intermediate standard in Texas

2026It is “an intermediate standard, falling between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). 15 C.

2014“Clear and convincing” proof is an intermediate standard “falling between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” Vardilos v. Vardilos, 219 S.W.3d 920, 922 (Tex.App.Dallas 2007, no pet.) (citing In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980)); see also In re M.L.S., No. 01-97-00886-CV, 1998 WL 414701 , at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jul. 16, 1998, no pet.) (holding that, due to lower standard of proof than criminal cases, evidence was sufficient to support involuntary termination of mother’s parental rights based upon a prior

2011App. 2002). 10 ―[C]lear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof which falls between the ordinary civil ‗preponderance of the evidence‘ standard and our usual ‗beyond a reasonable doubt‘ standard in criminal cases.‖ Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 212 (Baird, J., concurring). ―Clear and convincing evidence is defined ‗as that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.‘‖ Id. (quoting State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979)). 5 court must e

1987The "clear and convincing" standard of proof is defined as an intermediate standard which requires "that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." In the Interest G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847 , quoting State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.).

2021In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625 , 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).

2021In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625 , 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).

2014“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re C.S., 208 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).

2013“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re C.S., 208 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).

2019“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt 7 standard of criminal proceedings.” In re L.J.N., 329 S.W.3d 667 , 671 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, no pet.).

2019“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re L.J.N., 329 S.W.3d 667 , 671 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.).

2024In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means a ‘measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Tex. Fam.

2021“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal 9 proceedings.” In re M.N.G., 147 S.W.3d 521, 535 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means a ‘measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Tex. Fam.

2015See In re B.T., 954 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex.App.-San The ad litem also believes that arelationship has Antonio 1997, writ denied).

2002See In re B.T., 954 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).

2015However, we further observed that, in applying the intermediate standard of review, "[o]ther principles of law relating to sufficiency of evidence are still applicable even when the intermediate standard is used." Id.

2015A number of our sister courts have likewise continued to apply the traditional Page 631 standard of review for factual sufficiency where the burden in the trial court is clear and convincing evidence. [4] We note that other courts have espoused what they describe as an intermediate standard of appellate review of factual sufficiency of the evidence in such cases. [5] In In re L.R.M., this court recognized that, just as the clear and convincing standard of proof in the trial court is an "intermediate" standard of proof falling between the preponderance of evidence standard of ordinary civil pro

2015In re E.M.E., 234 S.W.3d at 73.

2013This is an intermediate standard that “falls between the preponderance of the evidence standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re L.J.N., 329 S.W.3d at 671 (citing In re E.M.E., 234 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.)). 9 The Texas Supreme Court has explained the unique procedure for reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental termination case as follows: In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fa

1996However, there is a split among the courts of appeals as to whether the higher burden of proof should impact the standard of review, see e.g., D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, no writ); Neal v. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs., 814 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied); Neiswander v. Bailey 645 S.W.2d 835, 836 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, no writ), and, in fact, the Supreme Court, rejected an intermediate standard, saying that Texas has only two standards of review; factual sufficiency and legal sufficiency.

1993We recognize that many courts, including this one, have described an intermediate standard of appellate review in such cases. “[I]t is the duty of the appellate court in reviewing the evidence to determine, not whether the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the existence of a fact is more probable than not, but whether the trier could reasonably conclude that the existence of the facts is highly probable.” Neiswander v. Bailey, 645 S.W.2d 835, 835-36 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, no writ); see also Williams v. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs., 788 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 19

2015See In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137 , 143 & n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ) (expressly overruling former opinions); In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437 , 439-40 & n. 1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ).

1996However, there is a split among the courts of appeals as to whether the higher burden of proof should impact the standard of review, see e.g., D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, no writ); Neal v. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs., 814 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied); Neiswander v. Bailey 645 S.W.2d 835, 836 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, no writ), and, in fact, the Supreme Court, rejected an intermediate standard, saying that Texas has only two standards of review; factual sufficiency and legal sufficiency.

2015Several courts have concluded the requirement that the existence of the fact be "highly probable" is merely another way of requiring that the existence of the fact be "clear and convincing." See Spangler v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 962 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, no pet.); In re B.R., 950 S.W.2d at 119 n. 5; In re L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ); Neiswander, 645 S.W.2d at 835-36 .

2015Several courts have concluded the requirement that the existence of the fact be "highly probable" is merely another way of requiring that the existence of the fact be "clear and convincing." See Spangler v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 962 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, no pet.); In re B.R., 950 S.W.2d at 119 n. 5; In re L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ); Neiswander, 645 S.W.2d at 835-36 .

2009“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re D.M.F., 283 S.W.2d at 129 (citing In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re K.W., 138 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)).

2009"This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings." In re D.M.F. , 283 S.W.2d at 129 (citing In re G.M. , 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re K.W. , 138 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)).

2015Several courts have concluded the requirement that the existence of the fact be "highly probable" is merely another way of requiring that the existence of the fact be "clear and convincing." See Spangler v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 962 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, no pet.); In re B.R., 950 S.W.2d at 119 n. 5; In re L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ); Neiswander, 645 S.W.2d at 835-36 .

2015Several courts have concluded the requirement that the existence of the fact be "highly probable" is merely another way of requiring that the existence of the fact be "clear and convincing." See Spangler v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 962 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, no pet.); In re B.R., 950 S.W.2d at 119 n. 5; In re L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ); Neiswander, 645 S.W.2d at 835-36 .

2025Indeed, “a requirement of ‘clear and satisfactory proof’ represents only an admonition to exercise great caution in weighing the 4 Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States has only “mandated an intermediate standard of proof—‘clear and convincing evidence’—when the individual interests at stake are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than a mere loss of money.’” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)). 5 N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Willacy County Appraisal Dist., 804 S.W.2d 894, 899 (Tex. 1991). 6 Bullock v

2015This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof -- "clear and convincing evidence" -- when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both "particularly important" and "more substantial than mere loss of money." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 424 .

2015See In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137 , 143 & n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ) (expressly overruling former opinions); In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437 , 439-40 & n. 1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ).

2015See In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137 , 143 & n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ) (expressly overruling former opinions); In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437 , 439-40 & n. 1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ).

2002See In re B.T. , 954 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, writ denied); In re H.C. , 942 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, no writ).

2002See In Interest of B.T., 954 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied); In Interest of H.C., 942 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).

2001However, on two prior occasions, In re King and In re J.J., we have declined to apply this intermediate standard of appellate review, relying on the unambiguous directive of the Texas Supreme Court in Meadows v. Green, 524 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex.1975), which expressly rejected the use of this intermediate standard.

2001However, on two prior occasions, In re King and In re J.J., we have declined to apply this intermediate standard of appellate review, relying on the unambiguous directive of the Texas Supreme Court in Meadows v. Green, 524 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex.1975), which expressly rejected the use of this intermediate standard.

2010In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980); State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979); see Strange, 256 S.W.3d at 775 .

2010In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980); State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979); see Strange, 256 S.W.3d at 775 .

2015See In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137 , 143 & n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ) (expressly overruling former opinions); In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437 , 439-40 & n. 1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ).

2015See In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137 , 143 & n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ) (expressly overruling former opinions); In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437 , 439-40 & n. 1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ).

2015See Neiswander v. Bailey, 645 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, no writ) (citing Beeler v. American Trust Co., 24 Cal.2d 1 , 147 P.2d 583, 600 (1944) and Comment, Evidence: Clear and Convincing Proof: Appellate Review, 32 CALIF.

2015See Neiswander v. Bailey, 645 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, no writ) (citing Beeler v. American Trust Co., 24 Cal.2d 1 , 147 P.2d 583, 600 (1944) and Comment, Evidence: Clear and Convincing Proof: Appellate Review, 32 CALIF.

2015See In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137 , 143 & n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ) (expressly overruling former opinions); In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437 , 439-40 & n. 1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ).

2015See In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137 , 143 & n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ) (expressly overruling former opinions); In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437 , 439-40 & n. 1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ).

2015See State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex.1977).

1997In the Interest of J.J. and K.J., 911 S.W.2d at 440 n. 1, citing Turner, 556 S.W.2d at 565 (the rule requiring clear and convincing evidence is merely another method of requiring that a cause of action be supported by factually sufficient evidence; in practical effect it is but an admonition to the judge to exercise great caution in weighing the evidence; no doctrine is more firmly established than that issues of fact are resolved from a preponderance of the evidence, and special issues requiring a higher degree of proof than a preponderance of the evidence may not be submitted to a jury); San

2015In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re C.S., 208 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006 pet. denied); Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 57 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).

2015In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re C.S., 208 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied); 34 Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 57 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).

2015See In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137 , 143 & n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ) (expressly overruling former opinions); In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437 , 439-40 & n. 1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ).

2000However, in In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437, 439-40 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied), we declined to apply an intermediate standard on appeal, stating we were bound by Meadows v. Green, 524 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex.1975), a case in which the Texas Supreme Court expressly rejected an intermediate standard of appellate review.

2025Indeed, “a requirement of ‘clear and satisfactory proof’ represents only an admonition to exercise great caution in weighing the 4 Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States has only “mandated an intermediate standard of proof—‘clear and convincing evidence’—when the individual interests at stake are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than a mere loss of money.’” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)). 5 N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Willacy County Appraisal Dist., 804 S.W.2d 894, 899 (Tex. 1991). 6 Bullock v

2005The United States Supreme Court "has mandated an intermediate standard of proof — `clear and convincing evidence' — when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both `particularly important' and `more substantial than mere loss of money.'" Id. at 756 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ).