license violation in California

2007XX, § 22.) In the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, the courts will uphold the Department’s decision to suspend a license for violation of the liquor laws.” (Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561, 566 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 , 869 P.2d 1163 ].) In contrast to the deference typically accorded Department decisions, some situations call for de novo review.

2007XX, § 22.) In the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, the courts will uphold the Department’s decision to suspend a license for violation of the liquor laws.” (Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561, 566 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 , 869 P.2d 1163 ].) In contrast to the deference typically accorded Department decisions, some situations call for de novo review.

1992But as said in Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 386 [citation]: ‘. . . when the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of caring on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordinance is void.’ ” (Id. at p. 641) This treatment of the contract as a nullity was

1989Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 152 [ 308 P.2d 713 ]; Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 289 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 703 , 696 P.2d 95 ].) 2 “[W]hen the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of carrying on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordina

1989Construction Co. v. Palma Ceia Development Organization (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 364, 367 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 690 ] held that the failure to obtain a license will bar a contractor from recovering for his work in an action brought by the contractor but will not bar him from offsetting as a defense amounts otherwise due him under the illegal contract.

1989Construction Co. v. Palma Ceia Development Organization (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 364, 367 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 690 ] held that the failure to obtain a license will bar a contractor from recovering for his work in an action brought by the contractor but will not bar him from offsetting as a defense amounts otherwise due him under the illegal contract.

2025(Stoner v. Zucker, supra, 148 Cal. at p. 520 ; see also Cooke v. Ramponi (1952) 38 Cal.2d 282 .) As plaintiffs accurately note, “the Legislature is presumed to know about existing case law when it enacts or amends a statute.” (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 57 .) If the Legislature had intended for Civil Code section 813 to apply to irrevocable licenses as well as prescriptive easements, it would have said so.

2025(Stoner v. Zucker, supra, 148 Cal. at p. 520 ; see also Cooke v. Ramponi (1952) 38 Cal.2d 282 .) As plaintiffs accurately note, “the Legislature is presumed to know about existing case law when it enacts or amends a statute.” (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 57 .) If the Legislature had intended for Civil Code section 813 to apply to irrevocable licenses as well as prescriptive easements, it would have said so.

2025(Stoner v. Zucker, supra, 148 Cal. at p. 520 ; see also Cooke v. Ramponi (1952) 38 Cal.2d 282 .) As plaintiffs accurately note, “the Legislature is presumed to know about existing case law when it enacts or amends a statute.” (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 57 .) If the Legislature had intended for Civil Code section 813 to apply to irrevocable licenses as well as prescriptive easements, it would have said so.

2025(Stoner v. Zucker, supra, 148 Cal. at p. 520 ; see also Cooke v. Ramponi (1952) 38 Cal.2d 282 .) As plaintiffs accurately note, “the Legislature is presumed to know about existing case law when it enacts or amends a statute.” (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 57 .) If the Legislature had intended for Civil Code section 813 to apply to irrevocable licenses as well as prescriptive easements, it would have said so.

2017(E.g., Martin v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 238, 248-249 [ 340 P.2d 1 ].)” (Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561, 566 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 , 869 P.2d 1163 ] (Provigo).) “ ‘The administration of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, within the scope of the purposes of that act, is initially vested in the department.

2017(E.g., Martin v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 238, 248-249 [ 340 P.2d 1 ].)” (Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561, 566 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 , 869 P.2d 1163 ] (Provigo).) “ ‘The administration of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, within the scope of the purposes of that act, is initially vested in the department.

1972To the same effect are, Page v. Mayors, 191 Cal. 263, 264 [ 216 P. 31 ]; Wysock v. Borchers Bros., 104 Cal.App.2d 571, 582-586 [ 232 P.2d 531 , 29 A.L.R.2d 948 ]; Corsetto v. Pacific Electric Ry., 136 Cal.App.2d 631, 635 [ 289 P.2d 116 ]; People v. J.

1972To the same effect are, Page v. Mayors, 191 Cal. 263, 264 [ 216 P. 31 ]; Wysock v. Borchers Bros., 104 Cal.App.2d 571, 582-586 [ 232 P.2d 531 , 29 A.L.R.2d 948 ]; Corsetto v. Pacific Electric Ry., 136 Cal.App.2d 631, 635 [ 289 P.2d 116 ]; People v. J.

1972To the same effect are, Page v. Mayors, 191 Cal. 263, 264 [ 216 P. 31 ]; Wysock v. Borchers Bros., 104 Cal.App.2d 571, 582-586 [ 232 P.2d 531 , 29 A.L.R.2d 948 ]; Corsetto v. Pacific Electric Ry., 136 Cal.App.2d 631, 635 [ 289 P.2d 116 ]; People v. J.

1972To the same effect are, Page v. Mayors, 191 Cal. 263, 264 [ 216 P. 31 ]; Wysock v. Borchers Bros., 104 Cal.App.2d 571, 582-586 [ 232 P.2d 531 , 29 A.L.R.2d 948 ]; Corsetto v. Pacific Electric Ry., 136 Cal.App.2d 631, 635 [ 289 P.2d 116 ]; People v. J.

1972If this case had been a wrongful death action, there would be no doubt that the evidence of defendant’s lack of a license would have been inadmissible: “The applicable rule is succinctly stated in Strandt v. Cannon, 29 Cal.App.2d 509, 518 [ 85 P.2d 160 ]: ‘The weight of authority, as we see it, is that the operator’s negligence is to be determined by the facts existing at the time of the accident, and whether the operator had a license to operate an automobile under the laws of this state is immaterial unless there is some causal relationship between the injuries and the failure to have a lice

1972If this case had been a wrongful death action, there would be no doubt that the evidence of defendant’s lack of a license would have been inadmissible: “The applicable rule is succinctly stated in Strandt v. Cannon, 29 Cal.App.2d 509, 518 [ 85 P.2d 160 ]: ‘The weight of authority, as we see it, is that the operator’s negligence is to be determined by the facts existing at the time of the accident, and whether the operator had a license to operate an automobile under the laws of this state is immaterial unless there is some causal relationship between the injuries and the failure to have a lice

1972If this case had been a wrongful death action, there would be no doubt that the evidence of defendant’s lack of a license would have been inadmissible: “The applicable rule is succinctly stated in Strandt v. Cannon, 29 Cal.App.2d 509, 518 [ 85 P.2d 160 ]: ‘The weight of authority, as we see it, is that the operator’s negligence is to be determined by the facts existing at the time of the accident, and whether the operator had a license to operate an automobile under the laws of this state is immaterial unless there is some causal relationship between the injuries and the failure to have a lice

1972If this case had been a wrongful death action, there would be no doubt that the evidence of defendant’s lack of a license would have been inadmissible: “The applicable rule is succinctly stated in Strandt v. Cannon, 29 Cal.App.2d 509, 518 [ 85 P.2d 160 ]: ‘The weight of authority, as we see it, is that the operator’s negligence is to be determined by the facts existing at the time of the accident, and whether the operator had a license to operate an automobile under the laws of this state is immaterial unless there is some causal relationship between the injuries and the failure to have a lice

1972To the same effect are, Page v. Mayors, 191 Cal. 263, 264 [ 216 P. 31 ]; Wysock v. Borchers Bros., 104 Cal.App.2d 571, 582-586 [ 232 P.2d 531 , 29 A.L.R.2d 948 ]; Corsetto v. Pacific Electric Ry., 136 Cal.App.2d 631, 635 [ 289 P.2d 116 ]; People v. J.

1972To the same effect are, Page v. Mayors, 191 Cal. 263, 264 [ 216 P. 31 ]; Wysock v. Borchers Bros., 104 Cal.App.2d 571, 582-586 [ 232 P.2d 531 , 29 A.L.R.2d 948 ]; Corsetto v. Pacific Electric Ry., 136 Cal.App.2d 631, 635 [ 289 P.2d 116 ]; People v. J.

2026The Williamson Rule In Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 651 , the California Supreme Court held that Williamson should not have been convicted of felony conspiracy to contract without a license in violation of Business and Professions Code section 7028 under the general conspiracy statute, section 182, because the Legislature intended the more specific misdemeanor conspiracy statute contained in Business and Professions Code former section 7030 (added by Stats. 1939, ch. 37, § 1, p. 384; repealed by Stats. 1963, ch. 1883, § 2, p. 3867) to control.

2026The Williamson Rule In Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 651 , the California Supreme Court held that Williamson should not have been convicted of felony conspiracy to contract without a license in violation of Business and Professions Code section 7028 under the general conspiracy statute, section 182, because the Legislature intended the more specific misdemeanor conspiracy statute contained in Business and Professions Code former section 7030 (added by Stats. 1939, ch. 37, § 1, p. 384; repealed by Stats. 1963, ch. 1883, § 2, p. 3867) to control.

2017Several cases have held that specific tasks that do not require a license may not be carved out of a single contract where those tasks are " 'part of an integrated whole.' " ( WSS, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 593 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 [tasks of ordering anchor bolts and preparing shop drawings could not be severed from the parties' integrated agreement to avoid the license requirement under section 7031 ], quoting Banis, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 .) However, we are guided again by the standards applicable to reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer.

2017Several cases have held that specific tasks that do not require a license may not be carved out of a single contract where those tasks are " 'part of an integrated whole.' " ( WSS, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 593 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 [tasks of ordering anchor bolts and preparing shop drawings could not be severed from the parties' integrated agreement to avoid the license requirement under section 7031 ], quoting Banis, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 .) However, we are guided again by the standards applicable to reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer.

1988(Riley v. Chambers (1919) 181 Cal. 589, 593, 597 [ 185 P. 855 , 8 A.L.R. 418 ].) Riley v. Chambers, supra, also considered the meaning of the power of attorney exemption of section 10133 and decided that the exemption “meant written authority to act for and in place of the principal in consummating the transaction as distinguished from merely negotiating it.” (Id., pp. 597-598.) The Attorney General has also opined that the power of attorney exemption was not intended to benefit those engaged in the business of real estate: “The naked words of the exemption statute permit the argument that the

1988(Riley v. Chambers (1919) 181 Cal. 589, 593, 597 [ 185 P. 855 , 8 A.L.R. 418 ].) Riley v. Chambers, supra, also considered the meaning of the power of attorney exemption of section 10133 and decided that the exemption “meant written authority to act for and in place of the principal in consummating the transaction as distinguished from merely negotiating it.” (Id., pp. 597-598.) The Attorney General has also opined that the power of attorney exemption was not intended to benefit those engaged in the business of real estate: “The naked words of the exemption statute permit the argument that the

1960This point has been decided in Marshall v. Von Zumwalt, 120 Cal.App.2d 807 [ 262 P.2d 363 ], and reaffirmed in the recent case of S & Q Construction Co. v. Palma Ceia Development Organization, 179 Cal.App.2d 364 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 690 ], (Petition for hearing in the Supreme Court denied May 25, 1960.) We quote from the latter ease: *39 “It is well settled that the failure to obtain a required contractor’s license will bar the contractor from recovering for his work in an action brought by him, but will not bar him from offsetting as a defense sums which would otherwise be due him under the illegal

1960This point has been decided in Marshall v. Von Zumwalt, 120 Cal.App.2d 807 [ 262 P.2d 363 ], and reaffirmed in the recent case of S & Q Construction Co. v. Palma Ceia Development Organization, 179 Cal.App.2d 364 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 690 ], (Petition for hearing in the Supreme Court denied May 25, 1960.) We quote from the latter ease: *39 “It is well settled that the failure to obtain a required contractor’s license will bar the contractor from recovering for his work in an action brought by him, but will not bar him from offsetting as a defense sums which would otherwise be due him under the illegal

1989Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 152 [ 308 P.2d 713 ]; Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 289 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 703 , 696 P.2d 95 ].) 2 “[W]hen the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of carrying on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordina

1989Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 152 [ 308 P.2d 713 ]; Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 289 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 703 , 696 P.2d 95 ].) 2 “[W]hen the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of carrying on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordina

2025The assessor may, however, “ ‘assume the presence of a license so that a bar’s taxable property may be taxed as a bar and not at salvage value (i.e., as a warehouse).’ ” (American Sheds, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 393 [discussing example from legislative history]; see Roehm, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 285 .) Second, “if the assessor assumes the presence of an intangible asset necessary to put taxable property to beneficial use . . ., and does no more than this, then by definition the assessor has not violated . . . [section 110](d)(1). . . .

2025The assessor may, however, “ ‘assume the presence of a license so that a bar’s taxable property may be taxed as a bar and not at salvage value (i.e., as a warehouse).’ ” (American Sheds, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 393 [discussing example from legislative history]; see Roehm, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 285 .) Second, “if the assessor assumes the presence of an intangible asset necessary to put taxable property to beneficial use . . ., and does no more than this, then by definition the assessor has not violated . . . [section 110](d)(1). . . .

2025The assessor may, however, “ ‘assume the presence of a license so that a bar’s taxable property may be taxed as a bar and not at salvage value (i.e., as a warehouse).’ ” (American Sheds, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 393 [discussing example from legislative history]; see Roehm, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 285 .) Second, “if the assessor assumes the presence of an intangible asset necessary to put taxable property to beneficial use . . ., and does no more than this, then by definition the assessor has not violated . . . [section 110](d)(1). . . .

2014(Ibid.) ‘The rule is not one of constitutional or statutory mandate, but serves as an aid to judicial interpretation when two statutes conflict.’ (People v. Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 577, 586 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 75 , 59 P.3d 150 ].) ‘The doctrine that a specific statute precludes any prosecution under a general statute is a rule designed to ascertain and carry out legislative intent.’ ” (Quoting People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 505-506 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 620 P.2d 587 ]; accord, People v. Walker, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 585-586.) In Williamson , the defendant was charged with conspiring t

2014(Ibid.) ‘The rule is not one of constitutional or statutory mandate, but serves as an aid to judicial interpretation when two statutes conflict.’ (People v. Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 577, 586 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 75 , 59 P.3d 150 ].) ‘The doctrine that a specific statute precludes any prosecution under a general statute is a rule designed to ascertain and carry out legislative intent.’ ” (Quoting People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 505-506 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 620 P.2d 587 ]; accord, People v. Walker, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 585-586.) In Williamson , the defendant was charged with conspiring t