76 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1894–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. O'YOUNGgreen2 sentences2021Instead of retreating from the license requirement, Jones clearly reaffirms that a plaintiff must satisfy both requirements.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 114-15. ¶ 141 The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision to which the Sullivan court referred, Jones v. O’Young, 154 Ill. 2d 39, 43 , 607 N.E.2d 224, 225-26 (1992), states the following: “First, the physician must be a licensed member of the school of medicine about which he proposes to testify. [Citation.] Second, the expert witness must show that - 35 - he is familiar with the methods, procedures, and treatments ordinarily observed by other p 2021Instead of retreating from the license requirement, Jones clearly reaffirms that a plaintiff must satisfy both requirements.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 114-15. ¶ 141 The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision to which the Sullivan court referred, Jones v. O’Young, 154 Ill. 2d 39, 43 , 607 N.E.2d 224, 225-26 (1992), states the following: “First, the physician must be a licensed member of the school of medicine about which he proposes to testify. [Citation.] Second, the expert witness must show that - 35 - he is familiar with the methods, procedures, and treatments ordinarily observed by other p | 3 | 5 |
People v. Turnergreen2 sentences2013App. 3d 868, 870 (2005) (de novo review appropriate on motion to dismiss charges where neither the facts nor the credibility of witnesses is at issue). ¶ 16 It is well settled that the only elements necessary to prove the offense of driving while -6- license suspended or revoked are “ ‘(1) the act of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this State, and (2) the fact of the revocation of the driver’s license or privilege.’ ” People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 509 (2010) (quoting People v. Turner, 64 Ill. 2d 183, 185 (1976)); see also People v. Waldron, 208 Ill. 2010Thus, we reaffirm our holding in Turner that the elements of the offense are "(1) the act of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this State, and (2) the fact of the revocation of the driver's license or privilege." Turner, 64 Ill.2d at 185 , 354 N.E.2d 897 . | 2 | 10 |
People v. Papprothgreen2 sentences2020App. 3d 1080, 1093 , 817 N.E.2d 968, 981 (2004). ¶ 23 A person commits the offense of driving with a revoked license when he “drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person’s driver’s license, permit, or privilege to do so *** is revoked or suspended ***.” 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2016). “[T]he only elements necessary to prove the offense of driving a motor vehicle after the revocation of one’s driving privileges are: (1) the act of driving - 10 - a motor vehicle on the highways of this State; and (2) the fact of the revocati 1985App. 3d 683, 689 .) That court, however, stated that the only elements necessary to prove the offense of driving a motor vehicle after the revocation of driving privileges are: (1) the act of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this State; and, (2) the fact of the revocation of the driver’s license or privilege. ( 56 Ill. | 2 | 5 |
People v. Heritschgreen2 sentences2016Employing customary principles of statutory construction and considering relevant provisions of the vehicle code, the Heritsch majority found that a license revocation terminates a person's license or privilege to drive and a revocation is restored only upon application and action by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 1-176 of the Code. 625 ILCS 5/1-176 (West 2008); Heritsch, 2012 IL App (2d) 090719, ¶ 8 . 2016Employing customary principles of statutory construction and considering relevant provisions of the vehicle code, the Heritsch majority found that a license revocation terminates a person's license or privilege to drive and a revocation is restored only upon application and action by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 1-176 of the Code. 625 ILCS 5/1-176 (West 2008); Heritsch, 2012 IL App (2d) 090719, ¶ 8 . | 2 | 5 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2025He also identified the photos in court. ¶ 52 Regarding the second offense, the elements of driving on a suspended or revoked license are “(1) the act of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this State, and (2) the fact of the revocation of the driver’s license or privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jackson, 2013 IL 113986, ¶ 16 ; see also 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2022). “ ‘[T]he testimony of just one credible witness is sufficient for conviction.’ ” People v. Swenson, 2020 IL 124688, ¶ 36 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morris, 47 Ill. 2d 226, 230 (1970)). 2024“It is well settled that the only elements necessary to prove the offense of [DWLR] are (1) the act of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this State, and (2) the fact of the revocation of the driver’s license or privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jackson, 2013 IL 113986, ¶ 16 ; 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2018). | 2 | 4 |
Sullivan v. Edward Hospitalgreen2 sentences2004Instead of retreating from the license requirement, Jones clearly reaffirms that a plaintiff must satisfy both requirements.” (Emphasis in original.) Sullivan, 209 Ill. 2d at 114-15 , citing Jones, 154 Ill. 2d at 44 , citing Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at 244 . 2004We expressly reaffirm the license requirement of Dolan and its progeny and decline plaintiffs invitation to deviate therefrom.” Sullivan, 209 Ill. 2d at 122-23 . | 2 | 4 |
WINGO BY WINGO v. Rockford Memorial Hosp.green2 sentences2004At the time of trial and until Sullivan, no Illinois court had held that the license requirement in Dolan prevented a physician from establishing the applicable nursing standard of care and several appellate cases had affirmed circuit courts where physicians “testified against nurses to establish the nursing standard of care without it being challenged” (Wingo, 292 Ill. 2004The majority holds that this case “falls squarely within the license requirement of Dolan [v. Galluzzo, 77 Ill. 2d 279 (1979)]” (209 Ill. 2d at 119), and rejects plaintiffs reliance on Wingo v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 292 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
People Ex Rel. Edgar v. Millergreen2 sentences2000App. 3d 264, 270 , 441 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (1982) (holding that an offer to sell bonds without a license was a violation of the ISL). 2000App. 3d 264, 270 , 441 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (1982) (holding that an offer to sell bonds without a license was a violation of the Securities Law). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Suddothgreen2 sentences2012The Code defines “revocation of driver’s license” as “[t]he termination by formal action of the Secretary of a person’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, which termination shall not be subject to renewal or restoration except that an application for a new license may be presented and acted upon by the Secretary after the expiration of at least one year after the date of revocation.” 625 ILCS 5/1-176 (West 2008); see also People v. Suddoth, 52 Ill. 1989(See People v. Suddoth (1964), 52 Ill. | 1 | 4 |
Lake Shore Riding Academy, Inc. v. Daleygreen2 sentences2018App. 3d 936 , 939, 150 Ill.Dec. 773 , 563 N.E.2d 900 (1990) (holding a municipality was not estopped from revoking the plaintiff's liquor license simply because the local liquor commission had renewed the license in violation of a referendum limiting the sale of unpackaged alcohol); Lake Shore Riding Academy, Inc. v. Daley , 38 Ill. 2018App. 3d 936, 939 (1990) (holding a municipality was not estopped from revoking the plaintiff’s liquor license simply because the local liquor commission had renewed the license in violation of a referendum limiting the sale of unpackaged alcohol); Lake Shore Riding Academy, Inc. v. Daley, 38 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
City of Chicago v. Morrisgreen1 sentence2025He also identified the photos in court. ¶ 52 Regarding the second offense, the elements of driving on a suspended or revoked license are “(1) the act of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this State, and (2) the fact of the revocation of the driver’s license or privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jackson, 2013 IL 113986, ¶ 16 ; see also 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2022). “ ‘[T]he testimony of just one credible witness is sufficient for conviction.’ ” People v. Swenson, 2020 IL 124688, ¶ 36 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morris, 47 Ill. 2d 226, 230 (1970)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Swensongreen1 sentence2025He also identified the photos in court. ¶ 52 Regarding the second offense, the elements of driving on a suspended or revoked license are “(1) the act of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this State, and (2) the fact of the revocation of the driver’s license or privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jackson, 2013 IL 113986, ¶ 16 ; see also 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2022). “ ‘[T]he testimony of just one credible witness is sufficient for conviction.’ ” People v. Swenson, 2020 IL 124688, ¶ 36 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morris, 47 Ill. 2d 226, 230 (1970)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Juragreen1 sentence2020App. 3d 1080, 1093 , 817 N.E.2d 968, 981 (2004). ¶ 23 A person commits the offense of driving with a revoked license when he “drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person’s driver’s license, permit, or privilege to do so *** is revoked or suspended ***.” 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2016). “[T]he only elements necessary to prove the offense of driving a motor vehicle after the revocation of one’s driving privileges are: (1) the act of driving - 10 - a motor vehicle on the highways of this State; and (2) the fact of the revocati | 1 | 1 |
In Re Application of County Treasurergreen1 sentence2013See Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601, 605 (2007); In re Application of the County Treasurer, 214 Ill. 2d 253, 260 (2005). ¶ 12 In its reply brief, the State argues, in part, as follows: “It is true that Defendant’s driver’s license was suspended and that he later applied for and obtained a new driver’s license, albeit by submitting a materially inaccurate application. *** But the People have not argued that Defendant cannot rely on his second driver’s license at trial. *** They have instead argued that there are only two elements to the offense of driving with a suspended driver’s license—‘(1) | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Waldrongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mulay v. Mulaygreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Closegreen2 sentences2013See People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 507-08 (2010) ***. 2013App. 3d 868, 870 (2005) (de novo review appropriate on motion to dismiss charges where neither the facts nor the credibility of witnesses is at issue). ¶ 16 It is well settled that the only elements necessary to prove the offense of driving while -6- license suspended or revoked are “ ‘(1) the act of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this State, and (2) the fact of the revocation of the driver’s license or privilege.’ ” People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 509 (2010) (quoting People v. Turner, 64 Ill. 2d 183, 185 (1976)); see also People v. Waldron, 208 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gilyardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cannongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Grassgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. William Hopegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Baileygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Purtill v. Hess
green
2 sentences2021Instead of retreating from the license requirement, Jones clearly reaffirms that a plaintiff must satisfy both requirements.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 114-15. ¶ 141 The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision to which the Sullivan court referred, Jones v. O’Young, 154 Ill. 2d 39, 43 , 607 N.E.2d 224, 225-26 (1992), states the following: “First, the physician must be a licensed member of the school of medicine about which he proposes to testify. [Citation.] Second, the expert witness must show that - 35 - he is familiar with the methods, procedures, and treatments ordinarily observed by other p 2021Instead of retreating from the license requirement, Jones clearly reaffirms that a plaintiff must satisfy both requirements.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 114-15. ¶ 141 The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision to which the Sullivan court referred, Jones v. O’Young, 154 Ill. 2d 39, 43 , 607 N.E.2d 224, 225-26 (1992), states the following: “First, the physician must be a licensed member of the school of medicine about which he proposes to testify. [Citation.] Second, the expert witness must show that - 35 - he is familiar with the methods, procedures, and treatments ordinarily observed by other p | 6 | 2004–2021 |
Dolan v. Galluzzo
green
2 sentences2004As our supreme court has made clear, “We expressly reaffirm the license requirement of Dolan and its progeny and decline plaintiffs invitation to deviate therefrom.” Sullivan, 209 Ill. 2d at 123 ; accord Jones, 154 Ill. 2d at 43-44 ; Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at 244 ; Dolan, 77 Ill. 2d at 285 . 2004The majority holds that this case “falls squarely within the license requirement of Dolan [v. Galluzzo, 77 Ill. 2d 279 (1979)]” (209 Ill. 2d at 119), and rejects plaintiffs reliance on Wingo v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 292 Ill. | 4 | 2004–2004 |
People ex rel. Shallberg v. Central Union Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences1910Being called upon to show by what warrant he exercises the functions of the office, if he does not exhibit good authority for doing so the people are entitled to judgment of ouster.” Again, in People v. Central Union Telephone Co., 232 Ill. 260, 271 , the court said: “When the people call upon one to show by what authority he exercises a license or privilege, which must emanate from the State or one of its agencies, the allegation of usurpation may be, as it was in this case, of the most general character, and the information merely calls upon the defendant to set forth particularly the ground 1908In People v. Central Union Telephone Co. 232 Ill. 260 , on page 271, it was said: “When the People call upon one to show by what authority he exercises a license or privilege which must emanate from the State or one of its agóncies, the allegation of usurpation may be, as it was in this case, of the most general character, and the information merely calls upon the defendant to set forth particularly the grounds of his claim and the continued existence of his right. | 3 | 1908–1911 |
People Ex Rel. Sherman v. Cryns
green
2 sentences2003The appellate court accordingly remanded this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. 327 Ill. 2003The appellate court accordingly remanded this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. 327 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Burden v. Hoover
green
2 sentences2002“This being true, whether the right to practice the profession be called a franchise, a license or a privilege, it is certainly a valuable interest that should, in justice, be entitled to protection.” Burden, 9 Ill. 2d at 118-19 . 2002“This being true, whether the right to practice the profession be called a franchise, a license or a privilege, it is certainly a valuable interest that should, in justice, be entitled to protection.” Burden , 9 Ill. 2d at 118-119 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Jihan
green
2 sentences2002In Jihan, 127 Ill.2d at 379 , 130 Ill.Dec. 422 , 537 N.E.2d 751 , the defendant was convicted of practicing midwifery without a license in violation of the now-repealed Illinois Medical Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1985, ch. 2002In Jihan, 127 Ill.2d at 379 , 130 Ill.Dec. 422 , 537 N.E.2d 751 , the defendant was convicted of practicing midwifery without a license in violation of the now-repealed Illinois Medical Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1985, ch. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Byrne v. Stern
green
2 sentences1996App.3d 601 , 59 Ill.Dec. 316 , 431 N.E.2d 1073 , revocation was found to be an abuse of discretion based on the fact that the parties had operated their liquor businesses for 33 and 5½ years, respectively, without a previous license violation. 1996App. 3d 601 , 431 N.E.2d 1073 , revocation was found to be an abuse of discretion based on the fact that the parties had operated their liquor businesses for 33 and 51/2 years, respectively, without a previous license violation. | 2 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Strode
green
2 sentences1977(People v. Turner (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 183 , 354 N.E.2d 897 ; People v. Strode (1973), 13 Ill. 1976(People v. Strode, 13 Ill. | 2 | 1976–1977 |
Clark v. People ex rel. Crane
neutral
2 sentences1908(Clark v. People, 15 Ill. 213 ; Catlett v. People, 151 id. 16.) The sole purpose of the information is to require the defendant to show by what warrant he is holding and exercising the license, privilege or franchise in question, and it is sufficient to allege, generally, that he is holding and exercising the same without lawful authority. 1908(Clark v. People, 15 Ill. 213 ; Catlett v. People, 151 id. 16.) The sole purpose of the information is to require the defendant to show by what warrant he is holding and exercising the license, privilege or franchise in question, and it is sufficient to allege, generally, that he is holding and exercising the same without lawful authority.—People ex rel. v. Cooper, 139 Ill. 461 .” The information, we are of the opinion, was sufficient to require an answer thereto by the appellants, and in case they determined to answer the information it was their duty to disclaim or to justify, and if they ju | 2 | 1908–1908 |
People ex rel. Samuel v. Cooper
green
2 sentences1908(People ex rel. v. Cooper, 139 Ill. 461 .) If the defendant justifies, his plea must show not only that he once had the right to use and enjoy the license or privilege, but that he still has it, since the continued existence of the right is essential to the enjoyment of the license or privilege claimed. 1908(Clark v. People, 15 Ill. 213 ; Catlett v. People, 151 id. 16.) The sole purpose of the information is to require the defendant to show by what warrant he is holding and exercising the license, privilege or franchise in question, and it is sufficient to allege, generally, that he is holding and exercising the same without lawful authority.—People ex rel. v. Cooper, 139 Ill. 461 .” The information, we are of the opinion, was sufficient to require an answer thereto by the appellants, and in case they determined to answer the information it was their duty to disclaim or to justify, and if they ju | 2 | 1908–1908 |
People v. Davis
green
1 sentence2024The Code defines “suspension” and “revocation” as the temporary withdrawal or termination, respectively, “of a person’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways.” (Emphasis added.) Id. §§ 1-176, 1-204. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Hanson v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission
green
1 sentence2023Hanson, 201 Ill. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Barrios
green
1 sentence2023On appeal, the court affirmed, finding, “The record properly shows that the defendant’s license and privilege to obtain a license were revoked at the time of application, and that the defendant knew of that revocation.” Id. at 273 . ¶ 19 Barrios is of minimal assistance in this matter, as the admonishment on the application in that case required the defendant to “affirm” his answers were true, language that the perjury statute explicitly references as the type of statement that can give rise to criminal liability. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Armond v. Sawyer
green
1 sentence2018App. 3d 936 , 939, 150 Ill.Dec. 773 , 563 N.E.2d 900 (1990) (holding a municipality was not estopped from revoking the plaintiff's liquor license simply because the local liquor commission had renewed the license in violation of a referendum limiting the sale of unpackaged alcohol); Lake Shore Riding Academy, Inc. v. Daley , 38 Ill. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Smith
green
1 sentence2013App. 3d 263, 266-67 (2004). ¶ 10 Pursuant to section 1-176 of the Code, “revocation” of a driver’s license means “[t]he termination by formal action of the Secretary of a person’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, which termination shall not be subject to renewal or restoration except that an application for a new license may be presented and acted upon by the Secretary after the expiration of at least one year after the date of revocation.” 625 ILCS 5/1-176 (West 2012). -7- 2013 IL App (2d) 121164 ¶ 11 If the statutory definition of “revocation”—the “term | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Dvorak green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Black Knight Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Oak Forest green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| City of Chicago v. Unit One Corp. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| United States v. Franklyn Arango green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Ramsey green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Murdy v. Edgar green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| In Re Sarelas green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| The City of Chicago v. Barnett green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Brewster v. Charles green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Carson v. American Savings Life Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| In re Sarelas green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Hewitt v. People neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| City of Chicago v. Vokes green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Mincy v. District of Columbia green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Carpentier v. Goers neutral | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Mayor of Danville green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Schreiber v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co. v. Twin City Telephone Co. neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Commerce Commission green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Miller v. Ammon green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Duck Island Hunting & Fishing Club v. Edward Gillen Dock, Dredge & Construction Co. green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Douthart v. Congdon green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| General Railway Signal Co. v. Virginia Ex Rel. State Corporation Comm'n green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.