license violation in Washington

2024“A license or privilege to enter or remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is 9 No. 85684-7-I/10 not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of a building which is not open to the public.” Id.

2024“A license or privilege to enter or remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is 9 No. 85684-7-I/10 not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of a building which is not open to the public.” Id.

2021State v. Collins, 110 Wn.2d 253, 261 , 751 P.2d 837 (1988).

2021State v. Collins, 110 Wn.2d 253, 261 , 751 P.2d 837 (1988).

2018Id. at 5 ; see also Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 119 .

2017Former RCW 9A.52.010(5) (2011). 6 No. 34972-1-III State v. Goodrum "A license or privilege to enter or remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of a building which is not open to the public." Id.

2016Sys., 162 Wn.2d 210, 217 , 173 P.3d 885 (2007). ¶36 The unchallenged findings support the DFI conclusion that PLC acted as a loan originator without a license in violation of RCW 19.146.200(1).

2016Sys., 162 Wn.2d 210, 217 , 173 P.3d 885 (2007). ¶36 The unchallenged findings support the DFI conclusion that PLC acted as a loan originator without a license in violation of RCW 19.146.200(1).

1999The regulatory purpose cannot be enforced by “the radical process of rendering void and immoral a matrimonial union otherwise validly contracted and solemnized.” Feehley, 99 A. at 665 .

1998They are incorrect. "[W]here a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum." Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 , 69 S.Ct. 1235 , 93 L.Ed. 1524 (1949).

1998They are incorrect. "[W]here a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum." Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 , 69 S.Ct. 1235 , 93 L.Ed. 1524 (1949).

1998Relying on State v. Collins, 110 Wn.2d 253 , 751 P.2d 837 (1988), and State v. Thomson, 71 Wn.

1990In State v. Reynoso, 41 Wn.

1988Ry., 15 Wash. 419, 421 , 46 P. 650 (1896). 6 See, e.g., Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 672-73 , 694 P.2d 641 (1985) (holding that Const, art. 1, § 19 provides additional protection for voting rights); State v. Rice, 98 Wn.2d 384, 399-400 , 655 P.2d 1145 (1982) (under Const, art. 1, § 12, the freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental interest for the purpose of equal protection analysis); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn.2d 195, 201 , 517 P.2d 599 (1973) (holding that even prior to the passage of the state Equal Rights Amendment, a classification based on sex is inherently suspect). 7 Although th

1988Ry., 15 Wash. 419, 421 , 46 P. 650 (1896). 6 See, e.g., Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 672-73 , 694 P.2d 641 (1985) (holding that Const, art. 1, § 19 provides additional protection for voting rights); State v. Rice, 98 Wn.2d 384, 399-400 , 655 P.2d 1145 (1982) (under Const, art. 1, § 12, the freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental interest for the purpose of equal protection analysis); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn.2d 195, 201 , 517 P.2d 599 (1973) (holding that even prior to the passage of the state Equal Rights Amendment, a classification based on sex is inherently suspect). 7 Although th

1988Ry., 15 Wash. 419, 421 , 46 P. 650 (1896). 6 See, e.g., Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 672-73 , 694 P.2d 641 (1985) (holding that Const, art. 1, § 19 provides additional protection for voting rights); State v. Rice, 98 Wn.2d 384, 399-400 , 655 P.2d 1145 (1982) (under Const, art. 1, § 12, the freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental interest for the purpose of equal protection analysis); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn.2d 195, 201 , 517 P.2d 599 (1973) (holding that even prior to the passage of the state Equal Rights Amendment, a classification based on sex is inherently suspect). 7 Although th

1988Ry., 15 Wash. 419, 421 , 46 P. 650 (1896). 6 See, e.g., Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 672-73 , 694 P.2d 641 (1985) (holding that Const, art. 1, § 19 provides additional protection for voting rights); State v. Rice, 98 Wn.2d 384, 399-400 , 655 P.2d 1145 (1982) (under Const, art. 1, § 12, the freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental interest for the purpose of equal protection analysis); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn.2d 195, 201 , 517 P.2d 599 (1973) (holding that even prior to the passage of the state Equal Rights Amendment, a classification based on sex is inherently suspect). 7 Although th

1988Ry., 15 Wash. 419, 421 , 46 P. 650 (1896). 6 See, e.g., Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 672-73 , 694 P.2d 641 (1985) (holding that Const, art. 1, § 19 provides additional protection for voting rights); State v. Rice, 98 Wn.2d 384, 399-400 , 655 P.2d 1145 (1982) (under Const, art. 1, § 12, the freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental interest for the purpose of equal protection analysis); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn.2d 195, 201 , 517 P.2d 599 (1973) (holding that even prior to the passage of the state Equal Rights Amendment, a classification based on sex is inherently suspect). 7 Although th

1988Ry., 15 Wash. 419, 421 , 46 P. 650 (1896). 6 See, e.g., Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 672-73 , 694 P.2d 641 (1985) (holding that Const, art. 1, § 19 provides additional protection for voting rights); State v. Rice, 98 Wn.2d 384, 399-400 , 655 P.2d 1145 (1982) (under Const, art. 1, § 12, the freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental interest for the purpose of equal protection analysis); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn.2d 195, 201 , 517 P.2d 599 (1973) (holding that even prior to the passage of the state Equal Rights Amendment, a classification based on sex is inherently suspect). 7 Although th

1988Ry., 15 Wash. 419, 421 , 46 P. 650 (1896). 6 See, e.g., Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 672-73 , 694 P.2d 641 (1985) (holding that Const, art. 1, § 19 provides additional protection for voting rights); State v. Rice, 98 Wn.2d 384, 399-400 , 655 P.2d 1145 (1982) (under Const, art. 1, § 12, the freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental interest for the purpose of equal protection analysis); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn.2d 195, 201 , 517 P.2d 599 (1973) (holding that even prior to the passage of the state Equal Rights Amendment, a classification based on sex is inherently suspect). 7 Although th

1988Ry., 15 Wash. 419, 421 , 46 P. 650 (1896). 6 See, e.g., Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 672-73 , 694 P.2d 641 (1985) (holding that Const, art. 1, § 19 provides additional protection for voting rights); State v. Rice, 98 Wn.2d 384, 399-400 , 655 P.2d 1145 (1982) (under Const, art. 1, § 12, the freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental interest for the purpose of equal protection analysis); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn.2d 195, 201 , 517 P.2d 599 (1973) (holding that even prior to the passage of the state Equal Rights Amendment, a classification based on sex is inherently suspect). 7 Although th

1983A minor child thus placed in such an alternative residence does not have the license or privilege to continue to treat the parental home as his or her own residence until the child is returned to the parental home pursuant to RCW 13.32A.190. 1 In In re G.L., 73 Ill.

1983App. 3d 467, 469 , 391 N.E.2d 1108 (1979), the minor child was charged with burglarizing his parents' home pursuant to Ill.

1973Mattieligh v. Poe, 57 Wn.2d 203 , 356 P.2d 328 , 94 A.L.R.2d 464 (1960); Andersen v. Northwest Bonded Escrows, Inc., 4 Wn.

1973Mattieligh v. Poe, 57 Wn.2d 203 , 356 P.2d 328 , 94 A.L.R.2d 464 (1960); Andersen v. Northwest Bonded Escrows, Inc., 4 Wn.

1973Mattieligh v. Poe, 57 Wn.2d 203 , 356 P.2d 328 , 94 A.L.R.2d 464 (1960); Andersen v. Northwest Bonded Escrows, Inc., 4 Wn.

1919This court in the early case of State v. Shelton, 16 Wash. 590 , 49 Pac. 1064 , held that the burden of proof, in a prosecution of one accused of selling intoxicating liquor without a license in violation of the statute, was upon him to show that he had a license rendering him immune from prosecution, and not upon the state to prove that he did not have a license; citing Black, Intoxicating Liquors, § 507, and 1 Greenleaf, Evidence, § 79; the court expressing the opinion that such was the weight of authority in this country, though recognizing that the decisions were not harmonious upon the qu

1919This court in the early case of State v. Shelton, 16 Wash. 590 , 49 Pac. 1064 , held that the burden of proof, in a prosecution of one accused of selling intoxicating liquor without a license in violation of the statute, was upon him to show that he had a license rendering him immune from prosecution, and not upon the state to prove that he did not have a license; citing Black, Intoxicating Liquors, § 507, and 1 Greenleaf, Evidence, § 79; the court expressing the opinion that such was the weight of authority in this country, though recognizing that the decisions were not harmonious upon the qu

1917Such was the basis of the rule announced in Seattle v. King, 74 Wash. 277 , 133 Pac. 442 , sustaining the power of the city to impose a license fee upon automobiles for hire.

1917Such was the basis of the rule announced in Seattle v. King, 74 Wash. 277 , 133 Pac. 442 , sustaining the power of the city to impose a license fee upon automobiles for hire.

1916In Phipps v. State, 22 Md. 380 , 85 Am.