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10 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1897–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cavanaugh v. State, Department of Social Servicesgreen2 sentences1997See Cavanaugh v. Department of Social Servs., 644 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.1982) (upholding validity of statute and sanctions for unlawful operation of unlicensed facility). 1997See Cavanaugh v. Department of Social Servs., 644 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.1982) (upholding validity of statute and sanctions for unlawful operation of unlicensed facility). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bozemangreen2 sentences1994A license or privilege to remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that pari of the building which is not open to the public, (emphasis supplied) Premises “open to the public” for purposes of the statute means premises which “would cause a reasonable person to believe no permission to enter or remain is required.” People v. Bozeman, 624 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo.App.1980). 1994A license or privilege to remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of the building which is not open to the public. (emphasis supplied) Premises "open to the public" for purposes of the statute means premises which "would cause a reasonable person to believe no permission to enter or remain is required." People v. Bozeman, 624 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo. App.1980). | 1 | 1 |
Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division v. Smithgreen2 sentences1987In Colorado Department of Revenue v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 (Colo.1982), we held that “once a person’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended, that person must pay a restoration fee before the license or privilege will be restored as required by section 42-2-124(3)_” Id. at 1144 (emphasis in original). 1987In Colorado Department of Revenue v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 (Colo.1982), we held that “once a person’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended, that person must pay a restoration fee before the license or privilege will be restored as required by section 42-2-124(3)_” Id. at 1144 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Evans v. City of Denver
green
2 sentences2020Evans v. City & Cty. of Denver, 79 Colo. 533 , 247 P. 173 (1926). 2020Evans v. City & Cty. of Denver, 79 Colo. 533 , 247 P. 173 (1926). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cumpsten v. Colorado Real Estate Commission
green
2 sentences1988The court concluded that such activities did not require a license since section 12-61-101(2) limits the license requirement “to the buying, selling, or renting of real property or the listing for, or negotiating of, such sale, purchase, or renting of real property or improvements thereon.” Id. at 382 . 1988The court concluded that such activities did not require a license since section 12-61-101(2) limits the license requirement "to the buying, selling, or renting of real property or the listing for, or negotiating of, such sale, purchase, or renting of real property or improvements thereon." Id. at 382 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Casias v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1983When an employee is discharged for violating a company rule, benefits may not be reduced under § 8-73-108(9)(a)(VII), unless the violation could have resulted in “serious damage” to the employer’s interests or endangered the “life of the worker or other employee.” Cf. Casias v. Industrial Commission, 38 Colo.App. 261 , 554 P.2d 1357 (1976). 1983When an employee is discharged for violating a company rule, benefits may not be reduced under § 8-73-108(9)(a)(VII), unless the violation could have resulted in “serious damage” to the employer’s interests or endangered the “life of the worker or other employee.” Cf. Casias v. Industrial Commission, 38 Colo.App. 261 , 554 P.2d 1357 (1976). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Lessar
green
2 sentences1982In People v. Lessar, Colo., 629 P.2d 577 (1981), we addressed the same issue presented here in the context of a revocation or denial of a driver’s license, and held at 629 P.2d at 580 that: “In both instances the right to licensing does not automatically spring to life at the end of the period of ineligibility, as if the order never had been entered.... 1982In People v. Lessar, Colo., 629 P.2d 577 (1981), we addressed the same issue presented here in the context of a revocation or denial of a driver’s license, and held at 629 P.2d at 580 that: “In both instances the right to licensing does not automatically spring to life at the end of the period of ineligibility, as if the order never had been entered.... | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Mayfield
green
2 sentences1978Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, see People v. Mayfield, 184 Colo. 399 , 520 P.2d 748 (1974), the evidence reflects that the defendant, who was not wearing a hospital uniform, entered a hospital room without the permission of the only occupant of that room, that he quickly exited when confronted by the occupant, and that he was unknown to the nurse on duty. 1978Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, see People v. Mayfield, 184 Colo. 399 , 520 P.2d 748 (1974), the evidence reflects that the defendant, who was not wearing a hospital uniform, entered a hospital room without the permission of the only occupant of that room, that he quickly exited when confronted by the occupant, and that he was unknown to the nurse on duty. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Chipman v. People
neutral
1 sentence1899The defendant wished to shoAV, by additional evidence that the liquor was sold for medicinal purposes, whereas that for the people was to the effect that it was sold as a beverage, and he was surprised thereat; but we have held in Chipman v. The People, 24 Colo. 520 , that a sale for medicinal purposes without a license is no defense under this statute. 3. | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences1897In Pullman’s Palace Car Company v. Pennsylvania, supra, Mr. Justice Gray, referring to these and kindred cases, says: “ Much reliance is also placed by plaintiff in error upon the cases in which this court has decided that citizens or corporations of one state cannot be taxed by another state for a license or privilege to carry on interstate or foreign commerce within its limits; but in each of those cases, the tax was not upon the property employed in that business, but upon the right to carry on the business at all; and was thereby held to impose a direct burden upon the commerce itself.” It 1897In Pullman’s Palace Car Company v. Pennsylvania, supra, Mr. Justice Gray, referring to these and kindred cases, says: “ Much reliance is also placed by plaintiff in error upon the cases in which this court has decided that citizens or corporations of one state cannot be taxed by another state for a license or privilege to carry on interstate or foreign commerce within its limits; but in each of those cases, the tax was not upon the property employed in that business, but upon the right to carry on the business at all; and was thereby held to impose a direct burden upon the commerce itself.” It | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.