45 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kent v. Department of Employment Securitygreen2 sentences2017See Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm’n, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (“The Commission’s findings, upon which the charges are based, must be supported by substantial evidence [when] viewed in light of the whole record before us.”). ¶ 15 Further, we review “an agency’s application of its own rules for reasonableness and rationality, according the agency some, but not total[,] deference.” Lunnen, 886 P.2d at 72 ; see also Kent, 860 P.2d at 986 (“In construing [Utah Code section 63G-4-403], the Utah Supreme Court has held that appellate courts should employ an intermediate standar 2010Utah Supreme Court has held that appellate courts should employ an intermediate standard, one of some, but not total, deference, in reviewing an agency's application of its own rules." Kent v. Department of Emp't See., 860 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct.App.1998). | 3 | 3 |
Caporoz v. Labor Commissiongreen2 sentences1999We have previously held that the statute’s “grant of discretion to the Commission to apply the law requires that we apply an intermediate standard of review to its determinations.” Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm’n, 958 P.2d 240, 243 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (citing Caporoz v. Labor Comm’n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct.App.1997)). 1998This court has previously concluded that the statute’s “grant of discretion to the Commission to apply the law requires that we apply an intermediate standard of review to its determinations.” Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm’n, 958 P.2d 240, 243 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (citing Caporoz v. Labor Comm’n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct.App.1997)). | 3 | 3 |
Semeco Industries, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commissiongreen2 sentences1993R.R. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 842 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted); accord SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). 1993R.R. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted); accord SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). | 3 | 3 |
Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'ngreen2 sentences2012Under this intermediate standard, an agency's decisions were "entitled to weight, but ... subject to judicial review to assure that they [fell] within the limits of reasonableness or rationality." Id. at 610 . 11 UAPA provided a new framework for determining the standard of review. 1989The Administrative Services case explains why statutory interpretations, which ordinarily pose questions of law, are often reviewed under this intermediate standard: An agency’s interpretation of key provisions of the statute it is empowered to administer is often inseparable from its application of the rules of law to the basic facts_ In reviewing decisions such as these, a court should afford great deference to the technical expertise or more extensive experience of the responsible agency. 658 P.2d at 610 (emphasis added). | 2 | 9 |
Westside Dixon Associates LLC v. Utah Power & Light Co.green2 sentences2013See Westside Dixon Assocs., LLC v. Utah Power & Light Co./Pacificorp, 2002 UT 31, ¶ 7 , 44 P.3d 775 (holding that the court applies an intermediate standard of review when considering an agency’s interpretation of its own rules, “deferring to an agency’s interpretation as long as it is both reasonable and rational”). 2013See Westside Dixon Assocs., LLC v. Utah Power & Light Co./Pacificorp, 2002 UT 31, ¶ 7 , 44 P.3d 775 (holding that the court applies an intermediate standard of review when considering an agency’s interpretation of its own rules, “deferring to an agency’s interpretation as long as it is both reasonable and rational”). | 2 | 5 |
Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1999We have previously held that the statute’s “grant of discretion to the Commission to apply the law requires that we apply an intermediate standard of review to its determinations.” Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm’n, 958 P.2d 240, 243 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (citing Caporoz v. Labor Comm’n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct.App.1997)). 1998This court has previously concluded that the statute’s “grant of discretion to the Commission to apply the law requires that we apply an intermediate standard of review to its determinations.” Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm’n, 958 P.2d 240, 243 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (citing Caporoz v. Labor Comm’n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct.App.1997)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Penagreen2 sentences1998See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) (stating that "policy reasons" can require court to limit discretion afforded lower court). 1998“Under the correction-of-error standard, this court affords no deference to the agency’s interpretation or application of statutory terms.” Allred, 914 P.2d at 1174 . *345 Whether the Board erred in.refusing to revoke EG & G’s permit in light of accidents and mishaps at TOCDF involves the Board’s application of law to fact, see Drake v. Industrial Comm’n, 939 P.2d 177 , 181 & n. 6 (Utah 1997); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-939 (Utah 1994), subject to the intermediate standard of review we discussed above. | 2 | 2 |
Nucor Corp., Nucor Steel—Utah Division v. Utah State Tax Commissiongreen2 sentences1998See Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1992) (stating “[a]gen-cy discretion may be either express or implied and, if granted, results in review of the agency action for an abuse of discretion”); Caporoz, 945 P.2d at 143 . 1993See also SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1171-72 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting); Nucor Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296-97 (Utah 1992); Morton, 814 P.2d at 587 . | 2 | 2 |
Taylor v. Utah State Training Schoolgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d 432, 434-35 (Utah App.1989) (pre-UAPA case noting "[t]he more likely it is that agency expertise will assist in resolving an issue, the more deference courts should give to the agency's resolution"). 1993See, e.g., Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d 432, 434-35 (Utah App.1989) (pre-UAPA case noting “[t]he more likely it is that agency expertise will assist in resolving an issue, the more deference courts should give to the agency’s resolution”). | 2 | 2 |
City of Orem v. Christensengreen2 sentences1989See, e.g., City of Orem v. Christensen, 682 P.2d 292, 294 (Utah 1984) (court reviewed the Board’s decision that employee’s conduct was culpable under the reasonableness and rationality standard). 1985City of Orem v. Christensen, Utah, 682 P.2d 292, 293 (1983). | 2 | 2 |
Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commissiongreen2 sentences2012See Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d at 583-84 ; Columbia HCA v. Labor Comm'n, 2011 UT App 210, ¶ 8 , 258 P.3d 640 (mem.) ("The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) determines the standard of review for a formal adjudicative hearing."). 1992Finally, an intermediate standard of review, “granting some deference to the agency’s decisions, has been used when the agency’s experience or expertise puts the agency in a better position to resolve issues concerning the application of findings of fact to the legal rules governing the case.” Morton, 814 P.2d at 586 ; accord Admin. | 1 | 3 |
Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1991In Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App.1989), this court held that the intermediate standard of review of reasonableness, previously applied by the Utah Supreme Court to judicial review of an agency’s determination of mixed questions of fact and law or to an agency’s “interpretation of the operative provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer,” id. (quoting Utah Dep’t. of Admin. 1991In Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App.1989), this court held that the intermediate standard of review of reasonableness, previously applied by the Utah Supreme Court to judicial review of an agency’s determination of mixed questions of fact and law or to an agency’s “interpretation of the operative provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer,” id. (quoting Utah Dep’t. of Admin. | 1 | 3 |
Dorsey v. Department of Workforce Services, Workforce Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences2013"An agency's interpretation and application of law is generally reviewed for correctness, but when the [Utah] Legislature has granted the agency discretion to interpret or apply the law, we apply an intermediate standard of review." Dorsey v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2012 UT App 364, ¶ 9 , 294 P.3d 580 . 2013"An agency's interpretation and application of law is generally reviewed for correctness, but when the [Utah] Legislature has granted the agency discretion to interpret or apply the law, we apply an intermediate standard of review." Dorsey v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2012 UT App 364, ¶ 9 , 294 P.3d 580 . | 1 | 2 |
Lunnen v. Utah Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence2017See Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm’n, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (“The Commission’s findings, upon which the charges are based, must be supported by substantial evidence [when] viewed in light of the whole record before us.”). ¶ 15 Further, we review “an agency’s application of its own rules for reasonableness and rationality, according the agency some, but not total[,] deference.” Lunnen, 886 P.2d at 72 ; see also Kent, 860 P.2d at 986 (“In construing [Utah Code section 63G-4-403], the Utah Supreme Court has held that appellate courts should employ an intermediate standar | 1 | 1 |
Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commissiongreen1 sentence2017See Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm’n, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (“The Commission’s findings, upon which the charges are based, must be supported by substantial evidence [when] viewed in light of the whole record before us.”). ¶ 15 Further, we review “an agency’s application of its own rules for reasonableness and rationality, according the agency some, but not total[,] deference.” Lunnen, 886 P.2d at 72 ; see also Kent, 860 P.2d at 986 (“In construing [Utah Code section 63G-4-403], the Utah Supreme Court has held that appellate courts should employ an intermediate standar | 1 | 1 |
Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberggreen1 sentence2016But as our supreme court has explained "legal errors, such as the incorrect interpretation of a statute or the application of an improper legal standard, are usually an abuse of discretion." Schroeder v. Utah Attorney General's Office, 2015 UT 77, ¶ 49 , 358 P.3d 1075 ; accord Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ¶ 17 , 209 P.3d 1058 , Accordingly, we review an agency's interpretation of its own rules under an intermediate standard, deferring to the agency's interpretation only so long as it is both reasonable and rational. | 1 | 1 |
Dorsey v. Department of Workforce Servicesgreen2 sentences2016See Dorsey v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2012 UT App 364, ¶ 8 , 294 P.3d 580 , affd, 2014 UT 22 , 330 P.3d 91 ; see also Westside Dixon Assocs, LLC v. Utah Power & Light Co./Pacificorp, 2002 UT 31, ¶ 7 , 44 P.3d 775 . 2016See Dorsey v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2012 UT App 364, ¶ 8 , 294 P.3d 580 , affd, 2014 UT 22 , 330 P.3d 91 ; see also Westside Dixon Assocs, LLC v. Utah Power & Light Co./Pacificorp, 2002 UT 31, ¶ 7 , 44 P.3d 775 . | 1 | 1 |
Crenshaw v. Industrial Commissiongreen1 sentence2008"This court has previously concluded that the statute's 'grant of discretion to the Commission to apply the law requires that we apply an intermediate standard of review to its determinations.'" Johnson Bros., 967 P.2d at 1259 (quoting Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 P.24 240, 243 (Utah Ct.App.1998)). 1 "The amount of the attorney fees awarded, if any, is a factual matter within the discretion of the Commission." Crenshaw v. Industrial Comm'n, 712 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Jeffs v. Stubbsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Facer v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Esquivel v. Labor Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pappas v. Richfield Citygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Platts v. Parents Helping Parentsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lander v. Industrial Com'n of Utahgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Union Pacific Railroad v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Securitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re K.K...
green
2 sentences2025Put differently, this standard requires the existence of facts that make a conclusion very highly probable.” In re K.K., 2023 UT App 13, ¶ 22 , 525 P.3d 6 . 2024“Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof that implies something more than the usual requirement” of a preponderance of the evidence and “something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re K.K., 2023 UT App 13, ¶ 22 , 525 P.3d 519 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 731 (Utah 2023). | 3 | 2023–2025 |
State v. Crutcher
green
2 sentences2024“Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof that implies something more than the usual requirement” of a preponderance of the evidence and “something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re K.K., 2023 UT App 13, ¶ 22 , 525 P.3d 519 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 731 (Utah 2023). 2023Put differently, this standard requires the existence of facts that make a conclusion very highly probable.” In re K.K., 2023 UT App 13, ¶ 22 , 525 P.3d 519 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 731 (Utah 2023). ¶28 Neglect is statutorily defined, and can be proved in any one of several ways. | 2 | 2023–2024 |
Bolden v. Doe (In re Adoption of J.S.)
green
2 sentences2014Thus, race-based classifications are evaluated under a stan- dard of strict scrutiny (requiring a compelling governmental inter- 30 Cite as: 2014 UT 51 Opinion of the Court est advanced by the least restrictive means possible23), while sex- based classifications are evaluated as a matter of intermediate scrutiny (requiring only an important governmental interest that is substantially advanced by the legislation).24 ¶70 Second, not all sex-based classifications implicate the same considerations under this intermediate standard of scrutiny. 2014Thus, race-based classifications are evaluated under a stan- dard of strict scrutiny (requiring a compelling governmental inter- 30 Cite as: 2014 UT 51 Opinion of the Court est advanced by the least restrictive means possible23), while sex- based classifications are evaluated as a matter of intermediate scrutiny (requiring only an important governmental interest that is substantially advanced by the legislation).24 ¶70 Second, not all sex-based classifications implicate the same considerations under this intermediate standard of scrutiny. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
King v. Industrial Com'n of Utah
green
2 sentences1993Between the substantial-evidence and the correction-of-error standards lies an intermediate standard of review. *1037 Where the Legislature has either explicitly or implicitly granted discretion to the agency with respect to a particular question, appellate courts review the agency's decision "under [UAPA] section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion." King, 850 P.2d at 1291 . 1993Where the Legislature has either explicitly or implicitly granted discretion to the agency with respect to a particular question, appellate courts review the agency’s decision “under [UAPA] section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion.” King, 850 P.2d at 1291 . | 2 | 1993–1993 |
BD. OF EDUC. OF SEVIER CTY. v. Bd. of Review
green
2 sentences1987Young at 23; Board of Education of Sevier County v. Board of Review, 701 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1985). 1986Board of Education of Sevier County, 701 P.2d at 1068 . | 2 | 1986–1987 |
Brown v. State
green
2 sentences2023It “is an intermediate standard of proof that implies something more than the usual requirement of a preponderance of the evidence; and something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brown v. State, 2013 UT 42 , ¶ 69 n.68, 308 P.3d 486 (cleaned up). 11 ASHBY v. STATE Opinion of the Court ¶53 Ashby contends that the district court incorrectly held her to a higher burden of proof because her factual innocence claim was based on a recantation. 2023It “is an intermediate standard of proof that implies something more than the usual requirement of a preponderance of the evidence; and something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brown v. State, 2013 UT 42 , ¶ 69 n.68, 308 P.3d 486 (cleaned up). 11 ASHBY v. STATE Opinion of the Court ¶53 Ashby contends that the district court incorrectly held her to a higher burden of proof because her factual innocence claim was based on a recantation. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Schroeder v. Utah Attorney General's Office
green
2 sentences2016But as our supreme court has explained "legal errors, such as the incorrect interpretation of a statute or the application of an improper legal standard, are usually an abuse of discretion." Schroeder v. Utah Attorney General's Office, 2015 UT 77, ¶ 49 , 358 P.3d 1075 ; accord Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ¶ 17 , 209 P.3d 1058 , Accordingly, we review an agency's interpretation of its own rules under an intermediate standard, deferring to the agency's interpretation only so long as it is both reasonable and rational. 2016But as our supreme court has explained "legal errors, such as the incorrect interpretation of a statute or the application of an improper legal standard, are usually an abuse of discretion." Schroeder v. Utah Attorney General's Office, 2015 UT 77, ¶ 49 , 358 P.3d 1075 ; accord Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ¶ 17 , 209 P.3d 1058 , Accordingly, we review an agency's interpretation of its own rules under an intermediate standard, deferring to the agency's interpretation only so long as it is both reasonable and rational. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Murray v. Labor Commission
green
2 sentences2012Murray v. Labor Comm'n, 2012 UT App 33, ¶¶ 12-13 , 271 P.3d 192 , cert. granted, 280 P.3d 421 (Utah 2012). 2012Murray v. Labor Comm'n, 2012 UT App 33, ¶¶ 12-13 , 271 P.3d 192 , cert. granted, 280 P.3d 421 (Utah 2012). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Columbia HCA v. Labor Commission
green
2 sentences2012See Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d at 583-84 ; Columbia HCA v. Labor Comm'n, 2011 UT App 210, ¶ 8 , 258 P.3d 640 (mem.) ("The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) determines the standard of review for a formal adjudicative hearing."). 2012See Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d at 583-84 ; Columbia HCA v. Labor Comm'n, 2011 UT App 210, ¶ 8 , 258 P.3d 640 (mem.) ("The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) determines the standard of review for a formal adjudicative hearing."). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board
green
2 sentences2009Sierra Ctub, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 9 , 148 P.3d 960 (alteration in original) (quoting Associated Gen. 2009Sierra Ctub, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 9 , 148 P.3d 960 (alteration in original) (quoting Associated Gen. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
R & R Industrial Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Ass'n
green
2 sentences2009Ass'n, 2008 UT 80, ¶ 25 , 199 P.3d 917 ("When a statute is ambiguous, we use extrinsic interpretive tools such as policy and legislative intent to guide our analysis."). ¥14 In contrast, "questions of 'ultimate fact, mixed findings of fact and law, and [the agency's] interpretation of the operative provisions of statutory law it is empowered to administer'" are reviewed under an intermediate standard that considers whether the agency's determination was rational. 2009Ass'n, 2008 UT 80, ¶ 25 , 199 P.3d 917 ("When a statute is ambiguous, we use extrinsic interpretive tools such as policy and legislative intent to guide our analysis."). ¥14 In contrast, "questions of 'ultimate fact, mixed findings of fact and law, and [the agency's] interpretation of the operative provisions of statutory law it is empowered to administer'" are reviewed under an intermediate standard that considers whether the agency's determination was rational. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Johnson Bros. Construction v. Labor Commission
green
1 sentence2008"This court has previously concluded that the statute's 'grant of discretion to the Commission to apply the law requires that we apply an intermediate standard of review to its determinations.'" Johnson Bros., 967 P.2d at 1259 (quoting Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 P.24 240, 243 (Utah Ct.App.1998)). 1 "The amount of the attorney fees awarded, if any, is a factual matter within the discretion of the Commission." Crenshaw v. Industrial Comm'n, 712 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah 1985). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Allred v. Utah State Retirement Board green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Drake v. Industrial Commission of Utah green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Silver v. Auditing Division of the State Tax Commission green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Sandy City v. Salt Lake County green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Zissi v. State Tax Com'n of Utah green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Grinnell v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Palmer v. Oregon Short Line R. green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.