license privilege in Florida

2013Id.

2009Although the court in Lescher v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 985 So.2d 1078 (Fla.2008), 11 Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1993), 12 City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1959), 13 and Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fla.1957) (en banc), 14 states that a driver’s license is a privilege, it does so in the course of explaining that, just as the Legislature has the power by statute to require a motor vehicle operator to obtain a driver’s license, it also has the power by statute to impose restrictions on the use of the license and to specify the

2009Although the court in Lescher v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor *925 Vehicles, 985 So.2d 1078 (Fla.2008), [11] Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1993), [12] City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1959), [13] and Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fla.1957) (en banc), [14] states that a driver's license is a privilege, it does so in the course of explaining that, just as the Legislature has the power by statute to require a motor vehicle operator to obtain a driver's license, it also has the power by statute to impose restrictions on the use of the license and t

2009Our supreme court’s decisions describing a driver’s license as a privilege all 16 involve suspension or revocation of a driver’s license on statutory grounds. 17 These decisions stand for the unremarkable proposition that a license “does not endow the holder thereof with an absolute property right in the use of the public highway.” Smith, 93 So.2d at 106 (citing Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1953)) (“While in Carnegie v. Department of Public Safety, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 728 , we held that a driver’s license cannot be revoked arbitrarily or capriciously, we have nonetheless consistentl

2009Our supreme court's decisions describing a driver's license as a privilege all [16] involve suspension or revocation of a driver's license on statutory grounds. [17] *927 These decisions stand for the unremarkable proposition that a license "does not endow the holder thereof with an absolute property right in the use of the public highway." Smith, 93 So.2d at 106 (citing Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1953)) ("While in Carnegie v. Department of Public Safety, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 728 , we held that a driver's license cannot be revoked arbitrarily or capriciously, we have nonetheless co

2009Although the court in Lescher v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 985 So.2d 1078 (Fla.2008), 11 Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1993), 12 City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1959), 13 and Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fla.1957) (en banc), 14 states that a driver’s license is a privilege, it does so in the course of explaining that, just as the Legislature has the power by statute to require a motor vehicle operator to obtain a driver’s license, it also has the power by statute to impose restrictions on the use of the license and to specify the

2009Although the court in Lescher v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor *925 Vehicles, 985 So.2d 1078 (Fla.2008), [11] Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1993), [12] City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1959), [13] and Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fla.1957) (en banc), [14] states that a driver's license is a privilege, it does so in the course of explaining that, just as the Legislature has the power by statute to require a motor vehicle operator to obtain a driver's license, it also has the power by statute to impose restrictions on the use of the license and t

2003In Osteen v. Morris, 481 So.2d 1287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), the fifth district imposed a similar limitation on quasi-contractual recovery.

2001Id. at 677 .

1991Mandile v. State, 547 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); § 322.26(3), Fla. Stat. (1987).

1989The Demarzo court also noted the Florida Supreme Court’s position “that a driver’s license is a privilege, subject to proper regulations and, on proper showing in accord with prevailing statutes, such a license may be revoked.” Id., citing Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fla.1957).

1988Moreover, since the officers almost immediately saw marijuana on the front seat, the search of the rest of the vehicle was also justified by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). [5] See State v. Irvin, 483 So.2d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), review denied, 491 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1986).

1988Moreover, since the officers almost immediately saw marijuana on the front seat, the search of the rest of the vehicle was also justified by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). [5] See State v. Irvin, 483 So.2d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), review denied, 491 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1986).

1988Moreover, since the officers almost immediately saw marijuana on the front seat, the search of the rest of the vehicle was also justified by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). [5] See State v. Irvin, 483 So.2d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), review denied, 491 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1986).

1988Since whether he did or not has no effect upon the undisputed violation of the driver's license requirement, we consider the controversy wholly immaterial. [4] The search was conducted after arrest pursuant to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).

1988Since whether he did or not has no effect upon the undisputed violation of the driver's license requirement, we consider the controversy wholly immaterial. [4] The search was conducted after arrest pursuant to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).

1985In Hickman v. State (supra) the judge in addition to ordering the defendant to pay a fine, suspended the defendant’s driver’s license for five years.

1982We find the circumstances of this delay more egregious than was the case in Aurora Enterprises v. State, Department of Professional Regulation, 395 So.2d 604 (Fla.3d DCA 1981) wherein we held that a fifty-day delay between the date of temporary suspension of a license and hearing on a complaint for revocation was a denial of due process.

1980The Supreme Court has stated in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 ; 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed. 2d 90 (1971) at p. 539: “Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of their livelihood.

1980The Supreme Court has stated in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 ; 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed. 2d 90 (1971) at p. 539: “Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of their livelihood.

1975Olan Mills, Inc. v. Tallahassee, 100 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1958), cert. den. 359 U.S. 924 . [ss. 246.201-246.231, F.S. (1974 Supp.)] Chapter 74-360, Laws of Florida, created the State Board of Independent Post-Secondary Vocational, Technical, Trade and Business Schools to establish minimum standards for licensure of schools which are maintained or conducted for the purpose of offering instruction leading to occupational objectives.

1975Olan Mills, Inc. v. Tallahassee, 100 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1958), cert. den. 359 U.S. 924 . [ss. 246.201-246.231, F.S. (1974 Supp.)] Chapter 74-360, Laws of Florida, created the State Board of Independent Post-Secondary Vocational, Technical, Trade and Business Schools to establish minimum standards for licensure of schools which are maintained or conducted for the purpose of offering instruction leading to occupational objectives.

1972NOTES [1] An exception is made for these types of firearms, however, if they "... are lawfully owned and possessed under provisions of federal law... ." § 790.221(3). [2] See, Victer v. State (Fla. 1965), 174 So.2d 544 , where the appellant was convicted of the possession of explosives without a license in violation of F.S. § 552.101, F.S.A.

1960When appellant applied for the license and when she instituted the litigation in 1957, she was entitled to receive the license under the rule of Abood v. City of Jacksonville, Fla. 1955, 80 So.2d 443 .

1934Counsel for respondent also rely on the opinion and judgment in Ex Parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412 , 44 Pac. 725 .

1934Counsel for respondent also rely on the opinion and judgment in Ex Parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412 , 44 Pac. 725 .