license privilege in Pennsylvania

2017See generally Brown v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 642, 646 , 566 A.2d 913, 915 (1989) (acknowledging that a person.holding a professional, license still possesses a property right in that license even where it has been suspended (but not revoked), as a suspended license is “susceptible to revival”); Pittenger v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, 142 Pa. Cmwlth. 57, 61-62, 596 A.2d 1227, 1229-30 (1991) (same, and expressing further that “when a license ... is revoked, it is extinguished and the former possessor is returned to the same position he occupied had the license or pr

2017See generally Brown v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 642, 646 , 566 A.2d 913, 915 (1989) (acknowledging that a person.holding a professional, license still possesses a property right in that license even where it has been suspended (but not revoked), as a suspended license is “susceptible to revival”); Pittenger v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, 142 Pa. Cmwlth. 57, 61-62, 596 A.2d 1227, 1229-30 (1991) (same, and expressing further that “when a license ... is revoked, it is extinguished and the former possessor is returned to the same position he occupied had the license or pr

2017See generally Brown v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 642, 646 , 566 A.2d 913, 915 (1989) (acknowledging that a person.holding a professional, license still possesses a property right in that license even where it has been suspended (but not revoked), as a suspended license is “susceptible to revival”); Pittenger v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, 142 Pa. Cmwlth. 57, 61-62, 596 A.2d 1227, 1229-30 (1991) (same, and expressing further that “when a license ... is revoked, it is extinguished and the former possessor is returned to the same position he occupied had the license or pr

2017See generally Brown v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 642, 646 , 566 A.2d 913, 915 (1989) (acknowledging that a person.holding a professional, license still possesses a property right in that license even where it has been suspended (but not revoked), as a suspended license is “susceptible to revival”); Pittenger v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, 142 Pa. Cmwlth. 57, 61-62, 596 A.2d 1227, 1229-30 (1991) (same, and expressing further that “when a license ... is revoked, it is extinguished and the former possessor is returned to the same position he occupied had the license or pr

2017See generally Brown v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 642, 646 , 566 A.2d 913, 915 (1989) (acknowledging that a person.holding a professional, license still possesses a property right in that license even where it has been suspended (but not revoked), as a suspended license is “susceptible to revival”); Pittenger v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, 142 Pa. Cmwlth. 57, 61-62, 596 A.2d 1227, 1229-30 (1991) (same, and expressing further that “when a license ... is revoked, it is extinguished and the former possessor is returned to the same position he occupied had the license or pr

2017See generally Brown v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 642, 646 , 566 A.2d 913, 915 (1989) (acknowledging that a person.holding a professional, license still possesses a property right in that license even where it has been suspended (but not revoked), as a suspended license is “susceptible to revival”); Pittenger v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, 142 Pa. Cmwlth. 57, 61-62, 596 A.2d 1227, 1229-30 (1991) (same, and expressing further that “when a license ... is revoked, it is extinguished and the former possessor is returned to the same position he occupied had the license or pr

2017Plowman v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 535 Pa. 314 , 635 A.2d 124, 126 (1993) (“Since a driver’s license is a privilege and not a fundamental right, legislation affecting it must be evaluated under a ‘rational basis’ analysis.”). 1 Moreover, even if we accept Shoul’s argument that the revocation of his commercial license impacts his right to choose his profession, “the right to practice a chosen profession is subject to the lawful exercise of the power of the State to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and morals by promulgating laws and regulations that reasonab

2017Plowman v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 535 Pa. 314 , 635 A.2d 124, 126 (1993) (“Since a driver’s license is a privilege and not a fundamental right, legislation affecting it must be evaluated under a ‘rational basis’ analysis.”). 1 Moreover, even if we accept Shoul’s argument that the revocation of his commercial license impacts his right to choose his profession, “the right to practice a chosen profession is subject to the lawful exercise of the power of the State to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and morals by promulgating laws and regulations that reasonab

2022Mastrangelo, 250 A.2d at 464 (footnote omitted).

1972The primary object of a licensing ordinance is to regulate the license by “regulation of the licensee” (Haller Baking Co. v. Rochester Borough, supra, page 511), or “supervision of the license privilege” (Mastrangelo v. Buckley, supra, page 386); the ordinance must regulate “the business which it covers,” “the business affected” (Flynn v. Horst, 356 Pa. 20, 28, 29 ).

2024For purposes of the burglary statute, a license or privilege to enter a building or occupied structure “is negated when it is acquired by deception.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 973 (Pa. 2013).

2024For the purposes of the burglary statute, a license or privilege to enter a building or occupied structure “is negated when it is acquired by deception.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 973 (Pa. 2013).

2020However, “the license or privilege to enter exception recognized by the burglary statute can be negated [if it is acquired] by deception[.]” Commonwealth v. -7- J-S01039-20 Edwards, 903 A.2d 1139, 1148 (Pa. 2006), citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 561 A.2d 699, 705 (Pa. 1989); see also Commonwealth v. Hayes, 460 A.2d 791, 796-77 (Pa. Super. 1983) (holding defendant’s deceit in gaining entrance to house vitiated any consent to enter, and thus defendant was not licensed or privileged to enter under burglary statute).

2018“However, a license or privilege to enter a premises is negated in the event it is acquired by deception.” Cooper, 941 A.2d at 666 (citing Commonwealth v. Edwards, 903 A.2d 1139, 1148 (Pa. 2006)).

2025See id.

2015“In most cases the Commonwealth will meet its burden of proving that the defendant was not licensed or privileged to enter by having the owner or occupant of the building testify that he or she did not give the defendant permission to enter.” Commonwealth v. Knight, 419 A.2d 492, 500 (Pa. Super. 1980). [Sanders] argues that he had license or privilege to enter Mr. Rehrig’s home, or reasonably believed so, because he entered the home with Co-Defendant who, in the past, had a license or privilege to enter while visiting his mother.

2025Id. at 1148 (quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 561 A.2d 699, 705 (Pa. 1989)).

2020However, “the license or privilege to enter exception recognized by the burglary statute can be negated [if it is acquired] by deception[.]” Commonwealth v. -7- J-S01039-20 Edwards, 903 A.2d 1139, 1148 (Pa. 2006), citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 561 A.2d 699, 705 (Pa. 1989); see also Commonwealth v. Hayes, 460 A.2d 791, 796-77 (Pa. Super. 1983) (holding defendant’s deceit in gaining entrance to house vitiated any consent to enter, and thus defendant was not licensed or privileged to enter under burglary statute).

2018However, “the license or privilege to enter exception recognized by the burglary statute can be negated by deception.” Id.; Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 623 Pa. 253, 302-303 (Pa. 2013) (“Any license or privilege to enter a premises is negated when it is acquired by deception.”); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 596 Pa. 119, 138 (Pa. 2007) (“A license or privilege to enter a premises is negated in the event it is acquired by deception.”).

2018“However, a license or privilege to enter a premises is negated in the event it is acquired by deception.” Cooper, 941 A.2d at 666 (citing Commonwealth v. Edwards, 903 A.2d 1139, 1148 (Pa. 2006)).

2017Plowman v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 535 Pa. 314 , 635 A.2d 124, 126 (1993) (“Since a driver’s license is a privilege and not a fundamental right, legislation affecting it must be evaluated under a ‘rational basis’ analysis.”). 1 Moreover, even if we accept Shoul’s argument that the revocation of his commercial license impacts his right to choose his profession, “the right to practice a chosen profession is subject to the lawful exercise of the power of the State to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and morals by promulgating laws and regulations that reasonab

2017Plowman v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 535 Pa. 314 , 635 A.2d 124, 126 (1993) (“Since a driver’s license is a privilege and not a fundamental right, legislation affecting it must be evaluated under a ‘rational basis’ analysis.”). 1 Moreover, even if we accept Shoul’s argument that the revocation of his commercial license impacts his right to choose his profession, “the right to practice a chosen profession is subject to the lawful exercise of the power of the State to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and morals by promulgating laws and regulations that reasonab

1970From the testimony it may be assumed that it was for an alleged violation of section 1002(b)(4). 1 The hearing is de novo upon an appeal from an order of the Secretary of Revenue suspending an operator’s license for a violation of section 626 of The Vehicle Code: Moyer Automobile License Case, 359 Pa. 536 (1948); Commonwealth v. DeSanzo, 40 D. & C. 2d 157, and it is the court’s duty to hear the witnesses of the Commonwealth and of the licensee and, from the testimony taken, to determine anew whether the operator’s license should be suspended: Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 399 (1939); Bure

1955In dealing with a driver’s license suspension in Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390 (1936), the court concluded that because this license was a privilege, due process principles were not applicable.

2015Id.

1982The most recent expression of the law concerning the license and privilege aspect of burglary is Com. v. Corbin, 300 Pa. Super. 224 , 446 A. 2d 308 (1982).

1999Plowman v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 535 Pa. 314 , 635 A.2d 124 (1993); Hershey v. Com., Dept. of Transportation, 669 A.2d 517 (Pa.Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 544 Pa. 664 , 676 A.2d 1202 (1996) (we found, without addressing free exercise arguments because none were raised, that no one has a generalized "God-given” right not to provide a social security number for a license renewal because driving was a privilege, not a right); Wessel v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 168 Pa. Cmwlth. 350, 650 A.2d 1135 , (Pa.Cmwlth.1994

1999Plowman v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 535 Pa. 314 , 635 A.2d 124 (1993); Hershey v. Com., Dept. of Transportation, 669 A.2d 517 (Pa.Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 544 Pa. 664 , 676 A.2d 1202 (1996) (we found, without addressing free exercise arguments because none were raised, that no one has a generalized "God-given” right not to provide a social security number for a license renewal because driving was a privilege, not a right); Wessel v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 168 Pa. Cmwlth. 350, 650 A.2d 1135 , (Pa.Cmwlth.1994

2019Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 118 (Pa. 2001) (affirming burglary conviction where defendant, who was the victim’s estranged husband, kicked in the victim’s door to gain entry to the home); Benito, 133 A.3d at 336 (affirming criminal trespass conviction where defendant, the victim’s husband, also kicked in the door of the victim’s residence, evincing his knowledge that he lacked the privilege to enter).

2016See Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 588 Pa. 218 , 903 A.2d 1178 (2006) (existence of PFA demonstrate ed absence of license to enter former marital home); Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 566 Pa. 349 , 781 A.2d 110 (2001) (existence of PFA, as well as use of force to enter residence, established absence of license or privilege); Commonwealth v. Woods, 432 Pa.Super. 428 , 638 A.2d 1013 (1994) (absence of license found where couple had been living apart and husband used force to enter residence).

1981An individual has no constitutional right to engage in the business of selling alcoholic beverages.” The Liquor Code itself provides in section 468(b.l), 47PS. §4-468(b. 1), that a liquor license is a “personal privilege granted by the board and nothing herein shall constitute the license as property. ” 7 As between the Liquor Control Board and the licensee, the license is a privilege only, which may be revoked without compensation to the holder: Feitz Estate, 402 Pa. 437 , 167 A. 2d 504 (1961); Leonardziak Liquor License Case, 210 Pa. Superior Ct. 511 , 233 A. 2d 606 (1967); Spankard’s Liquor

1981An individual has no constitutional right to engage in the business of selling alcoholic beverages.” The Liquor Code itself provides in section 468(b.l), 47PS. §4-468(b. 1), that a liquor license is a “personal privilege granted by the board and nothing herein shall constitute the license as property. ” 7 As between the Liquor Control Board and the licensee, the license is a privilege only, which may be revoked without compensation to the holder: Feitz Estate, 402 Pa. 437 , 167 A. 2d 504 (1961); Leonardziak Liquor License Case, 210 Pa. Superior Ct. 511 , 233 A. 2d 606 (1967); Spankard’s Liquor

1971See American Baseball Club of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Moore, Mayor, 312 Pa. 311, 316 , 167 A. 891 (1933).' . . . .

1971See American Baseball Club of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Moore, Mayor, 312 Pa. 311, 316 , 167 A. 891 (1933).' . . . .

1970From the testimony it may be assumed that it was for an alleged violation of section 1002(b)(4). 1 The hearing is de novo upon an appeal from an order of the Secretary of Revenue suspending an operator’s license for a violation of section 626 of The Vehicle Code: Moyer Automobile License Case, 359 Pa. 536 (1948); Commonwealth v. DeSanzo, 40 D. & C. 2d 157, and it is the court’s duty to hear the witnesses of the Commonwealth and of the licensee and, from the testimony taken, to determine anew whether the operator’s license should be suspended: Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 399 (1939); Bure

1948The first proceeding calls for an exercise of the judicial function while the second is an administrative one: Bureau of Highway Safety v. Wright, 355 Pa. 307 .

2020However, “the license or privilege to enter exception recognized by the burglary statute can be negated [if it is acquired] by deception[.]” Commonwealth v. -7- J-S01039-20 Edwards, 903 A.2d 1139, 1148 (Pa. 2006), citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 561 A.2d 699, 705 (Pa. 1989); see also Commonwealth v. Hayes, 460 A.2d 791, 796-77 (Pa. Super. 1983) (holding defendant’s deceit in gaining entrance to house vitiated any consent to enter, and thus defendant was not licensed or privileged to enter under burglary statute).