15 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2019“In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court outlined an additional prophylactic requirement, inherent in the privilege against self-incrimination, that an individual must be informed of his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.” Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625 (1966)). [29] “A waiver of one’s Miranda rights occurs when the defendant, after being advised of those rights and acknowledging that he understands them, proceeds to make a statement without taking advantage of those rights.” Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209, 12 2019“In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court outlined an additional prophylactic requirement, inherent in the privilege against self-incrimination, that an individual must be informed of his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.” Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625 (1966)). [29] “A waiver of one’s Miranda rights occurs when the defendant, after being advised of those rights and acknowledging that he understands them, proceeds to make a statement without taking advantage of those rights.” Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209, 12 | 2 | 3 |
Michigan v. Harveygreen2 sentences2012Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 345 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990). 2012Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 345 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990). | 1 | 2 |
Carter v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1994Accordingly, we hold that a state trial judge has the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify. 450 U.S. at 305 , 101 S.Ct. at 1121 (some citations omitted). 1994Accordingly, we hold that a state trial judge has the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify. 450 U.S. at 305 , 101 S.Ct. at 1121 (some citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Aaron L. Fansler v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2020(Appellant’s Br. at 13.) However, the language of the Rule 617’s exception does not require the State to demonstrate the origin of the malfunction of the equipment and, as our Indiana Supreme Court has explained, “Rule 617 is not a constitutional requirement or a prophylactic rule meant to enforce the Constitution; rather, it is a rule of judicial administration.” Fansler v. State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253 (Ind. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Danny Cherry v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-799 | December 18, 2020 Page 9 of 16 See Cherry v. State, 57 N.E.3d 867, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (exception applied where officer followed instructions for producing a recording, but the recording was missing), trans. denied. 2. | 1 | 1 |
Ringo v. Stategreen1 sentence2019“In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court outlined an additional prophylactic requirement, inherent in the privilege against self-incrimination, that an individual must be informed of his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.” Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625 (1966)). [29] “A waiver of one’s Miranda rights occurs when the defendant, after being advised of those rights and acknowledging that he understands them, proceeds to make a statement without taking advantage of those rights.” Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209, 12 | 1 | 1 |
Goodner v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
White v. State
green
2 sentences1992Id. at 900 . 1987Secondly, as the discussion in White pointed out, the court’s earlier decision in German v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234 (which demanded strict compliance with IC 35-35-1-2 regardless of whether the convicted person suffered any harm from the defective advisement) when considered in context with the court’s other decisions in this area, was clearly concerned with a prophylactic rule to control the conduct of trial court judges in taking guilty pleas. 497 N.E.2d at 900 . | 2 | 1987–1992 |
Malloy v. Hogan
green
1 sentence2019“In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court outlined an additional prophylactic requirement, inherent in the privilege against self-incrimination, that an individual must be informed of his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.” Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625 (1966)). [29] “A waiver of one’s Miranda rights occurs when the defendant, after being advised of those rights and acknowledging that he understands them, proceeds to make a statement without taking advantage of those rights.” Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209, 12 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Montejo v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 351 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 . *747 Subsequent to Hogan’s trial, Jackson was overruled by Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 , 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2091 , 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009). 2012Id. at 351 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 . *747 Subsequent to Hogan’s trial, Jackson was overruled by Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 , 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2091 , 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Griffin v. California
green
2 sentences1994Just as adverse comment on a defendant's silence "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly," Griffin, id., at 614, 14 L Ed 2d 106 , 85 S Ct 1229 , the failure to limit the jurors' speculation on the meaning of that silence, when the defendant makes a timely request that a prophylactic instruction be given, exacts an impermissible toll on the full and free exercise of the privilege. 1994Just as adverse comment on a defendant's silence "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly," Griffin, id., at 614, 14 L Ed 2d 106 , 85 S Ct 1229 , the failure to limit the jurors' speculation on the meaning of that silence, when the defendant makes a timely request that a prophylactic instruction be given, exacts an impermissible toll on the full and free exercise of the privilege. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
German v. State
green
1 sentence1987Secondly, as the discussion in White pointed out, the court’s earlier decision in German v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234 (which demanded strict compliance with IC 35-35-1-2 regardless of whether the convicted person suffered any harm from the defective advisement) when considered in context with the court’s other decisions in this area, was clearly concerned with a prophylactic rule to control the conduct of trial court judges in taking guilty pleas. 497 N.E.2d at 900 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
James v. State
green
1 sentence1986In James v. State (1982), Ind., 433 N.E.2d 1188 , this Court noted that Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1 -4(a) was designed to protect defendants against improper coercion by police or prosecutors. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Ewing v. State
green
2 sentences1986Of course, the German approach was not the only curative available, as Judge Garrard noted in his excellent opinion in Ewing v. State (1976), 171 Ind.App. 593 , 358 N.E.2d 204 . 1986Of course, the German approach was not the only curative available, as Judge Garrard noted in his excellent opinion in Ewing v. State (1976), 171 Ind.App. 593 , 358 N.E.2d 204 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Oregon v. Bradshaw
green
1 sentence1986Bradshaw, supra. The accused's initiation of a dialogue with the police does not suffice ex proprio vigore to show a waiver of the previously invoked right. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Solem v. Stumes
green
2 sentences1984Solem v. Stumes, (1984) — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1338 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 . 1984Solem v. Stumes, (1984) — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1338 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Lawrence v. State
green
2 sentences1974The sole issue is the retrospective application of Lawrence v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 306 , 286 N.E.2d 830 , wherein we adopted a prophylactic rule requiring a bifurcated trial in habitual criminal charges. 1974The sole issue is the retrospective application of Lawrence v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 306 , 286 N.E.2d 830 , wherein we adopted a prophylactic rule requiring a bifurcated trial in habitual criminal charges. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Enlow v. State
green
2 sentences1974In Enlow v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 348 , 303 N.E.2d 658 we held that the Lawrence rule was applicable to cases decided on direct appeal after September 11, 1972, the date that Lawrence was handed down. 1974In Enlow v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 348 , 303 N.E.2d 658 we held that the Lawrence rule was applicable to cases decided on direct appeal after September 11, 1972, the date that Lawrence was handed down. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.