8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New York v. Quarlesgreen2 sentences2020The potential for Defendant having objects on his person that threatened officer safety “outweigh[ed] the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657 (concluding that the need for answers may outweigh the prophylactic rule). {36} In Quarles, a woman approached two officers on patrol, told them that a man with a gun had just raped her, and gave them a description of the man. 2020Id. at 651-52 . | 1 | 1 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2011Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 467-68 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 14 , 131 N.M. 1 , 33 P.3d 1 . 2011Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 467-68 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 14 , 131 N.M. 1 , 33 P.3d 1 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. JAVIER M.green2 sentences2011Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 467-68 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 14 , 131 N.M. 1 , 33 P.3d 1 . 2011Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 467-68 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 14 , 131 N.M. 1 , 33 P.3d 1 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2010Prejudice is not to be presumed.”); People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo.2004) (en banc) (rejecting Remmer’s automatic presumption of prejudice and, instead, adopting an objective test that “eschews rebuttable presumptions that are conclusive in effect” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391 , 859 A.2d 364, 432 (2004) (“Remmer created a prophylactic rule whose purpose was to protect the impartiality of the jury. 2010Prejudice is not to be presumed.”); People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo.2004) (en banc) (rejecting Remmer’s automatic presumption of prejudice and, instead, adopting an objective test that “eschews rebuttable presumptions that are conclusive in effect” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391 , 859 A.2d 364, 432 (2004) (“Remmer created a prophylactic rule whose purpose was to protect the impartiality of the jury. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wadlegreen1 sentence2010Prejudice is not to be presumed.”); People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo.2004) (en banc) (rejecting Remmer’s automatic presumption of prejudice and, instead, adopting an objective test that “eschews rebuttable presumptions that are conclusive in effect” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391 , 859 A.2d 364, 432 (2004) (“Remmer created a prophylactic rule whose purpose was to protect the impartiality of the jury. | 1 | 1 |
Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurancegreen2 sentences1989Id. at 458 , 62 S.Ct. at 679-80 ; Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. at 93-95 , 108 S.Ct. at 402-03 (FDIC entitled to rely on face of note and collateral mortgage, notwithstanding that FDIC had actual notice of the allegations of fraudulent oral warranty made by bank prior to FDIC’s appointment as receiver upon bank's closure). 1989Id. at 458 , 62 S.Ct. at 679-80 ; Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. at 93-95 , 108 S.Ct. at 402-03 (FDIC entitled to rely on face of note and collateral mortgage, notwithstanding that FDIC had actual notice of the allegations of fraudulent oral warranty made by bank prior to FDIC’s appointment as receiver upon bank's closure). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Patane
green
2 sentences2007Id. 2007Id. | 3 | 2006–2007 |
State v. Saavedra
green
2 sentences2022Pearce, as our Supreme Court has explained, sets out a prophylactic rule that “a presumption of vindictiveness arises when [a defendant’s] second sentence is more severe than the first.” State v. Saavedra, 1988-NMSC-100 , ¶ 20, 108 N.M. 38 , 766 P.2d 298 . {14} The Pearce presumption of vindictiveness, however, applies in limited circumstances. 2022Pearce, as our Supreme Court has explained, sets out a prophylactic rule that “a presumption of vindictiveness arises when [a defendant’s] second sentence is more severe than the first.” State v. Saavedra, 1988-NMSC-100 , ¶ 20, 108 N.M. 38 , 766 P.2d 298 . {14} The Pearce presumption of vindictiveness, however, applies in limited circumstances. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
green
2 sentences1989Id. at 458 , 62 S.Ct. at 679-80 ; Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. at 93-95 , 108 S.Ct. at 402-03 (FDIC entitled to rely on face of note and collateral mortgage, notwithstanding that FDIC had actual notice of the allegations of fraudulent oral warranty made by bank prior to FDIC’s appointment as receiver upon bank's closure). 1989Id. at 458 , 62 S.Ct. at 679-80 ; Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. at 93-95 , 108 S.Ct. at 402-03 (FDIC entitled to rely on face of note and collateral mortgage, notwithstanding that FDIC had actual notice of the allegations of fraudulent oral warranty made by bank prior to FDIC’s appointment as receiver upon bank's closure). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.