Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Patanegreen2 sentences2010Id. at 639, 124 S.Ct. 2620 . 2010Id. at 639. | 1 | 1 |
Dolan v. City of Tigardgreen2 sentences2005Plaintiff relies on statements in the Court’s opinion such as, “The question for us is whether these findings are constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions imposed by the city on petitioner’s building permit.” Dolan, 512 US at 389 (plaintiffs emphasis). 3 Plaintiff argues, in essence, that the Supreme Court recognized in Dolan that the government has a constitutional duty to make rough proportionality findings before it imposes an exaction. 4 We disagree both with plaintiffs assertion that the Supreme Court created a prophylactic rule in Dolan and with the underlying premise that t 2005Whether such a rule is desirable is the sort of policy issue that is best addressed to the legislature. 3 Plaintiff also argues that the following passages in Dolan , among others, indicate that the Court intended to create a prophylactic rule: “No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.” 512 US at 391 . | 1 | 1 |
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Countygreen2 sentences2005Cf. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 US 340, 348, 106 S Ct 2561 , 91 L Ed 2d 285 (1986) (“[A]ppellant must establish that the regulation has in substance ‘taken’ his property * * *.”). *198 The prophylactic rule that plaintiff proposes prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process test. 2005Cf. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 US 340, 348, 106 S Ct 2561 , 91 L Ed 2d 285 (1986) (“[A]ppellant must establish that the regulation has in substance ‘taken’ his property * * *.”). *198 The prophylactic rule that plaintiff proposes prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process test. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
North Carolina v. Pearce
red
2 sentences2017Partain , in turn, was based on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 US 711 , 89 S Ct 2072 , 23 L Ed 2d 656 (1969), where the United States Supreme Court held that due process “requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked [a] first conviction must play no part in the sentence [the defendant] receives after a new trial.” Id. at 725 . 2015The presumption of vindictiveness is a prophylactic rule that is at least partially intended to ensure that defendants are not unconstitutionally deterred from exercising their rights to appeal — that is, as the United States Supreme Court has explained, the rule was partially based on the concern that “the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction[.]” Pearce, 395 US at 725 . | 3 | 2015–2017 |
State v. Partain
green
2 sentences2017The prophylactic rule of State v. Partain, 349 Or 10 , 239 P3d 232 (2010), protects against vindictiveness in the resentencing of a criminal offender after a successful appeal. 2017The prophylactic rule of State v. Partain, 349 Or 10 , 239 P3d 232 (2010), protects against vindictiveness in the resentencing of a criminal offender after a successful appeal. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Texas v. McCullough
green
2 sentences2017McCullough, 475 US at 139 . 2017McCullough, 475 US at 139 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn.
green
1 sentence1990Id. at 466 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Oregon v. Bradshaw
green
2 sentences1987Later, in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1044 , 103 S Ct 2830 , 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983), the Court commented that Edwards was “in effect a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers in the manner in which the defendant in Edwards was.” *97 In Smith v. Illinois, 469 US 91 , 105 S Ct 490 , 83 L Ed 2d 488 (1984), the Court again addressed the waiver issue. 1987Later, in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1044 , 103 S Ct 2830 , 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983), the Court commented that Edwards was “in effect a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers in the manner in which the defendant in Edwards was.” *97 In Smith v. Illinois, 469 US 91 , 105 S Ct 490 , 83 L Ed 2d 488 (1984), the Court again addressed the waiver issue. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Smith v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1987Later, in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1044 , 103 S Ct 2830 , 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983), the Court commented that Edwards was “in effect a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers in the manner in which the defendant in Edwards was.” *97 In Smith v. Illinois, 469 US 91 , 105 S Ct 490 , 83 L Ed 2d 488 (1984), the Court again addressed the waiver issue. 1987Later, in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1044 , 103 S Ct 2830 , 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983), the Court commented that Edwards was “in effect a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers in the manner in which the defendant in Edwards was.” *97 In Smith v. Illinois, 469 US 91 , 105 S Ct 490 , 83 L Ed 2d 488 (1984), the Court again addressed the waiver issue. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch
green
1 sentence1985Every major executive, including the one who has discovered the opportunity, would seem obligated to make a genuine effort to enable the corporation to secure the anticipated profit. * * * “Fearing that anything less than a prophylactic rule would discourage executives from expending their full efforts to obtain financing for the corporation, at least one court has articulated the rule that the executive is precluded from appropriating the opportunity where the corporation is allegedly unable to obtain the required funds. [Citing Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, supra.] * * *” Note, Corporate Oppo | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Travis
green
2 sentences1972Affirmed. ① Assuming that the Travis (State v. Travis, 250 Or 213 , 441 P2d 597 (1968)), definition oí a “focal suspect” is applicable to the “focal suspect” requirement in State v. Williams, 248 Or 85 , 432 P2d 679 (1967), we would point out that this does not make superfluous the prophylactic requirement set forth in State v. Williams, supra. The search-incident-to-an-arrest rule generally will suffice to legitimize the warrantless search of a person or the area within his immediate control. 1972Affirmed. ① Assuming that the Travis (State v. Travis, 250 Or 213 , 441 P2d 597 (1968)), definition oí a “focal suspect” is applicable to the “focal suspect” requirement in State v. Williams, 248 Or 85 , 432 P2d 679 (1967), we would point out that this does not make superfluous the prophylactic requirement set forth in State v. Williams, supra. The search-incident-to-an-arrest rule generally will suffice to legitimize the warrantless search of a person or the area within his immediate control. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences1972This is the very type of situation in which the prophylactic rule in Miranda was intended to apply.” 248 Or at 93-94 . 1972Affirmed. ① Assuming that the Travis (State v. Travis, 250 Or 213 , 441 P2d 597 (1968)), definition oí a “focal suspect” is applicable to the “focal suspect” requirement in State v. Williams, 248 Or 85 , 432 P2d 679 (1967), we would point out that this does not make superfluous the prophylactic requirement set forth in State v. Williams, supra. The search-incident-to-an-arrest rule generally will suffice to legitimize the warrantless search of a person or the area within his immediate control. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.