17 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Birkenmeiergreen2 sentences2020Four years later in State v. Birkenmeier, 185 N.J. 552, 564 (2006), decided eight months before Domicz, the Court identified—but did not resolve— whether Carty's requirement of suspicion extends to a roadside request to search a motorist's home. 2020Four years later in State v. Birkenmeier, 185 N.J. 552, 564 (2006), decided eight months before Domicz, the Court identified—but did not resolve— whether Carty's requirement of suspicion extends to a roadside request to search a motorist's home. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Reedgreen1 sentence2025As Justice Stein pointedly noted in his concurring opinion in Reed, "any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances." Reed, 133 N.J. at 273 (Stein, J., concurring) (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)). | 1 | 1 |
Watts v. Indianagreen1 sentence2025As Justice Stein pointedly noted in his concurring opinion in Reed, "any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances." Reed, 133 N.J. at 273 (Stein, J., concurring) (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)). | 1 | 1 |
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comergreen1 sentence2018Most also adopted "a prophylactic rule against the use of public funds for houses of worship." Trinity Lutheran , 137 S.Ct. at 2036 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Remmer v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. [ 347 U.S. 227, 229 , 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 98 L.Ed. 654, 656 (1954).] Remmer created a prophylactic rule whose purpose was to protect the impartiality of the jury. 2004The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. [ 347 U.S. 227, 229 , 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 98 L.Ed. 654, 656 (1954).] Remmer created a prophylactic rule whose purpose was to protect the impartiality of the jury. | 1 | 1 |
Wainwright v. Greenfieldgreen2 sentences2003Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 293 , 106 S.Ct. 634, 639 , 88 L.Ed. 2d 623, 631 (1986). *10 [ Id. at 519, 679 A. 2d 121 .] [2] The distinction between violation of a prophylactic rule and violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right is significant because of the consequences that flow from each. 2003Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 293 , 106 S.Ct. 634, 639 , 88 L.Ed. 2d 623, 631 (1986). *10 [ Id. at 519, 679 A. 2d 121 .] [2] The distinction between violation of a prophylactic rule and violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right is significant because of the consequences that flow from each. | 1 | 1 |
Federal Trade Commission v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.green2 sentences1986As the Supreme Court said in Zauderer : "When the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is in this case, we need not require the State to `conduct a survey of the ... public before it [may] determine that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.'" 471 U.S. at 652-653 , 105 S.Ct. at 2283 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 673 (quoting FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 , 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1046 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 904, 918 (1965)). 1986As the Supreme Court said in Zauderer : "When the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is in this case, we need not require the State to `conduct a survey of the ... public before it [may] determine that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.'" 471 U.S. at 652-653 , 105 S.Ct. at 2283 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 673 (quoting FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 , 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1046 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 904, 918 (1965)). | 1 | 1 |
Posadas De Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Ricogreen2 sentences1986A reading of both the United States Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme Court opinions makes it clear that there was no record support for the proposition that this kind of adverse effect will occur sufficiently often to warrant the prophylactic rule. 17 And in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, the Court accepted as constitutionally sufficient Puerto Rico’s assertion that excessive casino gambling by commonwealth residents would produce serious harmful effects, notwithstanding a dissenting opinion’s vigorous objection that the record before the Court contained no proof whatsoever of this assertion 1986A reading of both the United States Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme Court opinions makes it clear that there was no record support for the proposition that this kind of adverse effect will occur sufficiently often to warrant the prophylactic rule. [17] And in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, the Court accepted as constitutionally sufficient Puerto Rico's assertion that excessive casino gambling by commonwealth residents would produce serious harmful effects, notwithstanding a dissenting opinion's vigorous objection that the record before the Court contained no proof whatsoever of this asserti | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Arizonagreen2 sentences1984We further hold that an accused, such as [the defendant], having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused hirnself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. [Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d at 386 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).] This prophylactic requirement was recently restated in Wyrick v. Fields, supra, 459 U.S. at 46 , 103 S.Ct. at 395 , 74 L.Ed.2d at 217 , in wh 1984We further hold that an accused, such as [the defendant], having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused hirnself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. [Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d at 386 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).] This prophylactic requirement was recently restated in Wyrick v. Fields, supra, 459 U.S. at 46 , 103 S.Ct. at 395 , 74 L.Ed.2d at 217 , in wh | 1 | 1 |
State v. Belluccigreen2 sentences1981There is no reason to believe that appellant's conviction was in any sense "tainted by trial counsel's encumbered or diluted representation." Bellucci, supra, 81 N.J. at 547 (concurring opinion). 1981There is no reason to believe that appellant's conviction was in any sense "tainted by trial counsel's encumbered or diluted representation." Bellucci, supra, 81 N.J. at 547 (concurring opinion). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Standard Oil Companygreen1 sentence1980The conclusion in a particular case can be reached only after “painstaking analysis of the facts and precise application of precedent.” United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F.Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y.1955). *470 The prophylactic rules to be applied where, as here, an attorney is charged with representing an interest adverse to his former client are DR 4-101 and DR 9-101. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lippigreen1 sentence1979United States v. Lippi, 435 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.N.J. 1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1990The prophylactic rule of Miranda was adopted to preserve individuals’ fifth-amendment right against self-incrimination in the face of the “inherently compelling pressures,” id. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. at 1624 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 719 , brought to bear on a suspect subject to “incommunicado interrogation * * * in a police-dominated atmosphere,” id. at 445 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 707 . 1990The prophylactic rule of Miranda was adopted to preserve individuals’ fifth-amendment right against self-incrimination in the face of the “inherently compelling pressures,” id. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. at 1624 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 719 , brought to bear on a suspect subject to “incommunicado interrogation * * * in a police-dominated atmosphere,” id. at 445 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 707 . | 3 | 1982–1990 |
State v. Hartley
green
2 sentences2003There is "a qualitative difference between a failure to administer Miranda warnings in the first place, and a failure to honor, after they have been asserted, the constitutional rights that those warnings are designed to secure." State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 272 , 511 A. 2d 80 (1986). 2003There is "a qualitative difference between a failure to administer Miranda warnings in the first place, and a failure to honor, after they have been asserted, the constitutional rights that those warnings are designed to secure." State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 272 , 511 A. 2d 80 (1986). | 2 | 2002–2003 |
State v. Carty
green
1 sentence2019Ibid. *247 Leaving aside the unconstitutional search of Hanson's motel room -- which the State uses in part to try to justify the motor vehicle stop and search -- we find the State failed to demonstrate Hanson's consent was voluntary. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Burris
green
1 sentence2003Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 293 , 106 S.Ct. 634, 639 , 88 L.Ed. 2d 623, 631 (1986). *10 [ Id. at 519, 679 A. 2d 121 .] [2] The distinction between violation of a prophylactic rule and violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right is significant because of the consequences that flow from each. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio
green
2 sentences1986As the Supreme Court said in Zauderer : "When the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is in this case, we need not require the State to `conduct a survey of the ... public before it [may] determine that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.'" 471 U.S. at 652-653 , 105 S.Ct. at 2283 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 673 (quoting FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 , 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1046 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 904, 918 (1965)). 1986As the Supreme Court said in Zauderer : "When the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is in this case, we need not require the State to `conduct a survey of the ... public before it [may] determine that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.'" 471 U.S. at 652-653 , 105 S.Ct. at 2283 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 673 (quoting FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 , 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1046 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 904, 918 (1965)). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Michigan v. Mosley
green
2 sentences1984This prophylactic requirement is premised in part on the recognition that “the reasons to keep the lines of communica *286 tion between the authorities and the accused open when the accused has chosen to make his own decisions are not present when he indicates instead that he wishes legal advice with respect thereto.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 110 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 321 , 329 n. 2, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 , 325 n. 2 (1975) (White, J., concurring). 1984This prophylactic requirement is premised in part on the recognition that “the reasons to keep the lines of communica *286 tion between the authorities and the accused open when the accused has chosen to make his own decisions are not present when he indicates instead that he wishes legal advice with respect thereto.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 110 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 321 , 329 n. 2, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 , 325 n. 2 (1975) (White, J., concurring). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Wyrick v. Fields
green
2 sentences1984We further hold that an accused, such as [the defendant], having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused hirnself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. [Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d at 386 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).] This prophylactic requirement was recently restated in Wyrick v. Fields, supra, 459 U.S. at 46 , 103 S.Ct. at 395 , 74 L.Ed.2d at 217 , in wh 1984We further hold that an accused, such as [the defendant], having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused hirnself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. [Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d at 386 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).] This prophylactic requirement was recently restated in Wyrick v. Fields, supra, 459 U.S. at 46 , 103 S.Ct. at 395 , 74 L.Ed.2d at 217 , in wh | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Rhode Island v. Innis
green
2 sentences1982Our later cases have not abandoned that view.... [J]ust last Term, in a case where a suspect in custody had invoked his Miranda right to counsel, the Court again referred to the “undisputed right” under Miranda to remain silent and to be free of interrogation “until he had consulted with a lawyer.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 (1980). 1982Our later cases have not abandoned that view.... [J]ust last Term, in a case where a suspect in custody had invoked his Miranda right to counsel, the Court again referred to the “undisputed right” under Miranda to remain silent and to be free of interrogation “until he had consulted with a lawyer.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 (1980). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Trent
green
1 sentence1980Super. 39, 46 (App.Div. 1978), failure to give the Trent instruction "represents a substantial invasion of the defendants' right to a jury trial which taints the integrity of the verdict." Obviously, what is involved here is not merely a prophylactic rule designed to prevent police misconduct, it is an attempt to protect "[the] fundamental right of fair and impartial jury deliberations ..." State v. Trent , 79 N.J. at 257 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.
green
1 sentence1980These considerations require application of a strict prophylactic rule to prevent any possibility, however slight, that confidential information received from a client during a previous relationship may subsequently be used to the client’s disadvantage. [Emle Industries Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 , 571 (2nd Cir. 1973).] When dealing with ethical problems and applying such prophylactic rules, it is apparent that we cannot paint with broad strokes. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.