11 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2019"Absent these warnings, * * * a suspect's statements made during custodial interrogation * * * may not be used against him * * *." Id. , citing Elstad at 307, 105 S.Ct. 1285 and Miranda at 478-479, 86 S.Ct. 1602 . {¶19} "The prophylactic rule of Miranda , therefore, substitutes the totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness inquiry with" a four-prong inquiry: First, was the suspect in custody? 2019"Absent these warnings, * * * a suspect's statements made during custodial interrogation * * * may not be used against him * * *." Id. , citing Elstad at 307, 105 S.Ct. 1285 and Miranda at 478-479, 86 S.Ct. 1602 . {¶19} "The prophylactic rule of Miranda , therefore, substitutes the totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness inquiry with" a four-prong inquiry: First, was the suspect in custody? | 1 | 2 |
Oregon v. Elstadgreen2 sentences2019See also Goodpaster , 65 F.Supp.3d at 1022-1023 ("Rather than ask whether statements were actually compelled, a prophylactic rule asks whether certain other conditions were met and provides that statements made under those conditions are deemed per se compelled.), citing Elstad , 470 U.S. at 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 . 2019See also Goodpaster , 65 F.Supp.3d at 1022-1023 ("Rather than ask whether statements were actually compelled, a prophylactic rule asks whether certain other conditions were met and provides that statements made under those conditions are deemed per se compelled.), citing Elstad , 470 U.S. at 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 . | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Goodpastergreen1 sentence2019See also Goodpaster , 65 F.Supp.3d at 1022-1023 ("Rather than ask whether statements were actually compelled, a prophylactic rule asks whether certain other conditions were met and provides that statements made under those conditions are deemed per se compelled.), citing Elstad , 470 U.S. at 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 . | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2000This case is therefore not governed by the prophylactic rule announced in Michigan v. Jackson, supra, but is instead governed by the voluntary, knowing, intelligent relinquishment rule set forth in Patterson v. Illinois, supra. Further, because the record demonstrates that defendant received Miranda warnings before giving this post indictment statement, we are unable to conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress this statement. 2000Accord Patterson v. Illinois, supra. This assignment of error is without merit. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Michigan v. Jackson
red
1 sentence2022Montejo overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which had created a prophylactic rule forbidding police from interrogating defendants who had requested counsel but had not yet consulted with counsel. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Garrity v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2019Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ; Garrity v. New Jersey , 385 U.S. 493 , 87 S.Ct. 616 , 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). 2019Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ; Garrity v. New Jersey , 385 U.S. 493 , 87 S.Ct. 616 , 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Pennsylvania v. Finley
green
2 sentences2019The court stated that the Anders procedure was not “‘an independent constitutional command,’” but rather “just ‘a prophylactic framework.’”2 Robbins at 273 , quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). 2019The court stated that the Anders procedure was not “‘an independent constitutional command,’” but rather “just ‘a prophylactic framework.’”2 Robbins at 273 , quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Penson v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2018Similarly, in Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we described Anders as simply erecting "safeguards." (Citations omitted.) Smith v. Robbins , 528 U.S. 259 , 273, 120 S.Ct. 746 , 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). {¶6} Because the Anders procedure is not a constitutional mandate, we are able to craft alternate procedures that fulfill the purpose of Anders . 2018Similarly, in Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we described Anders as simply erecting "safeguards." (Citations omitted.) Smith v. Robbins , 528 U.S. 259 , 273, 120 S.Ct. 746 , 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). {¶6} Because the Anders procedure is not a constitutional mandate, we are able to craft alternate procedures that fulfill the purpose of Anders . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Smith v. Robbins
green
2 sentences2018Similarly, in Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we described Anders as simply erecting "safeguards." (Citations omitted.) Smith v. Robbins , 528 U.S. 259 , 273, 120 S.Ct. 746 , 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). {¶6} Because the Anders procedure is not a constitutional mandate, we are able to craft alternate procedures that fulfill the purpose of Anders . 2018Similarly, in Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we described Anders as simply erecting "safeguards." (Citations omitted.) Smith v. Robbins , 528 U.S. 259 , 273, 120 S.Ct. 746 , 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). {¶6} Because the Anders procedure is not a constitutional mandate, we are able to craft alternate procedures that fulfill the purpose of Anders . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Douglas v. California
green
2 sentences2018State v. Wilson , 4th Dist., 2017-Ohio-5772 , 83 N.E.3d 942 , ¶ 9. {¶5} According to the United State Supreme Court: [T]he Anders procedure is not "an independent constitutional command," but rather is just "a prophylactic framework" that we established to vindicate the constitutional right to appellate counsel announced in Douglas [ v. California , 372 U.S. 353 , 83 S.Ct. 814 , 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) ]. 2018State v. Wilson , 4th Dist., 2017-Ohio-5772 , 83 N.E.3d 942 , ¶ 9. {¶5} According to the United State Supreme Court: [T]he Anders procedure is not "an independent constitutional command," but rather is just "a prophylactic framework" that we established to vindicate the constitutional right to appellate counsel announced in Douglas [ v. California , 372 U.S. 353 , 83 S.Ct. 814 , 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) ]. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kyles v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2010Kyles v. Whitley (1995), 514 U.S. 419, 436-437 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 . 2010Kyles v. Whitley (1995), 514 U.S. 419, 436-437 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2010Under Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f), the prosecuting attorney must disclose all evidence “material” to guilt or punishment, whereas under DR 7-103(B), the prosecuting attorney must disclose all evidence “that tends to” negate guilt or lessen the criminal consequences. {¶ 64} Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) is a prophylactic rule, mirroring the rule explained in Brady v. Maryland, which describes the role of the Due Process Clause in ensuring that a defendant receives a fair trial by receiving all materially exculpatory evidence. 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (“the suppression by the prosecution of 2010Under Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f), the prosecuting attorney must disclose all evidence “material” to guilt or punishment, whereas under DR 7-103(B), the prosecuting attorney must disclose all evidence “that tends to” negate guilt or lessen the criminal consequences. {¶ 64} Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) is a prophylactic rule, mirroring the rule explained in Brady v. Maryland, which describes the role of the Due Process Clause in ensuring that a defendant receives a fair trial by receiving all materially exculpatory evidence. 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (“the suppression by the prosecution of | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Davis v. United States
green
1 sentence2005Davis v. United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452 , 459 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Smith v. Illinois
green
1 sentence2005This "`rigid' prophylactic rule" requires the court to, "determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel." Smith v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 91 , 95 . {¶ 46} This prophylactic rule only takes effect, however, when an accused has clearly invoked his constitutional right to counsel. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Texas v. McCullough
green
2 sentences2000Where there is no basis for a presumption of vindictiveness, such as where a second court in a two-tier system imposes a longer sentence, "the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply [and] the defendant may obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness upon resentencing." Texas v. McCullough (1986), 475 U.S. 134 , 138 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 , 111 . 2000Where there is no basis for a presumption of vindictiveness, such as where a second court in a two-tier system imposes a longer sentence, "the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply [and] the defendant may obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness upon resentencing." Texas v. McCullough (1986), 475 U.S. 134 , 138 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 , 111 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
New York v. Quarles
green
1 sentence1999New York v. Quarles (1984), 467 U.S. 649 , 654 ; Oregon v. Elstad (1985), 470 U.S. 298 , 306 , fn. 1. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State ex rel. Zone v. City of Cleveland
green
2 sentences1994The Supreme Court stated that its decision in Gibbons “creates a ‘bright line’ between appointment and other statuses, and it establishes a prophylactic rule which bars the assertion of back-pay claims as those asserted here.” Id. at 6 , 23 OBR at 5, 490 N.E.2d at 605 . 1994The Supreme Court stated that its decision in Gibbons “creates a ‘bright line’ between appointment and other statuses, and it establishes a prophylactic rule which bars the assertion of back-pay claims as those asserted here.” Id. at 6 , 23 OBR at 5, 490 N.E.2d at 605 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
1 sentence1988In Edwards , the Supreme Court held that “it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.” Edwards, supra, at 485 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.