intermediate standard in California

2018We believe the clear and convincing standard of proof is the appropriate standard because an arrestee's pretrial liberty interest, protected under the due process clause, is "a fundamental interest second only to life itself in terms of constitutional importance." ( Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424 , 435, 166 Cal.Rptr. 149 , 613 P.2d 210 ; see Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 . 756 ["This court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing evidence'-when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'partic

2018We believe the clear and convincing standard of proof is the appropriate standard because an arrestee's pretrial liberty interest, protected under the due process clause, is "a fundamental interest second only to life itself in terms of constitutional importance." ( Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424 , 435, 166 Cal.Rptr. 149 , 613 P.2d 210 ; see Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 . 756 ["This court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing evidence'-when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'partic

2018We believe the clear and convincing standard of proof is the appropriate standard because an arrestee's pretrial liberty interest, protected under the due process clause, is "a fundamental interest second only to life itself in terms of constitutional importance." ( Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424 , 435, 166 Cal.Rptr. 149 , 613 P.2d 210 ; see Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 . 756 ["This court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing evidence'-when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'partic

2018We believe the clear and convincing standard of proof is the appropriate standard because an arrestee's pretrial liberty interest, protected under the due process clause, is "a fundamental interest second only to life itself in terms of constitutional importance." ( Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424 , 435, 166 Cal.Rptr. 149 , 613 P.2d 210 ; see Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 . 756 ["This court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing evidence'-when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'partic

1999(See, e.g., Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190, 197 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 ["To withstand constitutional challenge, ... classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."]; Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461 , 108 S.Ct. 1910 , 100 L.Ed.2d 465 ["Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy."]; see generally, 3 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise

1999(See, e.g., Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190, 197 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 ["To withstand constitutional challenge, ... classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."]; Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461 , 108 S.Ct. 1910 , 100 L.Ed.2d 465 ["Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy."]; see generally, 3 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise

2024Jan. 25, 2023, S277693); see Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1261 [adopting an intermediate requirement of “reasonable particularity”].) “A UCL claim based on the fraudulent prong can be based on representations that deceive because they are untrue, but ‘ “ ‘ “also those which may be accurate on some level, but will nonetheless tend to mislead or deceive....’ ” ’ ” (Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1255 .) “ ‘[U]nless we can say as a matter of law that … members of the public were not likely to be deceived or misled by [the defendant’s alleged conduct]

2024Jan. 25, 2023, S277693); see Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1261 [adopting an intermediate requirement of “reasonable particularity”].) “A UCL claim based on the fraudulent prong can be based on representations that deceive because they are untrue, but ‘ “ ‘ “also those which may be accurate on some level, but will nonetheless tend to mislead or deceive....’ ” ’ ” (Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1255 .) “ ‘[U]nless we can say as a matter of law that … members of the public were not likely to be deceived or misled by [the defendant’s alleged conduct]

2024Jan. 25, 2023, S277693); see Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1261 [adopting an intermediate requirement of “reasonable particularity”].) “A UCL claim based on the fraudulent prong can be based on representations that deceive because they are untrue, but ‘ “ ‘ “also those which may be accurate on some level, but will nonetheless tend to mislead or deceive....’ ” ’ ” (Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1255 .) “ ‘[U]nless we can say as a matter of law that … members of the public were not likely to be deceived or misled by [the defendant’s alleged conduct]

2024Jan. 25, 2023, S277693); see Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1261 [adopting an intermediate requirement of “reasonable particularity”].) “A UCL claim based on the fraudulent prong can be based on representations that deceive because they are untrue, but ‘ “ ‘ “also those which may be accurate on some level, but will nonetheless tend to mislead or deceive....’ ” ’ ” (Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1255 .) “ ‘[U]nless we can say as a matter of law that … members of the public were not likely to be deceived or misled by [the defendant’s alleged conduct]

2024Jan. 25, 2023, S277693); see Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1261 [adopting an intermediate requirement of “reasonable particularity”].) “A UCL claim based on the fraudulent prong can be based on representations that deceive because they are untrue, but ‘ “ ‘ “also those which may be accurate on some level, but will nonetheless tend to mislead or deceive....’ ” ’ ” (Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1255 .) “ ‘[U]nless we can say as a matter of law that … members of the public were not likely to be deceived or misled by [the defendant’s alleged conduct]

2024Jan. 25, 2023, S277693); see Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1261 [adopting an intermediate requirement of “reasonable particularity”].) “A UCL claim based on the fraudulent prong can be based on representations that deceive because they are untrue, but ‘ “ ‘ “also those which may be accurate on some level, but will nonetheless tend to mislead or deceive....’ ” ’ ” (Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1255 .) “ ‘[U]nless we can say as a matter of law that … members of the public were not likely to be deceived or misled by [the defendant’s alleged conduct]

2023Where federal constitutional rights are implicated, the People must show that a fact finder’s application of an incorrect and lesser burden of proof was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt per Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).

2023Where federal constitutional rights are implicated, the People must show that a fact finder’s application of an incorrect and lesser burden of proof was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt per Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).

2018Although our bail statutes require statements of reasons to only a limited degree, 17 section 28, subdivision (f)(3), requires that when a judicial officer grants or denies bail or release on a person's own recognizance, "the reasons for that decision shall be stated in the record and included in the court's minutes." The significance of a statement of reasons is discussed in In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921 , 937-938, 127 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 544 P.2d 1297 ( Podesta ) and In re Pipinos (1982) 33 Cal.3d 189 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 730 , 654 P.2d 1257 ( Pipinos ).

2018Although our bail statutes require statements of reasons to only a limited degree, 17 section 28, subdivision (f)(3), requires that when a judicial officer grants or denies bail or release on a person's own recognizance, "the reasons for that decision shall be stated in the record and included in the court's minutes." The significance of a statement of reasons is discussed in In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921 , 937-938, 127 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 544 P.2d 1297 ( Podesta ) and In re Pipinos (1982) 33 Cal.3d 189 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 730 , 654 P.2d 1257 ( Pipinos ).

2014(Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 546 .) An intermediate standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence may be required “when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’ [Citation.]” (Santosky, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 756 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 608 ].) Clear and convincing evidence is an appropriate standard of proof when a balancing of the relevant factors leads to the conclusion that it is 9 “ ‘inappropriate to ask the individual “to share equally with society the risk” ’ ” of an erroneous adjudicati

2014(Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 546 .) An intermediate standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence may be required “when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’ [Citation.]” (Santosky; supra, 455 U.S. at p. 756 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 608 ].) Clear and convincing evidence is an appropriate standard of proof when a balancing of the relevant factors leads to the conclusion that it is “ ‘inappropriate to ask the individual “to share equally with society the risk” ’ ” of an erroneous adjudication

2000It is the imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases, authorized by a permit scheme which by its nature allows for both the discretionary deployment of the police power and an enhanced potential for its abuse, that constitutes the sine qua non for application of the intermediate standard of scrutiny formulated by the court in Nollan and Dolan." ( Ehrlich, supra, at p. 869 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 , 911 P.2d 429 , italics in original.) In the present case, appellants have also alleged that the City effected a taking when it made a discretionary, individualized, adjudicatory ruling requir

2000It is the imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases, authorized by a permit scheme which by its nature allows for both the discretionary deployment of the police power and an enhanced potential for its abuse, that constitutes the sine qua non for application of the intermediate standard of scrutiny formulated by the court in Nollan and Dolan." ( Ehrlich, supra, at p. 869 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 , 911 P.2d 429 , italics in original.) In the present case, appellants have also alleged that the City effected a taking when it made a discretionary, individualized, adjudicatory ruling requir

1999(See, e.g., Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190, 197 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 ["To withstand constitutional challenge, ... classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."]; Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461 , 108 S.Ct. 1910 , 100 L.Ed.2d 465 ["Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy."]; see generally, 3 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise

1999(See, e.g., Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190, 197 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 ["To withstand constitutional challenge, ... classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."]; Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461 , 108 S.Ct. 1910 , 100 L.Ed.2d 465 ["Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy."]; see generally, 3 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise

1985(See the numerous authorities cited in my separate opinion in Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 595-603 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 435 , 586 P.2d 916 ].) Now an intermediate test has been adopted by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in one of the most persuasive opinions in the country invalidating legislative provisions comparable to MICRA in California.

1985(See the numerous authorities cited in my separate opinion in Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 595-603 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 435 , 586 P.2d 916 ].) Now an intermediate test has been adopted by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in one of the most persuasive opinions in the country invalidating legislative provisions comparable to MICRA in California.

2026Construction, Inc. v. Patscheck (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 712, 716 [“When statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and we will not indulge in it.”].) Here, the record demonstrates the trial court dismissed the prior prison term enhancements and defendant ultimately received a lesser sentence.

2023Title Co. v. Moore (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 114, 116 (Moore).) We review a “finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, an intermediate standard of proof,” to determine “ ‘whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a 7 We note appellant filed his September 9, 2021, notice of appeal after the court’s July 27 ruling but before the court entered judgment on October 19.

2017(Del. 1985) 493 A.2d 946 , 954 ( Unocal ).) Unless the board determines it is in the corporation's best interest to avoid a change in control, "obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders should [be] the central theme guiding director action." ( Revlon, supra , at p. 182.) "When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." ( Emerald Partners v. Berlin (Del. 2001) 787 A.2d

2017(Del. 1985) 493 A.2d 946 , 954 ( Unocal ).) Unless the board determines it is in the corporation's best interest to avoid a change in control, "obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders should [be] the central theme guiding director action." ( Revlon, supra , at p. 182.) "When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." ( Emerald Partners v. Berlin (Del. 2001) 787 A.2d