intermediate standard in New York

2025In my view, the Attorney General should be required to prove her claims under section 63(12) by clear and convincing evidence, not by a mere preponderance of the evidence ( see People v Wyatt , 89 AD3d 112, 127 [2d Dept 2011] [proof by clear and convincing evidence is "deemed necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with a significant deprivation of liberty or stigma"] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv denied 18 NY3d 803 [2012]; see also Addington v Texas , 441 US 418, 424 [1979] [the intermediate sta

2025In my view, the Attorney General should be required to prove her claims under section 63(12) by clear and convincing evidence, not by a mere preponderance of the evidence ( see People v Wyatt , 89 AD3d 112, 127 [2d Dept 2011] [proof by clear and convincing evidence is "deemed necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with a significant deprivation of liberty or stigma"] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv denied 18 NY3d 803 [2012]; see also Addington v Texas , 441 US 418, 424 [1979] [the intermediate sta

2023Thus, where the People fail to present any evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, showing the nature of the relationship between a defendant and a victim, it is improper for the Supreme Court to assess 20 points under risk factor 7 ( see People v Green , 112 AD3d 801, 802 ).

2020We applied the intermediate standard in analyzing substantive due process rights in Anonymous v City of Rochester ( 13 NY3d 35 [2009]), but that involved a constitutionally unique situation involving conflicting claims of minors to enjoy freedom of movement and of parents to control the upbringing of the children.

2011In light of the stigma imposed by sex offender registration and notification, SORA appropriately places a burden on the district attorney to prove the facts in support of the ultimate risk level designation by clear and convincing evidence (see People v David W., 95 NY2d at 137 ).

2005An intermediate standard of review, referred to as the “heightened scrutiny” standard, is applied when a viable claim is made under the Equal Protection Clause that the challenged law has a negative impact upon a “discrete and insular minor-it[y]” which is being shut out of the political process (see Matter of Aliessa v Novello, 96 NY2d 418, 431 [2001], quoting United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144 , 153 n 4 [1938]).

1999The Court of Appeals has recognized the applicability of the standard in civil cases when the “denial of personal or liberty rights” is at issue (see, Matter of Capoccia, 59 NY2d 549, 553 [1983]) or when “particularly important personal interests are at stake” (Matter of Storar, 52 NY2d 363, 379 [1981], cert denied 454 US 858 [1981]).

1998(Matter of Town of Islip v Caviglia, 73 NY2d 544, 556 ; see also, supra, at 566 [Titone, J., dissenting]; People ex rel.

1987Its requirement is satisfied when the victim’s testimony is supported by evidence tending to establish a crime was committed and that the defendant committed it (see generally, People v Fuller, 50 NY2d 628, 635 , supra).

1982Murel v Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 * **§* * “This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof — ‘clear and convincing evidence’ — when the individual interest at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’ Addington v Texas, 441 US at 424 * * * Notwithstanding ‘the state’s “civil labels and good intentions,” ’ id., at 427 * * * quoting In re Winship, 397 US, at 365 -366 * * * the Court has deemed this level of certainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proc

1982Murel v Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 * **§* * “This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof — ‘clear and convincing evidence’ — when the individual interest at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’ Addington v Texas, 441 US at 424 * * * Notwithstanding ‘the state’s “civil labels and good intentions,” ’ id., at 427 * * * quoting In re Winship, 397 US, at 365 -366 * * * the Court has deemed this level of certainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proc

1981Center of State of N. Y. ( 39 NY2d 326 , supra).

1981In New York there is forthright recognition that circumstances exist “where the right sought to be vindicated might be found to call for a test somewhere along the sliding scale between strict scrutiny at one end and rational basis at the other” (see Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 61 ) and such an intermediate standard was applied when the Court of Appeals decided the reverse discrimination issue in Alevy v Downstate Med.

1981Buck v Hunter, 439 US 1059 ) also became the subject of the intermediate test.

1975Here, the New York Legislature has spoken. 20 In Matter of Ella B. ( 30 NY2d 352 ), the Court of Appeals held that a parent has the constitutional right to assigned counsel in child neglect proceedings, reasoning that a parent’s interest in the custody of his child may not be curtailed without a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

1949A substitutionary gift in favor of issue as to ¿he share which the parent would have taken if living imports a gift by representation through a parent and consequently a per stirpes distribution, (Matter of Collins, 131 App. Div. 834 , affd. upon opinion below 196 N. Y. 533 .) For the reasons above set forth the court determines that children of a living parent were not to share together with such parent, and that a per stirpes distribution was intended.

1949A substitutionary gift in favor of issue as to ¿he share which the parent would have taken if living imports a gift by representation through a parent and consequently a per stirpes distribution, (Matter of Collins, 131 App. Div. 834 , affd. upon opinion below 196 N. Y. 533 .) For the reasons above set forth the court determines that children of a living parent were not to share together with such parent, and that a per stirpes distribution was intended.