24 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1891–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fletcher v. Stategreen2 sentences2013The state contends that the trial court erred in excluding the results of the Intoxilyzer (breath) test on the basis of the court’s finding that the officer did not read rights and gave defendant extraneous and misleading information); cf. McHugh, supra at 131-132, 134 (prior to reading implied consent notice, police officer stated to driver with out-of-state license that the notice dealt with the driver’s license and privilege to drive in Georgia; held, officer’s warning was substantively accurate so as to permit driver to make an informed decision about whether to consent to the state-admini 2013The state contends that the trial court erred in excluding the results of the Intoxilyzer (breath) test on the basis of the court’s finding that the officer did not read rights and gave defendant extraneous and misleading information); cf. McHugh, supra at 131-132, 134 (prior to reading implied consent notice, police officer stated to driver with out-of-state license that the notice dealt with the driver’s license and privilege to drive in Georgia; held, officer’s warning was substantively accurate so as to permit driver to make an informed decision about whether to consent to the state-admini | 2 | 2 |
Keenan v. Hillgreen2 sentences2025As we have explained, “[w]hile driving 7 without a license is a violation of State law, it does not constitute actionable negligence unless there is a causal connection between the violation and the injury.” Keenan v. Hill, 190 Ga. App. 108, 111-112 (6) ( 378 SE2d 344 ) (1989). 2025As we have explained, “[w]hile driving 7 without a license is a violation of State law, it does not constitute actionable negligence unless there is a causal connection between the violation and the injury.” Keenan v. Hill, 190 Ga. App. 108, 111-112 (6) ( 378 SE2d 344 ) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Goldrush II v. City of Mariettagreen2 sentences2013Nevertheless, this very argument establishes that the Property Owners have failed to state a claim for which they can recover because not only have they failed to present any evidence that their property could not be converted to a use other than an adult business, but because the zoning for the particular parcels allows for adult business, the Property Owners also have failed to show that they could not continue leasing their buildings to other businesses in the same category that would not have violated the City’s licensing rules and could 3 See Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 2013Nevertheless, this very argument establishes that the Property Owners have failed to state a claim for which they can recover because not only have they failed to present any evidence that their property could not be converted to a use other than an adult business, but because the zoning for the particular parcels allows for adult business, the Property Owners also have failed to show that they could not continue leasing their buildings to other businesses in the same category that would not have violated the City’s licensing rules and could 3 See Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Terrygreen2 sentences2013See Kitchens, supra at 413, 415 (1); Peirce, supra at 626 (1); State v. Terry, 236 Ga. App. 248,250 ( 511 SE2d 608 ) (1999) (affirming exclusion of evidence of defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test following arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol; although police officer read defendant the implied consent notice, officer subsequently attempted to respond to questions about defendant’s rights and gave defendant extraneous and misleading information); cf. McHugh, supra at 131-132, 134 (prior to reading implied consent notice, police officer stated to driver with out-of 2013See Kitchens, supra at 413, 415 (1); Peirce, supra at 626 (1); State v. Terry, 236 Ga. App. 248,250 ( 511 SE2d 608 ) (1999) (affirming exclusion of evidence of defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test following arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol; although police officer read defendant the implied consent notice, officer subsequently attempted to respond to questions about defendant’s rights and gave defendant extraneous and misleading information); cf. McHugh, supra at 131-132, 134 (prior to reading implied consent notice, police officer stated to driver with out-of | 1 | 1 |
State v. Peircegreen1 sentence2013See Kitchens, supra at 413, 415 (1); Peirce, supra at 626 (1); State v. Terry, 236 Ga. App. 248,250 ( 511 SE2d 608 ) (1999) (affirming exclusion of evidence of defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test following arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol; although police officer read defendant the implied consent notice, officer subsequently attempted to respond to questions about defendant’s rights and gave defendant extraneous and misleading information); cf. McHugh, supra at 131-132, 134 (prior to reading implied consent notice, police officer stated to driver with out-of | 1 | 1 |
Kitchens v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Kitchens, supra at 413, 415 (1); Peirce, supra at 626 (1); State v. Terry, 236 Ga. App. 248,250 ( 511 SE2d 608 ) (1999) (affirming exclusion of evidence of defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test following arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol; although police officer read defendant the implied consent notice, officer subsequently attempted to respond to questions about defendant’s rights and gave defendant extraneous and misleading information); cf. McHugh, supra at 131-132, 134 (prior to reading implied consent notice, police officer stated to driver with out-of | 1 | 1 |
Mays v. Ellisgreen2 sentences2009See Mays v. Ellis, 283 Ga. App. 195, 197 (1) (a) ( 641 SE2d 201 ) (2007) (in construing OCGA § 24-9-67.1 (c) (1) (A), we held that “[if] the General Assembly intended that only experts in the same area of practice/specialty as the defendant doctor be deemed qualified to provide expert testimony against those doctors, it could have plainly *218 done so”) (punctuation omitted). 2009See Mays v. Ellis, 283 Ga. App. 195, 197 (1) (a) ( 641 SE2d 201 ) (2007) (in construing OCGA § 24-9-67.1 (c) (1) (A), we held that “[if] the General Assembly intended that only experts in the same area of practice/specialty as the defendant doctor be deemed qualified to provide expert testimony against those doctors, it could have plainly *218 done so”) (punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Nolen v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Nolen v. State, 218 Ga. App. 819, 822 ( 463 SE2d 504 ) (1995). 2002Nolen v. State, 218 Ga. App. 819, 822 ( 463 SE2d 504 ) (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Laborgreen1 sentence1990Cf. Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U. S. 290, 305 (105 SC 1953, 85 LE2d 278) (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Carpenter v. Lyonsgreen2 sentences1989Carpenter v. Lyons, 78 Ga. App. 214, 217, 218 ( 50 SE2d 850 ). 1989Carpenter v. Lyons, 78 Ga. App. 214, 217, 218 ( 50 SE2d 850 ). | 1 | 1 |
Head v. Cigarette Sales Co.green2 sentences1961See Head v. Cigarette Sales Co., 188 Ga. 452 (2), 456 ( 4 S. E. 2d 203 .) The foregoing view is reinforced with respect to the accounts receivable feature of this case, at least, by the following facts: In an act approved February 25, 1949, expressly amending Section 3(b) of the 1937 act a proviso was added to that section. 1961See Head v. Cigarette Sales Co., 188 Ga. 452 (2), 456 ( 4 S. E. 2d 203 .) The foregoing view is reinforced with respect to the accounts receivable feature of this case, at least, by the following facts: In an act approved February 25, 1949, expressly amending Section 3(b) of the 1937 act a proviso was added to that section. | 1 | 1 |
| Carr v. City Council of Augustagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hayes v. Howell
green
2 sentences1997In order to be grandfathered in under the zoning ordinance, and therefore have a compensable right in that business use, the nonconforming use must have been, “at that time, in full compliance with all applicable federal, state and local laws, rules and regulations, and for which use all required federal, state or local permits or authorizations were then, and continue to be, in existence.” (Emphasis supplied.) “The term Vested rights’ means ‘ “interests which it is proper for (the) state to recognize and protect and of which (the) individual cannot be deprived arbitrarily without injustice.” 1997In order to be grandfathered in under the zoning ordinance, and therefore have a compensable right in that business use, the nonconforming use must have been, “at that time, in full compliance with all applicable federal, state and local laws, rules and regulations, and for which use all required federal, state or local permits or authorizations were then, and continue to be, in existence.” (Emphasis supplied.) “The term Vested rights’ means ‘ “interests which it is proper for (the) state to recognize and protect and of which (the) individual cannot be deprived arbitrarily without injustice.” | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
1 sentence1989Jackson v. Virginia, supra. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (1). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Management Search, Inc. v. Kinard
green
2 sentences1982In Management Search, Inc. v. Kinard, 231 Ga. 26 ( 199 SE2d 899 ) (1973), it was held that the license requirement is not merely a revenue measure, but is a regulatory measure in the public interest. 1982In Management Search, Inc. v. Kinard, 231 Ga. 26 ( 199 SE2d 899 ) (1973), it was held that the license requirement is not merely a revenue measure, but is a regulatory measure in the public interest. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Stonaker
green
2 sentences1978State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1 ( 222 SE2d 354 ) (1976), does not apply as appellant’s trial took place before January 27, 1976. *828 We find no merit to appellant’s argument that the victim’s death was caused by his carrying a pistol without a license in violation of Code Ann. § 26-2903; and by his discharge of a firearm within fifty yards of a public street in violation of Code Ann. § 26-2909. 1978State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1 ( 222 SE2d 354 ) (1976), does not apply as appellant’s trial took place before January 27, 1976. *828 We find no merit to appellant’s argument that the victim’s death was caused by his carrying a pistol without a license in violation of Code Ann. § 26-2903; and by his discharge of a firearm within fifty yards of a public street in violation of Code Ann. § 26-2909. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Caldwell v. State
neutral
2 sentences1970Caldwell v. State, 58 Ga. App. 408 ( 198 SE 793 ). 1970Caldwell v. State, 58 Ga. App. 408 ( 198 SE 793 ). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Nelson v. State
green
2 sentences1970Wherefore, appellant prays that this part of the judge’s sentence be corrected and that the said order and judgment of the trial court be reversed as to that portion of the sentence revoking and suspending appellant’s driver’s license.” Held: In Nelson v. State, 87 Ga. App. 644 ( 75 SE2d 39 ), this court ruled that notwithstanding Code Ann. § 92A-9908, which authorizes the trial court to cancel or suspend a driver’s license for certain moving traffic violations, a sentence which suspends or revokes the license for a violation under a plea of nolo contendere effects a civil disqualification pro 1970Wherefore, appellant prays that this part of the judge’s sentence be corrected and that the said order and judgment of the trial court be reversed as to that portion of the sentence revoking and suspending appellant’s driver’s license.” Held: In Nelson v. State, 87 Ga. App. 644 ( 75 SE2d 39 ), this court ruled that notwithstanding Code Ann. § 92A-9908, which authorizes the trial court to cancel or suspend a driver’s license for certain moving traffic violations, a sentence which suspends or revokes the license for a violation under a plea of nolo contendere effects a civil disqualification pro | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Stoner v. Patten
green
2 sentences1958Cas. 1915C 1023), defined a riparian owner as “one having land bounded on a stream of water, as such owner having a qualified property in the soil to the thread of the stream,” and defined riparian rights as those that “grow out of the ownership of the banks of streams, and not out of the ownership of the bed of the stream.” In Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178 ( 63 S. E. 802 ), it was held that the grant of a license or privilege to one by a riparian proprietor to divert water from a stream did not make the licensee a riparian owner. 1958Cas. 1915C 1023), defined a riparian owner as "one having land bounded on a stream of water, as such owner having a qualified property in the soil to the thread of the stream," and defined riparian rights as those that "grow out of the ownership of the banks of streams, and not out of the ownership of the bed of the stream." In Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178 ( 63 S. E. 802 ), it was held that the grant of a license or privilege to one by a riparian proprietor to divert water from a stream did not make the licensee a riparian owner. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Shuman v. State
neutral
2 sentences1954In Shuman v. State, 82 Ga. App. 130 ( 60 S. E. 2d 521 ), this court held: “A person cannot be legally licensed by the State to manufacture alcoholic liquors in a ‘dry’ county, and hence one found operating an illicit liquor still in a ‘dry’ county cannot be convicted of operating a distillery for manufacturing liquor without a license in violation of Code (Ann. 1954In Shuman v. State, 82 Ga. App. 130 ( 60 S. E. 2d 521 ), this court held: “A person cannot be legally licensed by the State to manufacture alcoholic liquors in a ‘dry’ county, and hence one found operating an illicit liquor still in a ‘dry’ county cannot be convicted of operating a distillery for manufacturing liquor without a license in violation of Code (Ann. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Findley v. City of Vidalia
green
2 sentences1954Findley v. City of Vidalia, 78 Ga. App. 581 ( 51 S. E. 2d 542 ); City of Summerville v. Sellers, 82 Ga. App. 361 ( 61 S. E. 2d 160 ). 1954Findley v. City of Vidalia, 78 Ga. App. 581 ( 51 S. E. 2d 542 ); City of Summerville v. Sellers, 82 Ga. App. 361 ( 61 S. E. 2d 160 ). | 1 | 1954–1954 |
City of Summerville v. Sellers
green
2 sentences1954Findley v. City of Vidalia, 78 Ga. App. 581 ( 51 S. E. 2d 542 ); City of Summerville v. Sellers, 82 Ga. App. 361 ( 61 S. E. 2d 160 ). 1954Findley v. City of Vidalia, 78 Ga. App. 581 ( 51 S. E. 2d 542 ); City of Summerville v. Sellers, 82 Ga. App. 361 ( 61 S. E. 2d 160 ). | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Town of Fairburn v. Edmondson
neutral
2 sentences1941Town of Fairburn v. Edmondson, 162 Ga. 386 (2, 3) ( 134 S. E. 51 ); City of Macon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150 (4) ( 145 S. E. 57 ). 1941Town of Fairburn v. Edmondson, 162 Ga. 386 (2, 3) ( 134 S. E. 51 ); City of Macon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150 (4) ( 145 S. E. 57 ). | 1 | 1941–1941 |
City of Macon v. Samples
neutral
2 sentences1941Town of Fairburn v. Edmondson, 162 Ga. 386 (2, 3) ( 134 S. E. 51 ); City of Macon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150 (4) ( 145 S. E. 57 ). 1941Town of Fairburn v. Edmondson, 162 Ga. 386 (2, 3) ( 134 S. E. 51 ); City of Macon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150 (4) ( 145 S. E. 57 ). | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.
red
1 sentence1939Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. ed. 389, 411, Ann. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences1938While it is time that where one suddenly, upon- an emergency,acquires manual possession of a pistol for the purpose of defending himself, his family, or his property, he is not guilty of carrying a. pistol without a license in violation of the Code, § 26-5103 (Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 84, 85 , 76 S. E. 785 ; Amos v. State, 13 Ga. App. 140 , 78 S. E. 866 ; Harris v. State, 15 Ga. App. 315 , 85 S. E. 813 ); yet one is not authorized to carry a pistol about his person for the purpose of meeting any emergency that may arise, or an emergency which he unlawfully intends to create by his own ac 1938While it is time that where one suddenly, upon- an emergency,acquires manual possession of a pistol for the purpose of defending himself, his family, or his property, he is not guilty of carrying a. pistol without a license in violation of the Code, § 26-5103 (Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 84, 85 , 76 S. E. 785 ; Amos v. State, 13 Ga. App. 140 , 78 S. E. 866 ; Harris v. State, 15 Ga. App. 315 , 85 S. E. 813 ); yet one is not authorized to carry a pistol about his person for the purpose of meeting any emergency that may arise, or an emergency which he unlawfully intends to create by his own ac | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Amos v. State
neutral
1 sentence1938While it is time that where one suddenly, upon- an emergency,acquires manual possession of a pistol for the purpose of defending himself, his family, or his property, he is not guilty of carrying a. pistol without a license in violation of the Code, § 26-5103 (Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 84, 85 , 76 S. E. 785 ; Amos v. State, 13 Ga. App. 140 , 78 S. E. 866 ; Harris v. State, 15 Ga. App. 315 , 85 S. E. 813 ); yet one is not authorized to carry a pistol about his person for the purpose of meeting any emergency that may arise, or an emergency which he unlawfully intends to create by his own ac | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Davis v. State
green
1 sentence1938While it is time that where one suddenly, upon- an emergency,acquires manual possession of a pistol for the purpose of defending himself, his family, or his property, he is not guilty of carrying a. pistol without a license in violation of the Code, § 26-5103 (Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 84, 85 , 76 S. E. 785 ; Amos v. State, 13 Ga. App. 140 , 78 S. E. 866 ; Harris v. State, 15 Ga. App. 315 , 85 S. E. 813 ); yet one is not authorized to carry a pistol about his person for the purpose of meeting any emergency that may arise, or an emergency which he unlawfully intends to create by his own ac | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Harris v. State
neutral
2 sentences1938While it is time that where one suddenly, upon- an emergency,acquires manual possession of a pistol for the purpose of defending himself, his family, or his property, he is not guilty of carrying a. pistol without a license in violation of the Code, § 26-5103 (Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 84, 85 , 76 S. E. 785 ; Amos v. State, 13 Ga. App. 140 , 78 S. E. 866 ; Harris v. State, 15 Ga. App. 315 , 85 S. E. 813 ); yet one is not authorized to carry a pistol about his person for the purpose of meeting any emergency that may arise, or an emergency which he unlawfully intends to create by his own ac 1938While it is time that where one suddenly, upon- an emergency,acquires manual possession of a pistol for the purpose of defending himself, his family, or his property, he is not guilty of carrying a. pistol without a license in violation of the Code, § 26-5103 (Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 84, 85 , 76 S. E. 785 ; Amos v. State, 13 Ga. App. 140 , 78 S. E. 866 ; Harris v. State, 15 Ga. App. 315 , 85 S. E. 813 ); yet one is not authorized to carry a pistol about his person for the purpose of meeting any emergency that may arise, or an emergency which he unlawfully intends to create by his own ac | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Barbier v. Connolly
green
1 sentence1914Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. ed. 923). | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Campbell v. City of Thomasville
green
2 sentences1909See Carr v. Augusta, 124 Ga. 116 ( 52 S. E. 300 ); Campbell v. Thomasville, 6 Ga. App. 212 ( 64 S. E. 815 ), and cases cited. 3. 1909See Carr v. Augusta, 124 Ga. 116 ( 52 S. E. 300 ); Campbell v. Thomasville, 6 Ga. App. 212 ( 64 S. E. 815 ), and cases cited. 3. | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| The People v. . Meyers neutral | 1 | 1891–1891 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.