013The “clear and convincing” standard is “an intermediate standard of proof between the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard used in most civil cases, and the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt standard’ of criminal cases.” Morey v. Everbank, 93 So.3d 482 , 489 n. 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). 2013The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence “be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. (quoting Reid v. Estate of Sonder, 63 So.3d 7, 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (citations omitted)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Casey v. Florida Power Corporation
neutral
1 sentence1987Sub judice, the district court opted for what was characterized in Casey, 157 So.2d at 170 , as the intermediate rule: *897 Under this rule, evidence of the existence of fear and its effect on market value may be admitted into evidence as a factor or circumstance to be considered by the trier of fact in a property valuation proceeding, so long as it is shown that the fear has a reasonable basis. 485 So.2d at 1379 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings
neutral
1 sentence1987Sub judice, the district court opted for what was characterized in Casey, 157 So.2d at 170 , as the intermediate rule: *897 Under this rule, evidence of the existence of fear and its effect on market value may be admitted into evidence as a factor or circumstance to be considered by the trier of fact in a property valuation proceeding, so long as it is shown that the fear has a reasonable basis. 485 So.2d at 1379 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Willsey v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.
green
1 sentence1986Eleven states and the Sixth Circuit apparently follow the "minority" rule and admit such evidence on a simple showing that fear affects market value; nine states follow the intermediate rule, "admitting evidence of the existence of fear and its effect on market value if it is shown that the fear has some reasonable basis." Id., 631 P.2d 274 -275. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Gay v. Williams
green
1 sentence1982Moreover, in three (3) cases, federal courts have interpreted state law as having adopted Gertz : MISSISSIPPI: Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 , 101 S.Ct. 3112 , 69 L.Ed.2d 973 (1981) (applying Mississippi law); PENNSYLVANIA: Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law); VIRGINIA: Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D.Va. 1979) (applying Virginia law); only one federal court has interpreted state law as having adopted Rosenbloom : ALASKA: Gay v. Williams, 486 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc.
green
2 sentences1982Moreover, in three (3) cases, federal courts have interpreted state law as having adopted Gertz : MISSISSIPPI: Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 , 101 S.Ct. 3112 , 69 L.Ed.2d 973 (1981) (applying Mississippi law); PENNSYLVANIA: Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law); VIRGINIA: Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D.Va. 1979) (applying Virginia law); only one federal court has interpreted state law as having adopted Rosenbloom : ALASKA: Gay v. Williams, 486 1982Moreover, in three (3) cases, federal courts have interpreted state law as having adopted Gertz : MISSISSIPPI: Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 , 101 S.Ct. 3112 , 69 L.Ed.2d 973 (1981) (applying Mississippi law); PENNSYLVANIA: Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law); VIRGINIA: Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D.Va. 1979) (applying Virginia law); only one federal court has interpreted state law as having adopted Rosenbloom : ALASKA: Gay v. Williams, 486 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
green
1 sentence1982Moreover, in three (3) cases, federal courts have interpreted state law as having adopted Gertz : MISSISSIPPI: Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 , 101 S.Ct. 3112 , 69 L.Ed.2d 973 (1981) (applying Mississippi law); PENNSYLVANIA: Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law); VIRGINIA: Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D.Va. 1979) (applying Virginia law); only one federal court has interpreted state law as having adopted Rosenbloom : ALASKA: Gay v. Williams, 486 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Mills v. Kingsport Times-News
green
1 sentence1982Moreover, in three (3) cases, federal courts have interpreted state law as having adopted Gertz : MISSISSIPPI: Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 , 101 S.Ct. 3112 , 69 L.Ed.2d 973 (1981) (applying Mississippi law); PENNSYLVANIA: Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law); VIRGINIA: Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D.Va. 1979) (applying Virginia law); only one federal court has interpreted state law as having adopted Rosenbloom : ALASKA: Gay v. Williams, 486 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Hantzis v. Commissioner
green
1 sentence1982Moreover, in three (3) cases, federal courts have interpreted state law as having adopted Gertz : MISSISSIPPI: Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 , 101 S.Ct. 3112 , 69 L.Ed.2d 973 (1981) (applying Mississippi law); PENNSYLVANIA: Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law); VIRGINIA: Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D.Va. 1979) (applying Virginia law); only one federal court has interpreted state law as having adopted Rosenbloom : ALASKA: Gay v. Williams, 486 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Mazur v. Pennsylvania
green
1 sentence1982Moreover, in three (3) cases, federal courts have interpreted state law as having adopted Gertz : MISSISSIPPI: Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 , 101 S.Ct. 3112 , 69 L.Ed.2d 973 (1981) (applying Mississippi law); PENNSYLVANIA: Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law); VIRGINIA: Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D.Va. 1979) (applying Virginia law); only one federal court has interpreted state law as having adopted Rosenbloom : ALASKA: Gay v. Williams, 486 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co.
green
1 sentence1982Moreover, in three (3) cases, federal courts have interpreted state law as having adopted Gertz : MISSISSIPPI: Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 , 101 S.Ct. 3112 , 69 L.Ed.2d 973 (1981) (applying Mississippi law); PENNSYLVANIA: Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law); VIRGINIA: Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D.Va. 1979) (applying Virginia law); only one federal court has interpreted state law as having adopted Rosenbloom : ALASKA: Gay v. Williams, 486 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Dunlap v. Loup River Public Power District
green
2 sentences1963If an owner cannot sell his property at as good a figure with this line across it as he could before, then his land may be depreciated on account thereof. * * *" This view is represented by Dunlap v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 1939, 136 Neb. 11 , 284 N.W. 742 , 124 A.L.R. 400 , and various other cases. 1963If an owner cannot sell his property at as good a figure with this line across it as he could before, then his land may be depreciated on account thereof. * * *" This view is represented by Dunlap v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 1939, 136 Neb. 11 , 284 N.W. 742 , 124 A.L.R. 400 , and various other cases. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Kentucky Hydro-Electric Co. v. Woodard
green
1 sentence1963In the case of Kentucky Hydro Electric Co. v. Woodard, 1926, 216 Ky. 618 , 287 S.W. 985 , the lower court had instructed the jury that it could not consider depreciation in market value of adjacent land arising from apprehension of danger from existence of lines on the part of potential buyers. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Myers v. Korbly
green
1 sentence1963I am not too sure, from the record, whether the lower court struck the testimony of the appellants' two expert witnesses because of its belief in the so-called majority rule, or because the experts were testifying primarily from their own personal feelings and not from a knowledge that a sufficient number of prospective buyers would not purchase the remainder of the appellants' property because of their fear and apprehension of power lines that were to be located on the property, and their dislike for the looks, etc., of high power lines strung so close to their property. *173 Since it is prim | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.