intermediate standard in Pennsylvania

2024Finally, “if ‘important,’ though not fundamental rights are affected by the classification, or if ‘sensitive’ classifications have been made, the United States Supreme Court has employed what may be called an intermediate standard of review, or a heightened standard of review.” Id.

2019See James, 477 A.2d at 1306 (applying a heightened standard of review when analyzing a law which restricted the plaintiff’s “important interest in access to the courts”); see also Smith, 516 A.2d at 311 (Noting that the “important interest in access to the courts . . . should be examined pursuant to an intermediate standard of review.”).13 More colloquially deemed intermediate scrutiny, [t]his standard of review requires that the government interest be an ‘important’ one; that the classification be drawn so as to be closely related to the objectives of the legislation; and that the person excl

2024U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 [, 517] … (1973) [(Marshall, J., concurring)], citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 … (1972).

1988U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767, 775 (1973).(concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).

2024Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof, “falling below the highest level of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, but above the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2013).

2024The Commonwealth’s burden of proof “has been described as an intermediate test, falling below the highest level of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, but above the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034 , 1039 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

2013Under this intermediate standard, to withstand constitutional challenge, classifications “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to [the] achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976).

2013Under this intermediate standard, to withstand constitutional challenge, classifications “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to [the] achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976).

2023To meet this level of proof, the evidence should be " so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the [ trier of fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts at issue". d. (citing Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 219 ( Pa. 2006)).

2019Thus, the clear and convincing evidence test "has been described as an intermediate test, which is more exacting than a onderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a nable doubt." Com. v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 219 (Pa. 2006).

2025“Clear and convincing evidence is testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the - 10 - J-S26032-25 trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” S.M., 176 A.3d at 937 (citation omitted). “[T]he clear and convincing evidence test has been described as an intermediate test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2025“Clear and convincing evidence is testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the - 10 - J-S26032-25 trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” S.M., 176 A.3d at 937 (citation omitted). “[T]he clear and convincing evidence test has been described as an intermediate test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2022See Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 285 , 733 A.2d 593, 605 (1999) (“This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof—‘clear and convincing evidence’—when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’ Notwithstanding ‘the state’s civil labels and good intentions,’ the Court has deemed this level of certainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with ‘a significant deprivation of liberty’ or ‘stigma.’

2022See Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 285 , 733 A.2d 593, 605 (1999) (“This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof—‘clear and convincing evidence’—when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’ Notwithstanding ‘the state’s civil labels and good intentions,’ the Court has deemed this level of certainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with ‘a significant deprivation of liberty’ or ‘stigma.’

2007See Nicholson v. Combs, 550 Pa. 23 , 703 A.2d 407 (1997).

2007See Nicholson v. Combs, 550 Pa. 23 , 703 A.2d 407 (1997).

1985This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof — "clear and convincing evidence" — when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both "particularly important" and "more substantial than mere *39 loss of money." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 424 [ 99 S.Ct. at 1808 ].

1985This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof — "clear and convincing evidence" — when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both "particularly important" and "more substantial than mere *39 loss of money." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 424 [ 99 S.Ct. at 1808 ].

2019See James, 477 A.2d at 1306 (applying a heightened standard of review when analyzing a law which restricted the plaintiff’s “important interest in access to the courts”); see also Smith, 516 A.2d at 311 (Noting that the “important interest in access to the courts . . . should be examined pursuant to an intermediate standard of review.”).13 More colloquially deemed intermediate scrutiny, [t]his standard of review requires that the government interest be an ‘important’ one; that the classification be drawn so as to be closely related to the objectives of the legislation; and that the person excl

2013Id.

1986The first type — classifications implicating neither suspect classes nor fundamental rights — will be sustained if it meets a “rational basis” test____ In the second type of cases, where a suspect classification has been made or a fundamental right has been burdened, another standard of review is applied: that of strict scrutiny____ Finally, in the third type of cases, if “important,” though not fundamental rights are affected by the classification, or if “sensitive” classifications have been made, the United States Supreme Court has employed what may be called an intermediate standard of revi

1986The first type — classifications implicating neither suspect classes nor fundamental rights — will be sustained if it meets a “rational basis” test____ In the second type of cases, where a suspect classification has been made or a fundamental right has been burdened, another standard of review is applied: that of strict scrutiny____ Finally, in the third type of cases, if “important,” though not fundamental rights are affected by the classification, or if “sensitive” classifications have been made, the United States Supreme Court has employed what may be called an intermediate standard of revi

2022At an SVP hearing, the Commonwealth must show that: • the offender suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person ____________________________________________ 3Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re B.J.Z., 207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). -4- J-A24016-21 to

2021“Our Supreme Court has defined clear and convincing evidence as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he clear and convincing evidence test has been described as an intermediate test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re S.T.S., Jr., 76 A.3d 24, 38 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and internal quotation m

2020See Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 991 A.2d 935, 942 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

2019See Lankford, 416 So.2d at 1001 (declaring its “review is directed to the question whether a substantial relationship exists between the [social] evil and the legislature’s attempt to eradicate the evil.”); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 328 (N.D. 1986) (declaring unconstitutional a products liability statute of repose because it did not have “a close correspondence to the legislative goals”); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 295 (N.H. 1983) (invalidating products liability statute of repose under intermediate scrutiny because it was not “substantially related to a legi

2019See Lankford, 416 So.2d at 1001 (declaring its “review is directed to the question whether a substantial relationship exists between the [social] evil and the legislature’s attempt to eradicate the evil.”); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 328 (N.D. 1986) (declaring unconstitutional a products liability statute of repose because it did not have “a close correspondence to the legislative goals”); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 295 (N.H. 1983) (invalidating products liability statute of repose under intermediate scrutiny because it was not “substantially related to a legi

2019See Lankford, 416 So.2d at 1001 (declaring its “review is directed to the question whether a substantial relationship exists between the [social] evil and the legislature’s attempt to eradicate the evil.”); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 328 (N.D. 1986) (declaring unconstitutional a products liability statute of repose because it did not have “a close correspondence to the legislative goals”); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 295 (N.H. 1983) (invalidating products liability statute of repose under intermediate scrutiny because it was not “substantially related to a legi

2019See Lankford, 416 So.2d at 1001 (declaring its “review is directed to the question whether a substantial relationship exists between the [social] evil and the legislature’s attempt to eradicate the evil.”); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 328 (N.D. 1986) (declaring unconstitutional a products liability statute of repose because it did not have “a close correspondence to the legislative goals”); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 295 (N.H. 1983) (invalidating products liability statute of repose under intermediate scrutiny because it was not “substantially related to a legi

2014In the second type of cases, where a suspect classification has been made or a fundamental right has been burdened, another standard of review is applied: that of strict scrutiny-Finally, in the third type of cases, if “important,” though not fundamental rights are affected by the classification, or if “sensitive” classifications have been made, the United States Supreme Court has employed what may be called an intermediate standard of review, or a heightened standard of review.... *767 Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 512 Pa. 74 , 515 A.2d 1358, 1363 (1986) (quoting James v. Se.

2014In the second type of cases, where a suspect classification has been made or a fundamental right has been burdened, another standard of review is applied: that of strict scrutiny-Finally, in the third type of cases, if “important,” though not fundamental rights are affected by the classification, or if “sensitive” classifications have been made, the United States Supreme Court has employed what may be called an intermediate standard of review, or a heightened standard of review.... *767 Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 512 Pa. 74 , 515 A.2d 1358, 1363 (1986) (quoting James v. Se.