24 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Bradshawgreen2 sentences2020See also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 ( 103 SCt 2830 , 77 LE2d 405) (1983) (plurality opinion) (Edwards created “a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers[.]”). 2020See also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 ( 103 SCt 2830 , 77 LE2d 405) (1983) (plurality opinion) (Edwards created “a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers[.]”). | 3 | 3 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2019In Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court imposed on law enforcement a requirement to provide persons in custody with a prophylactic warning of their rights before subjecting those *868 persons to interrogation. 2019In Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court imposed on law enforcement a requirement to provide persons in custody with a prophylactic warning of their rights before subjecting those *868 persons to interrogation. | 2 | 5 |
Texas v. McCulloughgreen2 sentences2010Even if the presumption does not come into play, the issue of the legally correct yardstick for determining whether the severity of punishment has been increased remains relevant under Pearce because "[w]here the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness upon resentencing." Texas v. McCullough at 138(II), 106 S.Ct. 976 . 2010See Texas v. McCullough, 475 U. S. 134,138 (II) (106 SC 976, 89 LE2d 104) (1986) (“Where the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness upon resentencing”) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Michigan v. Harveygreen2 sentences2008Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 345 (110 SC 1176, 108 LE2d 293) (1990). 1996The trial court agreed and denied the motion for new trial. 3 In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (106 SC 1404, 89 LE2d 631) (1986), the court “established a prophylactic rule that once a criminal defendant invokes his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a subsequent waiver of that right — even if voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under traditional standards — is presumed invalid if secured pursuant to police-initiated conversation.” Michigan v. Harvey, *549 494 U. S. 344, 345 (110 SC 1176, 108 LE2d 293) (1990). 4 As Starks’ statement to the probation officer was elicited pursuant to governm | 2 | 2 |
Parks v. Stategreen2 sentences2006This Court has stated that the U.A.P.'s five percentage point limit "is a prophylactic rule designed to ensure `to the extent possible that disparities would be kept well below the constitutional minimum.'" Morrow, 272 Ga. at 693 (1), 532 S.E.2d 78 (quoting Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403 , 408-409 n. 4, 330 S.E.2d 686 (1985)). 2006This Court has stated that the U.A.P.'s five percentage point limit "is a prophylactic rule designed to ensure `to the extent possible that disparities would be kept well below the constitutional minimum.'" Morrow, 272 Ga. at 693 (1), 532 S.E.2d 78 (quoting Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403 , 408-409 n. 4, 330 S.E.2d 686 (1985)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Pauldogreen1 sentence2026State v. Pauldo, 309 Ga. 130, 133 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Elliott v. Stategreen2 sentences2019But "Georgia constitutional provisions may confer greater, fewer, or the same rights as similar provisions of the United States Constitution, and decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting those similar provisions are persuasive in our interpretation of the Georgia Constitution only to the extent that those decisions are rooted in shared history, language, and context." *870 Elliott , 305 Ga. at 187 (II) (C), 824 S.E.2d 265 ; see also Olevik , 302 Ga. at 234 (2) (b) n.3, 806 S.E.2d 505 . 2019But "Georgia constitutional provisions may confer greater, fewer, or the same rights as similar provisions of the United States Constitution, and decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting those similar provisions are persuasive in our interpretation of the Georgia Constitution only to the extent that those decisions are rooted in shared history, language, and context." *870 Elliott , 305 Ga. at 187 (II) (C), 824 S.E.2d 265 ; see also Olevik , 302 Ga. at 234 (2) (b) n.3, 806 S.E.2d 505 . | 1 | 1 |
Olevik v. Stategreen2 sentences2019But "Georgia constitutional provisions may confer greater, fewer, or the same rights as similar provisions of the United States Constitution, and decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting those similar provisions are persuasive in our interpretation of the Georgia Constitution only to the extent that those decisions are rooted in shared history, language, and context." *870 Elliott , 305 Ga. at 187 (II) (C), 824 S.E.2d 265 ; see also Olevik , 302 Ga. at 234 (2) (b) n.3, 806 S.E.2d 505 . 2019But "Georgia constitutional provisions may confer greater, fewer, or the same rights as similar provisions of the United States Constitution, and decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting those similar provisions are persuasive in our interpretation of the Georgia Constitution only to the extent that those decisions are rooted in shared history, language, and context." *870 Elliott , 305 Ga. at 187 (II) (C), 824 S.E.2d 265 ; see also Olevik , 302 Ga. at 234 (2) (b) n.3, 806 S.E.2d 505 . | 1 | 1 |
Morrow v. Stategreen2 sentences2006This Court has stated that the U.A.P.'s five percentage point limit "is a prophylactic rule designed to ensure `to the extent possible that disparities would be kept well below the constitutional minimum.'" Morrow, 272 Ga. at 693 (1), 532 S.E.2d 78 (quoting Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403 , 408-409 n. 4, 330 S.E.2d 686 (1985)). 2006This Court has stated that the U.A.P.'s five percentage point limit "is a prophylactic rule designed to ensure `to the extent possible that disparities would be kept well below the constitutional minimum.'" Morrow, 272 Ga. at 693 (1), 532 S.E.2d 78 (quoting Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403 , 408-409 n. 4, 330 S.E.2d 686 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Wilson v. State, 264 Ga. 287, 289 (2) ( 444 SE2d 306 ) (1994). 2005Wilson v. State, 264 Ga. 287, 289 (2) ( 444 SE2d 306 ) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Vaughn v. Stategreen2 sentences1997See Vaughn v. State, 248 Ga. 127 (1b), 281 S.E.2d 594 (1981). [3] However, appellant's observation that Bonner's statement, as summarized, was "basically correct," was not given in response to a question posed by one of the detectives, but was appellant's unsolicited comment on the detective's answer to appellant's line of questioning. 1997See Vaughn v. State, 248 Ga. 127 (1b), 281 S.E.2d 594 (1981). [3] However, appellant's observation that Bonner's statement, as summarized, was "basically correct," was not given in response to a question posed by one of the detectives, but was appellant's unsolicited comment on the detective's answer to appellant's line of questioning. | 1 | 1 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1982The “fruit” of a statement which was obtained in violation of a constitutional right must be suppressed, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 484-85 (83 SC 407, 9 LE2d 441) (1963); see also United States v. Crews, 445 U. S. 463, 470 (100 SC 1244, 63 LE2d 537) (1980), but the “fruit” of a statement obtained in violation of a prophylactic rule is not automatically subject to the exclusionary rule. | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Tuckergreen1 sentence1982See Michigan v. Tucker, supra, 417 U. S. at 439, 446-52 ; United States ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Crewsgreen1 sentence1982The “fruit” of a statement which was obtained in violation of a constitutional right must be suppressed, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 484-85 (83 SC 407, 9 LE2d 441) (1963); see also United States v. Crews, 445 U. S. 463, 470 (100 SC 1244, 63 LE2d 537) (1980), but the “fruit” of a statement obtained in violation of a prophylactic rule is not automatically subject to the exclusionary rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davison
green
2 sentences2018“Miranda establishes a prophylactic rule which applies only to an accused’s custodial statement which is made during interrogation.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Davison, 280 Ga. 84 (2) ( 623 SE2d 500 ) (2005). 2018“Miranda establishes a prophylactic rule which applies only to an accused’s custodial statement which is made during interrogation.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Davison, 280 Ga. 84 (2) ( 623 SE2d 500 ) (2005). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2014The “initiation” concept arose from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (II) ( 101 SCt 1880 , 68 LE2d 378) (1981), which established that, once an accused has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, he “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 484-485 . 5 The Court has since described the initiation concept as “a prophylactic rule, designed to protect 2014The “initiation” concept arose from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (II) ( 101 SCt 1880 , 68 LE2d 378) (1981), which established that, once an accused has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, he “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 484-485 . 5 The Court has since described the initiation concept as “a prophylactic rule, designed to protect | 2 | 1992–2014 |
Wilson v. Zant
green
2 sentences1984The ‘fruit’ of a statement which was obtained in violation of a constitutional right must be suppressed, [cits.], but the ‘fruit’ of a statement obtained in violation of a prophylactic rule is not automatically subject to the exclusionary rule. [Cits.]” Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. at 378 , supra. The Georgia court accepted the fact that Edwards “established a per se exclusionary rule” insofar as it concerned the admissibility of statements “given pursuant to police initiated custodial interrogation after the defendant had invoked his right to counsel,” but refused to extend it to physical evidence 1982The result we have reached does not conflict with Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373 (1), 377 ( 290 SE2d 442 ), where it was held that even though a defendant’s pretrial exculpatory statement was inadmissible in the state’s case in chief because he had been interrogated after requesting counsel (a procedural defect or what the court refers to as a prophylactic rule), the use of the statement for impeachment only was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the evidence of guilt. | 2 | 1982–1984 |
Rhode Island v. Innis
green
1 sentence2020Relying on Innis, 446 U. S. at 291 , we reasoned that if appellant had made an incriminating statement in response to the detective’s query whether he wished to make a statement, the prophylactic rule of Edwards would have precluded the State’s use of the statement. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Velazquez v. State
green
2 sentences2018“The issue of whether a statement was the result of an interrogation or was instead volunteered is a determination of fact for the trial court, and it will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.” Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871 (8) ( 655 SE2d 806 ) (2008). 2018“The issue of whether a statement was the result of an interrogation or was instead volunteered is a determination of fact for the trial court, and it will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.” Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871 (8) ( 655 SE2d 806 ) (2008). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Starks v. State
green
1 sentence1996Id.; Starks, supra, 262 Ga. at 246 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Michigan v. Jackson
red
1 sentence1996The trial court agreed and denied the motion for new trial. 3 In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (106 SC 1404, 89 LE2d 631) (1986), the court “established a prophylactic rule that once a criminal defendant invokes his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a subsequent waiver of that right — even if voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under traditional standards — is presumed invalid if secured pursuant to police-initiated conversation.” Michigan v. Harvey, *549 494 U. S. 344, 345 (110 SC 1176, 108 LE2d 293) (1990). 4 As Starks’ statement to the probation officer was elicited pursuant to governm | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Armstead
green
2 sentences1992While under State v. Armstead, 152 Ga. App. 56 (1) ( 262 SE2d 233 ) (1979), a defendant cannot be compelled to produce a handwriting exemplar, it is not error to allow the state to use as a handwriting exemplar a written statement voluntarily delivered by the defendant, even if the contents of the statement are later suppressed because of a violation of the prophylactic rule of Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U. S. Cf. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F2d 918, 928 (11th Cir. 1985) (confessions inadmissible because of violation of “per se” bar are not necessarily involuntary — fruits of voluntary state 1992While under State v. Armstead, 152 Ga. App. 56 (1) ( 262 SE2d 233 ) (1979), a defendant cannot be compelled to produce a handwriting exemplar, it is not error to allow the state to use as a handwriting exemplar a written statement voluntarily delivered by the defendant, even if the contents of the statement are later suppressed because of a violation of the prophylactic rule of Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U. S. Cf. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F2d 918, 928 (11th Cir. 1985) (confessions inadmissible because of violation of “per se” bar are not necessarily involuntary — fruits of voluntary state | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Henry
green
1 sentence1982Nor do we agree with defendant that he had a right to have counsel present during his visits with Haymans under the authority of United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (100 SC 2183, 65 LE2d 115) (1980). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Fleming v. State
green
1 sentence1981As Justice Bowles pointed out in his concurring opinion, such a prophylactic rule is necessary in cases where “life itself is at stake...” 246 Ga. at 95 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.