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6 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pennsylvania v. Finleygreen2 sentences2019The Court in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987), explained the no-merit procedure established in Anders was “a prophylactic framework” that is relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel. 2015Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987); Anders, 386 U.S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 . | 1 | 3 |
Smith v. Robbinsgreen2 sentences2019However, in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000), the Court stated: “We did not say that our Anders procedure is the only prophylactic framework that could adequately vindicate this right.” Instead, the Court described the Anders procedure as merely one method of satisfying the requirements of the Constitution for indigent criminal appeals. 2019However, in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000), the Court stated: “We did not say that our Anders procedure is the only prophylactic framework that could adequately vindicate this right.” Instead, the Court described the Anders procedure as merely one method of satisfying the requirements of the Constitution for indigent criminal appeals. | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Robersongreen2 sentences2001To effectuate the above-stated purpose, the Edwards decision created a bright-line rule of suppression because it must be presumed that any subsequent waiver of the previously asserted right to counsel that comes at the behest of law enforcement, rather than the suspect’s own initiation, is the product of the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation rather than the “purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, supra). 2001To effectuate the above-stated purpose, the Edwards decision created a brightline rule of suppression because it must be presumed that any subsequent waiver of the previously asserted right to counsel that comes at the behest of law enforcement, rather than the suspect's own *308 initiation, is the product of the "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation rather than the "purely voluntary choice of the suspect." Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, supra ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anders v. California
green
2 sentences2015Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987); Anders, 386 U.S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 . 2015Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987); Anders, 386 U.S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 . | 2 | 2010–2015 |
Texas v. McCullough
green
2 sentences2011Nonetheless, “[wjhere the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness upon resentencing.” McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138 , 106 S.Ct. 976 (citing Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 , 104 S.Ct. 3217 , 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984)). 2011Nonetheless, “[wjhere the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness upon resentencing.” McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138 , 106 S.Ct. 976 (citing Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 , 104 S.Ct. 3217 , 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Wasman v. United States
green
2 sentences2011Nonetheless, “[wjhere the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness upon resentencing.” McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138 , 106 S.Ct. 976 (citing Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 , 104 S.Ct. 3217 , 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984)). 2011Nonetheless, “[wjhere the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness upon resentencing.” McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138 , 106 S.Ct. 976 (citing Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 , 104 S.Ct. 3217 , 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Minnick v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences2001The prophylactic rule requiring the suppression of any statement made following police-initiated interrogation of a suspect who has asserted his right to counsel “ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures.” Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. at 151 . 2001The prophylactic rule requiring the suppression of any statement made following police-initiated interrogation of a suspect who has asserted his right to counsel "ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures." Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. at 151 , 111 S.Ct. 486 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Alabama v. Smith
green
2 sentences1998In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled in part, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989), the Supreme Court fashioned a prophylactic rule to protect against a sentencing authority imposing a greater sentence following a defendant's exercise of his right to appeal. 1998In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled in part, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989), the Supreme Court fashioned a prophylactic rule to protect against a sentencing authority imposing a greater sentence following a defendant’s exercise of his right to appeal. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
North Carolina v. Pearce
red
2 sentences1998In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled in part, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989), the Supreme Court fashioned a prophylactic rule to protect against a sentencing authority imposing a greater sentence following a defendant's exercise of his right to appeal. 1998In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled in part, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989), the Supreme Court fashioned a prophylactic rule to protect against a sentencing authority imposing a greater sentence following a defendant’s exercise of his right to appeal. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.