license privilege in Oregon

2016Relying in part on State v. Holte, 170 Or App 377 , 12 P3d 553 (2000), we reasoned that the victim had expressly limited the license or privilege she had afforded the defendant by telling him that he could go to the bathroom and giving him explicit instructions on where to find it.

2016Relying in part on State v. Holte, 170 Or App 377 , 12 P3d 553 (2000), we reasoned that the victim had expressly limited the license or privilege she had afforded the defendant by telling him that he could go to the bathroom and giving him explicit instructions on where to find it.

2019State v. Werner , 281 Or.

2019To conclude otherwise would fail to recognize that the "right to invite or to exclude [others] 'is the most nearly absolute of the many property rights that flow from the ownership or other rightful possession of land.' " Hall , 181 Or.

2017The court’s discussion in Brennen is couched in traditional common-law negligence terms that have undergone modification in Oregon, 12 see Towe v. Sacagawea, Inc., 357 Or 74, 86 , 347 P3d 766 (2015), but one of the opinion’s underlying precepts remains good law: A municipality’s statutory or regulatory obligation can define or limit the municipality’s duty and standard of care.

2017The court concluded that, in alleging that the city had issued the license in violation of the mandatory minimum insurance requirement of the city’s ordinance, the plaintiffs complaint had alleged a duty and its breach, and that the trial court had therefore erred in dismissing the complaint. 11 Id. at 414 .

2014But, on the other hand, the enactment of the place of residence exception reflects a legislative desire to allow people to possess concealed weapons in their homes, and “nothing in the text or available history of ORS 166.250(2)(b) suggests] that the legislature did not also intend to extend that statutory right to the outdoor living areas of people’s homes.” Wolf, 260 Or App at 424 .

2014Our review begins with the elements of the crime charged. “ [B]urglary as defined by ORS 164.225 is accomplished if a person (1) enters or remains unlawfully, (2) in a dwelling, (3) with intent to commit a crime therein.” State v. Andre, 142 Or App 285, 289-90 , 920 P2d 1145 , rev den, 324 Or 229 (1996).

2014Our review begins with the elements of the crime charged. “ [B]urglary as defined by ORS 164.225 is accomplished if a person (1) enters or remains unlawfully, (2) in a dwelling, (3) with intent to commit a crime therein.” State v. Andre, 142 Or App 285, 289-90 , 920 P2d 1145 , rev den, 324 Or 229 (1996).

1993However, we stated in State v. Kambra, 93 Or App 156, 159-60 , 761 P2d 539 (1988), that “the statutory exception created by ORS 153.585 cannot * * * prevail over the constitutionally created double jeopardy protection of Article I, section 12,” which bars successive prosecutions of “offenses which are criminal in nature.” Defendant argues that Article I, section 12, precludes prosecution for failure to carry or present a driver’s license, because the infraction of driving without a license is criminal in nature.

1993However, we stated in State v. Kambra, 93 Or App 156, 159-60 , 761 P2d 539 (1988), that “the statutory exception created by ORS 153.585 cannot * * * prevail over the constitutionally created double jeopardy protection of Article I, section 12,” which bars successive prosecutions of “offenses which are criminal in nature.” Defendant argues that Article I, section 12, precludes prosecution for failure to carry or present a driver’s license, because the infraction of driving without a license is criminal in nature.

1977Haviland Hotels v. OLCC, 20 Or App 110 , 530 P2d 1259 (1975).

1977Haviland Hotels v. OLCC, 20 Or App 110 , 530 P2d 1259 (1975).

1975And the state did thus read Blacker in Thompson : “Defendant appeals on the ground that a material element necessary for a violation of OES 166.230(1) — the fact that defendant was not licensed to carry the firearm — was not alleged in the indictment as is required by State v. Blacker, 234 Or 131 , 380 P2d 789 (1963), and that therefore the indictment was insufficient to charge that act, and the court had no jurisdiction to impose the additional five-year sentence.

1975And the state did thus read Blacker in Thompson : “Defendant appeals on the ground that a material element necessary for a violation of OES 166.230(1) — the fact that defendant was not licensed to carry the firearm — was not alleged in the indictment as is required by State v. Blacker, 234 Or 131 , 380 P2d 789 (1963), and that therefore the indictment was insufficient to charge that act, and the court had no jurisdiction to impose the additional five-year sentence.

1952The difference was recognized and the right to impose both taxes was upheld in Shanks v. Kentucky Independent Oil Co., 225 Ky. 303 , 8 S.W. (2d) 383 , where the company contended that it was not liable to pay a tax on its gasoline sales under the gasoline tax act of 1924 (chapter 120, Acts 1924), since it had already paid a license for the privilege of doing business in Kentucky.

1952The difference was recognized and the right to impose both taxes was upheld in Shanks v. Kentucky Independent Oil Co., 225 Ky. 303 , 8 S.W. (2d) 383 , where the company contended that it was not liable to pay a tax on its gasoline sales under the gasoline tax act of 1924 (chapter 120, Acts 1924), since it had already paid a license for the privilege of doing business in Kentucky.

1940State v. Justrom Fish Co., 149 Or. 362, 370 , 39 P. (2d) 355 .

1940State v. Justrom Fish Co., 149 Or. 362, 370 , 39 P. (2d) 355 .

1934The poundage fee involved is not a tax upon property but is a license or privilege tax on the business in which the fish company was engaged: State v. Applegarth, 81 Md. 293 , 31 Atl. 961 , 28 L.

1934The poundage fee involved is not a tax upon property but is a license or privilege tax on the business in which the fish company was engaged: State v. Applegarth, 81 Md. 293 , 31 Atl. 961 , 28 L.

1929The defendant does not contend that the statement of the rule was erroneous, but argues that since the defense did not claim the possession of a license the instruction was abstract, like the situation commented upon in State v. Wright, 122 Or. 379 ( 257 P. 699 , 259 P. 298 ), and prejudicial.

1929The defendant does not contend that the statement of the rule was erroneous, but argues that since the defense did not claim the possession of a license the instruction was abstract, like the situation commented upon in State v. Wright, 122 Or. 379 ( 257 P. 699 , 259 P. 298 ), and prejudicial.

1916Co. v. City of Lincoln, 82 Neb. 59 ( 117 N. W. 284 , 28 L.

1916Co. v. City of Lincoln, 82 Neb. 59 ( 117 N. W. 284 , 28 L.