prophylactic rule in Massachusetts

2015The instruction also failed to convey to the jury that no adverse inference may be drawn from the defendant’s failure to testify. “[T]he failure to limit the jurors’ speculation on the meaning of . . . silence, when the defendant makes a timely request that a prophylactic instruction be given, exacts an impermissible toll on the full and free exercise of the privilege.” Carter, 450 U.S. at 305 .

2013Rosario, 422 Mass. at 56 . 5 6 The Rosario rule seeks, among other goals, to provide for more effective implementation of a defendant’s right to prompt arraignment or presentment 6 and the additional rights that prompt presentment protects. 7 It is a prophylactic rule, see Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 561 (2011), designed to establish “as clear a rule as possible” in this area, and it applies, at a minimum, to statements made by an arrestee that are the product of police questioning.

2013Rosario, 422 Mass. at 53 .

2012Additionally, we conclude that a prophylactic rule requiring a defendant’s personal waiver confirmed by colloquy would lead a judge to “intrude on the defense presentation in a manner that would jeopardize the primary responsibility [which] our system places on counsel.” Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. at 651 n.23.

2012Commonwealth v. Beauchamp, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 591 , 598 n.12 (2000), and cases cited. 7 Even in such cases, the exception would be applicable only where the defendant’s testimony was prompted by and offered in response to the content of the improperly admitted evidence.

2000There is not, however, a shred of evidence in the record suggesting any such coercion by police or prosecution in Massachusetts, much less by the Federal officials whom he sought to implicate — indeed, in his “addendum” to his pretrial motion to exclude his prior testimony or obtain the attendance of various former government officials, he referred not to coercion but rather to “promises [and] inducements made to [him] regarding his testimony at the first trial.” The defendant’s invocation of Harrison is additionally misplaced because that exception rests on a prophylactic principle not applic

1990Id. 4 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reached the same conclusion in Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C.

1990Id. 4 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reached the same conclusion in Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C.

1986The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that restrictions on commercial speech must be narrowly crafted, see Zauderer, supra at 644 , and a prophylactic rule barring truthful, noncoercive, in-person solicitation is patently suspect.

1986The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that restrictions on commercial speech must be narrowly crafted, see Zauderer, supra at 644 , and a prophylactic rule barring truthful, noncoercive, in-person solicitation is patently suspect.

1984Commonwealth v. Davis, supra at 784-785 .

1979That principle is in part, but only in part, "a strict prophylactic rule to prevent any possibility, however slight, that confidential information acquired from a client during a previous relationship may subsequently be used to the client’s disadvantage.” Ernie Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 , 571 (2d Cir. 1973).

1975The court found no “valid distinction” between the situation in Harris, which involved defective Miranda warnings, a violation of a prophylactic rule, 37 and the situation in Hass , which involved the failure to afford a suspect his full constitutional right to counsel after his attempt to exercise that right. 38 The court added, however, that “ [i]f, in a given case, the officer’s conduct amounts to abuse, that case, like those involving coercion or duress, may be taken care of when it arises measured by the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and trustworthiness.” Id. at 723 .

1975The court found no *695 "valid distinction" between the situation in Harris, which involved defective Miranda warnings, a violation of a prophylactic rule, [37] and the situation in Hass , which involved the failure to afford a suspect his full constitutional right to counsel after his attempt to exercise that right. [38] The court added, however, that "[i]f, in a given case, the officer's conduct amounts to abuse, that case, like those involving coercion or duress, may be taken care of when it arises measured by the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and trustworthiness." Id.